Performing Temporalities:

A Practice-based Pursuit of Time-specificity Drawing on the Philosophy of Henri Bergson and the Performances of Tehching Hsieh, Every House Has a Door, Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the qualification of any other degree or diploma of a University or other institution of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

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Abstract

This practice as research project explores relations between time and performance in order to clarify how theatre might be seen as inherently and specifically temporal. The guiding research question is how to perform temporality. To do so I pursue a time-specificity of performance. The specific temporalities performed here are the present, past and future. This project develops a time-based aesthetics of contemporary experimental western performance, and it will be of use to practitioners and theorists interested in the temporalities of performance. It offers time-specificity as a practical and theoretical framework of creative and critical concepts and practices for making and understanding performances of time.

In chapter one on the present I look to how duration might be performed. I look to the one year performances of Tehching Hsieh, Henri Bergson's concept of duration in *Time and Free Will* and my own performance *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. Ultimately this chapter finds that clock time as an organising principle can lead to a performance of duration. In chapter two I explore how the past can be performed through documents and memory. This chapter analyses Every House Has a Door's *9 Beginnings*, surveys literature on documenting performance, closely reads Henri Bergson's *Matter and Memory* and documents my own performance *2: Untitled*. Chapter two argues for a creative and critical approach to documenting performance in which the past returns differently to the

present. Chapter three looks at performing the future, by turning to Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, my solo work *Three* and a name change performance project by three artists with the name Janez Janša. Chapter three thinks through the potentials of performance that are enabled by indeterminacy, to advocate evolutionary sense of time at work in performance and theatre.

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Introduction – Performing Temporalities

Title

"Performing temporalities: a practice-based pursuit of time-specificity drawing on the philosophy of Henri Bergson and the performances of Tehching Hsieh, Every House Has a Door, Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša." The title begins by establishing an active notion of making performance because I am interested in determining how a performance making process might foster and explicate a dynamic relationship between theatre and time. It is clear that theatre and performance are inherently temporal, but I take that principle a step forward by

asking how time can be performed? This project examines ways of making time manifest as performance in the work of others and myself. The project is practice-based because at its core is the development of my three works and their public sharing. I wish to emphasise that my work constitutes a pursuit rather than a point of arrival because the term time-specificity is not yet in circulation. Through this document I aim to show that the term is of great potential use for practitioners and theorists of performance and theatre. I understand time-specificity as a concept that can be used to analyse how performances compose temporalities. I shall not seek to define the term 'time specificity' in order to close down its meaning but rather to insert it into the lexicon of contemporary performance. I wish to share time-specificity as an open theoretical and practical framework.

Research Question

I set out with the aim of pursuing time-specificity of performance by attempting to stage time itself. Performance is unquestionably temporal, but how is it so and more specifically what are the ways in which time is presented and realised in the theatre? In the works that will be covered in this thesis, time is more than a supporting factor of the artwork. Time here is a dynamic agent that constitutes the performance. This role time plays in making performance is complicated because of the multiplicity of time, which in its simplest register is the threefold present, past and future.

Sensing that each of these tenses of time could be performed differently I decided that this project should cover present, past and future separately. Taken together my explorations of time-specificity would cover the multiplicity of temporality. The three temporalities of present, past and future form a triad which is approached through the key terms duration, memory and evolution. Duration is a form time takes in the present, memory is a key to the past, and evolution is the approach to the future. These solutions helped me to select the most relevant examples of contemporary performance practice to critique and contextualise my work. The artists and the philosophy which I explored in this research demonstrate a creative sense of the passage of time that could be brought into the studio for investigation through practice. My three pieces offered different experiences of time through performance.

My contribution to knowledge consists of an in depth examination of how time can actually be performed. I have presented in this document a theoretically informed set of practices that will allow others to make performance with closer attention to the temporality of their work, while leaving time-specificity itself open in the future to other definitions. While this is the first sustained study to make use of the term 'time-specificity' in performance, the term is not intended to become a label for certain kinds of work. Because all performance is temporal, all performance has some sense of time-specificity. My method involves looking in the first instance toward philosophers and artists who make explicit use of time in their work. Those

notions were brought into the studio so I could pursue relevant temporal aspects of practice that could be shared through performance and writing. My contribution to knowledge is to provide a comprehensive approach to performance making focused on time made manifest in both practice and theory.

Context

Before this study began in 2011 there already existed several important approaches to time and performance that were smaller parts of larger studies and these helped set the groundwork for time-specificity. There was no sustained study of time in performance with an equally practical and theoretical approach. My project builds on much published research that makes mention of temporality in a way that opens up the territory of time and performance. I will outline the most relevant of these here.

Theorist and historian Hans-Thies Lehmann's book *Postdramatic Theatre* conceives of performance as a shared event. 'The idea of time as an experience shared by all constitutes the centre of the new dramaturgies of time' (Lehmann 2006: 155). This remark occurs within a brief section on time as an aspect of postdramatic theatre, rather than a study of time itself. What it is missing and what I wanted to put forward are some suggestions as to what these dramaturgies of time might be. Lehmann's point is focussed on his realisation that contemporary theatre practices take account of all the people in the room, and he took this as indicating

that theatrical time was no longer the unified literary time of narrative drama or Aristotelian tragedy. 'It is a matter of time no longer of one (reading) subject but of the shared time of many subjects (collectively spending time)' (Lehmann 2006: 153). Lehmann relates the multiplicity of theatre to its temporality, seeing neither theatre, time nor the time of the theatre as one single thing. Lehmann takes the idea further, toward the territory I will pursue in this project, when he writes about the recent practice of

> utilizing the specificity of theatre as a mode of presentation to turn *time as such* into an object of the aesthetic experience. Consciously noticeable duration is the first important factor of time distortion in the experience of contemporary theatre. Elements of a *durational aesthetic* can be witnessed in numerous contemporary works of theatre. (Lehmann 2006: 156. Lehmann's italics.)

First it is clear that Lehmann is identifying theatre as best suited among other art forms to present time itself as the artwork. He explains that the first way this is done is through the spectator's increased awareness of the passage of time, resulting in this durational aesthetic which he describes as present in much contemporary work. Lehmann does not go on to explain exactly how duration becomes a consciously noticeable factor. The question of how this durational aesthetic might be produced in the artwork before, during and after it reaches the spectator is taken up in my pursuit of time-specificity.

Coming from a perspective closer to performance art rather than theatre, the writings of Adrian Heathfield are more specific than Lehmann's in outlining how

performance becomes temporal. In his 2004 book *Live: art and performance*, Heathfield indicates a disparity in contemporary thinking around performance time and space, and questions why space 'has tended to dominate the critical writing on performance' (Heathfield 2004: 10). Perhaps time is seen as so inherent to performance that theorists have wanted look elsewhere for novel concepts around performance. Writing five years later, Heathfield still argued that time is 'under-addressed in art theory.' (Heathfield 2009: 13). Heathfield is particularly concerned with the traditions of performance emerging through visual art, but his point is just as prescient for theatre. Again, it seems that the obviousness of theatre's foundational temporality prevented sustained critical engagement. Heathfield discerns the origins of performance art in a drive toward temporality when he writes that 'performance has consistently replaced or qualified the material object with a temporal act.' (Heathfield 2004: 8). Theatre had all along been focused on the temporal act, but what brings Lehmann and Heathfield into conversation is the historical moment in which the tradition of performance art emerging from visual art meets with avant-garde theatre's move toward visual art. I locate a genesis of time-specificity in the moment when performances of time overtake performances about time.

Heathfield indicates the creative possibilities of a temporal approach in the way 'performance gives access to other temporalities.' (Heathfield 2004: 10), and so finds himself in the same territory of multiplicity as Lehmann. They are not alone, for

Laura Cull and Bojana Kunst have also emphasised how time multiplies performance (Cull 2012 and Kunst 2010). Cull explains how the multiplicity of the temporality of performance introduces the ethical domain along with the aesthetic (Cull 2012: 179). Kunst explains how perception is 'dispossessed' by duration, which means that it leads displaced spectators toward the heterogeneities of contemporary life (Kunst 2010). These ethical considerations return throughout my project because attention to time in its multiplicity can imply a demand for responsibility. These issues are mostly researched here through how my performances relate with the audience.

From early on multiplicity was a central notion tying together performance and temporality. While these studies I mention begin to put forward revealing explanations, none sustain that investigation throughout the work on time. What I have done is seize performance and temporality at the moment of their intersection around the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, at a time when theatre's tendency toward visual art and visual art's tendency toward theatre converged in a range of practices that could all be called performance. From these diverse traditions I saw several practitioners emerge whose compositions make time a factor in a more explicitly dynamic way than before.

Rationale for Artists

This project reflects on three groups of practitioners who make an explicit use of temporality an integral part of their artistic work. The artists included here either

perform specific amounts of measurable time as the basis of their performances or internally they map every movement from the inside of their works according to specific counts of seconds. In the externally imposed model or the internal, both forms create a dynamic engagement with temporality. Time becomes a performable element of the artwork. This is most evident in the works of Taiwanese-American artist Tehching Hsieh who completed a series of one year performances. He made pieces with definite start and end dates and times and because each piece constitutes an entire year, Hsieh flattens the notion of performance as a fleeting event. In Hsieh's work the extended duration means that performance eclipses the everyday. His art supports my initial definition of time-specificity as the explicit deployment of duration integral to the artwork. This principle yields an experience of temporality not as something susceptible to rigid measurement but rather as something ultimately ineffable and closer to a durational time of qualitative multiplicity. Paradoxically Hsieh marks out a specific clock time in order to perform the flow of duration.

As captivating as Hsieh's performances are for the imagination, to work with them in the mode of practice-based research involved adapting to my material circumstances. What Hsieh's work inspired was not my own creation of performances with extended durations but rather an exploration into how an equivalent performance of temporality might occur in the theatre. I wanted to explore the boundary between art and life within the temporal and spatial

constraints of the theatre. Thus my practice made use of long periods of studio development for each work, involving the repetition and development of techniques over time in order to create a single performance. Yet each of my three works remains in progress. Each one is a single iteration of a longer life practice. In this way each of the three theatre pieces is constructed through the extended temporality exemplified by lifeworks.

To set an extended duration into a theatrical aesthetic I contextualised my work within the contemporary Western experimental Chicago company Every House Has a Door, formerly Goat Island. Led by director Lin Hixson and dramaturge Matthew Goulish, Every House Has a Door are just one of a number of contemporary experimental theatre companies who make work over long periods of time such as Forced Entertainment and Nature Theater of Oklahoma; and even stretching back to modernist practitioners such as Tadeusz Kantor. Working in these extended periods, Every House Has a Door offered me a model of including the temporalities of the lifework in a performance process that includes sharing performance within the more mainstream temporal and spatial constraints of a show. Typically for Every House a show means a piece that lasts not less than one hour and not more than two hours, performed in a place with a clearly demarcated stage and seats for audience. Every House Has a Door's performances are structured through a temporal dramaturgy, meaning they map out specific second counts for most actions on stage. Forming one of their works, as I learned in the

studio with them, is a process of fine tuning the timings of movements on stage so that everything will fit together. It all becomes a question of how long it should take for this or that to happen. Every House Has a Door are thus performing a temporal dramaturgy that remains not completely invisible to the audience. The production that I focus on, *9 Beginnings*, has an even greater relevance, in that it reperformed works from several archives. Through performing memory, the show was structured around the specific temporal challenge of returning the past to the present. Their creative task of processing the past of performance was a challenge that allowed me to develop my own form of performing the temporality of the past.

To perform the temporality of the future, I looked to the work of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša, three Slovenian artists who in 2007 legally changed their names to that of the then prime minister of Slovenia. As with the one year performances of Tehching Hsieh their name change is a performance that reaches into everyday life. What makes Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša relevant as a performance of the temporality of the future is that their name change continues into the future and beyond their authorial control. It has the indeterminate future duration of a lifetime. The name change is a performance with a radical openness in its futurity and also in the opportunities the name change creates for other people to respond to it. The evolving future of the name change prompted my exploration into how I might perform the idea that the future is constantly changing. To do so the research on the future tense of time-specificity is not about

how the future becomes the present but instead on future itself as a time of desire that continues to be always out of reach and always evolving. As with Hsieh I responded to the name change of the Janšas not by copying its extended duration but rather by isolating its temporality and addressing the problem of how to perform that time in a theatre.

The name change also brought up ethical and political considerations around a notion of the responsibility of the artist. Their work's political implication is that the artist's responsibility is to the creative act as opposed to any sort of requirement for art to be political or not. The name change validates the small everyday practices of the artist as perhaps even more important than a grand gesture. There is always a future and so there will be more time to develop the work. I hope my contribution to knowledge includes a galvanisation of art making even when it has no effect or audience. Time passes with or without art but art might bring out the beauty of time passing, as it has in the artworks I look at in this study.

Tehching Hsieh, Every House Has a Door, Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša each in their own way perform temporality. Hsieh performs the present of his life as time passing, Every House make present the past through the archive as memory, and the Janšas make the future into something to be created. That is their time-specificity. In the course of this project I got into contact with each of these artists and they were all extremely kind in opening their practices to me as well as reading parts of this thesis. They are a valued audience for this project, as I hope

that this thesis returns some of the favours that they have shared. Being in contact with them allowed for an exceptionally close engagement with their work.

These artists' practice encouraged me to focus on time in the way that I have, and there are many other directions I could have followed. Time and performance is of course a vast topic, and the notion of time-specificity might be defined in other ways. I look forward to the possibility of seeing how others may in the future use the term. Because I focused on the artists I did, I was not able to look into other seminal works of theatre and performance with a definite relevance to time, but I hope in later research to move in other directions. A future avenue of enquiry could investigate more historical practices that engage with the same quest to perform time. The most relevant might be John Cage and his seminal work *4'33"*, a 'silent' piece of music with a specified duration. The temporal aesthetics at play in this and other pieces by Cage such as *Lecture on Nothing* confirm the relevance of his work to time-specificity. Were my study more genealogical rather than based on artists working today with whom I was able to connect, Cage would be a great artist to begin the study. American avant-garde director Robert Wilson is another maker whose theatre transforms time. Arthur Holmberg has already used Bergson to unpack the relationship between clock time and duration in Robert Wilson's *Einstein on the Beach* (Holmberg 1996: 11). During this research I worked with Robert Wilson but he encouraged me to write about practitioners with less exposure than he has had. It is my intention in the future to trace a history of explicitly temporal theatre

where he will be included. Going further into history the work of Samuel Beckett is an obvious source because of the way his practice of minimal action creates frames where apparently nothing, except time, happens. It would also be useful to look into the work of the Futurists, with their rejection of the past as well as their interest in acceleration and technology as an artistic and political project (Marinetti 1909). The Futurists' multiplicity of media and multiplicity of meaning, seen in their use of ambiguity, would all be useful avenues for exploring further how temporalities are performed.

My present study is confined to my three chosen bodies of practice which I have aligned with Henri Bergson's books on duration, memory and evolution, and they have inspired important aspects of my practice. I chose to work with contemporaries because I could interact with them and actually experience their work as it happens. Still the pursuit of time specificity is a project to be continued. I will return to possible future developments of my pursuit in the conclusion. Now I turn to an explanation of the methodology at play in the thesis, which shows how these artists' work, my practice and philosophy are brought into dynamic relation.

Methodology

This research project is overall a practice-based exploration. I research from the position of an artist and the three performances are both input and output for this research. Each performance was a way of experimenting with ideas that could

feed back into the understanding of other artworks and philosophy; as well as a display of the findings of my research on other artworks and philosophy. Practice in this project was equivalent to both reading and writing. Doing research through performing allowed me both to illustrate in order to test what was coming off the page and to develop findings that could only be performed. The performances and this written document carry equal responsibility for the dissemination of my research. Practice is further manifest in this document through its companion DVD, extensive photographic documentation, programmes and extracts of scores from each of the performances. The academic writing sits alongside those performances but cannot be equivalent to what the performances did, more or less successfully, which was to create experiences of performing temporality. Still this document affords useful insights that the performances could not. From the perspective of a practitioner the core of my research is ongoing performance making.

The practice-based research into performing temporalities arose from my pursuit of what a time-specificity of performance might be. The word pursuit in the title indicates exactly where this research is positioned. Time-specificity is an undeveloped term and this exploration is based on one possible definition. The openness of the term has been helpful and challenging. This openness is also indicative of how my writing on practice is positioned. This thesis includes writing located as commentary on the performances, but that writing is intended to signal that these readings of my own work are not final. I intend for my commentary on the

work to be provisional for the reader. My perspective on my practice enables readers to respond to the performances I have made with more information. Another's response may differ from my own. A goal is that this study will encourage others to build on, revise, contradict and elaborate the potentials for time-specificity.

Pursuing time-specificity through performing temporalities here involves an elaboration of various sets of threes to create formulaic juxtapositions. It originates out of an overarching thematic rendering of the three tenses of temporality. Present, past and future are each given a chapter in this work. Inside each chapter there are three distinct elements: my own performance, a performance or body of work by another artist and one of Henri Bergson's philosophical texts. Within that formula the writing moves between elements in order to reconcile the linearity of argument with the horizontal motion of creativity. Holding the three different aspects of the research together was the foundation of this pursuit of time-specificity.

Although my training and background is in practice I challenged myself to pursue a deeply singular engagement with philosophy, a new discipline for me. The philosophical dimension of this research became the practice of thinking. To ground that theoretical engagement I aligned this project to the philosophy of Henri Bergson whose work sustains a philosophical engagement with temporality not seen in other philosophers. In the same way that this study might have considered a number of other practitioners, I also might have looked at other philosophers for

models of temporality; yet Bergson offered a singular and sustained engagement to time throughout his body of work that made his writings most relevant. While he made important contributions to philosophy Bergson is also relevant to me as a practitioner, for his total body of work includes a life of impassioned performances. Bergson's political engagement during his life, his public disagreement with Einstein, his eventual obscurity all gave his work a relevance to my focus on how performance in everyday life questions the boundary of life and art as well as life and work. Add to that his Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 which was symbolic of how his philosophy does not easily fit into established categories. As a critical artist I am interested in the philosophy that emerges from a man who was sent by France to convince Woodrow Wilson to engage the United States in the First World War. Even though Bergson does not write much directly of either politics or art his notion of freedom as an axiomatic term of value is crucial to his and my conception of both politics and art. To pursue freedom through time was a crucial position that I shared in my practice.

Contextualising Bergson can be more challenging than some other philosophers because his work has gone in and out of fashion. Contemporary focus on his work is emblematic of a third wave of 'Bergsonism', the term used by Gilles Deleuze, who was a part of second wave Bergsonism and is probably responsible for the current third wave (see for example Deleuze 1988, Lefebvre and White 2012, Mullarkey 1999, Ó Maoilearca and de Mille 2013, Pearson 2002). Deleuze is a crucial

element of the context surrounding Bergson. Because Deleuze's philosophy drew on and developed many of Bergson's ideas about difference in kind and multiplicity, Deleuze paved the way for other recent theorists that I draw on to make sense of Bergson in this study such as Elizabeth Grosz, Brian Massumi and Rosi Braidotti (Braidotti 2011, Grosz 2004 and Massumi 2002). In terms of precursors to Bergson, it is most important to mention Kant, to whom Bergson explicitly addressed much of his work. Kant saw time and space as intuitions, a kind of packaging that we put onto the world to give it order (Kant 1922: 18). Bergson on the other hand focuses on the creativity of time and posits no transcendental aesthetic that separates mind from the world.

Objections to Bergson come most strongly in three forms. One takes him to task for his idea that time is continuous (Bergson 1911: 39). The epistemologist Gaston Bachelard argues that 'duration always needs alterity for it to be continuous' (Bachelard 2000: 65). However Deleuze has shown that the heterogeneities of duration need not indicate discontinuity (Deleuze 1988: 37). As I will show in chapter one, through the performance of slow motion movement, we become aware of discontinuity because experience is continuous. This relates to a central feature of Bergsonian philosophy, which is that order precedes disorder (Bergson 1946: 99). Discontinuity is a product of continuity rather than the other way around.

The second and more contemporary objection to Bergson takes issue with his separation of space and time (*pace* Einstein) and his apparent classification of time

as dynamic and space as immobile. These oversimplifications result from taking Bergson's nuanced metaphors at face value. I will show that Bergson uses the differences between space and time in order to make points about duration and spatial thought, while still recognizing that the two are interconnected. For Bergson space itself can be dynamic. It is the homogeneous abstract dimension of space in which measurement, counting and clock time occur which is not dynamic. In experience space and time are inseparable.

A third objection to Bergson relates to the fact that his philosophy is more than a hundred years old and based on scientific developments of his time that are now out of date. However, a recent contribution to cognitive science reveals that Bergson's thinking can be aligned with contemporary scientific thought. Alva Noë's 2006 *Action in Perception* argues for an enactive approach to perception which views experience 'as thoughtful activity' (Noë 2006: 205). Like Bergson, Noë presents a conception of consciousness as related to evolutionary development, a point Bergson argues in *Creative Evolution* almost one hundred years before Noë. 'Consciousness and cognition are themselves aspects of the development of life.' (Noë 2006: 230). For Noë any understanding of the mind must include life as it is lived (Noë 2006: 231). By framing consciousness as an aspect of our development as organisms, Noë necessarily views neurological activity within a holistic frame that does not single out the brain as a machine in control of the body, but rather defines consciousness as something 'enacted by what we do with our bodies.' (Noë 2006:

31). For Bergson too, in the early part of the twentieth century, the brain was a part of an active body, engaged in a dynamic exchange with the environment. These objections to Bergson create opportunities to reveal the usefulness and radicalism of his philosophy, which for me relate to the mystery of the creative process. One of Bergson's major objectives was to deal with experiences that language is not well equipped to explain.

In his doctoral thesis *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 'Essay on the immediate data of consciousness', published in English as *Time and Free Will*, Bergson's first words locate a habit that leads, he claims, to philosophical mistakes. 'We necessarily express ourselves by means of words and we usually think in terms of space.' (Bergson 1913 (1889): xix). He goes on to argue that the reason for this mental habit is to facilitate social life, yet applying the systems of language and the rules of space to processes such as time and evolution causes the mind to distort and misunderstand the way these phenomena actually operate. To solve this Bergson employs metaphor and everyday language, among other strategies in order to communicate with his reader. Although Bergson wrote in French, the translations I use were authorised by Bergson. Bergson's excellent grasp of English is shown by his frequent lectures in the UK and the USA, diplomacy work and he would have spoken both French and English as a child to his Yorkshire born mother. Bergson's early bilingualism might explain his wish to find intuitive methods of thought and communication that transcend language.

An example will clarify the way Bergson depicts typical modes of thinking in order to address philosophical questions, especially with regard to the difference between how space and time operate. It is the fourth paradox of Zeno of Elea, a thought experiment to which Bergson returned in each of his three major works, which are also the works focused on in this thesis, *Time and Free Will* (Bergson 1913 (1889): 113-115), *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 1912 (1896): 252-253) and *Creative Evolution* (Bergson 1911 (1907): 308-311). The story is that the speedy Achilles is going to race against the slow tortoise who will be given a head start. Zeno explains that Achilles will never catch the tortoise because he must first pass the halfway point between himself and the tortoise, and while he does so the tortoise advances, both acts creating a new halfway point for Achilles to cross before overtaking the tortoise. Zeno deduces that space is infinitely sub-divisible, and that speed and travel are illusions. In Zeno's account of reality, time and space are both immobile dimensions.

Bergson returns to Zeno's paradox because it demands an obvious rebuttal through intuition that leads to a more complex account of how experience works. It is intuitively clear that if Achilles is faster he will certainly overtake the tortoise, but this is not enough to rebut Zeno. Bergson agrees that the measureable distance between the tortoise and Achilles is infinitely sub-divisible, but maintains that the action of moving that Achilles performs to overtake the tortoise is inherently qualitative and made up of heterogeneous elements. If divided, these elements

become something different in kind. While there may be a difference of degree between one inch and another inch, there is a difference in kind between a step with the entire body and a movement with the arm. That the act of moving is an indivisible whole takes account of time as duration whereas the concept of sub-divisible space rests on removing the passage of time from experience through assuming that nature is fundamentally in a state of rest.

Bergson's progressive readings of Zeno's paradox clarify why I find in his philosophy a useful armature for a creative practice-based pursuit of time-specificity; his philosophy probably more than any other is equipped to deal with the indescribable aspects of experience. In accordance with the specific terminology prevailing at Royal Holloway, University of London, I use the term practice-based research to mean practice-as-research, as distinct from research in written form based upon performance experimentation. It is the premise of this thesis that some fundamental aspects of the enquiry cannot be transmitted through writing. Bergson understood this principle intuitively and assumptions about the limitations of language underpin his work. Bergson is an encouragement to commit to performance itself as a kind of knowledge, while also searching for registers of writing that are able to compliment practice.

Research rooted in practice intensifies the importance of theory or else the research is merely a question of skill and craft. Conversely any project conducted too far from performance practice loses the messy reality of how art is actually made

and any project too focused on what happens in the studio loses sight of the big ideas that drive small decisions. Being interested in finding ways to perform time means learning about time and performance. My methodology involving the pursuit of an as yet undefined notion in order to create art; doing so argues that art is able to create original knowledge as well as any traditional form of scholarly writing.

Structure

In the three main chapters of this document, present, past and future I offer a chronological account of the development of my research. Each chapter investigates one of my own performances, one volume of Bergson's philosophy and work from one group of the artists. Chapter one, the present, is the foundation of performing temporality. It is an exploration of the moments of experiencing performing within the time-specificity of the present.

Chapter one concerns performing duration. It argues that it is paradoxically because Hsieh's works delimit a specific amount of time that his works transmit the sensation of the constant flow of time passing. This is the temporality of duration which as Henri Bergson shows in *Time and Free Will* is above all a force. This chapter contains three sections: duration, experience and conceptuality. Duration is theorised through Bergson and Hsieh's performance. With this ground laid, I interrogate my performance *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. In this work I walk in slow motion for specified sets of time and within

those constraints the flow of time is set free. The DVD contains a creative adaptation of this piece for video which has been published in *Video Journal of Performance* (Wakefield 2013). Once I have clearly defined Bergson's duration and Hsieh's works, I go on to explore experience as a shift in focus from how work is made to how work is encountered. Experience in Hsieh's work is at once in and out of reach of the imagination. Anyone can understand intellectually that he lived in a cell without speaking for one year, but how can anyone other than Hsieh actually apprehend that experience? This experiential factor of performance leads to a consideration of how the ineffable aspects of performance might be abstracted. I call my work conceptual performance because of how performance might lead to a more abstract and conceptual encounter with duration. Chapter one reveals how using clock time as structure is one technique to bring about duration.

Chapter two takes up the issue of documentation underlying the encounter with the works of Tehching Hsieh. Because Hsieh stopped performing at the end of the twentieth century his works are now continued through documentation. Documentation makes up a crucial aspect of the past of performance. Documents are aids to and objects of memory. For this chapter I decided to isolate each element of the research in order to note the specificities of each. So where chapters one and three contain within them three thematic sections, chapter two is divided according to the loci of the research. The segmented structure shows how knowledge transforms through different modes of access. I examine the process of

Every House Has a Door's creation of *9 Beginnings*, which I was a part of as a choreographed stagehand during the devising and performance process. Their work returns the past to the present by making use of a structure akin to memory. Next I investigate the literature on documenting performance in order to identify what a new position of time-specificity will be. This text has been published in the peer reviewed Australian Journal *Performance Matters* (Wakefield 2015). In the third section of chapter two I analyse Bergson's theory of memory from *Matter and Memory*, in order to see how the past interpenetrates with the present. Using Bergson's theory I sketch a creative relationship between past and present and between animate and inanimate matter. The final section of the chapter documents my performance *2: Untitled*. This work is more dynamic than my first piece and includes text. From an onstage television monitor I copy the choreography of Roger Federer playing a tennis match which I had attended live. At the same time I deliver various texts via memory, recording or printed text. The texts come from Proust's *Swann's Way*, from Bergson and from some friends and family of Antonin Artaud remembering him just after he died. This documentation I provide is a guide that could instruct another to recreate my performance or a different work using the same techniques. I incorporate in this chapter a set of diagrams, which map out relationships between times and materials. These diagrams, along with an article that begins to define my position on time-specificity have been published in

Choreographic Practices (Wakefield 2014). Overall chapter two offers a way to let the past perform through memory.

The third chapter was the most challenging aspect of my study because it involved exploring the future, of which necessarily I have no experience. The future will come to be the present but is essentially unpredictable. I solve this by considering how the sense of the future is always beyond the reach of the present. This is a future that is always changing, always evolving and completely open. This chapter is laid out thematically as was chapter one where my exploration requires an interconnected engagement between my practice, other artists' work, and philosophy. Here the three case studies comprise my piece *Three*, the name change project of the artists Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša, and Bergson's *Creative Evolution. Three* was the least minimal of all my works and the most direct. It was the only piece to include texts written by myself as well as music and original choreography. Bergson's theory invited me to consider evolution as a structuring device in order to bring about a performance of the future. The first section of this chapter on the development process is entitled 'making'. After that I focus on 'meeting' and explore the particularities of the event of the performance. The last section entitled 'adapting' is an attempt to show how performance, through a series of adaptations, continues into the future after it ends. Sections of this text have been published in the journals *Maska* and *Performance Research* (Wakefield 2016a

and 2016b). Here the overarching concept is the open-endedness of the future of performance.

In the conclusion I pick up the notion of performing time as a vindication of long term practices of art making. This pursuit of time-specificity has solidified my sense of the importance of art as an expression of freedom. The practical processes I have found most freeing are those with clear constraints, and on this basis I sketch out a set of core premises for a temporal approach to performance making. These core premises draw together the crucial aspects of my original contribution to knowledge and also indicates future directions for research. I remain in pursuit of time-specificity and I will continue to perform time.

1 - Present

Performing Duration

How do live arts perform duration? This overriding question drives the research of this first of three chapters. The general sense of this version of time-specificity is a temporal approach to making performance. A key issue at the start is to set out what I mean by time. Performance requires passing time so this version of time-specificity focuses on time as duration. For this chapter on the present tense of time-specificity I explore how duration is performed. During the present duration may become noticeable in performance. I use the term time-specificity for this experience of the passing of time through performance. Paradoxically the fluid passage of time that is relevant here becomes noticeable through a contrasting temporality of clock time. Duration can be performed as a result of using clock time to structure performance. This chapter locates time-specificity of performance present within a context of *Time and Free Will* by Henri Bergson, the *One Year Performances* of Tehching Hsieh and my first practice performance *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. Structurally this chapter moves through

duration, experience and conceptuality as three elements of performing duration, or time-specificity of the present within a practice-based performance philosophy.

The first of this chapter's three sections explains duration. I follow Bergson's analysis in *Time and Free Will* as it reveals the relationship between duration and clock time thereby paving the way for my time-specific performance making practice. Bergson analyses clock time to provide a contrast that allows him to reveal the experience of duration and likewise in performance I employ clock time as a structuring device to create the sensation of duration. The tension between these two temporalities is explicated through a metaphor of measure. Bergson's concepts are always in relation to experience, as is evident in his response to Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. While Zeno argues that Achilles will never overtake the tortoise in their race, which indicates that space is infinitely sub-divisible, Bergson shows that Zeno's mistake is to confuse the measurement of space with the act of moving. 'The mistake of the Eleatics arises from their identification of this series of acts, each of which is a definite kind and indivisible, with the homogenous space which underlies them.' (Bergson 1913: 113). The act of moving is different in kind from the measurement of that movement because a divided act of movement is not a smaller part of that movement, it is simply a different movement. While I can think of physical motion containing subdividable units, in actuality they are heterogeneous wholes. Bergson draws a connection between what is and is not measureable in order to explain the difference between clock time and duration.

Time-specificity places its focus on duration in actuality in which the passing of time produces differences in kind rather than differences of degree. This speaks to actual change. For Bergson, whose methodology works through the primacy of direct real experience, duration is within the realm of the concrete. Concrete concepts are contrasted with perceptions that emerge from philosophies that apply abstraction to experience, as will be shown later with reference to Immanuel Kant. Much of Bergson's innovation results from a productive response to Kant's philosophy. In the Bergsonian tradition of attending to experience before abstraction, time-specificity deals with the way the lived overlaps the abstract. In introducing their book series 'Technologies of Lived Abstraction', Brian Massumi and Erin Manning write that '[c]oncepts must be experienced, they are lived.' (Manning and Massumi 2013: front matter). For time-specificity the relationship between experience and concept is not a causal chain, but rather an effect of engaging with the way difference in kind emerges through duration in performance. Duration as the production of difference in kind is an actual concrete process that is as experiential as performance.

Time as duration in performance is expertly rendered in the *One Year Performances* of Tehching Hsieh, an artist who performs time passing. His relevance for time-specificity is not only that his works are of an almost unimaginably extended duration. Nor is his import only that his pieces had specific measurements of time as their titles and organising principle. The central point derived from Hsieh's

performance for time-specificity is a sense of duration occurring in contrast to the framing of exact clock time as well as extended temporality. In each *One Year Performance* clock time is a structuring device that creates the experience of duration. In this way Hsieh works differently from traditional theatre and even durational performance, as those both allow the action to determine the clock time. Hsieh's actions must correspond to a specific measure. Within that constraint they become more complex. The fluidity of duration is made noticeable by the attempt to constrain it.

In New York City Tehching Hsieh completes five one year performances in the late 1970's and early 1980's and his last piece is a thirteen year plan (Heathfield 2009: 11). Each work consists of a simple set of tasks that Hsieh will perform over an entire year. In the first work, *One Year Performance 1978*-1979, informally known as 'cage piece', Hsieh silently confined himself to a cell in his studio for one year. In *One Year Performance 1980-1981*, known as 'time clock piece', Hsieh set up an industrial punch clock in his studio that would stamp the present time on a card he would insert into the machine. Hsieh punched in every hour on the hour for the year, and then photographed himself on a single frame of 16mm film. The third work, *One Year Performance 1981-1982 or* 'outdoor piece' committed Hsieh to staying outside for the year. *One Year Performance 1983-1984 or* 'rope piece' consisted of Hsieh tied to artist Linda Montano with an eight-foot rope and never allowed to touch. The final of that series, *One Year Performance 1985-1986 or* 'no art piece'

meant Hsieh avoided making and viewing art for the year. *Tehching Hsieh 1986-1999*, the thirteen-year plan, consisted of Hsieh making art but not showing it publicly. His website, www.tehchinghsieh.com, offers documentation of each piece.

The 2009 book *Out of Now: the lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh* by Adrian Heathfield and Tehching Hsieh displays the vast documentation of each performance. It also collects multiple writings from other authors on Hsieh's work by other authors, and grants the reader impeccable access to these performances that occurred on the edges of visibility. Heathfield begins by explaining that a notable aspect of Hsieh's body of work is his approach to time. 'Hsieh is working with and from the direct experience of the present, using time as an artistic "material" and tool.' (Heathfield 2009: 12). Heathfield calls attention to the innovation Hsieh brings to art, which is a placement of conceptual focus on the temporality of the present and more importantly Hsieh's use of time as a tool in the artworks' production of meaning. Heathfield explains that Hsieh's works 'draw attention to the spatio-temporal limits of the artwork and privilege the making and unmaking of its meaning as a temporal matter.' (Heathfield 2009: 22). The result of Hsieh's attention to the temporality of the present as change causes the meanings of the artworks to become equally unfixed.

Heathfield explicitly makes the connection between Hsieh's work and the philosophy of Henri Bergson in the chapter 'Thought of Duration' (Heathfield 2009: 17-23). Heathfield sets out how performances with a durational temporality open the

understanding of time as multiple beyond the human and account for 'the radical heterogeneity of durations. (Heathfield 2009: 21). There are not only the multiple durations of different people, but also the contrasting and converging durations of other animals and other matter. The multiplicity of duration central to Hsieh's work is the difference between art time and life time. It leads Heathfield to coin a new term to describe what Hsieh is doing, calling his pieces 'lifeworks', as they are created upon the convergence, both practically and conceptually, of art and life (Heathfield 2009: 12). Although Hsieh is explicit about differentiating his *One Year Performances* from the time of life because of their aesthetic determination, the duration of one year, as Heathfield rightly shows, means that Hsieh's performances deserve close analysis in terms of their temporal interpenetration between art and life. Heathfield even explains that Hsieh 'directly raises questions of the nature of time itself, and his works resonate with the living forces of duration' (Heathfield 2009: 13). The sensate vitalism of Hsieh's performed temporality illuminates and is illuminated by Bergson's philosophy of duration.

Resonating with duration as living force by paradoxically structuring performance around clock time is where my practical performance shares aesthetic and philosophical strategies with the works of Tehching Hsieh. To outwardly copy Hsieh's one year duration might be interesting and one could even follow the many possibilities of one year performances that Santiago Serra offers in *Out of Now*, such as 'one year of destruction', 'one year without understanding anything' or 'one year

doing the same as the next' (Serra 2009: 364-365). Serra's responses, especially the last one quoted, confirms Heathfield's earlier argument that Hsieh's work raises questions about the nature of time. Because all performance is inherently temporal it is the perfect medium to explore time. The goal with my practice was to critically and creatively respond to Hsieh's works in such a way that would preserve their uniqueness rather than copy. So with my performance *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* I aimed to invite a similar specificity of temporal thought in a different shape and size.

Through questioning the interdependence of experience and concept of duration I created the performance *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. The piece consists of walking in acute slow motion. It was developed through regular studio practice over a period of seven months during which approximately twelve hours a week were spent moving in slow motion. The time spent in the studio was focused on developing my physical technique while also considering the best way to frame that movement. Early on the intention was to create a work of extended duration in response to Hsieh's year that would still be a common unit used to measure time in life, such as an eight-hour piece that would make use of the duration of a common workday. This extended duration could have had the effect of pushing the piece toward an embarrassingly pseudo heroic act of physical virtuosity or an image of endurance as suffering, both of which would

distract from the main concern of duration itself. This only became clear after one day in the studio in which I successfully remained in slow motion for five hours.

Instead of the extended duration then, the piece took two forms. Both involve the same almost imperceptibly slow motion movement, costume and video programme. The costume was a white boiler suit. This was a response to the industrial uniforms Hsieh would wear for his pieces, but was different in colour. While Hsieh wore mostly grey, *How Long a Thing Takes* was performed in white. The purpose of the white was to suggest the idea of the surface of the performer as a support onto which spectators might metaphorically project images. As a canvas is a support for paint, so might the body be a support for performance. The video programme is a two-minute static camera shot of a hand drawing and writing on a page of a notebook with a voiceover that explains the concept of the performance. Images from the video can be found below.

There are two versions of *How Long a Thing* Takes, gallery and theatre. In one version the performance consisted of an installation where the performer walked in slow motion in a gallery setting that included a laptop and headphones on which viewers could watch the video programme. The second version is the one I will focus on. It is documented in the video included on DVD in this thesis, which was also published in *Video Journal of Performance*. This second mode sought to test the theatre as a place and temporality to live duration. Thus it made use of the duration of one and a half hours as a typical unit to measure theatrical time. Light

cues were programmed according to pre-chosen times of forty-five minutes for each of the two acts. In this way I explored the use of clock time as a structuring device to create the experience of duration. The space was set up with chairs facing a clearly delineated stage, back grounded by three white panels on which grey symbols had been painted by hand. One panel showed three arrows on an axis symbolizing the three dimensions of space. Another showed three dots and the number 2 to display the idea of number and its inherent complexity, as I will show later in reference to Bergson's analysis of the idea of number. The last panel portrayed a clock face. The first action of the performance was to enter the stage and paint over each symbol then the slow motion began. During the interval the audience was given drinks and the video programme was played on a lobby television while I nervously rested back stage.

Below is one example of the one page programme that the audience found waiting on the seats. Different versions of the programme only deviated in the suggested activities for the audience should they become disinterested. My aim with that was to add humour to the performance and convey the difference of experience for each individual in the audience. Obviously the difference between programmes is imperceptibly buried within the artwork and only apparent to myself, readers of this text and in the unlikely event that some spectator read two programmes. Nonetheless the programme invites the audience to freely and individually contemplate and respond to the performance.

How Long A Thing Takes:

an invitation to think duration

Information

This performance is one and a half hours with a fifteen-minute interval, during which a four-minute film programme will be shown that gives some more information about the concept.

If at any time you would like to stand up, read, walk around, get some work done, draw pictures on the back of this piece of paper, leave, take a break, or anything else you might feel like doing that won't ruin everything for anyone else, please feel free to do so.

Wine, cake and soft drinks will be provided free at the interval.

For both acts the audience stayed in their seats although the programme encouraged them to move about during the performance. This was due to the difficulty of breaking the social contract created by the architecture, lighting and temporality of the theatre as well as the quiet and conceptual nature of the

performance. Although no one physically moved that is no indication of the many different experiences that might have happened internally for the audience. Hopefully they had some sense of time passing that changed throughout the performance. This sense of unfolding duration may have lead to some greater understanding of how time is performed.

This theatrical version of *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* thus questioned the notion of duration through making use of the temporalities of theatre which includes the audience. So in a way the performance is quiet and slow enough to potentially encourage the audience to be in charge of their own activity during the piece. By 'think' in the title I mean an experiential abstraction that is embodied through performance and it is shared by the spectators and the performer. As I will explain further, the main idea was to make duration something tangible.

As the premier domain of this study is performance, what follows is extensive documentation of *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. This documentation provides an experiential case study of how duration becomes experience and leads to concept. The sections of the chapter that follow start with duration, move on to experience and end with concept. Time-specificity must have a working definition of duration before exploring the relationship between experience and conceptuality. That overall structure sustains the argument that the present tense of time-specificity of performance is the activity of performing duration, in

which the constraint of clock gives way to the equally abstract and lived passing of time.

Photographs of Video Programme, Performance and Video Document




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
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
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slow Motion?


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
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
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THE FUTURE


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Repetition as tensioning


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
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
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
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
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













1.1 - Duration

Time-specificity requires a clear definition of time. Although this thesis is a work on and of performance it has been crucial to ground practice with theory. Doing so informs the innovation of the practice and sets the conditions for the creative work to be in a position to produce new knowledge. This first section of chapter one takes up philosophy as a jumping off point. Performance is the core of this project, not philosophy. That is why it is useful to make my relationship with philosophy clear from the outset so that the thesis has a foundation on which to focus in on performance. Knowing what is meant by time is the way to develop time-specificity. In this section I will locate duration in the philosophy of Henri Bergson as a premise of time-specificity. His model of temporality is useful because it is a concept based on experience. That is why it is relevant to this time-specificity of performance that is grounded in lived aesthetic qualities.

Bergson's intuitive philosophy also further aligns it with artistic creation. My version of time-specificity is about taking account of temporal forces, tendencies, operations and emergences within performance. As an approach offered through Bergson's elaboration of duration, temporal thought becomes the mode though which this time-specificity approaches performance. To define duration I follow Bergson's analysis of clock time as he contrasts it to duration. The importance of understanding clock time is that it may be employed as an aesthetic strategy to

structure performance in time-specific performance making such as the work of Tehching Hsieh. As Bergson reveals duration through showing how it is distinct from clock time, Hsieh performs duration by framing his art in clock time.

Change and the Continuous Flow of Conscious States

Bergson defines duration first through psychology because his method of intuition begins with immediate experience. He explains what goes on in his mind as a constantly changing set of perceptions, feelings, affects, sensations, thoughts, memories and varying degrees of concentrated attention to action (Bergson 1911: 1). His examination of inner life is the entry point to noticing the change that operates at the core of experience. Bergson's philosophy can be contextualized within philosophies of change traced back to Heraclitus, as Alice Frances Sprague makes clear in the 1920 book *Idea of Change in the Philosophies of Heraclitus and Bergson*. Heraclitus' and Bergson's world-views are full of constant motion. Processes of differentiation are to be found in duration which makes up the very core of existence. As Paola Marrati shows, Bergson understands duration as that which enables continuous existence, 'as the always open possibility of the emergence of the new' (Marrati 2005: 1103). Marrati reveals this continuous flow as the driving force of Bergson's conception of psychology. Inner life is always changing. An opposing view of consciousness would see it organized as a discrete series of fixed states. Marrati paraphrases Bergson and explains the implications of

exporting conventions of social shorthand to the domain of philosophy, or to deduce philosophy from what society generally agrees to be the structures of experience (Marrati 2005: 1099). Concepts such as clock time are effects of spatialization that make social life easier, because for example clock time gives people an agreeable time to meet; but if clock time comes back to refine time itself it distorts duration and leads to philosophical problems. The discursive dominance of spatial language has had the effect of encouraging philosophy to give greater value to spatial epistemologies. Privileging space over time implies that fixity is the fundamental principle of nature. Philosophers such as Heraclitus and Bergson on the other hand manifest a world-view with change at the core.

Bergson finds a model for thinking duration in the immediate experience of the workings of consciousness. He writes that 'we shall no longer consider states of consciousness in isolation from one another, but in their concrete multiplicity, in so far as they unfold themselves in pure duration.' (Bergson 1913: 73). All is engaged in the constant flow. The word concrete is used metaphorically. It does not refer to a hardened solid but rather to his perspective. The concrete perspective that Bergson employs is the intuition of immediate experience, which attends to life directly. In this way the concrete is a step that avoids the trappings caused by allowing the descriptive arrangements that facilitate communication to determine philosophy. The concrete experience of consciousness is marked by change. 'For an ego which does change does not *endure*' (Bergson 1911: 4). Endurance is a result of change.

Transformation is made possible through continuity. This notion of transformational endurance is crucial to time-specificity. Although continuity seems at first to be at odds with change the two are only possible if mutually coexistent. Endurance as transformation is obscured by common language and social life that hold the dominant mode of temporality to be clock time in which difference can ever only be rendered by spatial degrees.

Duration and Spatialized Time

Clock time is a spatial concept that distorts the pure temporality of duration. It is necessary to first problematize clock time because it is the socially dominant mode of temporality and seems to converge with the definition of time itself. Adrian Heathfield writes that '[f]or Bergson, the principal difficulty in the understanding and representation of duration was its suppression by space.' (Heathfield 2009: 21). Thus Bergson develops his theory of duration in *Time and Free Will* through an analysis of the spatiality of clock time. Clock time is an approach to temporality that modifies its nature through spatializing it, while duration is the immediate experience of temporality. Bergson will show that the purest form of temporality is duration. Clock time is a measure of duration. Revealing the mechanism of clock time through Bergson's intuition opens discourses about performance to the discovery of duration which in turn offers a foundation for time-specificity of performance grounded in the experiential nature

of live arts. In this version of time-specificity duration is the force that produces and is produced through performance. The major contribution of my version of time-specificity is to suggest that duration becomes more noticeable through framing performance with clock time.

Number

Number is essential to the concept of clock time but not for the measuring of duration. Water clocks, sundials and hourglasses all measure time without number. The amalgamation of number and time is a historical innovation as opposed to an ontological necessity. Because number can be conceived without any idea of clock time the link between the two is ease of use. Seen this way it is clear why social life functions more easily with recourse to the regularity of clock time. The use of number to measure clock time provides agreeable instances of simultaneity, which allow for meetings of multiple people, scientific measure and the management of transportation, for example. Number certainly facilitates social life but the incorporation of number and time does not help us understand duration. Understanding number does help us understand clock time which will in turn reveal duration.

Bergson begins his analysis of clock time by defining number as a paradoxical 'synthesis of the one and the many' (Bergson 1913: 75). The idea of number involves an effort of the mind to include multiple parts in a single whole, and if the system of

number is to function each of those parts is required to be 'identical' (Bergson 1913: 76). Number involves this paradox of identity through requiring the mind to both distinguish between and hold together the multiplicity of number. For example, ten is both one and several, whole and divisible. It is Bergson's next step of analysis that elevates his examination above an interesting paradox.

If number represents clock time, Bergson continues, it would follow that counting happens in time (Bergson 1913: 77). He insists that this cannot be the case, because instead 'we place them side by side in an ideal space.' (Bergson 1913: 77). He calls this leap of the mind 'juxtaposition', which requires space (Bergson 1913: 77). This juxtaposition is what proves the fact that number inescapably requires an abstraction or spatialisation. Each single unit that forms the unity of number must be included in the counting. Numbers and counting happen in space. Number is a spatial concept.

Quantitative Multiplicity

Distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative multiplicities is pivotal to understanding the difference between time and duration. Bergson explains 'that there are two very different kinds of multiplicity' (Bergson 1913: 85). He refers back to his analysis of psychic states, which can only be defined as intensities, although language tends to define them as measureable magnitudes (Bergson 1913: 1-4). He distinguishes between a multiplicity of matter and the multiplicity of conscious

states. 'Two kinds of multiplicity: (1) material objects, counted in space; (2) conscious states, not countable unless symbolically represented in space.' (Bergson 1913: 85). Because thought happens through time, conscious states cannot be counted and are therefore a very different kind of multiplicity.

Bergson explains how symbolic representation functions using two metaphors. His writing often employs such devices to illustrate thought. He asks the reader to think of the sound of footsteps and strokes of a bell. Instead of feeling 'the qualitative impression' of all the footsteps together, the listener makes an imaginative leap and localizes the space where they might have been (Bergson 1913: 86). Symbolic representation is an act of the mind that assembles and juxtaposes sensory perceptions into easily communicable forms. In the case of the ringing bell, the mind does not merely experience the impressions left by the sound. It produces a rendition of the previous rings to make them constitute a whole. Bergson explains that the whole unit of multiple rings is something else altogether or different in kind from the durational experience of the bell ringing. Symbolic representation, 'in which a necessary element is *space*' is the work of the mind that makes a multiplicity of variety appear to be a multiplicity of number (Bergson 1913: 87).

Any multiplicity that has been counted is fundamentally quantitative, whether added up through direct observation in space or through symbolic representation. It is different in kind from a multiplicity of qualities. The concept of clock time is a

quantitative multiplicity but duration in the mind must be something other than quantitative, while still multiple. A quantitative multiplicity isolates, distinguishes, sets apart, juxtaposes, imposes simultaneity, and occupies abstract space. Bergson is not content with such 'setting out time in space' because the flow of conscious states cannot be counted (Bergson 1913: 122). The idea of a quantitative multiplicity can only pertain to a spatial conception of time and will never describe the flow of duration. A quantitative multiplicity is nothing other than a discrete multiplicity of separate and simultaneous parts.

Homogeneity

The next step for Bergson is to analyse the medium within which the act of counting quantitative multiplicities necessarily occurs. The medium is abstract, empty and homogeneous space which allows units to be synthesized as a group. Bergson argues that the idea of homogeneity is fundamentally abstract. Homogeneity is a human invention far away from the heterogeneity of direct experience. Duration is not the uniform architecture of a clock face or the unchanging rate of its minute and second hands. Bergson's critique is situated in direct opposition to Immanuel Kant's transcendental aesthetic and its assumption of the homogeneity of time and space.

Bergson opposes duration to the Kantian notion of space and time as *a priori* intuitions. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant argues that time is not itself a thing

because it is and does nothing. Time is not a perceivable object. Kant suggests that '[t]ime is the formal condition, *a priori*, of all phenomena whatsoever.' (Kant 1999: 27). In this conception time and space are predetermined formal givens of experience. Space and time as containers for empirical information are rendered as homogeneous. Because time is merely a sort of stamp we use to order the world, and because time itself is not in or of the world, time then consists of an inherently ordered pattern. For Kant time is what experience is processed in, the packaging that keeps things in order.

Throughout *Time and Free Will* Bergson counters that the space-time intuition of Kant's transcendental aesthetic is a mechanical abstraction. Space and time are attributed to things in themselves but things in themselves have no time. This attributable time is necessarily homogeneous or it would be unable to perform the role of mechanically ordering empirical data. Homogeneity is a must of any system that seeks to differentiate on a basis of countable units. The units that are being counted as a numerical multiplicity need to share some likeness. If multiples are contemplated together, the unifying quality or identification attributes a sameness amid the variety. Homogeneous time must be constant. It must always move at the same speed and have parts that always fit together in a correct order. Kant's vision of time correlates with a Newtonian conception of time that is perfectly manifested in clocks and measurements. Bergson's point is that immediate experience is incompatible with the homogeneity of spatial abstraction.

Succession

It may be useful to imagine time in terms of clocks instead of duration. It is more common to think of time in the Kantian or clock-oriented mode than it is to think pure duration as a flow of conscious states. Time is often represented as a line with an arrow, moving along and through segments we experience as moments. Each moment is preceded by and precedes another. The future becomes the present and then becomes the past. Now it is one minute, then another and another after that. Although I have already shown that counting requires space, clocks imply that what is essential in time is the process of accumulation by counting and that counting is the essence of time. Time as counting functions as a succession. Clock time is a discrete succession while duration is continuous succession.

Succession has two common meanings with a notable overlap between each definition. It describes a process of one thing after another and also the inheriting of a title. In both something new follows something old. Both new and old share the same role and title. While the next minute will be different, it will still be a minute just as a successor who takes the position of another. Differentiating the new from the old requires a sense of the old to remain in the present while it may not in experience. The previous unit is held onto in thought as recollection and then juxtaposed to the present that is perceived. These two mental images, one arising in perception and the other in recollection are projected into an abstract space in

order to be processed as a succession. Bergson explains that succession is nothing other than juxtaposition in space, or even simultaneity (Bergson 1913: 116).

To sum up, clock time is a product of abstracting in homogenous space the idea of number as a quantitative multiplicity which proceeds through discrete succession. Clock time is a good tool for a science of measurement and organizing social life, but creates problems for understanding the experience of lived time. Lived time for Bergson is pure duration.

Pure Duration

To grasp pure duration Bergson intuits the facts of immediate psychological experience. 'Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former state.' (Bergson 1913: 100). Time takes the form of the fluid change of inner life. Later he continues that inner duration is 'a qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number; an organic evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity' (Bergson 1913: 226). The contrast with clock time comes into relief and it becomes clear why Bergson rejects Kant. Bergson reveals Kant's logic of number and space, quantitative multiplicity and homogeneity, which are properties of clock time that are at odds with inner life and duration. Bergson is using consciousness to make the wider point that the notions he has elaborated are not limited to 'a merely psychic dimension' but address the

underlying principles of everything (Marrati 2005: 1104). Psychology is only the starting point for Bergson once he expands his conception of duration in later works.

To summarise Bergson's argument so far: Duration is a 'constant state of becoming' (Bergson 1913: 183). This is time as a force of change and endurance. Duration is made up of intensities that cannot be measured and are not reducible to the binary of the many and/or the one (Bergson 1913: 224-225). Duration is a 'continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number.' (Bergson 1913: 105). Duration is still multiple but its parts are different from each other and interpenetrate. Bergson repeats this same idea later, writing that 'duration properly so called has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to number.' (Bergson 1913: 120). There are not easily distinguishable boundaries between conscious states. Living the passage of time, duration, is made up of total motion. Pure duration is the constant creation of the new.

Performing Duration

With a clear sense of the model of temporality that is being performed in time-specificity, the next question is: how does performance in turn add to an understanding of duration? Put more simply, what is the relationship between performing and passing time? The temporal mode of Bergsonian duration as lived

time is a premise for my conception of time-specific performance making in the present tense. My approach positions the temporality of performance from the perspective of immediacy without excluding the past and the future. Time-specificity affirms the importance of temporal multiplicity. The heterogeneities that are co-existent in duration, especially noticeable in performance, require awareness of how the present as duration incorporates the past and the future. For Elizabeth Grosz, a feminist philosopher emerging from Bergsonian and Deleuzian traditions, the elasticity of duration is evident in that it 'takes as long as it takes to perform a continuous action' (Grosz 2004: 177). Actions have a definite duration and if the duration is altered the action itself is fundamentally different. The elasticity of time with respect to action means that something other than clock time is needed to understand aesthetic temporality.

This time-specificity constructs a notion of performing duration contextualized through the work of Adrian Heathfield's aesthetic duration. He writes that 'aesthetic duration is a kind of entanglement' (Heathfield 2009: 22). The word entanglement makes specific reference to Michael Fried, whose 1967 essay *Art and Objecthood* critiqued minimalist art and its theatrical endlessness in the face of the absorptive instantaneousness of abstract expressionism that Fried favoured. In my Master's dissertation, *Instantaneousness and Performance*, I applied the theoretical framework of *Art and Objecthood* to performance practices. Entanglement for both Fried and Heathfield describes the process of encounter that changes as time

passes, as opposed to the art Fried praises because it 'at every moment is wholly manifest.' (Fried 1998: 167). The entanglement of aesthetic duration activates the art work, obliging the spectator to relate to art in a time in which 'duration is a continuous movement of differentiation.' (Heathfield 2009: 21). The concept of performing duration of time-specificity goes further by acknowledging the usefulness of clock time as a structuring device that can create optimal conditions for duration to appear.

Aesthetic temporality consists of a qualitative multiplicity of creative tendencies that are attended to differently over time. As performance shares forces with duration, if duration is difference, performance too changes over time. Time-specificity from a perspective of experience appreciates change even in stillness. Art becomes vital in its activity of constant change. Perhaps this is a problem for time-specificity as it implies a need to return for reflection. Or it becomes an opportunity to seize upon the unique potentialities that arise through the durational production of novelty. Because the work of art is a mobile entity time-specificity encourages criticism as well as performance to evolve. The time of performance is continuous and continuing.

Through continuation performance provides an opportunity to make time. If discourse is evolving, the experience of duration through performance may become a potent cultural critique. Heathfield explains how duration, by not conforming to the normativity of clock time, is made up of difference and is a 'a time out of time'

(Heathfield 2004: 8). The plurality of duration opens perception to other more non-normative temporalities and experiences. Performance can slow things down, speed things up, can project into the past and future, it can break the socially contracted system of clock time. The cultural relevance of performance is to a variable extent premised upon its separation from the rest of daily life. What differentiates aesthetic duration from everyday duration is the sense of freedom brought to bear on the manifestations of temporality. This version of time-specificity is concerned with the ways in which duration plays an active role in certain performances.

Time-specificity focuses on the attention that is given to time through performance. Heathfield's theory of aesthetic duration is defined 'as a sense passage in which corporeal attention is drawn to (a) time reforming.' (Heathfield 2009: 22). Because performance is created and being created as it is performed, new notions of temporality might come about through the work. In the performances of Tehching Hsieh there is a distinct separation of life time and art time that reveals their similarities. His work provides an enormous sense of the time of life as it is lived in the everyday. As the work of Bergson it is also underpinned by a search for the limits of freedom through attention to time. The serious implications of duration make up the context out of which my own simple practical experiment *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* comes about. Both my piece and Hsieh's one year performances are practices that reframe Bergsonian

duration within a context of contemporary art. As artworks and as much as philosophy they reveal the dramaturgy of time.

1.2 - Experience

I locate time-specificity in experience to elaborate the particularities of performing duration in the works of Tehching Hsieh and *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. These performance practices use clock time as a dramaturgical strategy and yet both make duration appear. The theoretical context for the kind of experience I pursue in time-specific performance making is the philosophy of Bergson because as Paola Marrati explains, for Bergson experience is more diverse than empiricism and transcendentalism admit (Marrati 2005: 1100). Bergsonian experience is neither transcendental as in Kant where the intellect is separate from the world, nor is it humanistic or existential, both of which involve distinct boundaries between the outside world and interior life. This way of defining experience is also different from the perspective of phenomenology whereby perceptions are received by the subject. For Bergson and for an experiential time-specificity, perceptions are of the subject. This means that a perception is between the body and the object perceived, both internal and external (Lawlor and Moulard Leonard 2013). Experiences of time-specificity are the actual temporal shifts that emerge through the shared time of living performance. The continuous quality of experience will lead to a new notion of repetition for performance. Experience also reveals why slowness is the method through which *How Long a Thing Takes* aimed

to make create the possibility of sensing duration. Slowness is what connects the experience of my performance practice to its concept.

Continuity

The continuity of duration is equally applicable to experience. Continuity is a key aspect of performing duration. How is continuity manifested in the works of Tehching Hsieh and *How Long a Thing Takes*? I will approach continuity through transformational endurance. In *Art as Experience* John Dewey points out that one effect of continuity is that 'experience is necessarily cumulative and its subject matter gains expressiveness because of cumulative continuity.' (Dewey 1934: 108). Experiences add up in memory and this accumulation changes the meaning of experiences. The cumulative effects on meaning offer a key to the potency of Hsieh's extended durations. Because of the grand scale of his performed durations the expressiveness is enhanced. James Dixon puts it clearly in his contribution to the journal *Performance Research*'s volume 'On Duration' writing that 'the real importance here is the consideration of a full year as experienced.' (Dixon 2012: 44). In the first work Hsieh lived through a whole year inside a cage without speaking. That he never broke the rule adds a sense of purity to the experiential continuity. Purity is achieved through the simplicity of the structure. The depth of the works is achieved because it is a continuously performed experience.

In response to Hsieh's simplicity of structure I sought to eliminate formal elements such as narrative or music that might distract from the experience of duration in *How Long a Thing Takes*. Perhaps narrative and music could be considered rhythmic inventions that protect spectators from the bareness of the passage of time. Slow motion studio practice is often enhanced when accompanied by music. For much of the early studio work I set music to play for a given duration, which marked beginning and end points, allowing me to focus on the act of movement and the passage of time. Music with a slow rhythm sets the pace. Alternatively fast music provides an interesting counterpoint to the slowness, illuminating the multiplicity of duration. Working without music is a deeper challenge to attention. Silence forces the body to generate the rhythm and draws closer attention to time passing.

Silence aids concentration. If the performance is an invitation to think duration through experiencing it, the overall conditions of the performance must encourage continuous attention. Although the programme excused the audience from fully focusing on the performance, the audience chose to stick with the work, at least physically. As performance theorist Lara Shalson makes clear here is 'the opportunity to concentrate on a single, often very simple, idea or activity for an extended period of time, in the belief that such entanglement yields certain rewards' (Shalson 2012: 103). In the case of my performance the rewards are not something outside the work but rather the experience of concentration on time

passing. That resonates with Hsieh's work, which Heathfield calls 'an extended investigation of the nature of temporality and lived experience.' (Heathfield 2009: 17). Hsieh's long exploration invites others to question the nature of time through his performance. My work explicitly asks the audience to share in an investigation of temporality through the performance.

The continuous action of staying in slow motion or remaining locked in a cage in their own way draw attention to the limits of freedom. Continuity means that freedom happens through the condition of the past, which is continuous with the present through interpenetration. Hsieh himself elaborates on how *One Year Performance 1978-1979* or 'Cage Piece' had no topical message or spiritual drive but rather was an explicit practice centred 'on freedom of thinking and on letting time go by.' (Hsieh 2009: 328). The cage becomes a generative constraint that enables Hsieh to think. Along the same lines, the continuous slowness of *How Long a Thing Takes* allows for uncontrolled thinking. That it resists the contemporary acceleration and multi-tasking of everyday life need not be the instrumental rationale for slowness. For Hsieh the freedom of thought generated by the constraint of the cage is the reason he was able to continue, as he shows by writing that 'thinking gave me energy to go forward one day, and I would do it all over again the next day, and day after day, go on doing it for one year.' (Hsieh 2009: 328). Thinking in the experiential mode is directly connected to the environmental

situation the body finds itself in. The repetition of the same activity day after day is what makes Hsieh's thinking free.

Continuity does not mean that experience and duration operate through sameness; rather it affirms the differential connection between the multiple times of past, present and future. Continuity accounts for difference because of transformational endurance. Although it might sound contradictory, continuity is the predicate that makes the impression of discontinuity possible. If the nature of experience was actually discontinuous there would be no way to distinguish the past from the future. This position refers back to the Bergsonian notion that order precedes disorder. Disorder is order that the mind was not seeking.

Slow motion in *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* is the continuous action sustained throughout the duration of the piece. This continuity includes discontinuity. My abilities in the performance meant that the movement was shaky. The effort required by acute slow motion is a work of the entire body. It makes the body sweat. Some movements are so difficult in slow motion that they become close to impossible. In those moments a sudden jerk of the arm or slide of the foot is required to maintain balance. Although I trained for many hours a week in the studio for several months, I do not possess the skills of a dancer, and the slow motion was not entirely fluid. With the physical technique of a trained dancer, lighting tricks and a greater distance between the audience and the stage slow motion might appear constant; but even with such strategies there will always be

some jolts of movement no matter how minute. Each moment in which movement occurred at a perceptibly regular speed was a result of the effort to maintain the continuity of the performance. Those ruptures, as micro events, are results of continuity. Elizabeth Grosz explains how this occurs. 'Time is a continuity, though the events in time each have a duration of their own, and thus function through discontinuity, realignment, or rupture.' (Grosz 2004: 250). The visibility of discontinuities reveals the underlying continuity of experience. The tremors and sudden jolts are recuperated by the unavoidable continuity of duration. Discontinuity is an effect of the maintenance of continuity.

Passing Time

Continuously passing time is an active element of time-specificity. It takes time to perform and it takes time to experience performance. Alterations in tempo cause alterations of form and content. Passages of time need to be considered as constituent elements of dramaturgy. In the introduction to the edition 'On Duration' of *Performance Research*, Edward Scheer writes of durational performance that 'the completion of the task takes as long as it takes,' which of course is the way most theatre operates (Scheer 2012: 1). The action determines the time. I am interested here in performance that moves in the opposite direction where time determines action. Through rhythm dance is typically the more temporally determined performing art. The title of my performance comes from my supervisor, Professor

David Wiles, who pointed out that the French word *durée* has less to do with the typical English usage of a duration as a fixed measurement of time and more to do with what is between measurements, which he put as 'how long a thing takes'. The difference relates back to Bergson's response to Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, but is also clarified through the notion of duration itself as constantly passing time. For my performance, the 'thing' in 'how long a thing takes' is not a thing at all but duration itself. The point is not to measure how long it takes but rather to depart from the measurement to reveal that performance has a dynamic relationship with the passage of time.

The idea that in experience time is always passing reveals two inherent qualities of the time-specificity of performance present. First it reveals that performance is an art that occurs. Brian Massumi explains that this does not only apply to performance as he defines any kind of art as 'occurent', because it necessarily happens sometime specific and 'that when it happens something new transpires.' (Massumi 2013: 82). This bolsters the experientiality of time-specificity and helps make sense of the creative political potential of the temporality of performance. Passing time as a key element implies that performance is processual and emergent; as well as that performance is apprehended as it is being made. The intention of *How Long a Thing Takes* is to create the experience that Bojana Cvejić describes by explaining that '[t]o attend duration can only be an event of attunement,' by which she means that performance places attention on time itself

(Cvejić 2013: 327). Duration is encountered as ongoing. Cvejić brings up the crucial point that the passing of time is shared. Time-specificity complicates this by emphasizing that the time is shared through difference. The audience is together but by no means the same. The universality of temporality is only as definite as its heterogeneity.

The centrality of passing time in performance is explicit in Hsieh's practice. At a lecture at Hayward Gallery in London on the 20th of June, 2012, Tehching Hsieh began with three principles of his practice. 'Life is passing time. Life is a life sentence. Life is free thinking.' (Hsieh 2012). Hsieh first defines time as an instigator of life, then its constraint and thirdly what is produced by it. That time is passing gives us reasons to be humble and hopeful. In the interview between Hsieh and Heathfield in *Out of Now*, Hsieh repeats this idea and adds an effect of it. 'The only thing I'm sure about is that I'm still in the process of passing time, as I always am. Life becomes open and uncertain once again.' (Hsieh in Heathfield 2009: 338). Passing time is the constant production of novelty. Performance acquires its political potential on the back of this positivity. Vital operations of temporality can become apparent through performance.

Sharing Time Actively

The passing time of performance is not reducible to the regular speed or homogeneous units of clock time because it is shared by a multiplicity of attendees

with very different experiences. In *Postdramatic Theatre* Hans-Thies Lehmann suggests that this multiple temporality is one of the aspects that distinguishes contemporary experimental theatre practices, what he terms postdramatic, from the literary temporality of drama. 'It is a matter of the time no longer of one (reading) subject but of the shared time of many subjects (collectively spending time).' (Lehmann 2006: 153). Within this conception of shared time is the notion of radical difference through the shared act, because each attendee of the performance experiences that work from a different perspective. Different people have different kinds of skills, for example skills of interpreting or understanding, empathizing and so on, which they bring to bear on performance. Sharing time happens together differently. Time-specificity speaks to the positivity of being together differently. The unpredictability and indeterminacy of the experience of the audience is a crucial value of performance.

Hsieh's work has an understandably complex relation to the audience and the idea of sharing time due to his extended durations. The unbridgeable distance between Hsieh and the spectator brings awareness back to the labour of beholding. Hsieh suggests that '[f]or me the audience is secondary. However, without them, my performances couldn't exist.' (Hsieh 2009: 327). Hsieh did not need people watching him to go on doing what he was doing and yet he nonetheless suggests that his work is actualized each time someone sees or even considers one of them. During each one year performance Hsieh placed posters around downtown

Manhattan announcing the days during which the pieces were open to audiences. In the second work, 'Time Clock Piece', it was open for fourteen days (Heathfield 2009: 103). On those fourteen days of the year, it is possible to imagine people heading to Hsieh's studio to see him punch in, take a photo of himself and then leave. This alone is no spectacle. As Heathfield shows, Hsieh's work results in a 'de-privileging not only of the object, but also of the visual field and optical values.' (Heathfield 2009: 16). The audience is only invited for fourteen of three hundred sixty-five days of the performance because there really is very little to see. By doing something that is uncontainable within the usual social contracts of audience behaviour, Hsieh's diminution of spectacle in experience reinforces the primacy of temporality within his concept. The audience shares in the temporality of the performance with Hsieh through imagining his lived experience.

Like Hsieh's one year performances my work *How Long a Thing Takes* places the focus on temporality through reducing the importance of spectacle. This does not necessarily have the effect of internalizing the piece. My aim to create a conceptual performance mode led me to consider the possibility of an avisual performance. This allows the performance to function as a trigger for experiencing a concept as opposed to a situation in which a specific meaning is communicated from artist to audience.

This requires a notion of experience for the audience that is active. In his book *Action in Perception*, Alva Noë offers a framework for enactive perception

arguing that experience 'is thoughtful activity.' (Noë 2006: 205). The mind is engaged in the body and the world. As I will show in chapter two Bergson also defines the body to be a centre of action, not knowledge, and Noë's view updates Bergson's philosophy with contemporary cognitive science. Noë explains that experience 'is something we do;' not something we receive (Noë 2006: 216). Noë offers a way of defining experience that clarifies what audiences do during performance. The spectator is not a passive observer but an agent who is a part of an exchange. Spectators interact with performance. Noë even employs an artistic metaphor. 'Seeing, on the enactive view, is like painting.' (Noë 2006: 222). Experience includes the agency to interact with and create meaning in life and during performance. The audience choose how to engage. They do this together at the same time while also doing it differently. For example, an audience faced with repetition in performance will not all react the same way to seeing the same thing over and over again. Spectating is an external and internal activity of skill with an infinite range of possibilities. Like making, spectating can be creative and pleasurable action.

Repetition as Tension

Time-specificity redefines repetition in performance through temporal terms. One way of defining repetition is through objects, such as perceiving two of the same chairs repeating in space. This is spatial thinking and defines repetition as

simultaneity. Time-specificity questions how exactly an action is repeated in performance. Repetition in time is not the same as objects that repeat in actual or virtual space. Repetition in duration becomes a question of relation through memory. If duration means that the present is a constant becoming of newness, then nothing repeats, as Bergson shows. 'We could not live over again a single moment, for we should have to begin by effacing the memory of all that had followed.' (Bergson 1911: 6). Memory is required to establish a relation between the past and the present that will be termed a repetition, while those two or more acts themselves are different in kind.

In Tehching Hsieh's *One Year Performance 1980-1981* or 'Time Clock Piece', he punched in eight thousand seven hundred and sixty times, the amount of hours in one year, and was either early or late for only one hundred thirty-three (Heathfield 2009: 107). This performance is an act of extreme repetition. Almost every single hour of the entire year Hsieh placed the card into the clock, heard the sound, saw the time on the card, turned around and exposed a single frame of film then left the studio. Over and over again. While this is a kind of repetition the act does not repeat in the same way that the stamped times repeat on the cards.

The experience of performing repetition is different in kind from the simultaneity of objects in space. Following Bergson, Gilles Deleuze takes up similar questions in *Difference and Repetition*. As with Bergson's point that order precedes disorder, Deleuze shows how difference makes repetition possible. Deleuze even

explains how differences in kind can become differences of degree (Deleuze 1994: 2). In Hsieh's performance the spatial relation between each act is of a difference of degree, like number, while the experience of each repetition is a difference in kind.

How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration is also an act of sustained repetition. It is made up of a repetition of steps. The continuity of the act defies the ability to conceive of this performance as a perpetually ending and recommencing process. As Hans-Thies Lehmann writes, 'in theatre, there is no such thing as repetition. The very position in time of the repeated is different from that of the original.' (Lehmann 2006: 157). Repetition is a relation created through interpretation that is not independent of its perceiver. Lehmann therefore takes constant production of novelty to be at the core of duration and again the experience of the repetitive act of slow motion means that time-specificity's repetition cannot be conflated with simultaneity.

If repetition is a difference of degree superimposed on two or more acts that are different in kind, repetition in temporal terms can be defined as a conceptual relation that alters the tension of the force of duration. The time-specificity of establishing an explicit relation with the past adds or releases pressure to the sense of change that is occurring in experience. Temporal repetition is a work of memory that alters the flow of duration. Repetition brings attention toward the constant emergence of difference in kind through duration, or as Laura Cull puts it, 'repetition, like slowness, can really change our perception over time, such that what

we see is less and less a repetition of the same and more and more a repetition of difference.' (Cull 2012: 208). Her comparison between repetition and slowness brings up the way these two aesthetic components might be intertwined. Certainly for *How Long a Thing Takes*, repetition and slowness make up the core of the work.

Slowness

Slowness plays a pivotal role in the aesthetics and politics of contemporary performance. The experience of slowness on stage often ushers in the political because slowness refuses to accelerate along with modernity. In contemporary theatre slowness can have that effect without explicitly announcing it. Hans-Thies Lehmann names American avant-garde theatre director Robert Wilson's style a 'theatre of slowness' (Lehmann 2006: 156). His seminal work *Einstein on the Beach* is a five-hour opera created in collaboration with composer Philip Glass and choreographer Lucinda Childs in 1976. The production has been remounted multiple times with the most recent world tour in 2012. Wilson's slowness is a formal effect of his predominately visual aesthetic. In Wilson's work the present image is emphasised over the dramatic imperative of what will happen next. Slowness in other work might be more explicitly connected to resisting the temporal acceleration of capitalism as Cull and Heathfield note (Cull 2012: 191-195 and Heathfield 2004: 10). Heathfield contends that slowness questions the very nature of performance (Heathfield 2004: 10). In visual art Pamela Lee has observed that

slowness is related to creating conditions for the emergence of concept in experience because it alters perceptual habits and activates the imagination (Lee 2006: 121).

For *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, slowness is a technique of experience that encourages a perceptual and conceptual grasp of duration. The form of the performance was the result of an aim to achieve a purity of theatrical means by reducing the amount of activities in the work, such as narrative, text and music. This was intended to have the uncanny effect that Laura Cull describes as occurring in *September Roses* by Goat Island, which is to highlight the creativity of duration through inaction (Cull 2012: 205). Slowness in *How Long a Thing Takes* is a strategy of attention. There may be a lot happening in what looks like very little. Bergson writes that '[a]ttention is not a purely physiological phenomenon, but we cannot deny that it is accompanied by movements.' (Bergson 1913: 27). Attention is an embodied activity.

My practice of slow motion movement is a heightened awareness of the complex action of moving. My slowness is aiming toward a continuity of movement in which all parts of the body are in constant motion. To do so it takes the pelvis as the centre and allows impulses to travel outward to the extremities giving the effect of an unbroken flow of movement. Bergson describes the multiple movements of a beautiful dance, for example, concentrating into 'one single feeling of effort' (Bergson 1913: 9). This is what contains the simple continuity of duration through

the intensely complex heterogeneity of movements. The eyes are important. They must move as slowly as the body by looking closely at each thing they are focused on and travelling over the surface of the visual plane inch by inch.

Balancing in slow motion requires a sense of grace. While walking there are many moments in which all the weight of the body is carried on one leg as the pelvis rotates to bring the other leg forward. The arms have a tendency to move forward unnaturally with the right arm swinging forward as the right leg advances. This is due to the unusual amount of concentration dedicated to a simple movement that confuses coordination. This impulse has to be corrected. A normal gait consists of the alternate-side leg and arm advancing in the same forward or backward direction as a result of the motion originating in a twist of the pelvis.

In order to account for the experience of slow walking, I will describe it in detail. The body balances on the right leg first with the weight slowly transferring from the heel to toe, as the left leg is lifted off the ground and brought forward. The left foot that left the ground at the toe must meet the ground at the heel, and must therefore rotate upward as it is drawn forward. The right arm is behind the body, elbow bent with the hand slightly extended on an angle at the wrist. The elbow softens as it is drawn forward from the shoulder. The left arm that will be in front of the body also straightens as it is drawn backward. The head will turn slightly from left to right, eyes moving across the field of vision. This lengthy description is only a

small part part of the detail of a single step in slow motion and shows how the continuity is easily broken with a sudden correction to maintain balance.

The body in slow motion is not representing duration. The slow body is an effect of duration and it is an attempt to resist the distraction of speed. Bergson describes the way fluidity in the dancer's body relates to the passage of time. He explains that the reason for stops and starts are the effect of disconnected movements. For Bergson dance is about 'the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the future in the present.' (Bergson 1913:12). Above and beyond the joy of rhythm, Bergson is making a more important claim about performance providing the future for the audience. Performance announces its future. Bergson shows that the sudden corrective movements indicate a discontinuity of effort and a disconnection between parts of the body. While slow motion requires a great effort of concentration, it ideally manifests as ease throughout the body.

Experiencing slow motion over an extended duration, such as half an hour or more might create a rhythmic connection between the audience and the performer. By doing so the activities that are shared between them become emphasized through the performance. For *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* my intention is to bring the audience into the research of temporal thought. Bergson describes how an unspoken communication between performer and audience creates sympathy which means that

> if it stops for an instant, our hand in its impatience cannot refrain from making a movement, as though to push it, as

> though to replace it in the midst of its movement, the rhythm of which has taken complete possession of our thought and will. (Bergson 1913: 12-13).

Suggesting that if the performer were to stop the audience would continue the performance has important political implications regarding the active agency of the audience. The audience is partially responsible for making the work as it occurs. This suggests a conception of performance as having its own vital force.

There is an action of the performance that both performer and audience tune in to. The collective moments can be found even in the suddenly quick movements required to maintain balance and the shaking that results in particularly demanding moments of strength. One example can be seen in the beginning of the second half of *How Long a Thing Takes* when I crossed over a waist high barrier in slow motion. One spectator explained that this moment was full of drama and tension that he felt in his own body. The struggle with which I crossed the barrier was for him more a moment of success. Ruptures to the slowness, which again are the result of attempting to maintain continuity, point back to the multiplicity of duration and therefore the ways performance provides opportunities to be together differently. Experiencing duration is the way to think duration. Now that I have elaborated how duration and experience set up the framework of time-specificity in the present tense, I will now turn to conceptuality. Temporal thought emerges through the meeting points of Bergson, Tehching Hsieh, and *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*.

1.3 - Conceptuality

This third section of chapter one concerns how conceptuality emerges through performance. It builds on the ideas of duration and experience with specific reference to *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, in which the experience of performing duration was aimed at creating the conditions for the emergence of the concept of duration. In this way, it is more a conceptual performance than a durational one. Calling performance durational has little in common with time-specificity because the former is a typological label whereas the latter is an approach that includes theory and practice. As I have explained, durational performance designates work in which action determines time, while I have worked in the opposite direction.

Of course both *How Long a Thing Takes* and Hsieh's one year pieces could loosely be called durational performances but time-specificity resists categorization. Instead it aims at identifying temporal aesthetics as they emerge in Hsieh's work and as they are tested in my own work in order to pull out more general strategies that might occur in other performances as well. What makes these works not durational is that they are both structured around specific intervals of clock time, as opposed to durational performance and most theatre which is focused on performing an action to completion in a relatively flexible amount of time. Beyond that, as a set of practices and theories time-specificity has no one locale. It is rather the temporal

thought of performance, a gear to shift into when practices and theories necessitate clarity on how performance and duration are being articulated. In this way, both my performance and Tehching Hsieh's work will be interrogated in terms of conceptual scope. This involves identifying the relevant questions and problems these works bring to light, which are further illuminated through the philosophy of Henri Bergson.

By doing so I intend to make explicit an approach that is usually implicit. In my work and Hsieh's, clock time is explicitly used as a framing device for the performance. The audience knows that Hsieh will be doing or was doing his work for one year, and the audience for *How Long a Thing Takes* are informed by the programme that the performance will consist of two forty-five minute acts with a fifteen-minute interval. By indicating the future end point each work immediately attends to the immeasurably fluid duration in between. This is the concept of duration as a result of experience.

Meaning

Conceptuality in time-specificity relies on the assumption that no one meaning is attached to the lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh and *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. Their concepts are triggers for further thought. This is a result of conceiving of temporality through duration. The nature of time is a heterogeneity of forces, and the art work too is an ongoing mixture. In her 2010

article *How Time Can Dispossess: on duration and movement in contemporary art*, Bojana Kunst writes that '[t]ime becomes independent when it does not allow us to fill the emptiness with meaning.' (Kunst 2010). One aim of time-specificity is about allowing time to be independent, which is another way of expressing a conception of duration as pure temporality as opposed to the abstract spatiality of clock time. While a meaning closes down a work, its concept opens it.

So instead of one uncomplicated meaning, time-specificity delves into the difficult realm where concept and affect intertwine through performance as lived experience. The constant change of duration allows for thinking to continue and for interpretation to be a question rather than an answer. Time-specificity is about 'creating situations in which the hindrance of recognition and understanding of movement would be taken as a productive problem, a positive constraint and difficulty for the spectator from which thought begins.' (Cvejić in Cvejić and Pristaš eds. 2013: 133). Performance becomes a cognitive catalyst rather than a meaning container.

The ability of an artwork to operate with a catalytic concept though may be dependent on an expressible clarity on the part of some commentator. In the case of this text the commentator is myself but I share it in order to further a conversation that leads to more creation. So while I absolutely affirm the openness of all the works contained here I must make attempts at clarifying my position on the works of other artists. Of my own work it is even more necessary to humbly detail my specific

intentions so that future readers are enabled to consider and hopefully offer different options. This is an admittedly complex position. When taken as a whole my project of time-specificity is divided into a body of performances and a collection of documents. I necessarily must do my best to achieve the utmost clarity and transparency in all those areas because doing so is the only way others will have the ability to make use of this research. So when I position a given reading of concept of my own work it comes from a critical position alongside performance as opposed to an omniscient reflection. My gestures toward interpretation are intonations of possibilities.

Sympathy and Suggestion

For my version of time-specificity I take up the models of suggestion and sympathy between audience and performer in order to perpetually open the work. My critical activity in this writing is suggestion, for although I made the work another might have a more useful vantage point on it. My suggestions regarding the intention of the work will be affected by protectiveness that might make me unable to see a crucial aspect of the piece. As I examined above, Bergson's writing in *Time and Free Will* on the connection between the dancer and the spectator offers to time-specificity a model of sympathy and suggestion for understanding how concept is exchanged with the audience through the performance. By imagining that the audience might continue the gesture the dancer does not complete

Bergson reveals that sympathy between all attendees is a core element of the performance encounter. 'It is this mobile sympathy, always ready to offer itself, which is just the essence of higher grace.' (Bergson 1913: 13). What that means is that the most an artist can ask for is that the audience might sympathize with what is being done. The reciprocal action is for the artist to sympathise with the audience's different modes of attending.

Sympathy is the effect of poise within the performance. There is finesse in Hsieh's commitment and discipline through how he subdues his ego in the enactment of his work. The audience may sympathize with his experience. Hsieh is the surrogate for the beholder's imagination of Hsieh's sacrifices that he endured to complete his one year performances. This results in the formal grace of pose in the documentation through which the work is accessed now. There is creates sympathy between him and us that begins to open the work. Hsieh shows us time, not himself.

To follow Bergson's logic on this process is to insist on the artist's role situated not as manager but as guide. He writes that 'art aims at impressing feelings upon us rather than expressing them; it suggests them to us' (Bergson 1913: 16). What Bergson offers here is a less visual and more internal account of transmission through art, apposite in terms of both the practices of Tehching Hsieh and *How Long a Thing Takes*. As an aspect of lived experience conceptuality is a virtual mixture of affective and cognitive processes. These are sites of becomings with art. *How Long a Thing Takes* shows very little and shows it over and over again for the

same amount of time as a typical theatre show. By doing so the audience is given a chance to consider the duration of the show as an important and singular aspect of the experience of theatre.

For the audience, thinking with myself during *How Long a Thing Takes* will manifest in as many different ways as it will people who attend the works. The sympathy that allows suggestion as a result of the togetherness formed by the encounter can be a productive mode through which concepts can be shared. For Bergson the encounter between the audience and a work of art emphasizes the different perspectives that each bring to the work through the fact that they meet. With the example of poetry, Bergson writes that the reader 'thinks and sees with the poet' (Bergson 1913: 15). The poet offers a perspective. This with-ness must be conceived in terms of difference and not sameness.

The side of concept that relates to affect, the sympathy of the encounter, is potentially the initial measure of a performance's ability to hold the attention of the audience. In *How Long a Thing Takes*, one spectator told me afterward that she had felt dread at the beginning of the performance, knowing that this was it, a performance of one person walking in slow motion. Within several minutes she said that feeling was replaced by a calm set by the rhythm of the performance during which her mind slowed down and wandered within the work's conceptual terrain. She said that she lost sense of time and after the initial fear of boredom subsided time seemed to pass very quickly. In losing sense of clock time it may be that

duration is found. This occurrence cannot be forced. As a performer I have some power over the experience of the audience but not all. Sympathetic openness to suggestion may or may not occur in the audience. It is their choice. There will be some in the audience who will have sat through the most boring performance they will have ever seen.

Regarding the audience of *How Long a Thing Takes*, their connection to the concept was always going to be mediated through their relationship to myself. Given that about ten people attended, the audience of colleagues and friends cannot help but contextualize the work within the broader image they have of the maker. As Bergson writes, 'the feelings and thoughts which the artist suggests to us express and sum up a more or less considerable part of his history.' (Bergson 1913: 17). Which is to say that the person who suggests it inflects the concept's translation. As much as I tried to respond to Hsieh by taking myself out of the work, the material conditions of the performance meant that the audience all knew me, possibly giving the environment a more sympathetic tone. On the other hand the conditions may have induced a resistant incredulity toward the concept because of the intended formal purity of the work that may have come across as coldness. I leave this up to those who were there and those who imagine it now. In any case time-specificity indicates that the real people of the performance have an effect on the meaning of the work, which might encourage an active engagement with strategies to make such relationships useful.

Performing Time

While the last section complicates the notion of concept as it operates in performance, the following will simplify the ways in which both *How Long a Thing Takes* and Hsieh's work clearly engage with duration. My performance relates to how temporality operates in Hans-Thies Lehmann's *Post-dramatic Theatre*, which is about 'utilizing the specificity of theatre as a mode of presentation to turn *time as such* into an object of the aesthetic experience.' (Lehmann 2006: 156). It is useful that Lehmann points out the specificity of theatre as an environment for the appreciation of temporality, but I do not aim to objectify duration. In time-specificity duration is a given. In *How Long a Thing Takes*, I aim to emphasize the immediacy of duration by stripping other theatrical elements away besides slow repetitive movement and emphasizing duration by using a clock time structure. The performance invites the audience to think duration not as an object of experience, or an *a priori* package around which experience is ordered, but rather a constant flow that itself can be attended to without being objectified.

How Long a Thing Takes is rooted in a thought from Gilles Deleuze. In his book *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, Deleuze offers a philosophical reading of the work of the British Figurative painter. In a chapter on 'Painting Forces', Deleuze contemplates the limits of painterly presentation (Deleuze 2003: 56-64). He makes specific reference to the way Bacon paints the scream instead of that which causes it (Deleuze 2003: 60-62). This leads Deleuze toward the non-visible realm of vital

forces. 'Can life, can time, be rendered sensible, rendered visible?' (Deleuze 2003: 63). Deleuze is suggesting that the problem Bacon was addressing in his painting was the difficulty of painting that which is invisible. Through this analysis, Deleuze ends the chapter with a provocation that I take up with *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*. 'To render time sensible in itself is a task common to the painter, the musician and sometimes the writer. It is a task beyond all measure and cadence.' (Deleuze 2003: 64). Deleuze's key is that time is not rendered visible but rendered sensible. In my performance the strategy of disengaging the visible was a result of trying to make the invisible more sensible. *How Long a Thing Takes* works toward enabling duration to be sensed.

In this pursuit my work is contextualised with Tehching Hsieh who writes that 'the concept of my work is passing time' (Hsieh 2009: 336). This concern can be seen in each individual performance. The 'cage piece' invites notions of freedom and generative constraints; both which are political implications of duration. 'Time clock piece' reveals how capitalism appropriates all time. Hsieh's 'outdoor piece' returns to the idea of freedom through exploring human animality. 'Rope piece' questions intimacy and the ways people share time. The 'no art piece' and 'thirteen year plan' are more complex conceptual reckonings of disappearance and the creative differences between art and life. While each of his performances work on their own as singular pieces it is more useful for time-specificity to see them as one body of work united by the exploration of time. Heathfield explains how by

performing these works Hsieh makes himself into 'a sentient witness of time.' (Heathfield 2009: 11). Hsieh suggests his perspective as a witness to duration and we have the ability to sympathize with him.

Art and Life

The extended durations of Tehching Hsieh's one year performances conceptually confront the difference between art and life. While they still have beginnings and endings like any piece of theatre, the time in between is so grand in scale that it completely alters how art relates to life. There is no interval and there is no backstage. The pieces are so long that they become life. With any performance life is what makes it possible, but in Hsieh's yearlong pieces the temporal frame that encapsulates the work is not an evening but an entire life. Hsieh explains that each piece offers 'different perspectives of thinking about life, but they are all under the same premise: life as a life sentence.' (Hsieh 2009: 324). The year is important because it frames each piece within the magnitude of a whole life. This is a scale most performance only achieves through narrative jumps. In Hsieh's work it is a modulated version of his daily life that is the performance.

Hsieh confronts the difference between art and life by forcing the two to overlap during extended durations beyond typically imagined and experienced limits of art, not by collapsing them into one. Hsieh maintains that the works are not intended to suggest that no such separation exists between art and life (Hsieh 2009:

334). Because his performances are concerned with the passage of time they engage with the scale of life. This causes his art to overlap with life. Although it is not a blurring, the life quality that pervades his one year performances is a function of the biological and cosmological rhythms that frame his work. For Hsieh one year is important because it is a major single unit of human time and the duration for the earth to revolve around the sun (Heathfield 2009: 319). Although Hsieh distinguishes between art time and life time, the year long framing device problematizes the relationship between art and life as a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind.

The difference of degree between life time and art time in Hsieh's performances functions through his embodied thinking. His goal was to give form to the abstract work he was doing in the studio and make thinking into art (Hsieh 2009: 319). He did actually complete these huge plans. The potency of the concepts of the performances is only achieved through the fact of their reality. The idea is nothing without Hsieh's embodied thinking. Concept is a product of lived experience.

The way Hsieh fits art into life prevents his work from becoming insignificantly singular. The pieces are immutable because of their focus and scale. That he has to do them does not limit the performances to one application. Hsieh explains that 'my works do not have to be done at a specific time or site.' (Hsieh in Heathfield 2009: 324). All performances must have a place and moment but Hsieh's point is about

the unimportance of the immediate environmental context in relation to the meaning of the work. A reading of his work in this way would limit its potential in the same way as identifying these performances as social commentary. Hsieh does not want to be considered 'a political artist', instead he explains that he is 'inclined to observe the universal circumstances of human beings instead of pointing to issues.' (Hsieh 2009: 330). He positions himself as an observer rather than an instructor. The importance of Hsieh's lifeworks is that they have the ability to conceptually travel from the general to the specific without that specificity constraining the work into one reading. That duration is a central aspect of experience is the concept that underlies the work. The spectator is free to imagine more detailed and specific notions from that.

The ending of Hsieh's performances testifies to their life quality. In a sense Hsieh ended because he had nothing more to do. Waste and creative lack even became material for Hsieh's performances in the later works. In the last yearlong piece, *One Year Performance 1985-1986*, 'no art piece', 1985-1986, Tehching Hsieh vowed to have nothing to do with art, and rather to 'just go in life.' (Hsieh 2009: 296). This is an artist revealing the fragile process of creation. It is the perfect completion of a series of works about time as it removes the artist and art to leave time itself. He used the fact that he had no more ideas as the idea of the piece, because running out of ideas is a part of life time and art time. 'Lack of creativity is a negative thing for artists, but in my art concept it needs to be shown. […] With or

without creativity, it is all about passing time.' (Hsieh 2009: 336). Hsieh's performances present a complicated pose toward time. He observes duration's magnitude.

Freedom

Freedom as a critical aspect of experience is the political implication underlying the attention to the passage of time for time-specificity. The indeterminacy of art time makes it free time. Thinking duration in *How Long a Thing Takes* means confronting the determinism implied by clock time. Bergson's major thesis in *Time and Free Will* is that if we attend to immediate experience there is some certain freedom. If duration creates constant novelty then there is always the opportunity to differ. 'It is the force of time that makes free will possible. We could even say that free will *is* the force of time.' (Guerlac 2006: 81). Freedom is not control or power but rather a product of the temporal interval within which thought can be embodied. 'Consciousness, by definition, already means freedom, i.e., the interruption of the mechanical order of necessity and the possibility of acting otherwise.' (Guerlac 2006: 54). Hesitation offers the opportunity to find a different way to act. For Bergson freedom is situated around the moment of performance as a relation between myself and what I am doing (Bergson 1913: 219). I am not determined to repeat myself. The relevance of Bergson for this time-specificity of

performance is that it reveals freedom as inherent to experience, fully aware of how constrained freedom always is.

In Hsieh's lifeworks freedom is a concept that is cultivated through limitation. Heathfield writes that Hsieh lives 'the notion of freedom from within his constraint.' (Heathfield 2009: 25). That Hsieh finds freedom in limitation reveals that the concept of freedom is something given in lived experience as opposed to a state that one seeks to attain. Because of that Hsieh's art makes no attempt to represent or explain freedom. As Heathfield argues, 'as it arises in duration, for freedom to be free it must continue to move in the space of the unrepresentable, it must be unstilled and unheld by the thought that would tame and contain it.' (Heathfield 2009: 29). Freedom is therefore a confounding principle of life that is possibly beyond the limits of epistemology but nevertheless unavoidable in duration. For Hsieh to commit to doing those five yearlong lifeworks, the sacrifice of his own freedom questions norms of what kinds of freedom are possible through art and life. That Hsieh can choose to limit his freedom is what makes him free. By giving up control, Hsieh produces a freedom through constraints that are generative.

Documenting Duration

Documentation is a final constraint that allows work to continue. A performance that is no longer occurring may be made visible through documentation, even if that performance relies upon disappearance as an aesthetic

strategy to emphasize time as a force. In the beginning of *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, three painted symbols representing space, number and clock time were painted over so that their partial erasure would leave a gap within which duration as a force could appear. That the surface of those paintings was the same white as the costume worn by myself performing is to suggest that the body is the surface on which duration appears. The final activity of the piece is to rotate the painted flats leaving an unmarked surface that is intended to open a space for freedom within the concept of duration. These suggestions rely upon a dismantling of the primacy of the visual in order to emphasize the forces of the temporal that act without representation. There is nothing of time to be seen. The visual progression of the performance suggests this by offering less and less to see as time passes. My action encourages creativity by subtracting legible signs. In this way I intended to end my performance by undoing it.

Hsieh's traces are even more withholding as they disclose their difference from the actions that created them. *Out of Now: the Lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh* displays the many items that were created by the performance of Tehching Hsieh. For him 'the document is secondary.' (Hsieh 2009: 326). The lived experience is the core of the work that enables its concept to be transmitted. Hsieh holds that the performances can be understood through the imagination as well as they could if they were seen (Hsieh 2009: 327). The performances therefore become live again later through transmission within media or by word of mouth. The documents of the

one year performances are tokens of substantiation that are different in kind from performance itself.

Tehching Hsieh 1986-1999, Hsieh's final lifework, is a thirteen-year plan that attempts to make the artist invisible. Hsieh's goal was 'to disappear.' (Hsieh 2009: 338). Before starting the piece Hsieh released a statement saying that he would make art during this time but not show it publicly and he returned thirteen years later on the first of January 2000 to say that he had survived (Heathfield 2009: 300 and 315). With this piece Hsieh suggests that survival is a creative act. Here again is the important overlap between life and art. Hsieh returns the freedom possible in making art to life. Hsieh also shows that art need not be seen to be art. The invisibility reinforces the concept. The book *Out of Now* offers an incredible amount of documents for each work. Significantly the years between 1986 and 2000 are each documented as a blank page. Compositional strategies of documentation such as these employ the same creativity used to make the performances. Erasure is legible in both. Following the performance the document continues to suggest concept but specified for the conditions of the page.

Documenting *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* also required the creation of techniques to express duration in a different way to those techniques used for its performance. Because documentation is an act of materialization, it is a spatial apparatus. If the document spatializes duration, the document is of clock time. Through this logic it is clear that the video

documentation of *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration* must necessarily expose itself as a spatializing apparatus.

The video contained in the DVD in this thesis consists of the two acts of the performance split into twenty-five equal parts displayed simultaneously on one screen. Twenty-five is the greatest amount of split-screens that still allow movement to be visible in each when shown together. The entirety of one act could be seen in less than two minutes. Conceptually the video offers a different version of duration than the one suggested by the performance. The distinctions between the past, present and future blur in the simultaneity. The documentation exposes its ability to juxtapose material that spatializes the continuous flow of duration that marked the performance as experienced. The document uses simultaneity in the same way the performance uses slow motion, in order to render the concept of duration able to be experienced. Documenting performance reveals significant questions regarding the nature of performance and temporality, which is the focus of chapter two.

Conclusion

In this first chapter on the present tense of time-specificity of performance, I have shown how art performs duration. By using Bergson's duration as a qualitative multiplicity, I teased out how temporality is transformed by performance. The experience of time passing in my practice and the works of Tehching Hsieh creates the conditions for the emergence of temporal concepts. The continuity of

performance is met with the tensioning of duration through repetition. Freedom is to be found in the constraints of clock time that ultimately never prevent the indeterminate activity of time.

2 - Past

Performing Memory Documents

How to perform the past? The time-specificity of performance in the past tense is concerned with documentation and memory. The past of performance is a part of the present as the past returns through performances that make use of memory and documentation. Time-specificity of performance past investigates practices of accessing and storing ephemeral events in order to elaborate a new approach to documentation as memory. In this chapter time-specificity indicates new models for making documentation as well as theorising how to work with documents. The method is to consider documentation as memory because both are routes to the past. As the first chapter shows how clock time can create the sensation of duration, the work of this chapter is to demonstrate how performance can create the sensation of the past.

To pursue the goal of considering documentation through the idea of memory the structure of this chapter follows the sequential development of my research. Unlike the first and third chapters that are structured according to a thematic development of time-specificity, in which I attempt to balance my own

practice, other art and theory together in order to develop notions of time-specificity step-by-step, this chapter is divided between those different modes of research. I shall cover sequentially the work of another group of artists, a literature survey, an analysis of philosophy and finally my own practice. Instead of losing the overall sense of time-specificity through focusing on different elements, this chapter demonstrates the functionality of time-specificity as a methodology itself. This chapter shows how a focus on performing temporality drives a research practice toward unique modes of knowledge. Problems and solutions are worked through step by step in this chapter to demonstrate, document and therefore remember the research process. While the first chapter and third chapter develop insights on performing temporality through generating a continuous collision of elements, this chapter constitutes a document of memory. It performs a past.

The first section of this chapter is devoted to Every House Has a Door's performance *9 Beginnings*, an explicit performance of documentation. This performance opens up the potential for a creative approach to working with the past of performance. Next I explore a wide variety of positions on performance documentation in order to position my time-specific perspective within a context. With an understanding of the issues at stake in documenting performance both in theory and in practice, I then pursue Bergson's concept of memory for insights into issues of documentation. Taken together, my understandings of key ideas on documenting performance, the making process of *9 Beginnings* and the framework

of Bergsonian memory make up the ground for my own performance *2: Untitled*. The final section of this chapter is concerned with how I developed time-specific modes of performing the past through memory and documentation. I will now offer a more thorough introduction of each element in the order that they will appear as sections of this chapter.

9 Beginnings was a commission by the AHRC Performing Documents project 'Remake' strand that asked artists to make work with other artists' archives. Every House Has a Door consists of director Lin Hixson and dramaturge Matthew Goulish collaborating with different artists on each project. Hixson and Goulish are formerly of Goat Island, the Chicago-based experimental theatre group. For *9 Beginnings* Hixson and Goulish brought together two performers, an assistant director and two choreographed stagehands, one of whom was myself. The performance consisted of nine beginnings of nine performances by nine different artists or groups found in several performance archives in Bristol. The work was initially performed at Arnolfini in Bristol during the Remake Symposium in September 2012, and then again in Chicago at Gray Arts Center, University of Chicago in January 2014 along with another piece, *9 Beginnings Chicago*, with beginnings from the performance archives of Chicago's Randolph Street Gallery. *9 Beginnings* offers a useful case study for a time-specificity of the past as it explicitly performs archives. The piece also builds on the use of clock time as a structuring device. Much of the action in the

performance is structured around performing a given action within a specified number of counted seconds.

The second section of this chapter is an extended review of literature surrounding performance documentation (published in the Australian Journal *Performance Matters* - Wakefield 2015). My aim in this survey is to explore the temporal implications of the divergent perspectives on documenting performance, which emerges as a major concern of the discipline of performance studies in the last twenty years. There are strengths and weaknesses of each perspective, as well as varying degrees of how theoretical or practical each approach is. The survey ends by incorporating a wider variety of conceptions of form and ideas of transformation in art in order to make space for a time-specificity of the past that is as active as memory.

To explore memory in philosophy I look to *Matter and Memory* (1912 [1896]), Bergson's next major work after *Time and Free Will* (1913 [1889]). In French the work is subtitled *Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit*, which is literally translated as essay on the relation of the body to the spirit. Bergson sought to address the classic metaphysical problem of the relationship between the body and the mind. Bergson argues in the book that memory is what connects body and mind. Because *Matter and Memory* uses temporal thinking to understand how the past persists in the present, it offers conceptual frameworks for issues of performing the past. Bergson's approach is always to consider questions in terms of time before space. He locates

the past not in a spatial inside or outside but rather in a temporal mode of thinking so that memory is how the past is accessed (Grosz 2004: 178). His approach offers an activation of the past.

Among Bergson's key contributions is the idea that the body is a 'centre of action' as opposed to a centre of knowledge (Bergson 1912: 5). The focus on action implies that memory is embodied and performed. Bergson analyses different kinds and degrees of memories such as habit memory and pure memory. He examines the ways in which action and memory have virtual and actual manifestations. As *Matter and Memory* offers a way to see the body and mind related through memory, time-specificity of performance in the past tense shows a new relation between performance and documentation also through memory. With this theoretical armature, I then create my next practical work, and offer a narrative of its development.

2: Untitled was a solo work performed in the Boilerhouse at Royal Holloway, University of London on the afternoon of 8th May 2013. The piece was also performed at Lapsody Festival in Helsinki, Performance Studies International conference in Stanford University in California and at Robert Wilson's Watermill Centre on Long Island, New York. The fullest manifestation of the piece was its London incarnation and so I will focus on that version.

Before the piece began, tables exhibiting objects used to create the performance were exhibited in a gallery setting, and the audience was invited to

peruse the objects (listed in the appendix). The performance itself was just under one hour long and consisted of a series of texts performed alongside the choreography of a Roger Federer tennis match. The choreography consisted of copying the movements of Roger Federer in a tennis match he played against Janko Tipsarevic on 6th November 2012, which I attended at the O_2 Arena in London. The video of the tennis match that I copied was visible to the audience. Throughout the entire performance I attended to both the speaking and the movements.

The texts began with Marcel Proust's *Swann's Way*, specifically the section on the Madeleine that triggers memory (Proust 1996: 51-55). While still performing the tennis choreography I then spoke interviews with friends and family of Antonin Artaud. Each person offers a differing account of the same person, with conflicting views on Artaud's madness, religion, drug use, loyalties, humour and personality (Marowitz 1977: 66-112). The final text was a short selection from *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 1912: 297-298). Each spoken passage was remembered through a different method. The Proust was entirely memorized, but the Artaud texts were alternatively shown on video, read from the page and listened to by the performer on headphones in order to be repeated out loud in real time. Each text was introduced with the name of the author, the title and a page number reference. Those were the materials used to form *2: Untitled*. What follows is the practice and thinking that led to the work, beginning with a project that explored beginnings.

Throughout this chapter I will demonstrate how the temporality of the past can be performed.

2.1 – *9 Beginnings*

Every House Has a Door's *9 Beginnings* is a time-specific performance that makes the past appear. The work realises the beginnings of past performances. Instead of attempting to present an accurate re-enactment, *9 Beginnings* aims toward a fidelity to the previous works through creative alteration. Every House Has a Door approaches documentation of past performances as materials to be creatively actualised as opposed to using documents to secure certain pasts. The dramaturgy of the piece preserves of the past through transformation. This performance of the past is not unlike remembering, in which the present image of the past is constantly differentiated from the past event. The time-specificity at work in *9 Beginnings* is an explicit and creative actualisation of the past. In this section I will analyse how Every House Has a Door works with records as scores. I will proceed to show how the past is activated through creative response and alteration, creating a sense of a genealogy of performance material. The overall objective is to explain how Every House Has a Door's process of making *9 Beginnings* proposes an active relationship between performance and documentation.

Records are Scores

What sorts of documents are used to make and archive performance? In *9 Beginnings* Every House Has a Door used video recordings of nine performances by nine different artists or groups found in the Live Art Archives in Bristol to make a new piece. The decision to work with videos as source material is key. If video or photographic documentation of performance is considered time-specifically, these kinds of documents can be called records. Videos and photographs record a past event. Records are useful for viewing a performance that cannot be attended live. The innovative strategy of Every House Has a Door is to take up these supposedly indexical images as materials to be performed. Every House Has a Door treats the video as text-based theatre practitioners treat the play script. The video records become guides for enactment. The process of making *9 Beginnings* considers records as scores, or documents that are to be performed. The treatment of documents by Every House Has a Door reveals the potentially porous status of performance documentation.

Scores and records document performance at specific levels of detail. The position of the camera might be too close to the stage to take in the whole image, or might be too far away to allow details to be seen. The score might explain that a certain performer enters the space without explaining how. Although I have said that *9 Beginnings* starts by using video records as scores, it is possible to trace several steps of scoring before the videos. Considering the making process of Every

House Has a Door's piece from different levels of magnitude helps reveal the many important choices that might otherwise not be apparent.

The initial score of *9 Beginnings* may be the concept to use videos to make a performance. That score brings about another score of the selection of nine videos. Each of these steps involves revealing creative decisions that might be documented. Looking at the micro and macro elements that make up the performance will result in the production of different scores. At a macro level is the score as the commission from the Performing Documents Project asking artists to respond to other artists' archives. Every score is as valid and together they make up a heterogeneous whole of the performance. These incorporate difference into the performance rather than fracture it and maintain the cohesion of the parts of the work.

Focusing in closer, the score of the concept had to do with beginnings. During the composition process, director Lin Hixson categorized the nine video records into three separate kinds of beginning. Preamble or preparation is when the artist introduces what is to come within a separate dramaturgical structure from the rest of the work. Ritual is when an act is performed in order to draw the attendees into the environment of the piece. In media res is when a performance begins right in the middle of an action that has already begun. Hixson and Goulish then used each beginning as a section of three, and *9 Beginnings* started with three rituals, then three beginnings in media res and finally three preambles. Zooming in produces a document that specifies the artists and titles of the video records of

performance. Zooming out creates a document that provides overarching concept of beginnings in the archive. There will be multiple scores for every performance lurking virtually. What the process of *9 Beginnings* shows is that a single document fails to record or score the multiplicity of a making process. Scores were used as a way to mark development throughout the studio composition process, but they had to be continually rewritten in order to reflect the evolving performance. Simply explaining that nine beginnings are being performed, for example, says very little about the manner in which Every House Has a Door actually staged these works.

Creative Response

Goat Island, the precursor company to Every House Has a Door, developed a method of working with pre-existing performances that they call 'creative response': make a new work, but one 'that would not have existed without the work you are responding to.' (Cull 2012: 217). It is an artistic version of a critical response. A creative response is a new performance that attempts to echo a 'miraculous moment' from a previous piece (Goat Island 2009). The new work is related to the piece being responded to not in terms of sameness but difference. The concept of creative response is an insightful way of understanding how the score was realised. Each beginning in the video records were chances for a creative response.

The second beginning is a piece by Leicester Polytechnic Department of Performing Arts from 1990 entitled *Inventing the Logic in Chaos*. It is a dance for

approximately 12 performers wearing flippers. Pairs of flipper wearing dancers move around the space while holding a large poster board cloud. They drop the clouds, do some movements, and then blow bubbles. Lin Hixson and Matthew Goulish wanted the choreographed stagehands, Annalaura Alifuoco and myself, to find a way to perform this dance with only the two of us. We watched the video many times and notated what we saw in it. It looked to be a simple floor pattern of each pair moving alternately forward, backward or sideways. Since there were only two of us we decided to focus on whichever pair was in focus and made a score of which direction they moved and how many steps they took. We wrote the score on the back of a cloud we made and attempted to begin learning the movements.

Once we scored the dance on the back of the cloud the work by Every House Has a Door became very different from the Leicester Polytechnic version. The score is a simple piece of writing, '5 back, 4 left, 6 right, 4 back, 5 forward […]'. It is most likely a completely different score from the one the students used in their performance, if any. Because our work differentiated itself in so many ways, it is more a response than a re-enactment. Scores are catalysts for the imagination. They instigate possibilities of manifestation. The performance is as much a response to the score as a performance of the score. In *9 Beginnings* the programme lists the sources of the performance. During the work each beginning is announced with the year of its previous version. Crediting in this transparent manner discloses the initial piece. The creative response references its source and allows the maker freedom to

make new choices. The will to capture the miraculous moment of a previous work might necessitate a creative response that is alteration of the the previous work.

Alteration

By choosing creative response as staging method Every House Has a Door gains the potential to alter the works that are being referenced. Some changes were needed to make *9 beginnings* cohere while others were made in order to more closely approximate the effects of the previous performances. The seventh beginning came from Lone Twin's performance *Walk With Me Walk With Me Will Somebody Please Walk With Me*, from a VHS tape mislabelled as *Sledgehammer Songs*. This beginning is a list of seven parts that includes an acappella rendering of the Bruce Springsteen song *Thunder Road*. In the Lone Twin version an English man had sung the song. In *9 Beginnings* a Croatian woman would now sing it. This beginning also includes a slow movement and some texts during which the performers say their names. Both the song and the names required careful decisions about how to alter the piece to maintain the integrity of both versions.

Director Lin Hixson's first question was whether the song should be changed to one that would have the same meaning to Selma Banisch as *Thunder Road* has to Gregg Whelan. While this would maintain the integrity of the relation between performer and material, it might depart from the original so much as to create mistaken perceptions of Lone Twin's work. After trying out multiple options and

several discussions a compromise was reached. Because the importance of the sung section was its long length, structure and content rather than its specific meaning to the performer, it was decided that Selma Banisch would sing *Thunder Road*. Springsteen's music overall and *Thunder Road*'s themes of protection along a journey are an identifiable motif of Lone Twin's body of work. The song specifically stood out because of the comedy created due to its length of almost six minutes, with several pauses in which the performer appeared to be imagining an instrumental section. During these pauses the other performer, believing the song had ended would almost begin to speak, only to be interrupted by yet another Springsteen verse. Every House Has a Door chose to attend to certain elements of the performance, and by doing so eliminate some aspects of the Lone Twin version.

With the names of the performers what appeared most essential was the specific performance style of Lone Twin. In *Walk With Me Walk With Me Will Somebody Please Walk With Me* one of the first words uttered are 'I love you. I hope that doesn't make you feel uncomfortable but I have to say it. Good evening, I love you.' In the video record Lone Twin speak softly and create a sense of intimacy through the performance. Every House Has a Door decided that the dominant dramaturgical structure was that of the performers being themselves. Thus if *9 Beginnings* aimed to foster a similar intimate environment it would have to use the real names of its performers, Selma and Sebastian. By doing so *9 Beginnings* affirms an interpretation of the Lone Twin performance that changes the words of the

previous version in order to create a new composition that is more sympathetic to the preceding performance than repeating the same text.

This example implies that the authentic presence of a performance is a function of how the material of performance is attended to. It is not only what is done on stage but also how it is done, which includes how the performers feel about it. An authentic creative response might need to change some aspects of the work. Authenticity and presence may be important aspects of performance, but if they are used to limit the evolution of a form through time, they become less about integrity and more about turning an experience into an object that can be possessed, capitalized and repeated. In *9 Beginnings* Every House Has a Door redefines authenticity as a fluid relation between the past and the present. The past performance is given its time-specificity as a past work that the present performance is responding to. In time-specificity authenticity is valued through differentiation as an act of integrity.

The quality of integrity in *9 Beginnings* is a result of the community-making ethos of the Lin Hixson and Matthew Goulish of Every House Has a Door. Their performance practice is implicitly driven by an ethical impulse. They situate their work within a diverse network of artists and create value out of expressing those connections. What makes *9 Beginnings* important for time-specificity is that the work is clear about the performances coming from that past and having the ability, still, to generate new performance. The past is continued in the present through affirming

the past times and dates of the beginnings, at the same time as performing them in different and new ways. It is not the stereotype of faithful re-enactment that attempts to get everything right. *9 Beginnings* affirms the creative potential of the past in the present.

Genealogies

Every House Has a Door proclaims the positivity of the past through focusing on beginnings rather than endings. At a basic level *9 Beginnings* is a performance that is constantly starting. It is always becoming new by folding more temporalities into its duration. During the composition process dramaturge Matthew Goulish told a story of John Cage's notoriously difficult *Freemen Etudes* and Irvine Arditti, one of the few violin players who had achieved playing it. Arditti had explained that the only way to play the piece was to imagine it constantly starting and restarting over again. This resonates with Bergson's notion of the constant emergence of the new in duration. Because Every House Has a Door is re-beginning past performances, *9 Beginnings* sets itself into a genealogy of performance. What came before makes something new possible.

This temporal interpenetration demonstrates how *9 Beginnings* is presenting the past by performing something new in the present. The past makes certain presents possible. The time-specificity of *9 Beginnings* indicates that there might be a passing down of material from performance to performance. Time-specificity of

the past of performance helps explicate genealogies of performance. The term genealogy is useful because it folds vitality into history. It accounts for performance as a living creative practice. This genealogical approach to performance rejects the possessive notions of presence by taking account of the uniqueness of the totality of the event and that there is always something that can be passed down. Each remains individual while maintaining a connection to the familial context.

Determining connections within genealogies can be a creative act. As with the ways in which scores function on certain levels of magnification, so might genealogical connections be redrawn on specific levels. The project of time-specificity, for example, expresses resonances between performances around their similar use of time as a determining feature of the work, even though in other aspects these works look very different. The genealogical approach pays attention to making processes and public performances. These genealogies speak of the elements of a work. Those elements include not only what people said and did but also conditions, structures and qualities of the event.

Genealogies of performance are not fixed throughout time. Returning to a past performance might highlight elements of the piece that seemed at the time to be inconsequential. Carl Lavery's account of his return to a document to remember a performance inspires my genealogical approach, as he explains that the document reveals aspects of the piece that may not have been visible in the performance (Lavery 2010: 44). Lavery stresses the fallibility of experience and shows how having

been there does not secure an authoritative reading. Returning to a past performance might redraw its genealogies. This shows how both making and spectating are heterogeneous. It also emphasises the creativity with which the past is made present, exemplified so diligently in *9 Beginnings*. Every House Has a Door's performance sketches out a kind of family of performances, identifying elements of similarity and difference.

Conclusion

9 Beginnings indicates several crucial areas of research for time-specificity of the past of performance. Its creative response method of bringing about records as scores offers a useful approach for working with and staging performance documentation. Their strategies of alteration indicate a kind of genealogy at work in performance contexts. Every house Has a Door also builds upon the time-specificity of the present. To choreograph transitions in the performance, director Lin Hixson experiments with different micro-durations and eventually settles on a precise time, for example a pause of ten seconds rather than twelve before picking up a pair of flippers and walking to the other side of the stage in sixteen seconds. This meticulous attention to detail continuously creates the sense of duration. *9 Beginnings* is therefore a pivotal example of how time-specificity can be used to elucidate performance practices that are made with a specific focus on time of not only the present but also the past. The time-specificity of performance past in *9*

Beginnings is that Every House Has a Door makes use of the past as a creative element of the work.

2.2 – Performance Documentation

Literature Review

Disappearing Presence Performing Live

The questions surrounding the documentation of performance have generated a vast amount of discourse. Photography and writing are often the primary mediums academics use to access performance outside their own spatiotemporal location. Discourses about performance and documentation often lean into philosophical territory as researchers find themselves needing to clarify what it is exactly that is being documented and the relationships performance has to photography and writing.

In the field of performance studies Phelan's 1993 book *Unmarked: the Politics of Performance* has shaped much of the debate about how performance is documented and what it is. She writes that performance 'becomes itself through disappearance' (Phelan 1993: 146). It is an axiom of Phelan's theory of ephemerality that what once was now is lost. She posits that the critic's work has the potential to erase the performance. She states that any complete documentation of performance

itself is impossible precisely in order to stake an ideological position regarding performance's radical stance against commodification. Phelan's is an ontological argument based on a perception of the archive, gallery, and museum as structures of capital. It defines performance as something that cannot be sold because it is gone before it is over. Although Phelan's point about disappearance has come to dominate appraisals of her subtle and nuanced work, she goes on to make important points about how different kinds of writing can retain the ephemerality of performance.

In direct opposition to Phelan's privileging of disappearance is Philip Auslander's 1999 book *Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture*. He takes issue with any notion of directness in the experience of performance before it is written about. His argument is that mediatization, which for Phelan erases performance, is already functioning as an inherent aspect of experience. Performance is already mediatized, so documenting it cannot be said to alter it.

Advancing this argument in a 2006 article titled 'The Performativity of Performance Documentation', Auslander defends the role of documentation as a formative part of performance rather than a secondary practice. He states that documentation can be the end goal of performance, referencing Kathy O'Dell who argued that 'performance is the virtual equivalent of its documentation', a reciprocal approach that perhaps deviates from Auslander's overall argument for an aesthetic of mediatization (O'Dell 1997: 3). Auslander goes further, suggesting that some

performances are even staged in ways that configure documentation as more important than live spectatorship. Unconvinced by an intersubjective definition of performance as a transaction between performer and audience, Auslander posits that if performance were really about this relationship then documentation would not omit the audience, as it does in most cases (Auslander 2006: 7).

Amelia Jones has written extensively on the issue of presence and its role in both performance and documentation. Like Auslander, Jones seeks to problematize the notion of an original and pure performance. In a 1997 article, ''Presence' in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation', she defends the position of only being able to view performance as documentation because the differences 'are largely logistical rather than ethical or hermeneutic' (Jones 1997: 11). For Jones, whether one attends to performance or documentation makes little if any difference because 'neither has a privileged relationship to the historical 'truth' of the performance' (Jones 1997: 11).

In her extensive article on Marina Abramović's *The Artist is Present*, published in 2011, Jones expands on her earlier work, arguing that the artist is not actually present if we accept that presence is something that cannot be documented or commodified. For Jones, an art historian, performance must logically be able to be preserved. Sympathetic to Jones, and yet still prioritizing the phenomena of experience, is Simon Bayly, who in his 2011 book *Pathognomy of Performance* reveals the complexity of the issue, writing that while ''presence' is never coexistent

with its experience [. . .] the 'liveness' of human (co)-presence is still something profoundly and doggedly meaningful' (2011: 57). Bayly admits that the relation between performance and presence is not simple. Perhaps the significance of performance lies in this reality. His perspective is persuasive unless one conceives an evolutionary process whereby performance has become a subgenre of photography or film more easily reproduced mechanically for widespread dissemination. Jones and Auslander rightly reveal the non-original and already mediated operations of performance. While their claims are surely not calling for an end to performance, they do run the risk of problematizing liveness to the point of its losing value. In contrast, Bayly admits that while experience is inherent to performance, presence is not guaranteed by either.

In 2012 Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield published their edited tome *Perform Repeat Record: Live Art in History*, in which commentators grapple with how to historicize performance, with documentation and disappearance emerging as central themes. The first section of the book, entitled 'Theories', contains numerous essays, most of which, like Auslander's 'The Performativity of Performance Documentation,' specifically respond to Phelan's notion of disappearance. For example, Sven Lütticken argues against the notion of disappearance by referencing the dematerialization at the heart of contemporary art practices such as that of Tino Seghal. The fact that no material or documentation may be produced or disseminated about Seghal's work is the exact reason his practice becomes so

highly valued and commodified in a culture based on performing for capital. Christopher Bedford's response to Phelan is also convincing; he argues for an ontology of performance that acknowledges the way it continues into the future and multiplies historically, stating that 'performance is a myth-making medium and as such essentially viral in nature' (Bedford 2012: 86).

Reenacting Remains

One provocative response to Phelan's framework is Rebecca Schneider's 2011 book *Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment*, which expands on theories advanced in an earlier article titled 'Performance Remains' (2001). Schneider critiques Phelan's logic, making use of the process of reenactment and Jacques Derrida's 1998 book *Archive Fever*. She argues that Phelan's privileging of an ontology of performance as disappearance ends up reinforcing the 'logic of the archive' (Schneider 2011: 98).

Rather than ontology, Schneider applies a theory of reenactment in order to arrive at a version of performance that does not disappear. Her title thus has two meanings: realizing that reenactors perform remains helps us understand that performance remains. Reenactment, Schneider suggests, shows that performance reappears. Following this logic, 'when we approach performance [as] remaining we are almost immediately forced to admit that remains do not have to be isolated in the document' (Schneider 2011: 101). If Phelan's argument was to encourage modes

of writing able to capture the ephemeral ontology of performance, Schneider urges us to take care with how the remains of performance are returned to. As useful and convincing as both these approaches are, they also are positioned after the performance. It will be useful also to have theoretical frameworks that take account of performance before and during its becoming, a point to which I will return.

In his 2007 book *Documentation, Disappearance and the Representation of Live Performance*, Matthew Reason finds that disappearance is a contradiction, because 'some continued existence and retention within memory is always at least implied' (Reason 2007: 26). He also examines the tensions between mechanical and live reproduction—in the case of big-budget musicals, for example—and notes that even in this situation a 'transience' exists in the link between the live body and the represented character (Reason 2007: 18 and 20). But here Reason makes the assumption, which Auslander and Jones would take issue with, that the live body can lay claim to authenticity.

In her article on Marina Abramović, Jones points to an implication of reenactments in the same way Schneider points to the hidden function of the archive. Each makes knowledge available for future 'repetition' (Schneider 2011: 108). Jones writes: 'While often posed as confirming the truth of the past, paradoxically re-enactments activate the now as always already over, the present always already turning into the future—and both continually escaping human knowledge' (Jones 2011: 43). Jones shows that tensions between past and present

are inherent in both documentation and reenactment, as neither of these phenomena would be complete without a double and more. Further complicating Jones' conception of the impossibility of an original moment, Adrian Heathfield and Andrew Quick, in their introduction to 'On Memory', a special issue of the journal *Performance Research* in 2000, indicate the similarities between memory and reenactment, explaining that the work of reenacting performance is analogous to an act of memory, in that the 'lost originary moment is (partially) retrieved and reconstituted' (Heathfield and Quick 2000: 1).

Reenactment brings with it the same paradox that is found in photography, according to Susan Sontag in her 1973 monograph *On Photography*. She explains that photographs have a 'pseudo- presence' because the image is a material artifact existing now; but the photograph is also 'a token of absence' because it is contingent on a past event that was photographed (Sontag 1973: 16). In 1989, Henry M. Sayre made a similar comment in *The Object of Performance: The American Avant-Garde Since 1970*. His dialectic of presence and absence is construed as 'ritual' and 'narrative' (Sayre 1989: 17). The former does while the latter tells.

The phenomenon of reenactment problematizes originality within performance because performance always returns something that may have otherwise been considered lost. Reenactment reveals that performance is rarely, if ever, singular. It functions with memory and can have no single point of origination.

Abramović herself prescribes a method of reenactment that by its lack of specificity reveals this difficult issue, saying that 'any re-enactment should address the big issues that the original piece was about at the time' (Abramović 2012: 554). Which issues are big is a question that I will return to at greater length below.

Jan Verwoert's 2010 book *Tell Me What You Want, What You Really, Really Want* looks at how community is made through art and philosophy. Echoing Auslander, Verwoert's comment on visual art could just as well describe the same contradiction hidden in documents as is hidden in reenactments: 'These paintings are not a live performance. But they perform live' (Verwoert 2010: 151). What they perform live and the implications arising from this are more problematic. Focusing on how artists appropriate history, Verwoert tellingly questions a central caveat of appropriation, which may also be an aspect of reenactments: 'The only thing we should maybe be less optimistic about is the possibility of thinking of the object of appropriation and the knowledge it generates in terms of property' (Verwoert 2010: 134). The notion of property brings with it the notion of possession, and thus the economic implications of reenactments mirror the issues of authenticity that Jones questions in Abramović's reworkings of other artists' performances.

Historical repetition brings up the fundamental question at the heart of Jones' and Heathfield's *Perform Repeat Record*: how *to do* performance art history? Perhaps live art should be studied like painting, where students copy masterpieces in order to develop personal technique; or like drama, where seminal performances

become reenactable scores no different from *Hamlet*, with a credited author and a copyrighted literary form. In both cases, understanding the nature of memory is helpful. As Jan Verwoert explains, past artworks do not determine but condition and affect present creation and reception (Verwoert 2010: 30–31). Verwoert demonstrates the creativity of memory in both the artist and the beholder. Memory is the vehicle through which the past interpenetrates the present. In the work of the artist and the critic the past is retained, in ways that are sometimes conscious and sometimes not, through the differentiations that new work manifests.

Archaeology

In the discussion of her place in reenacting other artists' performances, Marina Abramović casts herself in a surprising role, saying 'I was feeling like an *archaeologist* really' (Abramović 2012: 549). Mike Pearson and Michael Shanks use the same language in *Theatre/Archaeology* from 2001, explaining that it is 'more appropriate to discuss performance (particularly devised performance) through archaeological rather than literary means', which for them is 'to imagine the retrieval and recontextualisation of performance as constituting a theatre archaeology.' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 13). This is performance as cultural practice rather than as text. In this seemingly simple theoretical move, they thus privilege the experience of performance over its material through a focus on the deeper time of, surprisingly, material and the more enmeshed conception of performance in context. What

follows in their book is a convincing argument for an interdisciplinary theory through the delineation of practical approaches.

Pearson writes from the perspective of a performance maker/theorist and Shanks as archaeologist, though as the book proceeds the lines are crossed, blurred, and erased. They work first to show how archaeology, like performance, is a creative act of 'cultural production' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 11). The opportunity archaeology presents to performance documentation is that it aims at 'making a past work a present presence' through objects and sites in which embodiment is long gone (ibid.). Performance reveals to archaeology concrete manifestations of the relationships between the live and the material.

The work of theatre/archaeology starts with the present. It inventories only as a way to begin. It travels into history, acknowledging that the past is virtual. The present is the site of the critical acts of theatre/archaeology, Pearson and Shanks argue, in that 'we should retain the ambiguity and tension which is actuality; actuality is the *primacy*, but not *superiority*, of the present over the past' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 42, emphasis in original). The relationship between past and present is ambivalent and unpredictable. Various sites of archaeology and different forms of documentation require specific iterations and explications of a past moment's ties to now. The writers even go as far as to suggest that the 'temporality of performance and the archaeological project is neither linear nor a slice through time; it is convoluted. Memories, pasts, continuities, present aspirations and designs

are assembled in the work that is performance and archaeology' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 55). Theatre/archaeology commits to a heterogeneous temporality of performance. Its temporal perspective is mobile as if moving around the time of the work rather than always coming after it - which implies that when it returns, the performance will have changed. Repetition through time is not repetition of the event, but of something else altogether as 'nothing ever happens twice, because it has already happened before' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 55).

What is repeated is not ontologically destabilized because it has been or will be repeated, but instead because what is being repeated was never static in the first place. Experiences are not objects. For Pearson and Shanks, both the performance and the document are simulacra (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 92). Originality presumes stability, and theatre/archaeology comes close to wholly rejecting it: 'To think authenticity as essential and intrinsic obscures the relationship of exchange which exists between past and present' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 114). It is not only the past that has an effect on the present. The novelty of the present occasions reinterpretations of the past which can be powerful enough to appear to change the past. Rather than dwell on the complex question of whether or not they actually do, the authors commit to a practice outside the trappings of fixity. Instead, they advocate an aesthetic of the 'unauthentic' which proposes to bring the practitioner and attendee into a creative relation (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 119). Inauthentic performance might make a claim to originality or truth whereas the unauthentic

transparently reveals its sources. Pearson's and Shanks' suggestion here retains a complex sense of time as multiple because it conceives of an interpenetration between the past and the present.

Theatre/archaeology reveals a different kind of relationship between the formative documents of performance and their manifestation. When performance is rendered unauthentic, its sources are transparently separate. The moment of embodiment brings with it a 'haunting past' that it never attempts to conceal, possess, or contain (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 126). Advocating a transparent relationship between aims and outcomes, 'the work [of theatre/archaeology, which might be a performance and might be writing about performance] is a reading 'onto' and 'into' rather than a reading 'from'' (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 146). The benefits of credited appropriation resurface, referring to Verwoert's caveat, as practices outside of economic and ontological operations. In this case 'performance occasions reinterpretation,' enacting a mode of documenting performance that is as critical as it is creative (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 59).

Pearson and Shanks advise thinking forensically about what kinds of performance documents can be used to discover and preserve different aspects of performance (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 59–61). Theatre/archaeology provides a way through the problematic practices of reenactment, performance, and documentation. It enables thinking qualitatively through these issues, allowing for the constant invention and reinvention of forms, lives, and objects to be at the heart

of the historical evolution of performance. It also implies that historiography might want to reflect this process. Performances and documents erupt of the present, not without a diverse swathe of accomplices. They are continually doing so.

Appearance, Form, Becoming, Transformation

In a chapter in the 2006 collection *A Performance Cosmology*, edited by Judie Christie, Richard Gough, and Peter Watt, David Williams indicates that Phelan's ephemeral ontology is founded on a paradox, noting that 'disappearance is the function of appearance' (Williams 2006: 105). Remaining and reenactment, too, can only be functions of appearance. To take this point further, I suggest that whether a performance disappears or remains after it ends is impossible to determine. Before getting to any prediction of what may happen in the future, performance must first do something other than disappear or remain.

Performance appears. This is necessary in order for it to disappear or remain. But appearances must be unlocked from primarily visual and representational modes. For Bayly 'there is a void at the heart of appearing,' but perhaps the void is only that which is past or future (Bayly 2011: 58). I am advocating an appearance defined in terms of becoming as a result of transformation. This is the processual nature of performance through its various iterative appearances: plans, scores, experiences, documents, and memories. Each becoming is a transitional process. Such an approach rejects the fixity implied in the word being. The concept of

'becoming' opens processes to the past and the future, as Elizabeth Grosz explains in the introduction to her edited book *Becomings* (Grosz 1999: 15–28). Appearance as becoming can offer an ontology of performance rooted in performance itself.

The way performance becomes and appears is not only visual. It is multisensory, cognitive, affective, spiritual, and charged with memory. These kinds of becomings and appearances have been called 'forms' in art history. In the mode of appearance as becoming, form is not only a result of creative forces but also a part of those forces. In this perspective, form aligns itself to a particular manifestation of an artwork and virtual counterparts. Form is therefore multiple as it is located in the present of the artwork but not separated from the past through memory and the future through desire. This multiplicity is the immanent temporality of form including present, past, and future. The present form is continuous with past and future forms.

Form is in and of the document and the performance. In *The Life of Forms in Art*, the French art historian Henri Focillon argues for a reconceiving of art history that identifies form as living (Focillon 1948: 33). Because Focillon theorizes a vitalism at the core of art history, which responds to Platonic antitheatricality by taking appearances seriously, his framework is useful for live art historiography. Following Balzac, Focillon writes that 'Life is form, and form is the modality of life' (Focillon 1948: 33). The book never pins down a singular definition of form. Form translates into a plethora of scenes, and like theatre/archaeology what this multiplicity makes

possible is an approach to art history that takes change to be fundamental: 'Art begins with transmutation and continues with metamorphosis' (Focillon 1948: 169). Form is what goes on living, is what remains, because it continues to change. In Focillon's view, form is prehistory and it is inescapable. But Focillon's theory is not deterministic, because form is life, so it moves, changes, and even acts: 'Man works on himself. But he does not, it is true, rid himself of the age-old deposits laid down by time, and they are something that must be accounted for. What they constitute is a tonality, rather than an armature or a foundation' (Focillon 1948: 142). Focillon accounts for the interpenetration of the past and the present on the basis that the past creates the conditions for the present as opposed to determining it through causality. The agency of the artist remains intact, empowered by history.

With the artist's work, the life of forms breathes through each painting, performance, and document. As Focillon notes, 'A score of experiments, be they recent or forthcoming, are invariably interwoven behind the well-defined evidence of the image' (Focillon 1948: 41). Here form is in the realm of the barely visible. It is not only already there but also waiting to happen. Form is the document of the performance that has yet to be imagined, but form is also in the tendencies that will lead to performance. Form is what allows the painting to create space (Focillon 1948: 65). In live art, form is what allows performance to create time. Focillon indicates that seeing art in this way cancels any sense of static images: 'Form is always, not the desire for action, but action itself' (Focillon 1948: 119). Art as action

accounts for its creative relations with time and space. Art in this way is not about allowing agency, but perhaps becomes agency itself. Performance makes time; this is one manifestation of its temporal specificity. Becomings of form are temporal creations.

Form may manifest as action in performance documents as well. Imagine you tell a story about your childhood, holding the actual object the story involves, showing the scar left by the moment. The life of forms for this performance suggests several sets of documents. One set might transcribe the spoken words of the story while another set gives a prompt to tell a story about your childhood in which you show an object that gave you a scar and then you show the scar. There are many other ways such a performance could be documented, and any will in some way provide access to the past through memory.

Those different kinds of documents lead to new interpretations that would each preserve different aspects of the original performance. Each one would also substitute something entirely new. What documentation of performance proves here is less that performance is not authentic and more that it works through alteration. As Heathfield explains, 'the multiple lives of performance, dissected, represented, re-performed [suggest] that one of performance's most consistent and recurring conditions is *transformation*' (Heathfield 2012: 32). The disappearance of the live through writing indicates the creation of a new appearance in writing. The reenactment substitutes locational context but creates a congruent dramaturgical

form. Each one maintains the life of forms, and each one is an appearance that becomes. Even disappearance is a kind of becoming.

David Williams writes that 'appearances, like love, can be transformative becomings' (Williams 2006: 105). Williams here is working through Phelan's politics of empathy to carve out, through writing, a space of appearance for performance. The immediacy of these becomings substantiates their reality and at the same time reduces them to a factor of the ongoing processes of transformation. They are neither eternal nor ephemeral because of memory. Each becoming brings about and is brought about by movement.

In their edited 2007 book *Theatres of Thought: Theatre, Performance and Philosophy*, Daniel Watt and Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe, Laura Cull and Matthew Goulish compose a performed document called 'A Dialogue on Becoming.' Beginning with a particular anecdote about how identity is a part of theatre company Goat Island's working process, they arrive at a central idea, that '[a] performer is becoming' (Cull and Goulish 2007: 56). Identity is not fixed. It is constantly being made. It requires continuous analysis because it is always becoming. For Cull and Goulish, the work of Goat Island resists ontological, archival, mediatized-based and reenactment-based thinking about what performance is and does: 'All the different beings, identities and entities we conceive in conscious experience are but the effects of a primary, universal becoming' (56). Manifestations are the particulars and specifics that will again be renewed.

For Cull and Goulish, becoming is based on a process inseparable from two phenomena: moment and movement (61). The immediacy of performance is contestable but irreducible. Becoming depends on these processes, and these processes depend on becoming. While these ideas developed out of their working processes, notably their practice of creative response, Cull and Goulish admit that finding the temporal philosophy of Henri Bergson gave them a framework within which to reference their intuitions. Specifically referring to Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1912), Goulish writes, 'the notion of identity as becoming, it seems to me now, comes to us via this understanding of perception and memory' (Cull and Goulish 2007: 61). As will be shown toward the end of this text, Bergson's writing on memory opens up a productive relationship between the past and the present through matter and memory.

The Double Archive: Experiences and Memories

Published between and to a certain extent bridging the central ideas of Phelan's *Unmarked* and Schneider's *Performing Remains* is Diana Taylor's 2003 book *The Archive and the Repertoire: Cultural Memory and Performance in the Americas*. Like Schneider, Taylor finds that performance is repeated continually as an operation inherent within culture: 'The repertoire [. . .] enacts embodied memory [. . .] all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge' (Taylor 2003: 20). She suggests the repertoire has a relationship to the archive that is

symbiotic. Taylor maintains that writing and performance are not 'binaries' or 'sequential,' in which one process causes another (Taylor 2003: 22). She insists that what is performed from the archive and how its contents are valued are different throughout time, reinforcing the belief in the archive's stability but introducing change to its reception, an idea both Jones and Schneider will return to. Whether one believes the archive or the repertoire to be more significant, Taylor asserts that it has always been the case that 'writing was far more dependent on embodied culture for transmission than the other way around' (Taylor 2003: 17).

Attending to the relation of performance and archives is Gunhild Borggreen and Rune Gade's 2013 collection *Performing Archives/Archives of Performance*. This nearly five hundred-page collection of essays again takes up the notion of ontological disappearance via Phelan, but with a different approach to that taken by *Perform Repeat Record*. Where Jones and Heathfield's book addressed historiography, Borggreen and Gade's collection 'proposes a twofold movement of ongoing and mutual interaction' between performance and archives (Borggreen and Gade 2013: 10). The book is notable for its diversity of theoretical approaches, and includes Heike Roms' astute essay 'Archiving Legacies: Who Cares for Performance Remains?' In this essay Roms thinks through the archive for its practices of caring for long durations, as 'one documents a piece of work, but one archives a body of work' (Roms 2013: 36). The book as a whole is also significant for its delicate treatment of how a kind of archival turn may currently be taking place in practices from

performance to visual art and curation.

Using the terms of performance in a manner like the selection of volumes from an archive, Joseph Roach provides yet another analysis of performance as it presents itself to the future in his 1996 book *Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance*:

> The process of trying out various candidates in different situations—the doomed search for originals by continuously auditioning stand-ins—is the most important of the many meanings users intend when they use the word *performance*. . . . Performance, in other words, stands in for an elusive entity that it is not but that it must vainly aspire both to embody and to replace. (Roach 1996: 3–4)

Roach explains here that there is always a doubleness, at least, to the operations of performance. This definition offers a framework for a longer life of performance beyond the present. Roach shows how memory is not inert in the action of performance. The multiplicity of memory is actively proliferating.

Because of the active multiplication of memory, which affects the creation of performance as well as its documentation, documents and reenactments are not less truthful than performance. The experience itself is not without its own set of precursors. As Schneider puts it, 'in performance *as* memory, the pristine self-sameness of an 'original,' an artifact so valued by the archive, is rendered impossible—or, if you will, mythic' (Schneider 2011: 100). Phelan too does not proceed without admitting the link, explaining that the 'document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present'

(Phelan 1993: 146).

Returning to Heathfield and Quick's introduction to their edition of *Performance Research entitled* 'On Memory,' they note that: 'Just as performance is a vital component in the operation of memory, remembering and forgetting are crucial dynamics in the make-up of performance' (Heathfield and Quick 2000: 1). Memory is a crucial part of the reality of performance distinct from its representational aspects because it aims attention toward specific becomings and forgets others. Likewise, as necessary as memory is for making the performance, it is also a part of observing it: 'Performance, like the traumatic event, can exceed its spectator's understanding and consequently set in play the need for its repetition through memory, language and representation' (Heathfield and Quick 2000: 3). Trauma is substantiated over a longer duration than experience itself. The continuity of these kinds of memory creates an excess of affect. Through this continuity countless repetitions are possible. There is a multiplicity to memory. It performs a past in the present. Memory multiplies the past into the future. For performance, the present includes memories of the past and creates memories that will be carried into the future.

This discussion of memory leads us to a pivotal question at the heart of how to document performance: the question of scope. For example, is a performance enacting or reenacting an artist's intention, visual shape, or narrative content? What kinds of documents would leave traces of these aspects? Surely documents of

performance need be as multiple as performance itself, in which different perspectives accumulate to create a sense of wholeness. This raises the question of the position from which the work is viewed, and we have to ask about the role into which documents cast the viewer: audience or artist? How the document configures remembrance of performance is essential for a comprehensive history of performance. That experience and memory are multiplicities leads to the position that documentation also should manifest as a multiplicity. It will offer the fullest memory of performance if it channels several, sometimes contradictory, scales of experiencing performance.

Vital Materialism and Document Memory

Considering the document as active opposes the idea of inert matter, which suggests that a theoretical framework for understanding matter as active will be helpful. A vitality of documents may be theorized through the work of Jane Bennett. In her 2010 book *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Bennett identifies the way non-human entities act in political events. In a move that mirrors the trends of posthumanism by thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti, Bennett envisages a materialism conjoined with vitality, by which she means 'the capacity of things [. . .] to act [. . .] as forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own' (Bennett 2010: viii). Her work is especially significant because it allows performance studies to take account of the vitality of objects of performance documentation in a shift that might

do away with stultifying binaries. Bennett's ideas also speak to how performing and writing might take place. Is not her question 'how to describe without thereby erasing the independence of things?' after all an interrogation of the potential power of visibility through writing that parallels Phelan's concerns in *Unmarked* (Bennett 2010: xiii)? As Phelan was questioning how certain kinds of writing might not betray the truth of performance, Bennett's framework offers a way to see 'events as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some human, some not, though all thoroughly material' (Bennett 2010: xiv). In the vital materialist mode both performance and documentation are intertwined in a greater ecology of transformation. This language is clearly aligned with Bergsonian duration through the force of constant change.

Claims of a binary existing between writing and performance collapse under the conception of time as change and material as active. Stuart Brisley corrects any misconceptions about performance documents lasting forever: 'The issue is not one of the ephemeral versus the permanent. Nothing is forever. It is the question of the relative durations of the impermanent' (Brisley quoted in Heathfield 2012: 30). Taking account of other durations beyond human scales makes the fragility, or temporariness, of appearances visible. For example, it is only from an anthropocentric perspective that photographs do not visibly decay. Temporality reveals that both performance and documentation are temporary. The repertoire may continue long after the walls of the archive have been reduced to dust. Memory

allows access to the past. Performance is unimaginable without some memory. Memory's various repetitions through different moments and media are constitutive of the transformational process of appearances constantly becoming. Specific manifestations will substitute various stand-ins for the role, but later memory might forgo the role and perform the stand-in. The purposefully unauthentic aesthetic of theatre/archaeology seems to paradoxically return reliability to performance. The memory persists because it appears, disappears, remains, is reenacted, archived, and performed. Memory, like performance, appears.

As Matthew Reason suggests, 'ideas of time are central within discourses of documentation,' because performance only disappears if time is represented as a spatial line, a discrete succession of moments (Reason 2006: 210). When the past and present are constantly interpenetrating, through memory, it is very difficult to remain confident that disappearance will not soon give way to another different appearance. Of course, it is possible to imagine any number of performances that may have completely disappeared if the people who once remembered them have now forgotten or are dead. It is also likely that some effect of this hypothetical performance memory would influence future action even if only unconsciously through habit.

2.3 – Bergsonian Memory

This section explores the relevance of Bergson's theory of memory for a time-specific understanding of performance documentation, because both documentation and memory are routes to the past. Memory, especially as Bergson theorises it, offers an active way of understanding how the past interpenetrates with the present. Remembering can be said to be the activity of what is done with documents. Considering documentation as memory activates the process of working with the past of performance. Documentation is a memory of performance and the past is an active ingredient in the present. In this section I will tease out the relevant implications of Bergson's theory for performance documentation. Doing so will elaborate the time-specificity of the past of performance.

Active Images

In an overall sense, Bergson's philosophy of memory is relevant to time-specific performance documentation because his work proposes a world comprised of active images. Bergson's worldview seeks to overcome dualism through understanding how action occurs in experience between objects and subjects. Bergson's interactive view of the world makes it possible to consider the images of documentation as indicators of possibilities for the present. As I will show, if the images of performance documents are as active as the images of memory and

perception, the work that an artist researcher might do with documents becomes more creative than conservative. The images of Bergson's worldview include perception and memory, with careful distinctions between them. Overall, this activation of images of the world indicates a potential to approach documents as interactive.

Bergson explains that there is, in the world, a multiplicity of images (Bergson 1912: 1). These images possess 'a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing*' (Bergson 1912: vii). Images are not separate from the body that engages with them, and that body is an interested centre of action looking for what is useful. This formulation indicates Bergson's solution to the issue of the connection between *corps*, body, and *esprit*, mind, namely that the image lies between the two. The image is both material and not. By considering images as positioned between body and mind, his understanding of perception is not about an addition of information to the world but rather a subtraction of what is not of interest (Bergson 1912: 30). The image as perceived is a specific and interested sense of something. For example, if I only know a bed as a thing to be slept in, I will not look at it as a good place to jump. The image of the bed is defined by my abilities to interact with it. Along with present perception, memory provides options for how to act upon the world.

For Bergson memory is an action, not a storage house. Memory is knowing what might be done. This implies that the past is integrated with the present as opposed to an idea of memory as isolated from experience. Memory is an aspect of experience. The past is available in the present to the extent of how active the memory is. The past is mediated, so memory might not always identify the same aspects of the past as relevant for present action. This is not to say that the past changes over time, but rather that our understanding of the past changes. Each new moment carries previous moments within it. Memories appear along with perceptions as an integral aspect of action.

Remembering Body

Bergson defines the body as a centre of action (Bergson 1912: 233). The body is not told what to do by the mind, but instead the two work simultaneously by solving problems in the present. Following this or that goal, perception is a process of filtering that highlights useful qualities of the world, which in turn results in a unique experience. For example, an architect and a skateboarder looking at the same stairway will see respectively a connection between two floors and a good spot for a trick. The analogy is useful because it becomes clear how memory affects perceptual experience, by subtracting from the object that which is not useful. The memories that inform action are not purely abstract. The architect and the skateboarder experience the staircase as an image that includes different senses of

physics, motion, balance, and style. Bergson configures memories as another kind of potentially useful image that the body acts with. Memory is constantly interpenetrating with perception (Bergson 1912: 80). Memory is an action of the present on which a relation with the world is constructed.

To open up the implications of this world-view, Bergson offers his famous memory cone. Bergson's explanation of the cone precedes the diagram (Bergson 1912: 196-197). The diagram is an image of an active body with memory. The cone itself is a representation of the totality of memory. Memories come from and return to the summit of the cone, the point 'S', which is the present. That present is constantly in motion, where it meets with the plane 'P' of the world as it actually appears. Bergson stresses in his explanation that the point of the cone, or the body, and the plane, or the world, are connected through interaction. Travelling up and down the cone are the two related tendencies of memory, pure memory and habit memory, represented on the cone as 'A' and 'B' on the opposite sides.



Pure and Habit Memory

Bergson points out two interrelated but slightly different tendencies of memory, habit and pure. Pure memory occurs when thinking back to a specific past while habit memory is developed in the doing of a learned action. Both are a reappearing of the past, but the pure memory is less physical than the habit memory. Pure memory is when the mind thinks back to previous experience. The habit memory is 'motor mechanism' while pure memory is 'recollection' (Bergson 1912: 87). While the habit memory is movement, the pure memory is an image of movement. The pure memory 'imagines' while the habit memory 'repeats' (Bergson 1912: 93). What distinguishes the habit memory from a pure memory is that the pure memory is a 'representation' while the habit memory is an 'action'; the major difference being the ability to recall a pure memory over 'any duration I please' while the habit memory 'requires a definite time' for its movements to be executed (Bergson 1912: 91). Remembering a year can occur in an instant, but tying a shoe takes an unavoidable duration. However these two forms of memory are not distinct from each other. A single event of past experience may include interrelated aspects of habit and pure memory.

To examine the relationship between habit memory and pure memory Bergson considers what happens when he memorises something.

> I study a lesson, and in order to learn it by heart I read it a first time, accentuating every line; I then repeat it a number of times. At each repetition there is progress; the words are more

> and more linked together, and at last make a continuous whole. When that moment comes, it is said that I know my lesson by heart, that it is imprinted on my memory.' (Bergson 1912: 89).

Bergson is demonstrating the overlap between habit and pure memory. The habit memory is the work of repeatedly speaking the text, while the pure memory captures the uniqueness of all the moments of rereading it. Pure memories attest to the unrepeatability of the actuality of lived experience. The pure memory is a personal and unique record of a lived experience. It serves to differentiate the past from the present while allowing each to be experienced simultaneously. On the other hand the performance of speaking a memorized text is an act of habit, different from recalling a personal experience. The difference is in the degree to which remembering manifests through action. To recite the lesson Bergson does not need to remember the past moments he experienced while learning it. The repetition involved in habit memory is not necessarily conscious. The two might refer to the same experience and bring that experience back to the present in slightly different ways.

Virtual and Actual

Bergson analyses the concepts of the virtual and the actual in order to show how memory, in both habit and pure tendencies, helps make sense of the relationship between mind and matter. The most general definitions of virtual and

actual are as temporal designations; the present is actual and the past is virtual. In a more vital sense, the virtual is that which a body contains but does not physically act on (Bergson 1912: 173). Virtuality is the past and imagined future of bodies and objects. The virtual exists between bodies and things, and our perceptions and memories of objects around us highlight their virtualities as capacities for action (Bergson 1912: 185). Actions on objects and experiences from them are informed by projections of how moments that have become past and virtual are mediated through memories. Virtual is past which may be projected into imagined futures. The virtual is the capability for change.

There is a movement between the virtual and the actual. Actual experience becomes virtual memory. Repeating the past is the process of the virtual 'becoming materialized' (Bergson 1912: 174). Performance must be actualised, and yet it always contains virtuality. The actual is the moment when movement and matter becomes transformed. The living moving body can exist nowhere else but in the realm of the actual, yet still the body necessarily includes the virtual as the continuation of the past in the form of memory. Action is not predetermined but instead inflected with habit and recall. The actual becomes virtual through memory and the virtual is actualised through memory.

Conclusion

To conclude, *Matter and Memory* is a book that employs Bergson's novel methodological approach to consider problems with a temporal conceptual framework. Overall the book presents a world view in which there are multiple images constantly acting, which includes processes of virtualisation and actualisation through pure and habit memory. Bergson addresses the problem of how body and mind are related by showing that memory is the relation between the two.

Pure memory and habit memory expand the possibilities for using time as a way to make and theorise performance. The time of the habit memory is the unavoidable duration of moving action. The amount of time it takes to perform an action is a constituent element of that action. On the other side of the spectrum is the more elastic time of remembering in the mind. If I repeat an action according to habit memory I necessarily engage in its duration, while if I recall a pure memory I might alter its duration according to the needs of the present. Habit memory and pure memories indicate different approaches to dramaturgies of time-specificity in the past tense.

Time-specificity incorporates Bergson's theory of memory into an approach to performance documentation. Doing so reveals the creative process of remembering whereby the past creates conditions for the present. Working with documentation is as dynamic as remembering. There is an activation of the past in the present. To explicitly perform the temporality of the past in the present is to

create a time-specificity of performance in the past tense. A work of this kind repeats and recalls the virtual and actual images of the past in the present.

2.4 – *2: Untitled*

To Create the Sensation of the Past

How then to perform the past? With Bergson's theory of memory along with my understanding of performance documentation and the insights of *9 Beginnings*, I set about making a work that would bring the past into the present through staging documentation and memory. The performance I made, *2: Untitled*, was created over a period of seven months. It was a step toward complexity from the minimalism of *How Long a Thing Takes*. The performance includes a range of texts as well as a several technologies of memory and an exhibition of objects. In this section I provide a detailed analysis of the performance and the decisions that went into making the work, so that the reader might construct a memory along the lines of the performance. This text continues the experience through writing. Many photographs from *2: Untitled* are included below and a video recording of the work can be accessed on the DVD. I would encourage the reader to watch the work before reading this section. The piece itself is the primary mode of research. *2: Untitled* performs the past, and now even more so that it is in the past.

This section is both record and score of the performance *2: Untitled*, a way to make it and a way to save it. This critical commentary goes beyond documenting the work as it aims to offer methods for how to perform the specific temporality of the past. To share the making process, I will not only narrate the development but also add findings that were produced through it. A key example is my diagram of performance documentation. This unlikely remake of Bergson's memory cone ties together the insights from *9 Beginnings*, my review of literature on performance documentation and *Matter and Memory*. The diagram is the symbolic critical companion to *2: Untitled*. It sums up the approach of time-specific performance documentation. Finally, I end with a consideration of contingency. The surprises that occurred in *2: Untitled* form the conclusion of this chapter. This is because firstly contingency is a problem for documentation in so much as it questions whether an unplanned element of performance is to be documented as part of the work or not. Secondly such uncertainties predict the focus of the next and final chapter of time-specificity of performance, the future, as the unknown guaranteed. Overall this section on the performance *2: Untitled* is an example of the kind of documentation made possible by employing the temporally specific methodology of memory as a way to access the past. Now I will narrate the experience of the performance.

Before *2: Untitled* at 13:00 on 8th May 2013 in the Boiler House at Royal Holloway, University of London, I welcomed the audience into the space. I handed them a programme.

2: Untitled

By Nik Wakefield

8 May 2013

This is performance. This is research. This is philosophy.

It concerns the past and memory,

Bergsonian memory and performance documentation.

It is inspired by '9 Beginnings' by Every House Has a Door.

Collected materials include video of a tennis match between Roger Federer and Janko Tipsarevic that I saw with my friend Tim in London on 6 November 2012. There is also video of Tim and I playing tennis together. There is text by Marcel Proust from *Swann's Way*. There is also text from the appendix to the play *Artaud at Rodez* by Charles Marowitz. He interviewed Antonin Artaud's psychiatrist, Dr. Gaston Ferdiere, two of Artaud's friends Roger Blin and Arthur Adamov, and a text published in a French magazine written by Artaud's sister, Marie-Ange Malausséna. There is a final word from Henri Bergson taken from *Matter and Memory*.

I don't know any more about these materials than you do. We will all encounter them together differently. I can't remember everything even though I tried. The performance lasts an hour. Enjoy the exhibition and the homemade madeleines.

The audience was then given time to have a look at an exhibit of materials used to form the performance, including fresh baked madeleines. For about twenty minutes the attendees could flip through the books, hold the tennis racket, see the tickets to

the Federer match and view a variety of images. The materials prescribed the action I would perform, indicating what was to come, and described actions from the past. The exhibition included several scores for the performance. Here is the list of items on display.

2: Untitled

Exhibit Catalogue

1. Madeleines
2. Television – (during performance will show Federer match)
3. Book – Henri Bergson *Matter and Memory*
4. Book – Marcel Proust *In Search of Lost Time Volume 1 Swann's Way*
5. Book – Charles Marowitz *Artaud at Rodez*
6. Book – Antonin Artaud *50 Drawings to Murder Magic*
7. Book – Matthew Goulish *Work from Memory*
8. NY Times Article – *Federer as Religious Experience* by David Foster Wallace
9. Carboard-backed Photograph, black and white – Artaud at Rodez 1
10. Carboard-backed Photograph, black and white – Artaud's study at Rodez
11. Diagram on paper – Bergson's Memory Cone
12. Diagrams on paper – *Documentation Cone* and *Genealogy of Performance*
13. Bad Memories Eraser
14. Tennis racket (Mine, a replica of Federer's)
15. Tennis balls
16. Tickets from Federer match
17. Scanned diagrams - Schoenberg's system of notation for tennis
18. Typewriter with paper for audience to enter their names
19. Projection of past work
20. My score and documents from *9 Beginnings*
21. Website Images from *9 Beginnings*
22. Flippers from *9 Beginnings*
23. Original notation system of Federer match
24. Score of spoken text in performance
25. This catalogue

One reason to exhibit the materials of *2: Untitled* was to indicate to the audience which materials would be performed before the performance started. This pre-knowledge emphasized the non-dramatic aspect of the performance by disengaging any sense of surprise that might have occurred had the attendees not known what was coming. This is intended to signal that the work is of the past. This signalling also showed that the materials of the piece would have a certain familiarity with many in the audience. By performing texts and movements that are well known the audience is being asked to consider how such disparate materials might fit together. Tennis, the memories of childhood in Proust and the memories of Artaud were variables as in a mathematic equation where each sets out given durations and connect to specific pasts. The time it takes to perform each memory is the determined durations of habit memory, where to remember means to perform the duration of the whole action. To provide this information to the audience before the performance removes the element of surprise another kind of work might make use of. For *2: Untitled*, I wanted to clearly signal that this performance comes from the past; that it performs the past.

After the attendees had a chance to look around I entered the empty square in the middle of the room and introduced the performance, which included saying how long it would take. Over the next hour I performed remembering the past, or the act of doing research into performance documentation. As choreography I copied the

movements of Roger Federer easily winning a tennis match. During that hour long movement, I spoke a series of texts. First was the well known section of Marcel Proust's *Swann's Way* on the madeleine and the memory of Combray. The following texts were divergent perspectives on the personal life of Antonin Artaud by his psychiatrist, two friends and his sister. Each remembered him very differently. While the Proust text was spoken from memory, the Artaud passages made use of other technologies of memory. A pre-recorded video of myself spoke a passage about Artaud from his psychiatrist, Dr Gaston Ferdière, after calling out the live version of myself for not remembering. Two texts by Artaud's friends, Roger Blin and Arthur Adamov, were spoken by repeating recordings I was listening to on head phones. A magazine article by Aratud's sister, Marie-Ange Malausséna, was read from a printed page. All while sweating through copying Federer's movements. After the tennis had finished I spoke from memory a paragraph from Bergson. Here are, in mostly chronological order, a series of photographs of the performance.

Photographs of 2: Untitled

2: Untitled







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


















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

Time-specific past performance making

Making a performance of the past that stages documents and memories involved carefully selecting and arranging material. A goal throughout the making process was to create a dramaturgy of multiplicity in which there were several temporalities being performed at once. This encouraged the generation of multiple scores. Like *9 Beginnings* there is a brief, or conceptual prompt, which is to investigate issues of performance documentation as memory in the philosophy of Henri Bergson in order to create a time-specific presentation of the past. Then there is the score of the approach to use different types of material, including magazine articles, interviews, televised video and prosaic fiction. Between these two is the score that asks the artist to remember a series of texts and speak them while dancing the choreography of an athlete who uses memory to play. Most detailed is the notation of specific tennis shots and words. Each of these scores could be found in the exhibit that was on display before, during and after the performance of *2: Untitled* and in the appendix. At each level of magnitude, these different descriptions of the performance indicate different ways the work stages the past. The dramaturgy of multiplicity intends to allow these various perspectives to function simultaneously. What was happening in *2: Untitled* is a question with more than one right answer. Choosing to explain the performance using a specific level of magnification will yield certain knowledge about it.

In this section I want to show how the texts and choreography I chose for the performance investigated and reflected the time-specificity of performance in the past tense. The three main sources for *2: Untitled* are the tennis of Roger Federer, a selection from Proust's *Swann's Way*, and remembrances of the personal life of Antonin Artaud. On their own each is a useful form to explore different issues of memory and documentation. Together they inspire a committed approach that wavers between discipline and unruliness. Artaud, Proust and Federer each have a very different style. The calm of Federer meets with the frenzy of Artaud and the beautifully exhaustiveness of Proust. Their lives also reveal different sides of memory. While Federer plays tennis with his bodily memory, Artaud's is shocked out of him and Proust rebuilds the past in his mind. These forms of memory are shuttled alongside each other in *2: Untitled*. I will now analyse the significance of each element in greater detail, beginning with the tennis choreography of Roger Federer.

The movement of *2: Untitled* comes from a match between Roger Federer and Janko Tipsarevic on 6 November 2012 which I saw live at the O2 Arena in Greenwich London. Federer is a rare athlete who gives the impression of having more time than his opponent. To see him play tennis is to see a body move in beautifully unique ways. David Foster Wallace epitomizes the awe Federer inspires in his 2006 *New York Times* article 'Federer as Religious Experience'. While watching Federer at his best it appears he is creating an entirely new sport, and yet his talent is based on his highly developed habits. In addition to his creativity it is

Roger Federer's habit memory that makes him such an amazing athlete. His movements have been learned and repeated. Tennis moves too quickly for Federer to think about what he does. His habit is playing the past in the present.

In the studio I watched a recorded video of Federer. I began to consider how to stage the act of watching Federer play. My intention was that by doing so I might suggest a certain kind of memory. It was habit memory that I wanted to show with Federer playing. To emphasise that I would place the video of the match on stage and copy the movements live. It is therefore different from Jérôme Bel's *The Last Performance*, where a performer enters dressed in tennis clothing and says 'I am Andre Agassi' then seriously hits a tennis ball against the back wall of the theatre. In that work tennis is really played, in my piece I direct the attention back to a specific moment of tennis in the past. By staging the movement as a reflection of the recorded image, I intended to suggest that the movement, the habit, is a memory that brings the past back to the present without thinking. That permits me to speak alongside that habit memory repetition, which allows the performance to begin to suggest the divergent tendencies of memory as habit and pure.

Through working on this in the studio it became clear that pure memory was creeping into the habit memory another way. Because I had been present at the match I was copying the movements of, it became clear that my own pure memory was a filter through which the habit memory was being repeated. The work could furthermore suggest this by explaining that I had been present at the match and

exhibiting the tickets to it. It is clearly a pure memory, a performance of personal recollection; and it is also a performance of the habit memory of Roger Federer's choreography.

This rerouting the habit memory toward the pure suggested a dramaturgical reversal of direction in which the pure memory might be presented through habit memory. The relationship between the two kind of memory, habit and pure, are then suggested in two ways. First there is a performance of habit memory tennis choreography alongside text-based pure memories. Second there is a dramaturgical filtration system that consists of performing the habit memory through a system of pure memory as recollection; and simultaneously performing the pure memories in the texts through habit memory practices. The first text concerning an attempt to remember something personal was memorised to be spoken out loud, which is Bergson's first example of habit memory. The multiplicity of memory led to a dramaturgy of multiples.

The first text is the 'independent recollection' of the narrator in *Swann's Way*, a pure memory, performed through the 'motor mechanism' of habit memory (Bergson 1912: 87). What Proust describes in the passage performed in *2: Untitled* is a completely personal remembrance. To complement the physicality of Federer's choreography, the passage from *Swann's Way* could be performed purely through speech. Most importantly the text was memorised, a definite exercise of habit memory. To reiterate the explanation of the dramaturgy of multiplicity above, *2:*

Untitled performs a pure memory of Proust through my habit memory of memorised speech at the same time as performing my pure memory of the tennis of Federer's habit memory.

Proust was chosen for multiple reasons. The well-known madeleine section is a form that the audience might already be familiar with and therefore be more freely able to give it less focus than the overall dramaturgy of memory within which it is performed. Within the writing also is a link that is more implicit. Henri Bergson married a cousin of writer Marcel Proust, who served as best man at the wedding (Bisson 1945: 104). The two had a personal relationship and were readers of eachothers' work. In addition to this personal relationship, Proust's writings offer a creative rendering of similar issues Bergson was working on through philosophy.

In the passage of *Swann's Way* Proust's narrator tastes a madeleine dipped in tea. The smell and taste make him feel something he cannot understand. He realizes there must be some memory attached to the sense experience of the food that he cannot remember, yet after failing several times 'the memory revealed itself.' (Proust 1992: 53). Before the memories come flooding back, Proust describes his futile efforts to recall the memory. His intellect is no help and neither is eating more madeleine nor shutting out distractions. The harder he thinks the weaker the effect of the sense memory becomes. Then he gives up and the memory appears. He recognizes his first encounter with the taste and smell and then a flood of other childhood memories enters his mind. The rush of memory allows the narrator to

describe for the reader an image of his childhood environment. First the shapes of his family home begin to form in his mind 'and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers' until 'the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea.' (Proust 1992: 55).

The significance of the passage is that the memory is neither only physical or of the mind. Proust's involuntary memory is like Bergson's image, between mind and matter. The madeleine is an actualisation of the virtual. In *2: Untitled* the habit performance of the text comes after the audience have been able to eat freshly baked madelienes and thumb through Proust's text. So not only is the text itself made to refer to a specific memory action, an attempt to remember, which is as I have said part of the concept of *2: Untitled*. The text is encountered by the audience as already resonating with their past, especially if they have read Proust's work. The Proust text stages the activity of remembering as a return to specificity of the past through multiplicity.

The texts on Antonin Artaud in *2: Untitled* reveal how memory is an active process as opposed to a fixed storage system. Documents and memory mediate the past to the extent that the activity of returning may change the present's relationship to the past. Memory is active in the present. To draw out these important aspects and to further investigate tensions between virtual and actual, I

choose to perform texts from the appendix of the play *Artaud at Rodez* by Charles Marowitz. These texts on remembering a man serve several functions in *2: Untitled*.

As four texts they allowed me to demonstrate various technologies of memory as ways to perform them. The first text is seen as spoken by myself on recorded video. During *2: Untitled* I try and fail to remember that text, a representation of my inability to memorise more than the passage from Proust. Then I lay a video on the laptop, in which the past me explains that there are several versions of the texts for the rest of the show. The first will be spoken on video, the others are audio recordings that maybe repeated live, and the last is printed on paper. The video then tells the then live me to continue copying the Federer choreography. I chose video for Artaud's psychiatrist Dr Gaston Ferdière because that text felt the most defensive. It sounds like a scandalous television interview. The words of Arthur Adamov and Roger Blin, friends of Artaud, are the most intimate. I performed these by repeating a recording I listened to through headphones. These sadly humorous texts show a very personal side of Artaud. The final text was read off a page as it was originally a magazine printing of a public letter written by Artaud's sister Marie-Ange Malausséna. It reads like the prepared words of someone seeking to set the record straight.

Each single text offers a convincing account of Artaud but all are different. Each person might as well have been remembering a different man. There are opposing views of Artaud's mental health, religion, relationship with his family and

drug use. Because the memories are so at odds with each other, instead of giving a clear picture of who Artaud was, these conflicting accounts lay claim to the difference and multiplicity that operate within memory. These memories show that recall is coloured, shaped and motivated by present action. Recall alters memory, even if it does not alter the past. Memory and the past are not one and the same. *2: Untitled* therefore performs a complicated version of the past, with contradictions and varying senses of actual and virtual, pure and habit. Each text about Artaud is performed through a form of documentation. By staging these materials together, *2: Untitled* brings about a dramaturgy of memory and documentation. A multiple and divided performance without a single reference point besides the past. In the next section I will offer an alternative form of time-specificity of the past of performance.

Diagrams of Performance Memory

This section will offer diagrams of the past tense of time-specificity of performance. Where *2: Untitled* questions specifically how to perform the past through memory and documentation, the diagrams here demonstrate another form of materialisation of research. The diagram sits between the performance and the writing, as it communicates at the level of image and still requires explanation. The images here begin with attempting to identify the implications of traditional methods of remembering performance, and move toward offering a summary of my time-specific method of documentation. This material has been presented at

numerous conferences on the temporality of performance and documenting performance, and the diagrams are published in *Choreographic Practices* (Wakefield 2014). The language is of a very different kind of register to other kinds of writing in this document. I have preserved its overly formal tone in order to maintain its status as a kind of how to technical document or instruction booklet. Again, the process of experimenting with the various multiplicities of the past has meant that this chapter is divided up between modes of enquiry. The diagrams are another result of conducting the process in this way. What follows is the communication of an approach.

Performance is of the present. It may describe and prescribe other experiences. Performance involves a multiplicity of attendee roles such as artist and audience. It is actual in that it is lived. Before a performance, it may be that a score is developed. The word score is used here instead of script because this document may or may not be language-based. The score is prescriptive, provocative and generative. It intends to have something done with it. It looks forward into the future. When viewing it the reader is cast in the role of the artist, who imagines and interprets what it might become. It is concerned with the temporal realm of the possible. After a performance records may be used and generated to remember the event. A record references the manifestation of the score. In this way a record is descriptive. It looks back to the past. The viewer of a record is placed into the perspective of the audience, attending to a performance from outside of it. The

record then is concerned with the temporal realm of the virtual. The table below maps out these distinctions.



Inserting memory into the mixture connects each distinct stage into a process more like the complex way performance practices actually function. By grouping records and scores into one overarching category as documents and relating these to performance it becomes clear that memory runs a circular route between both. This memory that connects performance and documentation may be lived first-hand or it may not be, for example in hearing a memory of a performance from someone else who was there while you yourself were not. Various performances and documents are connected through memory. Every iteration is a different becoming. Without memory the process is a linear series with differences in kind between documents and performance. Inserting memory makes the framework able to theoretically account for a difference of degree between performance and documentation.



Magnifying the circle brings more detail into view about the relations between different kinds of memories of performances. This is how I developed the memory cone, which is a diagram of the time-specificity of performance past. It is created through merging the above diagrams with Bergson's memory cone. The cone shows how memory connects performance and documents. It represents the flow of memory in two directions, virtualization and actualization. In the middle of this cone is the force of aesthetics and ethics, which can cause the two spheres of memory and temporality to have different relationships. A performance might be a re-enactment and if so the two spheres will come into very close contact.



The cone meets with two spheres. The surface of the sphere T is spatial clock time, while the spinning mobility of the sphere is duration. The summit of the cone P is performance, which is the realm of action and actuality. As forms move up along the cone, they tend more or less towards records or scores. Along the way, aesthetic and ethical forces such as history, politics and style change them. When the forms reach the sphere which is the base of the cone, they not only tend more or less toward records or scores, they also either push away from the summit performance as possibilities, which may then go on to create another cone, multiplying the same diagram into the future, or push back toward the summit performance, tending toward the virtuality of referring to a past. The movement is memory. As Bergson explains about his theory of memory in general, movement is always 'going

backwards and forwards between the plane of action and that of pure memory.' (Bergson 1912: 210). Memory accounts for the movement of artworks up and down the cone as well as driving the motion that spins the sphere of virtual and possible. As performance memory travels between the realms of virtual, actual and possible, aesthetic and ethical forces cause reconfigurations between these realms.

The documentation cone represents a time-specific theory of documenting performance. This approach in practice involves using multiple forms of documents at various levels of scale, which will offer memories of performance that are more about making it accessible in the present as opposed to preserving the past. The documentation cone reveals continuities between the various temporalities of performance. The cone can be reconfigured for any performance through time. The mixture in every performance of real, possible and virtual might shorten, lengthen or bend the cone around. The passage of time might cause the creation of a new cone, through a process of creative response or through a differential repetition as in the case of both *2: Untitled* and *9 Beginnings*.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to explore the time-specificity of the past from different points of view. Every House Has a Door's *9 Beginnings* was the initial case study of a performance of documentation. The dramaturgy of that piece indicated a more fluid and memory-like approach to the past than a fixed archive might offer

new insights into performance documentation. Every House Has a Door's creative response to records as scores, and their alteration of the past performances that end up placing their work into a genealogy all helped set a frame for a time-specificity of performance in the past. With those insights in mind I closely read recent literature on performance and documentation. Again it was change, multiplicity and memory that I came away with as keys to understanding the past. Next I analysed Henri Bergson's theory of memory and showed how its frameworks might imply a dynamic and creative interaction with the past of performance. Finally I scored and recorded my performance *2: Untitled*, which placed memory and documentation on stage together. A dramaturgy of the past is developed by approaching documentation time-specifically. By creating a diagrammatic memory document dramaturgy, my practice demonstrates one approach to performing the past.

3 – Future

Perform the future

In this third and final chapter, I turn time-specificity toward the future. How to perform the future? Time-specificity of performance future is an approach to making performance inspired by evolution that explores how the future can be created. This is not to say that performance determines what will come to be present, but rather that performance might indicate a future that may or may not come to be. The very important distinction here is that the future I have focussed on in this research is the future as a constant temporality. By constant I mean that there is an always future which does not ever become present; a duration that remains virtual. So in addition to our conception of the future as that time that will become the present, there is also a constantly evolving future which never becomes present. That future is still to come and unpredictable, because as I have shown duration entails constant change. That temporality of always future is always changing. This movement of perpetual futurity operates as an evolutionary process. The evolution of the future is connected to the present and the past.

I will argue in this chapter that performance plays a crucial role in the evolution of the ever present future. In order to develop this argument, this chapter considers an evolution of a creative process. The first section of this chapter is on making. I will investigate the role of the future in the performance making process. In my own studio work a concept of evolution inspires the invention of new ways to make performance. The second section of the chapter, meeting, is about how the future plays an active role during performance. Here I will show how the future is a point of relation between the audience and the performer. Adapting is the focus of the third section of this chapter. I consider the future of performance after it is over by exploring the ways in which performance might evolve beyond its own limits. Through each step of the process of performance, the future that will always be future plays a creative role and is constantly changing. The time-specificity of performance future is about considering the evolution of the future while creating, sharing and looking back upon performance.

My investigation of the time-specificity of performance future will focus upon my performance *Three*, upon *Creative Evolution* by Henri Bergson and upon the name change project of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. *Three* was a work for theatre that was one hour long and consisted of a highly structured series of experiments through performance on evolution and the future. It was partially inspired by Bergson's major study of biology, *Creative Evolution*, for which he won a Nobel prize for literature, not science or philosophy, in 1928 (Lawlor and Moulard

Leonard 2013). The implication of Bergson's study for performance is that there is a constantly evolving present and future of art. His concept of the vital impetus is a source of creativity.

In this chapter I will argue that art making is indeterminate and vital. Through doing so I will be considering what strategies an artist may use to open up an art making process to this constant evolutionary openness of the future. How to perform that always evolving future? For a case study I look to three Slovenian artists who in 2007 legally changed their names to Janez Janša, the same name as the Prime Minister of Slovenia. The artists have gone on making work as before and explained that their reasons for the name change are personal. The name change collapses easy distinctions between art, life and politics. The piece announces an open future for what will be made of the name change. As I will show, responses to the name change are as important as the act itself. Where the name change creates conditions for political critique through ambiguously and perhaps subversively affirming the name of a politician, *Three* reveals generative problems created by the practices of performance.

Janez Janša, Janez Janša, Janez Janša, *Three* and *Creative Evolution* will be discussed alongside each other in a developing narrative in this chapter that seeks to define the evolution of the future before, during and after performance. This chapter is the first which begins to examine the political implications of performing temporalities, taking the cue from the ambiguously political gesture of the name

change. I am interested here in how performing futurity might be political itself, without having anything to do with politics per se. Nonetheless, working creatively and findings ways to work freely with futurity and evolution brought up ethical and ecological questions. These lines of questioning are drawn together through the free creativity of artistic making, meeting and adapting. Each of those three sections will assume a knowledge of my final practical experiment *Three*, so I include the programme from the performance and photos below, preceding the chapter so that the reader will have the performance in mind. The reader may also wish to refer to the DVD to view the performance.

Three => By Nik Wakefield => 19 February 2014

What evolutionary adaptations are possible in performance? How can a performance evolve after it ends and actually do something in life? Perhaps evolving for performance is similar to evolving for social life, and thus what is real about art is that it requires the same respect, care and empathy necessary for social life.

Because it is research, this performance aspires to discover something new. As such it begins the work of seeing what will come of thought. Not just art then, this performance is of a very individual type. You might think of this performance as an ongoing 'thought-work'.

'[T]o the artist who creates … from the depths of his soul, time is no longer an accessory; it is not an interval that may be lengthened or shortened without the content being altered. The duration of his work is part and parcel of his work. To contract or to dilate it would be to modify both the physical evolution that fills it and the invention which is its goal. The time taken up by the invention, is one with the invention itself. It is the progress of a thought which is changing in the degree and measure that it is taking form. It is a vital process, something like the ripening of an idea.'
-Page 340 of Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*

This performance concludes a series of three experiments into the time-specificity of performance. The order is present, past and future. This performance, *Three*, explores futurity and evolution. It is a creative and critical response to *Creative Evolution* by Henri Bergson and the name change of the Janez Janšas.

Please turn the page over for information on the other performances and source materials for the one you are about to see.

The first of these experiments explored the relationship between duration and performance through a solo of acute slow-motion. It was titled *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, and was a response to the one-year performances of Tehching Hsieh and *Time and Free Will* by Henri Bergson. The second, *2: untitled*, explored performance documentation and memory. It combined tennis choreography by Roger Federer, texts by Marcel Proust and

friends and family of Antonin Artaud. *2: untitled* was a response to *9 Beginnings* by Every House Has a Door and *Matter and Memory* by Henri Bergson.

Source Materials for *Three* –

-Some text in this performance is taken directly from *Creative Evolution* by Henri Bergson

-The song 'Time Will Tell' is by Blood Orange off his 2013 release *Cupid Deluxe*

-The ideas concerning running are inspired by a current research project being undertaken by Gregg Whelan of Lone Twin

-Janez Janša is a Slovenian politician. In 2007, three artists legally changed their names to Janez Janša, citing personal reasons, and allowed the ramifications of their decision to multiply in the public sphere. It is an artwork without an ending.

-Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, to which Bergson refers in each of the three books of his I focus on, is an argument about the sub-divisibility of space and time. The tortoise has a head start, and Zeno argues that Achilles will never catch the tortoise because he must first pass through the halfway point between himself and the tortoise. While he does so, the tortoise advances again, creating a new halfway point, and this repeats forever. Bergson returns to the paradox to differentiate between measureable lines and embodied acts.

This performance has a text, and if you are interested in having one I will provide you with a copy. On that note, please feel free to respond to this performance in any way you would like. I can be contacted through pwwe041@rhul.ac.uk

Photographs of Three







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
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JANEZ WHO?




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
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3.1 – Making

The first section of this chapter is an exploration of how the future may be of use as a creative element in a performance making process. The future is defined here as a constantly evolving time that always remains ahead of the present. With that working definition, the research question is how to invite the openness of that temporality, the constantly changing and never arriving future, into the creation process? Because this kind of future is unreachable, it does not lend itself to being actualised in the same way as the present or the past. Instead, my method was to develop modes of performance that would refer to that kind of future. In the studio I developed forms that would bring into question the movement of time. This process accumulated into *Three*, my third and final performance of practice as research.

To understand the process of making *Three* this chapter sets out the context of Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and the name change of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. I start this section with Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in order explicate my understanding of the always changing or always evolving future. As a work on evolutionary biology, *Creative Evolution* offers useful concepts that helped me approach artistic creation as an open ended process. Once I have explained the relevance of Bergson's work in more detail, I look to a radically open performance to see how this constantly evolving future might be an integral element of an art practice. For this quality I look to the name change of the Janšas. Their work

continually unfolds in unforeseen ways that redraws the relationship between art and life. From the name change and *Creative Evolution*, I draw out some key concepts for inviting an open ended futurity into a making process. Creation as subtraction and problem solving are key notions of this chapter, as they show how to work with indeterminacy as a positive aspect of a making process. This is not only a performance making process that looks to the future. My research here attempts to make performance with the openness and unreachability of the future as an integral element.

Force of Life

Creative Evolution was written originally in French in 1907 (*L'évolution créatrice*) and translated into English in 1911 by Arthur Mitchell. In it Bergson introduces his theory of *élan vital*, the vital impetus or force of life. Bergson makes use of this concept as a way to explain the simultaneous continuity and transformation of life through evolution. With the notion of change on a grand scale, Bergson is building on the idea of duration. Through the notion of endurance as change, *élan vital* is pure duration at the scale of biological development. Bergson also builds on his theory of memory by expanding on the process of how virtual becomes actual. *Creative Evolution* is Bergson's most well-known work. It applies his temporal methodology to a macro-historical narrative.

Élan vital is a universal force of life and it is Bergson's name for what makes things alive. He explains that every form of life 'seems in its essence like an effort to accumulate energy and then to let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which it will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work' and insists that the force 'cannot overcome all obstacles' (Bergson 1911: 254). The force of life is unpredictable, dynamic, adaptive, persistent, and resourceful, yet there is no mention of purpose in *Creative Evolution*. The force of life is a tendency to overcome obstacles. Bergson is not looking for a reason for life but rather observing the powerful activity of life. Because the view Bergson takes is on a greater scale than in his earlier works, the theory of *élan vital* builds on rather than departs from his earlier work on duration and memory. Bergson's temporal method of analysis allows him to reveal continuities between the micro and the macro. 'Evolution implies a real persistence of the past in the present, a duration which is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link.' (Bergson 1911: 22). Evolution and the theory of *élan vital* are a part of what Bergson sees as processes of temporal change.

Élan vital is the ultimate process of Bergson's principle of endurance as change. He explains that 'to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.' (Bergson 1911: 7). The three parts of the sentence distil the arguments of *Time and Free Will*, *Matter and Memory*, and *Creative Evolution*, respectively. If his first book was about noticing that change is constantly occurring, his second explored how the past continues along with that

constant change, and *Creative Evolution* is a work that documents his concept of novelty from the perspective of biology. All of those processes which Bergson analyses rely upon not only change but also endurance. For Bergson duration, memory and evolution (as present, past and future) are marked by endurance as change. For Bergson ephemerality is not incompatible with permanence. Regarding continuation and transformation as essential aspects of the drive of *élan vital*, Bergson makes the case for a creative and therefore positive conception of the movement of life. 'The universe *endures*. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.' (Bergson 1911: 11). In *Creative Evolution* Bergson is concerned with this newness, how it comes about, and how in this way the work is turning toward the future. The book is concerned with how the future is made, with the engine of creativity.

Élan vital is the creativity of evolutionary temporality that provides time-specificity with a model for a new approach to performance making. It builds on the time-specificity of the present and on my concern with the sensation of time passing, as well as the time-specificity of the past that activates the time of memory. In an evolutionary sense *élan vital* is the driving force of evolution that freely negotiates the limits of the environment. If this is transposed into art, *élan vital* is a term that expresses the will to create. It describes a desire to make the future. Even if the moments of our life are not art, for Bergson each moment is an act of creation

(Bergson 1911: 7). As a force of constant creation, *élan vital* invites me to make a commitment to a life of art making as a continual process of change and creativity.

The Name Change

In much performance art, committing to a life of art making manifests in performing with the material of everyday life, especially the daily experience of time. This is what Tehching Hsieh was doing with his lifeworks. Instead of a theatre or a canvas, the support on which his work is made is the time of his life, and thus lifeworks is the term Tehching Hsieh and Adrian Heathfield adopt to describe Hsieh's performances for the book on his work *Out of Now: the Lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh* (Heathfield and Hsieh 2009). What is temporally most significant about Hsieh's practice is the extended duration of one year. That is its basic time-specificity. The performance must take one year.

There is another kind of lifework that makes use of the time-specificity of an even longer and indeterminate time, the time of a life. This is what three Slovenian artists who in 2007 legally changed their names to the same name as the then Prime Minister of Slovenia, Janez Janša. (I first encountered the name change by hearing a paper by Janez Janša at the same conference where I performed *9 Beginnings* with Every House Has a Door. I have subsequently read as many publications as I can about the work, and travelled to Ljubljana to meet with Janša. The most relevant publication here is *Name Readymade*, edited by the three Janšas to coincide with

an exhibition of their identity documents in 2008.) Like a time-specificity that imposes a clock time onto the action of performance, the three Janez Janšas impose the duration of the rest of their lives onto their work. Their name change continues for at least as long as they live. During their lives the name change is a factor of their future. Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša face a future of continuing to be Janez. This time-specificity of indeterminacy of the name change creates conditions for contingencies. Because the piece is also legal as well as personal it requires upkeep and moreover requests the participation of those surrounding Janša, Janša and Janša. The Janšas use their names for themselves on documents, for example, and others around them have to call them something. The open-endedness of the name change is not only temporal but also authorial as the piece allows others to create along with it.

Whether this name change is a performance or not is arguable but less relevant than what the name change can reveal about performance in general, especially through its temporality. The example of the Janšas is an innovative artwork in that its site is social and legal more than in the theatre or gallery. The name change is a performance in the sense of it being an activity that must be actually done, but not in the sense that it follows a recognizably theatrical aesthetic. The implications of the futurity of the name change on performance, specifically the way the Janšas open themselves to an evolution, have to do with the freedom with which life and art are created. The Janšas' name change is an exercise of the artists'

freedom. Perhaps not surprisingly art can be used as a metaphor to explain free will, showing how something new is made in every moment (Bergson 1911: 7). Each moment of life is a kind of creation because we are always collectively authoring the moments of our own lives. The name change is proof of freedom because the work creates new futures for not only the performers but also, as I will show, for others who come into contact with it.

The open futurity of the name change is directly related to the unlimited authorial capacity of it. The audience of the name change can make or break the work. The Janša's chose to change their names and the rest of us choose to go along with it, or not. Names are experienced as signifiers of the self and are supposed to belong to the self but in everyday life it is most often the other who utters our name. The public, including those who know the Janšas personally, are forced to decide whether to go along with their choice to change their names. For example, I have chosen not to use the artists' former names or any other strategy to distinguish between them, even when I am only speaking of the one Janša I know best. These complexities allow me to develop a deeper sense of the ways in which performance creates relations between people.

The three Janez Janšas create possibilities for others to be affected, think about and respond to the artwork in ways they would not have been able to without it. One of the first examples is the article written by Boris Dežulović for the newspaper *Dnevnik Objektiv* on the 1st of September, 2007, which he wrote under

the pseudonym of Ivo Sanader, the same name as the Croatian Prime Minister from 2003 to 2009, and convicted felon. The provocative title sets the tone - 'Is Janez Janša an Idiot?' Although 'Sanader' admits that normally Janša would be quick to 'sue people for slander even in cases of much smaller proportions', Sanader mounts a tongue in cheek attack against Janez Janša (Sanader 2008: 172). The journalist, or president, questions whether Janša is an idiot directly, highlighting the playful absurdity of the act. The significance of the article is that before the name change a journalist asking whether Janez Janša is an idiot would be fired, sued and perhaps jailed. Now that the three artists have taken the name, the change allows the name itself to circulate and be critiqued free of the consequences attached to the politician Janša, while nonetheless remaining associated with him. Still because the article is in the public record, that may in the future become part of history as such that someone might not know it was art. The artists responded to the article with a letter published in the same newspaper asking for an apology and threatening legal action. Although anyone in Slovenia at the time can easily find out that this is the work of artists, Janez Janša also knows that some future historian might come across these articles and attribute them to the politicians Janša and Sanader. The Janšas' practice is as much for the future as the present. They perform for a present and future audience.

The journalist's response, call him Sanader or Dežulović, is a significant response to the name change given that it utilizes the same aesthetic strategies that

the name change operates through, namely over-identification and subversive affirmation. Both strategies make use of excess. Before the names were changed the three artists joined the right wing Slovenian Democratic Party, which Janez Janša was leader of. They received a letter in response that ended by stating 'The more we are, the faster we will reach the goal!' (Janša 2008: 9). The name change actualizes the idea of more by multiplying the name itself. So although the artists maintain that their decision to change their names is personal, they have nonetheless literalised and transcended the slogan of the politician Janša. Over-identification 'exceeds the personal, intimate character of the decision' and by doing so creates the conditions for multiplicity, as performance theorist Blaž Lukan has explained (Lukan 2008: 16). The kind of excess created by a 'series' of so many Jansas removes the politician's sovereign claim on his name and places attention on the process of identification as a collective action (Lukan 2008: 18). Once the name has been changed the performance continues, not only in the life of the artist but also in the ways that other people can create with the excess of the name change through response.

That the artists literally follow the politician's call for more in order to reach some nebulous goal implies that the act is a playful critique. By following the politician the artists end up potentially undermining him and his rhetoric. This is subversive affirmation in which 'a distance is established from the object of affirmation or its disclosure […] which destabilizes affirmation and turns it into its

opposite.' (Arns and Sasse quoted in Lukan 2008: 23). By becoming Janša as performance the artists question how the politician Janša was always already a kind of performance. The Janšas all in their own way make use of notions of the future. Both over-identification and subversive affirmation are ways of performance making that use excess; excess that permits others to forge relations with art in ways that mix the lived and the conceptual. A seemingly simple choice such as using the name or not affects the theoretical structure of the art work directly, and vice versa. These open relations of the name change bring attention to the future as an impending and creatable factor of the present.

Three

The aim of my final practice as research experiment was to explore how I might perform the future. Finding out how to do so was challenging because my focus was on the future that never becomes present and is always out of reach. What helped was considering how the name change of the Janšas reveals structures of social and legal life through a work of art as well as how Bergson understands creativity as an ongoing evolution. I translated these ideas into an approach to making that poses generative problems created by the practice of performance. Working on *Three* consisted of spending time in the studio dealing with the conditions of performing. For example I might feel like abandoning a performance, but if I do so I only end up in another space and still performing something else.

This for *Three* turned into a repeated moment of leaving the theatre, which I will come back to later. The overarching approach to making this piece was about attending to these problems of performing directly, as if they were obstacles that *élan vital* might overcome with evolutionary solutions. Making *Three* was a work of attempting to adapt to the theatre and by doing so bringing attention to the future.

I will go on to reveal how it was made and how it happened throughout this chapter after I briefly introduce it here. The piece is another experimental solo that like *How Long a Thing Takes* and *2: Untitled* was performed by myself. *Three* was staged in the Caryl Churchill Theatre on 19 February 2014. The audience entered the space after being given the programme and being told that they were free to view the exhibit on stage. As with *2: Untitled*, the stage set included a display of materials that made up the performance. These objects were shown within the Practice Gallery, a bespoke set of sculpted furniture designed to display the materials of practice as research. The furniture came about through an initiative founded by myself, with support from the Creativity research theme at Royal Holloway and designed and constructed by students at Bartlett School of Architecture's Unit 14. Placing a pop-up gallery within a theatre questioned the boundary between theatre and visual art. More specifically, the function of the practice gallery is to display research, so *Three* was all at once an activity of research in a gallery and theatre. Light changes indicated to the audience when it was appropriate to take their seats for the performance to begin.

Three included spoken text, music and movement. All text was spoken into a microphone to allow the text to be simultaneously intimate and distanced. Some text was taken directly from *Creative Evolution* but most was written for the performance. The score is included in the appendix at the end of this document. Most of the text was read aloud from a page of the score on a stand. Music was used as a structuring device. There were three musical sections, one each at the beginning, middle and end. The beginning and ending musical pieces were songs, and the middle section was an instrumental interspersed with text from *Creative Evolution*. The middle section acted as a bridge between the two halves of the performance. The first half is focused on evolution and the second is focused on the relation between art and life. In *Three* there were sixteen sections involving activities aimed at solving problems of the time-specificity of performance future. Each single part posed a specific generative problem of the practice of performance. Taken together they amount to an approach to making art that considers the temporality of the future as a useful material for realising the openness of performance.

Structure and Function

One way I aimed to perform the future in *Three* was to find simple functions of complex structures. This was inspired by the name change and Bergson's analysis of evolution. The name change appears at first to be a simple act but that simplicity is achieved by a complex set of legal and social operations. For example, it would

be impossible without the unique rules for changing one's name in Slovenia that do not require a reason, as well as the already developed public profile of each of three artists and their oppositional political stance that contextualizes their actions. The surface of the name change contains an intricate system. Likewise, in *Creative Evolution* Bergson explains how evolution proceeds with complex structures and simple functions, using the example of the eye. 'Nature has had no more trouble in making an eye than I have in lifting my hand.' (Bergson 1911: 91). Bergson is emphasizing that evolution solves complicated problems by developing organs that perform simple tasks, such as seeing what is ahead or lifting the arm. The evolutionary developments that go into making vision possible are fantastically elaborate and yet the animal automatically observes an obstacle ahead and changes its path to avoid collision. Bergson is over-simplifying vision as a function in order to make the point that nature easily creates complex structures to solve simple problems.

This idea inspired my approach to making *Three*. I set out to establish a simple situation of a performance that brought the future to mind in new and different ways by playing with how time passes through performance. The experience was meant to be directly relatable and yet ambiguous underneath. Bergsonian evolution indicated that one way to achieve this was to make a highly elaborate structure for the performance. The complexity was available only to the observer who sought it underneath a carefully designed simple surface. For example

I started the performance by saying, 'Ok, this is a beginning of the performance.' While this simply indicated to the audience that the performance had begun, the operative of the sentence was 'a' beginning. The structural significance of the sentence was that this beginning is only one of many. I meant to suggest that the performance has in some ways already begun and may continue to begin in other ways later. Those implications were left unexplained in order to prevent the function of the structure to be locked down to one possible meaning; simple function, complex structure.

Making simple functions from complex structures is an act of care that intended to invite the audience to engage with *Three* on their own terms. It was not about tricking the audience. Instead it emerged from a respect for the way all audiences come to performance from different perspectives, and therefore could generate through *Three* their own significant affects and thoughts, or not. The highly complex structure is never a guarantee that a simple function will be completed. The relationship between structure and function is not causal. To assume causality in evolution is to make the mistake of instrumentalizing parts rather than to perceive the process as a whole. The simple individual functions of complex structures remain free and contingent, spurred by the creative force of evolution but not made as a result of evolution. The theory of *Élan vital* offers a holistic view, in which solutions are tested for existing problems. For example, vision is a way to notice obstacles in order to prevent injury. In *Three*, stating that it was 'a' beginning

as opposed to the beginning questioned the limits of performance. Being clear that *Three* had 'a' beginning called attention to how the current present is related to the time before the performance when its beginning was still in the future; perhaps this might be described as a virtual temporality of past future. The audience is invited toward these ideas but I do not explain them in the performance.

The complex structure for simple functions is a manifestation of the persistent creativity of *élan vital*. Straightforward solutions to what I see as problems of performance, such as starting a work, are arrived at through careful and difficult negotiations in the studio. The complexity is reliant on the simplicity of the surface. This leaves the work more open for interpretation, while also allowing precision in my reading of the function and structure. The ultimate goal of making performance with a complex structure and simple function is to reveal indeterminacy at work in time passing, which is made especially clear when it is considered that there is always more future. For me this meant that what my work might do to the audience is never guaranteed. *Three* makes use of simple directness so that the audience may decide meaning for themselves. I resist an authoritative artist-audience relationship in which the artist communicates some idea to the audience through a process of causal actions. *Three* is an invitation to the audience to bring their creativity to bear on the meaning of the performance.

Subtraction and Division

In order to create a simple form with complex structure for *Three* I approached the making process by subtraction as opposed to addition. This means acknowledging that there is already some performance material to work with when the studio process begins. With *Three* I had already done two practice as research performances, and I knew that this piece would be a creative response to, or subtraction of the name change of the Janšas as well as *Creative* Evolution. As the work developed subtraction became about experimenting with taking away different parts of the performance to see how they relate differently. Subtraction in my making process began by taking stock of what I already had to work with.

This is a reorientation of artistic making. To begin forming a work there are any numbers of possibilities. Every act of making limits the work step by step until what is left is a small set of actions. There is so much that any performance can do; what it does may not necessarily be more important than what it does not. An artwork is as much about what it is as about what it is not (Vujanović 2013: 82). This is to say that exclusion became a positive compositional force of making my performance. For example, developing a small scene to stage Zeno's paradox of the race between Achilles and the tortoise, early on I had hoped to include a real tortoise in order to actually set up the conditions of the thought experiment. However, the real tortoise would circumvent the experiment because of the powerful theatricality of the animal on stage. I chose instead to subvert the actuality

of the thought experiment by extending its theatricality through a dumb show in which I play the tortoise. To develop those movements, I experimented with doing the least amount of movement possible to still convey the story. Achilles became a staccato run, and the tortoise a prone wagging of legs and arms. Subtraction in this case allowed me to see the material of the thought experiment as a very representational kind of theatre, which I could accentuate by playing all parts myself. Subtraction gave me the confidence to simply perform the choreography of the race without actualising its conditions. By doing so the thought experiment is critiqued for its theatricality. Almost inadvertently then, subtraction becomes another complex route to simplicity, allowing the maker room to see the material of performance in a new light.

While subtraction begins by noticing what material is already available for the performance; the next step is working out how the unwanted aspects of that material will be taken away. A challenging aspect of developing *Three* was to decide how to relate my work to the name change of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. I experimented with different lifeworks I could do leading up to and continuing after *Three*. I found that my not being Janez Janša would be the most significant point to perform. My goal then was to form a situation that would show how my work is a response to the name change. I settled on a physical process of subtraction and division to also play out these principles of making. This part of *Three* was an explicit subtraction of Janez Janša.

There is a website for the documentary about the name change, *Who is Janez Janša*, that sells t-shirts that say 'Janez Who?' One of the shirts was displayed in the gallery before *Three*, so the audience who saw the shirt and who had read the programme were invited to question 'who is Janez Janša' before the performance. As *Three* progressed the shirt contained its virtual future of possibly being worn, although it progressively faded into the background as it was not made use of until the last third of the performance. Then I put it on and silently stood in view of the audience, who may had already known the story of the artists from their own experience or had read about it in the programme. The topic was introduced through the t-shirt before I suggested how I and *Three* relate to Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. Here is the score of the passage.

11. Subtracting Janez Janša.

PAUSE janez t-shirt
Who is Janez Janša?
I cannot be Janez Janša
There are only four
SHIRT cut four pieces with knife, display
Creation can come about through division and subtraction
We are doing this now, instead of a million other things
All those options
And we cut them down to these four
The only four Janez Janša's
Of which I cannot be one
I can only be with you right now

There are more than four Janez Janšas, at least ten according to Blaž Lukan (Lukan 2008: 18). The four that are relevant to time-specificity are the politician and the three artists. Four is the important number, the four people with one name. Cutting the shirt into four was an act of creation through division and subtraction. The text was used to further distance myself from the Janšas and also to distance *Three* from the name change. I established contextual relation through distance and differentiation. Cutting the one shirt into four pieces echoed both how the name appears for each person and how the name change creates a series. It divides the name into still connected but smaller pieces. It subtracts to create. My performance was made to submit to the material of both the name change and the shirt. Those materials account for the four Janšas through *Three*. Subtraction, as a process of reducing to create, is similar to the work of the sculptor who chips away at marble to reveal a form.

This creative subtraction, especially in the way it is performed with the shirt, is inspired by how life divides as it proceeds with evolution. This related notion sets the form for the pivotal middle musical section of *Three*. It began with a piece of music for electric guitar with a delay effect that repeated the played notes in a successive fade. The music consisted of six distinct phrases. I first played all six, read an extract of Bergson, then played the first five sections, then another extract, and so on until I read the final extract, '[l]ife does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by disassociation and division' and played only the first of

the six musical phrases (Bergson 1911: 89). The diminishing length of each musical section was intended to create an accumulation of energy. Shorter and shorter sections amount to the feeling of an increase of tempo. The delay effect layered each of the past musical notes onto the present and carried them partially through the spoken sections. The music not only served as a demonstration of the principle of creative subtraction, but also offered wordless time for the audience to contemplate Bergson's text. As the shirt was both subtracted and divided, so then was the music separated into parts.

Performance making as subtraction and division reveals its closeness to evolutionary processes, such as selection. Bergson's evolutionary model operates not through dividing living beings into determined forms of life, but rather through highlighting their process of selecting how to live. In my making process, selection is the free act of choosing to perform certain elements in an artwork. The creation of a single performance is an evolutionary process on a small scale. Here artistic creation is a process of change operating through selection. The process of selection includes the removal of obstacles. The performance is made by subtracting that which blocks its ability to occur. Subtractive creativity is still a becoming even though the subtraction reduces what there is. The subtraction reorients the material toward new insight. My use of subtraction within my composition process rests upon a changing relation of the virtual and the actual, which has specific implications on how the future is positioned in the present. Cutting away during the present

changes what the future can be. My performance *Three* was an act of actualizing the subtraction of possibilities and dividing the past into the present. I made use of evolutionary processes of performance making to alter the relation of the future in the present.

Subtraction positions the future as a virtual with the ability to become actualised. Actualization is not a process of addition even though it is absolutely original. The actual is new because of the progressive differentiations of duration that allow nothing to repeat in kind. The processes of actualization in performance making include a multiplicity of tendencies including intention, environment and *élan vital* which results in a singular emergence, such as *Three*. Future oriented time-specific performance making involves distinguishing between the future, as the actuality of something imminent, and a future, or the temporality that is continually the future. These are the conditions that make the new possible as an indeterminate actualization. Actualization might add nothing to the world even though a different perspective is made available. In this way subtraction and division are creative or actualising modes of performance making inspired by evolution. Instead of adding something new, creating in this way poses a problem.

Problem Solving

The major problem I faced in researching the future is that it is permanently out of reach. My solution was to consider this to be a productive problem to go

about trying to solve with *Three*, with the support of the name change and Bergson. So instead of thinking of creating *Three* as adding something to the world I took what already existed and placed it into a novel relation by working on the problems that arose. Bergson offers the groundwork for this approach to performance making when he explains how problem solving constitutes creation and that as soon as a problem is properly stated the solution becomes clear (Bergson 1946: 51). This is to say that creativity is a challenge of finding out firstly what the problem is. My problem with *Three* was the uncontrollability of the future. In respect of the paradoxical nature of performance almost always involving a repetition, the unpredictability of the future is a challenge to the necessities of performance making. Accepting the ways in which the future is always future, as opposed to thinking about the time that is on its way to becoming present, facilitated creating experiments to perform that constant future temporality. My work on *Three* was never about prediction, but rather on attending to the always future. This productive problem inspired my evolutionary approach to performance making, as a method that accentuates the openness of the future.

Problem solving is a way to deal with the unknowability of the future. Exploring the time-specificity of performance future requires openness toward a problem solving that begins with not knowing. This means the approach is about working through problems during the making process and offering the results of that process to the audience. As much as I subtracted and clarified in the studio, the

reality of the time-specificity of performance future is that I could never know what performance might do. *Three* might have been be political, it might be beautiful or might have meaning. Rather than attempting to make it political, beautiful or meaningful, my approach was to face these issues as they arise in the making of the work, knowing that with careful composition I could work toward such areas.

With this sense of problem solving, time-specificity may explain the ability of art to connect to times of life beyond aesthetic experience. Art becomes a realm to explore important issues, which in turn causes art to factor into history (Kubler 1962: 30). For example, *Three* was a performance that invited the audience to consider what force the future has on the present. The making of *Three* involved me considering how a given action will come across to an audience, and how parts of the piece will fit with the other parts. By sketching these problems *Three* aimed to enable the audience to consider their own future. One small way art might return some freedom to life is that if I could make *Three*, in some way I must able to make my own future. In addition to that creative capability, because I invited an audience, *Three* is something that would be different for each person who came, and it was impossible to predict the difference. This limited freedom with which I made the performance is the same limited freedom with which I live my life. The future of performance carries the same qualities of imminence and unknowability as the future of life.

The way the future is connected to the problem of freedom is furthermore revealed during the making process of *Three* in my body. What I now know is chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (CIDP) at first only registered as a progressive muscle weakness. It is similar to multiple sclerosis (MS), an auto-immune disorder that effects the peripheral nerves instead of the central nervous system in MS. As an athlete my entire life, it was bizarre and distressing to lose the ability to run, unscrew a cap on a water bottle or even stand from sitting without great effort. My body simply did not respond in the way it always had. So *Three* was also a solution to the problem of losing the ability to move. This personal problem and its attendant solutions involved a serious adaptation of method from the previous performances that involved demanding physical efforts. I altered my approach to making in order to continue facing the problem of the future, specifically the impending performance. With the ability to complete virtuosic physical actions subtracted from my process, I was faced with how else I might work. The problem solving needed to make *Three* also included finding new ways to use my body. I did not know how my strength would be in the future, and so created a work that could be performed in a variety of different ways according to physical ability. As I worked on the piece, the future as a problem made me realise that my physical difficulty created the possibility to perform in new ways, and even to fold those new ways of making into the work itself.

Preperformance

Preperformance might be a way to describe the making process that goes into a work before it is shared; but as a noun, a pre-performance is a solution to the issue of how to perform the future in the present. Because it is a figure of the future a pre-performance is an imaginative act. A preperformance happens when a piece discloses something that cannot happen now. *Three* and the name change are pre-performances because they both open rather than close the relation with the audience. In *Three* I was very aware of performing, and hoped that awareness might encourage the audience to be aware of their activity. I hoped that a distanced, critical demeanour would be equally useful for the audience to potentially invite a critical reflection on why we were there in the theatre. To specifically to ask if being there implied that some kind of future was desired, perhaps one with art in it. These indeterminacies are the goal, to create a subtly problematic environment. To do so I performed what I could not perform in the image of the preperformance. Like subtraction, the attention to that which cannot be performed encourages creative spectatorship. Specially in the case of preperformance creative spectatorship means thinking about the limits of what can and cannot be done in a theatre. The preperformance signals to what might have been. It is a speculative act, not dissimilar to the biography written about Janez Janša that folds the three artists' lives into one. A person looking for a volume on the politician might well come

across this book, but who knows for sure? As a pre-performance writing the biography anticipates a future not yet possible.

Preperformance demonstrates the interpenetrative relationship between the lived and the conceptual; only by living the experience of not being able to control the future can the future be revealed as an active force of the present. The future in this way is not a time that will come. The future is a time that is always later than the present. It remains continuously out of reach. The continuity of the future implies that a preperformance is as much a concept as an experience. It is the experience of concept. The preperformance is a strand of the conception of the future in the experience of duration. This is yet another way the abstract becomes lived through the work of time-specific performance making.

Preperformance dwells in the time before the future. In *Three* I say 'let's make a preperformance. Let's do something we can't do right now.' I describe the qualities of that preperformance and demonstrate them. 'Won't it be magic' followed a silly magic trick, 'won't it be dangerous' was spoken after wielding a sharp knife, and 'won't it be composed' came after holding on display a page of the performance score. I was doing something and pointing to the fact that I was not doing what was being referred to. That performance is still in the future. The audience was invited to imagine a future performance through the present one.

Demonstration

During the preperformance section of *Three* I would act before speaking; the simple magic trick preceded the words 'Won't it be magic'. The pattern of demonstrating before speaking was another way of creating the sensation of a constantly changing future. Because I set up that pattern of act then speak, the audience in each moment would know that whatever was happening would be likely followed by some kind of textual explanation. It was my way of saying to the audience that I am doing something that will relate to what will come in the future. In this *Three* was about asking the audience to trust their future to the time of the performance. It was my way of indicating how to spectate *Three*.

In a similar vein, throughout his writing Bergson signals to the reader how to approach his work, as he explains that the books are only diagrams for thought within the mind of the reader (Bergson 1911: 137). The reader of Bergson and the spectators of *Three* complete the work. This is a result of the complicated temporality in which the reader and the spectator are in the future during the making process. With that in mind, while making *Three* my studio work was always about finding out how to demonstrate my problems of performance as clearly as possible.

Making *Three* was a process of exploring how to perform the future. I have shown how it draws on clues from Bergson and the name change to interrogate the constantly evolving future that is always imminent. I have explained the performance

making methods I developed in order to adapt to the future of performance. Now I turn to the way the future is performed during the meeting with the audience.

3.2 – Meeting

This section, meeting, explores how the future evolves through the experience of performance. I am concerned here with elaborating on the skilful activities of the audience. Through the name change I became more aware of the ways in which performance gives me a chance, as an audience, to do what I could have never done otherwise. With *Three*, one goal was to point out how the audience makes use of highly developed but often implicit skills of attending performance. I will argue that the observation that occurs through meeting a performance is an active process. I follow the development of the performance as it occurred, with its demonstrated beginning. Then I articulate the modes of attending made possible by the Janša name change, which I invited during *Three* such as waiting, certain kinds of attention, intimacy and intuition. These indicate a positivity of spectating and open the possibility for a circumvention of failure. The writing on successful failure has published in the journal *Maska*. Ultimately this third of the chapter reveals that the audience trusts their future to performance, which is a positive act that creates shared experience and can lead to the creation of radically different futures.

Boundaries

The boundaries that mark the temporal beginning and end of a performance in the theatre are usually easily intelligible. With time-specificity of performance future, there is a special focus on the way a work such as the name change has an indeterminate future. It has no curtain call. The name change does not end in the traditional way that theatre ends. And yet as I have shown in chapter two, in memory there is a virtual version of any performance that continues after its actual ending. That virtual version also begins before the actual performance. For example, while the actual *Three* lasted an hour the virtual work started when the making process began. For the audience *Three* began the first time they heard about it. The implication of considering both the virtual of performance and the Janša name change is that any performance has the potential to continue perpetually. For this reason, the time-specificity of the performance future considers the multiple beginnings and endings of its meeting with the audience.

Boundaries such as ends and beginnings are framing devices that do not contain a performance although the actuality starts and stops. Time-specificity conceives of performance as a mixture of actualities and virtualities. The virtuality of *Three* continues in the circulation of this text, in colleagues' memories, and in the official records of the university. The performance temporally exceeds these beginnings and endings. A performance such as *Three* is a plan but the name change implies a conception of performance as having a life of its own through its

unpredictability. Bergson explains that a plan 'closes the future' but that for 'the evolution of life, on the contrary, the portals of the future remain wide open' (Bergson 1911: 104-105). There is a vital tension in performance between the imminent actual ending and the virtual perpetuity.

Because time-specificity defines the future as always evolving it is more accurate to consider beginnings and endings as processes of association more than discrete borders. Time-specificity conceives of beginnings and endings less as walled boundaries and more as fuzzy and penetrable clusterings (Kubler 1962: 11). Because the present carries a persistence of the past within it and because the present is constantly creative with an always evolving future, actual experience is a heterogeneity of qualities that fade into and out of attention as opposed to a series of discrete states. Constant creation implies that any beginning is also an ending and vice versa.

In addition to the articulation of 'a' beginning and 'an' ending in *Three*, to perform the idea of beginnings and endings as penetrable boundaries there is a passage in which I raise my hand in the air several times while reciting a section of *Creative Evolution* where Bergson analyses the motion of a hand being raised and then dropped again. He goes on to describe the world as 'a reality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself.' (Bergson 1911: 247-248). The doing of the action incorporates the undoing of the action. The performance ends because it begins, and because it ends it must have begun. These artificial boundaries are

more points of contact with or attention to materials rather than full stops and starts.

I continue with the following original text –

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Evolution is a lift of the hand, a hand to a door
Simple and precise
Complex and messy
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As I repeatedly lift my arm in the performance, I am ambiguously waving goodbye to the audience as I prepare to leave the theatre, which I intimate by saying 'a hand to a door'. The audience does not know this, as I am not explaining it outright. Minutes later when I attempt to leave the theatre the audience might recall the line and consider that this moment is the past future. The end of that section is the beginning of another. *Three* is a performance structured through a continuous evolution of beginnings and endings even though the meeting with the audience is marked by beginnings and endings. The discrete borders of the actuality of *Three* facilitate the social and material conditions of sharing as well as make it possible to create the sensation of the more permeable and moveable boundaries of time-specificity.

Waiting

What happens between a beginning and an ending might be the action of waiting. Waiting for a specific future, for example. What is conceived of as the future is often populated with that which is desired. When the future contains objects of desire the present becomes an experience of waiting for the future. Waiting

happens when attention moves toward the future. Waiting is also the meeting of different rhythms of duration, as when the audience meets with a performance such as *Three* that is full of pauses. The experience of the passage before the arrival is how Bergson returns to his concept of duration in *Creative Evolution* with the story of waiting for sugar to dissolve in water (Bergson 1911: 9-10). Bergson uses the experience of the sugar dissolving in water to reveal the concreteness of the passage of time. As I explain in the video that accompanies the performance of *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, while it is possible to accurately measure how long it takes for the sugar to dissolve, the experience of waiting will be different for different people because it is an effect of immeasurable duration.

Three performed the duration of sugar dissolving, as one of my first actions was to pour sugar into a glass of water and display it on a shelf. I then read out the passage from *Creative Evolution* and carried on with the rest of the performance. About fifty minutes later I returned to the glass of water and placed it on a table at the centre of the stage. I then hid myself behind a curtain and waited while the glass of sugar and water became the performer on stage, and the audience was implicitly invited to spectate the dissolving of sugar in water. I then spoke a passage from *Creative Evolution* some 333 pages after Bergson introduces the sugar water in which he returns to it. He explains that a significant implication of this concrete experience of waiting for duration to pass is that the future is absolutely indeterminate (Bergson 1911: 339-340). If we did not need to wait to see how things

will pan out, they will have been pre-determined. Waiting implies that there will always be contingencies.

Three involves a lot of waiting to give the audience time to think. Each pause in the work is given the length of a specific clock time, usually five seconds for pauses within sections and ten seconds to mark more important structural divisions. Even five seconds is a long pause in performance, and ten is difficult to sustain. Maintaining the long pauses throughout the performance was intended to establish a rhythm that the audience could attune to. The waiting allowed there to be time for difference, to create the sensation of the multiplicity of durations, which is an effect of the multiplicity of the audience in general (Cull 2012: 200). Waiting creates the possibility for the positive act of patience from the audience. The pauses of *Three* are an invitation for the audience to consider how it will wait, with impatience and boredom or creative engagement. In *Three* I wait to encourage the audience to decide their own future.

Attention

The audience experiencing the pauses of *Three* were given the choice of attention. The work aimed to highlight the idea of the attention of the audience as an expressive capacity. This is inspired by the Janša name change, a work outside the theatre where the attention of its audience is more easily active and expressible. The audience of the name change speaks Janez or another name out loud,

confirming the performance and living its continuance. *Three* aimed to explore how the theatre can create just as active a relation with the audience. The audience of *Three* was not asked to speak or perform, but by waiting I left intentional gaps of time and ambiguities which were opportunities for the audience to think along with the performance. As the performer, even I am sharing in the activity of thinking about the performance, not to mention needing continuously to decide to stay committed to the work. Both the performer and the audience choose where to place their attention, above and beyond choosing to go to and remain at a performance.

Attention is a shared activity that indicates the creative potential of the audience. For the name change of the Janez Janšas, the audience fulfils the work of the piece in many ways, most obviously by using the names that the performers chose, but in other not yet actualised ways as well. This future oriented time-specificity is also a creative act related to the work of being an audience to the Janez Janša name change. From the meeting between the Janšas and myself I move in several directions. I invite Bergson and bring the readers of this document and the audience of my performances into that meeting. A concentration occurs through performance in which a shared attention attracts disparate elements. As Ric Alsopp explains, this figures the future as a 'shift of attention' in the present (Alsopp 2013: 306). The shift is the constantly evolving future changing again. Through the

meeting between the performer and the audience on the plane of performance, a new future is made possible.

This mode of attention confirms the open-endedness of the future because 'perception is a creative activity culminating in the production of an event of change.' (Massumi 2013: 27). As time passes in a performance, the idea of the future is always changing. For a painting, the beholder might imagine the work that goes into making it (Dewey 1934: 56). For performance this act of imagined creation on behalf of the audience is doubly complicated because the piece is being created as it is being beheld. The audience of a performance during its evolution can imagine it as a finished piece and must also think along with the work, or perhaps in *Three*, as the work. In this way the audience as much as the performers are making the work as it goes along. Because performance includes a passage of time that is a sequence of continuities, the audience chooses whether to follow the processual development of the meeting. The audience give their future to the performance through their creative attention.

Successful Failure

The meeting ground of performance I have described so far sets up a charged situation of different people coming together; a lot can go wrong. Failure as a compositional strategy is a popular method that some contemporary performance practitioners utilize in order to play with the expectations of the

audience. Failure becomes a way of playing with the future, but if an action is intentional it becomes inappropriate to consider it a failure. I differentiate between imposed or actual failure, which could only mean illness, humiliation or death, and composed failure or the appearance of failure. The appearance of failure relies upon the successful creation of representations of failure.

In her book *Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure*, Sara Jane Bailes writes that as a 'failure is inclusive, permissive even. It can lead to unanticipated effects.' (Bailes 2010: 2). Failure can be a useful tool for art, especially critical practices, because failure often reveals how virtuosic representation fosters exclusivity and competition. Although democracy relies on representation, the disillusionment of contemporary politics discourages participation. Representation or 'performance' comes to be critiqued as a corruptive force in politics, art and philosophy. Performances that make use of failure show the attempt and the breakdown. Failing shows awareness of what is being asked for and the gesture of refusal. It signals a future and then refuses to follow through.

Thus failure is a critique of the notion of positive progress. Bailes describe failure's specific temporality as a creating an 'intriguing […] orientation toward a/the future.' (Bailes 2010: 2). The future will come, but it might be a present different from how that time as a future was imagined. Failure shows that continuity is not a product of success. Failure defies the pressure to perform, it objects to entering into mechanical circulations of capital in the experience economy. Failure also creates

conditions for a future in which new positions to be created, and for Bailes failure is underpinned by 'hope' (Bailes 2010: 12). In Bailes' view failure is positive. Failure is enabling because it problematizes normativity. As an aesthetic strategy failure is correlative to the political imperative to opt out of systems one finds too broken to fix.

In the 2014 book *MISPerformance: essays in shifting perspectives*, editors Marin Blaževič and Lada Čale Feldman point to an interesting paradox in Bailes' framework of failure. 'Failure turned into a constitutive element of a poetics presupposes a success (a successful failure) that conforms and confirms that very poetics. […] What remains is failure that failed to fail' (Blaževič and Feldman 2014: 18). If a poetics of failure can only mean that failure becomes an intended condition, failure becomes something other than a spontaneous emergence of difficulty and instead becomes an element that is created through performance making. If the first part of the quote reveals a complex appropriation of failure that transforms it into an aesthetic strategy, the second part of the quote aims to reclaim failure as it was, an actuality that is now a virtuality. It becomes possible to speak of imposed and composed failure as different forms.

If an action can be a failure or a success, it becomes necessary to locate the perspective from which the decision is made. The inclusion of intention into the framework of failure suggests not only that such failures are also successes, but also that a technique of perception is required in order to observe an action as a failure

or a success. The audience believes that a certain future is enabled and avoided. In an act of collusion the audience agrees to pretend that the action set up a desired result, which instead produced an alternative. The audience knows that the artist knew that the action would 'fail'. This is the success.

Another option is that a set up produces a result that was not intended by the artist and is not accepted by the agreeable audience as an acceptable failure. This option escapes recognition and fails because it does not offer the inclusive transcendent irony of the successful failure. This shares some of the functions involved in the absurd or pleasurable suspension of disbelief necessary to imagine that an invisible wall separates the auditorium from the raised stage.

One result of this analysis is that failure therefore returns representation to experimental performance, an art genre that usually prides itself on a critique of illusion. And yet his goes too far because it suggests that an impenetrable boundary exists between success and failure. Bailes' book makes a much more sophisticated point, as do the contributors to Feldman and Blaževič's edited volume. Perhaps there is a possibility that there are always degrees of success and failure to action, and that what was intended as a failure can in fact not succeed.

I performed a successful failure in *Three*. It was a simple choreographic action with a microphone stand. The stand is laid down to create a one-foot high barrier. I took two runs to attempt to jump over it, but could not. Although the barrier was relatively short, those in the audience who knew me well also knew that my chronic

inflammatory demyelinating neuropathy had caused enough muscle weakness that I actually could not jump. I rotated the stand so that it became a barrier between myself and the audience. To cross onto the other side, I 'realized' that though I was unable to jump, I was able to slide under the stand. It was a lot easier this way. The slide was less showy and less virtuosic. It was a failure to jump. Although in another way it was a success. I was able to cross the barrier, but had to find a solution that existed outside the parameters that the preceding action had set up, that of to jump over the stand. Here is the text that went along with the action.

```
Time to Fail
Time to be lazy
     STAND up left
     MIC lay down, attempt jump, rotate, slide under
I did it
     MIC up left
To fail
I must succeed at failing
There is no failure
Failure is nothing
This is so political
```

The failure becomes a positive action, a success. To make sense of the text, in addition to the allusion to Mladen Stilinović, whose notion of laziness I will return to later, and the appropriation of the language of Tino Seghal's *This is So Contemporary* (2005), the idea that failure is nothing is inspired by Bergson.

In *Creative Evolution* Bergson tells a story about looking for a book of poetry (Bergson 1911: 221). He takes a book off a shelf, opens to a random page and begins to read. He then returns the book to the shelf when he realizes that it is not poetry. Bergson's analysis is that the book cannot be made of a negative, a not poetry; it is instead prose. In Bergson's terminology, an intellectual effort causes the perception of the negative. The negative is a representation added to the existing positive. It is equivalent to the identification of an actual success as failure. For Bergson order precedes disorder and fullness precedes emptiness (Bergson 1911: 273-286). I condensed this down to express it in *Three* as 'nothing does not exist'.

Later in *The Creative Mind* Bergson returns to the notion of nothing as more than something. He explains that imagining nothing preceding something makes the mistake of denying the force of duration, or suppressing duration to the spatiality of clock time (Bergson 1946: 91-106). Doing so assumes that the past does not interpenetrate with the present and projects the past into the future, which denies duration its radical inventive capability. Order exists and differentiates through the force of duration. When Bergson describes evolution as the production of novelty it does not mean that something is created from nothing. His point is that the future always arrives with more complexity than was imaginable and that the future is unpredictable. The future is unknowable in a different way to the disorder identified in an undesired order.

If the work of attention becomes interested in the something before the

nothing, the framework of failure and success as a binary is replaced by indeterminism of positivity. The name change of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša shows this by uncovering the imminence and unknowability of the future. The audience is encouraged to engage in the positive action of finding order through their practice. Beyond success and failure is the identification of order through shared invention. As Zdenka Badovinac explains, the failure or success of the name change is much less important than the experimentation enabled by it (Badovinac 2008). That the three artists succeeded in changing their names to Janez Janša is certainly not worth praise of artistic genius. The very simplicity of their partial sense of authorship bestows upon the surrounding social group the ability to create within the critical space they have opened.

The name change made positive sense of the power of signification and enabled invention in a domain previously seen as limiting. Perhaps truly critical arts practices are those that announce the unimportance of either failure or success through their commitment to a task that involves a process of revealing order rather than disorder. The name change is one of these actions because it is positioned a step before success or failure. By keeping the reason for changing the names personal and private the work is uncontained. It does not require the intellectual effort to represent a negative. This makes the name change as life and art a volatile and undetermined force that is able to evolve beyond recognition. This is how the name change reveals the tension between the future that will come to be the

present and the future that will always be the future.

It is Personal

One of the most important aspects of the name change of the three Janez Janšas is their answer when asked why they changed their names. They all cite personal reasons (Badovinac 2008: 59). Achieving the skilful conceptuality of the work is reliant upon this way that the Janšas evoke the personal dimension. They do so to conceal the reason for changing their names. This aspect of the work delimits its future potential as it 'can be interpreted as a conceptual stance producing a whole range of meanings.' (Milohnić 2008: 124). Because the Janša's do not tell us why they changed their names, we immediately imagine their reasons. On a grander scale, withholding the reason might imply that the quest for a reason for art is problematic. By imagining their personal reasons, the work pushes the private into the public. The fact of not explaining leaves room for the audience to create, 'which triggers performative actions with unforeseeable end results and durations' (Badovinac 2008: 58). The collectivity of the name change is facilitated by the artists' respectful evocation of the personal. The name change is at its most challenging in the face-to-face domain. That is where their parents, partners and close friends are faced with the choice of whether to say Janez or not. The name change becomes a work of art authored by anyone who calls one of the artists Janez Janša.

Intimacy

The personal realm of the name change enables the experience of intimacy, which inspired me to create through *Three* an intimate meeting with the audience. My performance was not intimate in the sense of revealing autobiographical information or being physically close to the audience, or even by limiting the audience to a small group of people. Between myself and the thirty people who came to see *Three*, ten felt cushions created a clear border. *Three* was however intimate in a formal sense, in which the sharing time of performance made the audience and myself temporarily inseparable. Intimacy is for time-specificity the character of looking toward the future together differently. It is the affirmation of making a performance in the first place and the confirmation that the audience offers to the performance through their activities. Because the meeting of *Three* is about creating the future, it places attention on the positive act of perceiving order instead of disorder. By looking for order, the method of this kind of attention is both positive and affirmative. Identifying what there is also means looking for relations that extend beyond individuality. It is based on the kind of collectivity that is inherent in the name change by virtue of the name change's reliance on others to create with it. This affirmative relationality also characterizes the posthumanist ethics of Rosi Braidotti, another philosopher emerging from the same tradition as Bergson (Braidotti 2011: 304). The experiential encounter of performance is the realm for the ethics of the time-specificity of the future.

The intimacy of *Three* is centred on the sharing of responsibility. For me attention to time, especially the future as a site of creation, implies that the present is the time for urgent mutual care. To provide a concrete example, toward the end of *Three* I sang and played on electric guitar a cover of the Blood Orange song 'Time Will Tell' from the 2013 album *Cupid Deluxe*. The song fulfilled two main functions. First its structure shares the citational multiple temporality of *Three*. It is the final track on *Cupid Deluxe* and yet is made up of two other Blood Orange songs. It takes lyrics and musical phrases from both the 2011 album *Coastal Grooves* song 'Champagne Coast', and another earlier track on *Cupid Deluxe* entitled 'It Is What It Is'. Layering the multiple songs into one to create a new work involves a subtractive method of creation. Second and more importantly, the words of the song are very personal. 'Time Will Tell' includes provocatively intimate and yet nondescript lyrics. 'Come into my bedroom' is a repeated phrase but there are no sexual underpinnings. It serves in *Three* to invite the audience into a situation of intimacy and reflect on the possibilities of doing so within the public event of performance. It ushers the private into the public realm just as the Janšas do with their name change and their statement to keep the reason for it personal.

When the words 'come into my bedroom' are repeatedly sung, a tension is created between the formal social conditions of the performance and the intimate and private nature of the utterance. This was how I created a situation in which the audience's meeting with performance involved negotiations between public and

private. I packaged specificities as universalisms in order to construct intimate relations. Repeatedly throughout *Three*, for example, I used the pronoun 'we'. As a shifter, or a word that can be defined only in its message or relation, the word is performative. It figures the audience as a community. Shifters, such as 'I' and 'you' in addition to the deliberately inclusive 'we' were used throughout *Three* in order to question the way individuals and groups are defined. Intimacy in *Three* is a volatile and productive problem of performing.

Intuition

This section on meeting has been an exploration of how the future sits between the audience and the performer in *Three* and the name change of the Janez Janšas. To conclude it and lead on to the next section on adapting I must explain the relevance of Bergson's methodology of intuition, which plays a crucial role in my approach of time-specific performance work. I write about performance in this thesis from the perspective of practice, in which reading and writing are as creative as performing. With the time-specificity of the future the practice becomes intensely more challenging, because the future as the object of research is always beyond the realm of cognition. The intellect as a spatial mode of thinking is unequipped to examine the future, a temporality without space. It is the intuition as Bergson employs the term that is most helpful as a way to encounter the future.

Throughout Bergson's work he remains committed to the productive difference between temporal and spatial thinking. In *Creative Evolution* this manifests through an exploration of the development of different forms of thought and consciousness through the middle third of the book. Bergson analyses the evolutionary movement from instinct to intelligence, showing how intelligence moves toward spatiality (Bergson 1911: 151-165). He explains that intelligence provides the potential for a partial return to instinct as the most precise and direct way of doing philosophy, and this principle is the basis of Bergson's philosophical method of intuition. The implications of the differences between these kinds of thinking are indispensable, as the intellect usefully creates boundaries while the intuitive identifies relations (Bergson 1911: 176). Although spatial thinking facilitates social life, philosophy must also involve excursions into the concrete observation of experience through intuitive temporal thinking. Contemporary thinkers such as Doreen Massey have updated Bergson's split and made use of the qualitative and intuitive approach to space, and yet there remains in Bergson a useful challenge to find ways to approach time (Massey 2005).

Bergson's intuition is a philosophical concept particularly relevant to art. Art without intuition is scientific craftsmanship or poor design at best. Time-specificity points to intuition as a relation between art and philosophy. As intuition is conceived as primary contact with material, it involves a togetherness and empathy well worth fighting for. Intuition is not only a necessary condition for achieving time-specific

performance making. It is also an important quality in the audience. As an audience to the name change I intuit its specificities. Bergson defines intuition as a means by which 'one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it.' (Bergson 1946: 161). Intuition for Bergson is about coming into direct contact with the world. What intuition offers, though, is not always as easily packaged as that which is expressed through space. The time-specificity of the meeting with the audience intends to move past easy definition. It is the only practical way of going straight into the creative meeting through performance. Time-specificity here is the practice of intuiting the constantly evolving future. Intuition leaves the future open to adaptation. As I will show in the next section, what the meeting through performance makes possible is the creativity of adapting to the future, which marks the politics of time-specificity.

To conclude this section on meeting, what I have shown is that the way in which performance comes into contact with its audience entails a specific futurity. The audience trusts their future to the performers. The audience has a lot of work to do in a performance, especially when that performance does not make use of established techniques of observation in mainstream arts such as immediate recognition. In experimental theatre such as *Three* or a lifework such as the name change, the audience which sticks with the work has to decide what to do with it. It is a challenge to be the audience of these kinds of art, but they offer to some a

distinct pleasure of discovery. What occurs through discovery may be change or real life adaptations, to which I now turn.

3.3 – Adapting

Art Adapts

This last section of chapter three concerns the way art can be seen as adapting. *Three* is an exploration of the relationship between performance and evolution through the future. A major aim was to question how performance might involve processes of adaptation. If *Three* can be boiled down to a single statement to express the time-specificity of performance future, it is that performance is adaptation to a future. By this I mean that performance is a way of making the future, or an activity of the present that enables change. Evolution is relevant because it is open ended and vital. Evolution makes the future, but has no certain future, as is also the case with the name change. Adaptation, or adapting, the word I use here because it activates the concept as a verb, describes the activity of the future as an unreachable non-spatial realm of desire. Adapting collapses the distinction between life and art because it is the future of both. As I continue with this section, I will show time-specificity manages to tie into these large processes.

The programme given to the audience of *Three* starts by asking

What evolutionary adaptations are possible in performance? How can a performance evolve after it ends and actually do something in life? Perhaps evolving for performance is similar to evolving for social life, and thus what is real about art is that it requires the same respect, care and empathy necessary for social life.

With this I draw a connection between art and life through the necessity of change. The most common word to use when relating art and life is 'imitate', but time-specificity involves an explosion of possibilities for how life and art may be related. My piece for pencil and paper, *A Map of Art/Life Relationships* (published in *Maska* as a supplement to my article on successful failure), is the diagram of this action.



The diagram shows how art and life may be related in any number of ways, and that relationship is always changing. What is important about performance is that it shares the temporality of life, so time-specificity seeks what is factual in the artifice of art, rather than its ability to imitate. This is why I place so much importance on the conditions of relation that *Three* and the name change create. These conditions,

such as the qualities of observation, are created just as the elements of the artwork that are between the typical beginning and end. The evolutionary changes that art goes through relate to all aspects of its experience, not just the creation of forms. Artistic evolution is bodies as much as light, architecture and text.

To perform artistic evolution I created the middle musical section of *Three*. It was the only accumulation of energy in the performance where my voice rose above a conversational volume. I read sections of Bergson interspersed with a diminishing musical phrase; which I earlier analysed as a performance of creative subtraction, a method of performance making inspired by evolutionary division. The text is about the violent capacity of evolution which Bergson compares to a shell that explodes into smaller parts that again explode (Bergson 1911: 98). Bergson emphasizes the resilience of life, the maintaining persistence of *élan vital*. The delayed guitar music elaborates on the bursting of shells that Bergson writes of. Fragments emerge, hang, and burst again to leave more fragments. Bergson offers a metaphor for evolution that I adapt in *Three* to make a new configuration, which then is a condition for the audience to go further, creating more fragments which will continue to burst.

Any performance is one fragment of shell in the long development of evolution, as *Three* is of the name change of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. The title *Three* suggests that the performance is more than one and also partial. It is made up of a project that consists of three performances, this text being

the current one, which in some ways also contains the preceding two performances. The two earlier performances of time-specificity make up a significant aspect of the conditions in which *Three* evolved. The work of Bergson, Hsieh, Every House Has a Door and the three Janez Janšas also made up those conditions. As was the university and the audience. Every iteration is another solution to a problem. Each one adheres to a compromise between generation and constraint. *Three* is between opening up time-specificity to an unknowable future and setting out clear parameters for its definition.

Performance adapting over time is an exercise of the free will to solve the real problems of life. This is not to say that adaptations always work out. The future is different but not necessarily better. Performance adaptation is immensely complex due to the sophistication of evolution. Art sometimes attempts to go so far as to overstep its adaptive capabilities by attempting to make everything perfect. It should come as no surprise then that the avant-garde's heyday of actually threatening hegemony is now only a nostalgia coloured memory (Badovinac 2008: 60). Still it is more than a consolation that life continues despite setbacks. Adaptation and change are forces that continue. The time-specificity of the future of performance shows the real possibility of art and politics meeting through their mutually creative capabilities. Performance adapts over time because life is difficult to stamp out.

Inviting Politics

With time-specificity, the focus on temporality and its implications invites recognition of a political dimension within art practice. As an effect of its attention to time, art may imply the political without sending a message. For example, the name change of the three Janez Janšas contains no explicit political critique. The three artists changed their name to the same name as a powerful politician, but they do not offer their opinion of the politician Janez Janša. Without a stated reason, the name change is ambivalent, uncertain and complicated. It is political, but not immediately apparent how it is political. This piece invites politics.

In *Three* I respectfully invite politics into the theatre in order to acknowledge rather than ignore power structures. I raised the possibility of a politics of performance as a way to explore the structures of power and potentials for violence and creativity that occur in the theatre. The activities that surround performance rehearse and repeat political practices. Therefore I was cautious that *Three* needed to introduce the political in a self-reflexive manner. For me this entailed invoking how politics are performed outside of the theatre. I only go as far in *Three* as to use the word 'political', but I say nothing of recent elections or policy decisions. Instead I explore how a performance might reconstruct relationships. Art does not need to say anything about politics in order to be political (Massumi 2013: 54). The emancipatory aspect of time-specificity of performance lies in its practices of performance making. I advocate for the freedom of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and

Janez Janša, for example, to be able to change their names without expressing why. Of course this also means that there is nothing wrong with overtly political art. It only means that art is free to perform its politics.

The political invitation becomes a site of adaptation as the problem solving force of life makes its way around the theatre. In *Three* I aim to construct a creative temporal relation between politics and art through their shared life, which is to say that politics and performance are related to evolution. Performance can be a safe duration in which to find new ways to pose the problems that politics is looking for answers to, and these creative acts might incorporate adaptations into other dimensions of life outside of theatres. The pervasive creativity of evolution is what links politics and art.

Conflict

Three included a protest as a performance of political action adapted into the theatre. I produced a picket sign made of heavy wood with block black letters painted on a white background that read 'Protest this performance'. Holding the sign but saying nothing I walked across the stage and back in slow-motion. This was an attempt to construct a boundary of tension between the audience and myself. Knowing that most of the audience was sympathetic to the performance, this moment played with the conventions of politeness in the theatre. But instead of pushing the boundaries of the audience, I incriminated myself by suggesting that

my work is something to be protested. I undermined my own authority, but for what? If the audience were to respond with protest-like behaviour, they would have been doing exactly as I instructed them to. The audience did remain quietly seated. That might imply that the critical and distanced spectatorship is a kind of protest, or active political engagement already. The protest moment was again only a political invitation, a performance of the choreography of political action. It carried no message apart from the admission of culpability and a boorish critical appreciation of radical political action.

This moment throws the relationship between audience and performer into a particular light, which was an aspect of a set of deliberate choices about audience interaction inspired by political implications for *Three*. The entire performance is directed toward the audience in a kind of direct address, which was a relational strategy employed in *Three* to invite the audience to think without requiring a response. I wanted to ask the audience a question and make it clear that I was not expecting an answer. I set a pattern of only speaking into a microphone for the whole performance. Although it is a use of technology, electrical amplification has the paradoxical effect of literally intensifying all the sounds of the body, making it possible to communicate quietly and intimately. The microphone also distances the text and provides another level of mediation between the audience and myself, highlighting the materiality of the text. Through separation and difference, the performer and audience make, meet and adapt.

The destination of my gaze was the most significant way to let the audience know that they did not need to perform the work for me. Whenever I spoke my eyes were focused directly in front of where I was but just above the heads of the audience. The light was focused on stage, which left the audience out of the playing space. For the audience this offers the relative safety of not being asked to perform. I was looking directly toward the audience but not at any one of them. The audience is provided with conditions from which to actively observe from the safety of historical and therefore socially contracted mutual understanding. Within this frame the use of shifters allows the performance to highlight how the relationship is being experimented with through the performance. *Three* is respectfully directed to the audience but I bear the responsibility of performance rather than asking the audience to perform.

The 'Protest this Performance' passage destabilized this respectful relation. It invited the audience to reflect on their activities of being in the audience. This action intended to reveal the multiple tendencies acting through performance that may be in opposition. Conflict need not be violent or even problematic. For evolution conflict is inherent and does not disturb the continuity of life (Bergson 1911: 13). Conflicting tendencies in performance such as disinterest, boredom, epiphany, inspiration, love, hatred, agreement and disagreement are equally important. My goal with *Three* was to affirm the positive potential of conflict.

Positive Difference

Recognizing conflict in performance creates the conditions for adaptations that encourage the freedom to differ. Politics, rife with disagreement and misunderstanding, stands to gain from performance modes of attention that encourage empathy. As often as politics divide, theatre does so as well with the power of affirming the positivity of division. Difference in the theatre can be construed as a positive. For the audience, performance is a time to actively witness without the requirement to express. The darkness and silence of the audience is the rare opportunity to pay attention without having to offer an opinion. The difference between the performer and the audience is a positive opportunity for the time it takes to reflect. Performance portends the chance to have a new idea.

Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša is a performance that invites participation into social and political life. They turn the body politic into the audience while also inviting them to create new works with the name change. Obviously their work is legal as much as artistic, as it can only be performed with the armature of the state and its laws that permit a name change. The idea that a politician achieves notoriety because of the integrity of their leadership is thrown into humorous relief. After the name change, headlines such as 'Janez Janša Dances in Berlin' and the wedding of one of the artists, while it was rumoured that the politician was due to wed soon, both exposed the enjoyable theatricality inherent to

the political dimension. The name change brings performance to the political and by doing so uncovers the productive differences between art and politics.

One way the name change performs with politics is by 'the strategy of subversive affirmation' (Lukan 2008: 23). Inke Arns and Sylvia Sasse define subversive affirmation as neither purely artistic nor political, but a mode of practice that champions something in such a way that a new critical space is opened around it (Arns and Sasse 2006: 6). The name change must be subversive, or so we think, because the artists are already known as politically critical left-wingers; and yet, as Jela Krečič makes clear, '[t]he project only appears subversive, while in fact it subverts nothing and nobody.' (Krečič 2008: 184). The name change involves no attack on the politician Janez Janša; Janez Janša is not speaking out about the horrific leadership of Janez Janša. Instead the artists go about making art and doing more or less the same activities that they had been before the name change.

The three Janez's collectivize authorship in the public sphere as a discursive site (Cvejić and Vujanović 2012: 24). The name change plays with identity through creating shifters and questioning the legal discourses through which subjects are politicized. The character of the discourse surrounding the Janšas is pleasurably positive even as it highlights difference, a tone that might be called serious optimism. Conflict is healthy only if differing perspectives are respected (Mouffe 2013: 7). It is crucial to respect the different perspectives of artists and politicians, who each have a separate claim on the attention of the public. The positive

difference of art and politics is their creative potential, which also renders them continuous. Art and politics are simultaneous and free. Affirming the positive differences between art and politics maintains the creativity and evolution immanent to both.

Opting Out

In *Three*, in order to stage reluctant participation, as it might occur in art or politics, I tried to leave the theatre. The score from the moment is below.

```
     EXIT
     RETURN
I wanted to leave the theatre
I found myself in the hallway
I wanted to leave the theatre because
I want this to leave the theatre
     EXIT
     RETURN
I want to leave the theatre
Because I want this to leave the theatre
But how can I only leave the theatre
Without just going somewhere else?
Nothing in this world does not exist
     EXIT
     RETURN
```

This passage brought together two related artistic principles surrounding the relationship between life and art. Firstly that the social structures of participation are so disempowering that the only actual response might be to opt out. Secondly that leaving the theatre emerges from a desire for performance to be more than only art.

By trying and then refusing to leave the theatre I was performing an impotent mode of political participation. I wanted the work to be lasting enough that *Three* would transcend the walls of the theatre, and yet to do so the only option is to remain within them. Because I changed my mind, returned to the stage, and explained that leaving the theatre only means going somewhere else, I affirmed the resolve to continue. Leaving the theatre would be a capitulation to the instrumentalisation of art, but inspired by the Janšas' refusal to explain why they changed their names, with *Three* I opted out of opting out. The double negative was a positive commitment to the future. Deciding not to opt out was an attempt to reclaim creative agency.

Freedom

The time-specificity of the future as imminent and unknowable reveals the freedom of performing. The future is a performance of desire, and desire can be formed in the present to encourage creativity. Surprisingly, this implies that freedom is of the present and not of the future, in which action is impossible. The constant future is only a time of imagination, plans and unpredictability. This is why it is so significant that Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša perform a constant present with a future as Janez. Their practice discloses their confidence in the future. The lifework, as a commitment that closes down the future, is paradoxically the performance of freedom. Again here is the paradoxical operation of the generative

constraint. Such practices take a creative approach to the passage of time by making a set of decisions that amount to making art into life. This is invariably an exercise of freedom in which the artist sacrifices some aspect of daily life to an artistic goal, which generates unforeseeable potentials of freedom.

This signals the political importance of performance because it shows how art offers freedom to life. As a free act that may go on to create the conditions for other free acts, the performance of life fights against the ever increasing mechanization of social systems that produce conformity, subservience to capital and disenchantment. The inherent freedom exercised through performance can produce enchantment and encourage political participation in playful ways.

As a work in and for the theatre, *Three* is not a lifework but it shares with Hsieh and the Janšas a willingness to perform life with the future in as full a view as possible. This is to say that *Three* employs a similar approach to the Janšas that makes 'use of the power to construct the subject as a source of agency' (Janša, Janša and Janša, eds. 2008: 33). Strategies of the lifework can uncover hidden potentials for free acts. Uncovering the hidden is the ability to correctly state the problem, which requires actualizing the virtual. Connections made through performance are in a constant process of change, being renegotiated according to compromises based on how to define the future.

If evolution and creation are shared by life, politics and art, each also shares freedom. As evolution creates new forms of life, performance makes vitalities. For

Bergson the order in a work of art and in a star in the sky deserve equal admiration (Bergson 1911: 224). Evolution dictates a persistence of adaptation, which implies that the future of art is wide open. Artistic and personal freedoms are driven by the creativity of *élan vital* to develop order, but they constantly surprise us (Bergson 1911: 96). The unknowability that is inherent to the future affirms the freedom of life, but not the desirability of control. It is the relinquishing of control that makes new futures possible. Time-specificity means that freedom exists in tandem with the unpredictability of the future. Artistic freedom rendered in this way is the invention of generative constraints that continue even after performance is over. The shared time of the theatre becomes a site for the performance of the freedom to make the future.

Lazy Process

The slow ending of *Three* was a beginning of a lifelong process of making. At the end of the work the complementary ideas of continuous transformation and, surprisingly, laziness, became markers of the future. As the future evolved throughout the piece, and I adapted to it, the future after performance is thrown into relief as evolution. The relief of ending a performance becomes increasingly imminent, until the lights brighten the space of the audience. Even though *Three* provided an actual ending, 'Ok, this is an ending of the performance', its focus on the future meant that the insouciant work never quite came to a close. In this way I

aspired to create 'a continuous work-in-progress' as the Janšas have done with the name change (Lukan 2008: 27). The positivity of a world-view of 'unceasing transformation' flies in the face of a melancholic end (Bergson 1911: 231). Art in this framework is alive, and always changing (Focillon 1948: 169). *Three* continues to have a future even after it ends. Ending the work allows others to take it on just as ending this chapter, for example, allows it to be read by others. To conclude the time-specificity of the future of performance I turn to a Croatian artist, whose work influenced the Janšas and discloses the positive difference between the Janšas and myself, thereby instigating the next adaptation of my work, which is a commitment to a future of art making, the concern of the overall conclusion of this project. Much of the following text was published in *Performance Research* (Wakefield 2016).

In order to retain the future in the present of performance, towards the end of *Three* I evoke laziness as an adaptation to the problem of what art will be in the future. Instead of agreeing to try harder, compete more, and display success, I follow the advice of Mladen Stilinović and practice Laziness. Stilinović is an artist of the same Eastern European contemporary conceptual art context as the Janez Janša's, active a generation before them. His 1993 text *In Praise of Laziness* is a provocation in a cool 568 words. The length of the piece as spoken is too short to be a speech but too long to be a slogan. When read it is too short to be an essay and too long to be an epigraph. Mladen Stilinović read out the text in 1993 in Ghent at Gallery Opus Operandi. The year and location are significant to the piece as it

occurred not long after Yugoslavia dissolved, and independent countries Croatia and Slovenia were being formed. The question Stilinović was partly addressing in the text is how that political change might affect artists like him, coming from cities like Zagreb or Ljubljana. However he was reading the text in Belgium and clearly addressing a Western European audience with whom his relationship was now being reconsidered. Stilinović was able to draw a distinct boundary between the socialism of East and the capitalism of the West only because he had recently become aware of that line's historicity and abstraction. He was considering the effects of the new political situation on art and suggesting a key that might solve a problem that was perhaps only apparent from that specific vantage point. The problem Stilinović addressed with *In Praise of Laziness* is the existence of art. He surprisingly made the idiosyncratic argument that art only emerges from laziness.

In the first part of the text he explains that Western artists become instruments of capitalism because their labour consists of acts of production. Artworks that are objects to be traded are no longer artworks. For Stilinović there is a difference in kind between the art that is monetised and the art that has the purity of having no reason for being. Those who would see this as nostalgia for the autonomy of modernist abstraction miss the point. Art without application, or lazy art-making, is not apolitical. Perhaps Stilinović is revealing that those art practices that made claims to autonomy had in fact only traded their allegiance from the social to the economic. More than only warning against the effects of the

commodification of art, Stilinović is suggesting that laziness becomes the ultimate expression of freedom necessary in order to make sense of contemporary life with art. Lazy art is free because it is not working for anyone or anything. It is excused. That is its value (Sabolović).

In Praise of Laziness ends with two quotes that reflexively play with authority in order to destabilise value. Stilinović misattributes 'work is a disease' to Karl Marx and then quotes himself and artist Vlado Martek saying 'work is shame.' First, Stilinović is playing with the idea that any quote followed by the name Karl Marx is something to be valued and trusted. This misappropriation is significant as an apposite of the typical Western post-modern appropriation that takes the work of another by the name of the self as Stilinović puts his own words into Marx's mouth. Second, giving a similar quote and attributing it to artists, one being himself, suggests that the erasure of the socialist East and its subsequent incorporation into capitalist West reconfigures the location of authority from political theory to artist. Taking this further, perhaps the idea is that celebrity is the new authority. Value is in the mouths of those whose quotes are the most reproduced. Reproduction operates socially through conformism, and conformism is the opposite of laziness in the system that Stilinović suggests. If capitalist individualism is only masked conformism then laziness is crucial to the complex and important collective role of contemporary art, which is perhaps to actualize spaces of appearance and durations of creative becoming; in a word to foster potential for difference.

Laziness is not defined as not working but rather as not offering to the world a performed representation of being always at work. Laziness might include all kinds of effort and thought but it does so for no good external reason. If capital becomes a substitute for religion in that in gives meaning to action, 'laziness is courage for those who do not find salvation in work' (Miroslav Jilek 1977: 35 quoted in Stipančić 2007: 14). Although this is a negative action because it does not conform to capitalist scripture, it could be a positive assertion of individual freedom to decide what to do with time. Laziness becomes a positive act. That the resistance to capitalism, construed here as a negative act, is also a positive act, by actualising an individualism based not on brand loyalty but rather loyalty to community, as art critic Jan Verwoert has encouraged with his announcements to 'defy the pressure to perform' and later to 'dare to disappoint' (Verwoert 2010: 13 and 2014: 13). So while the word laziness is not without trappings of the apparent negativity of non-action, here an enabling positive is added on. It is the prospect of small, slow, casual and easy; of which we might still be afraid.

So being lazy is deciding not to participate in a belief in the inherent goodness of work and rather commit to activity without application. This is why laziness is crucial to art making in the aftermath of modernist autonomy and the contemporary requirements for social impact or community engagement on one side and big money galleries and high profile institutions on the other, both which resist excusing art of its need for a reason to be. This is a validation of art as an

activity whose relation to life is that it is not a part of life, but rather like or equal to life itself; which is nether autonomous, dependent or determined but rather all these and more, which is to say intuitive and beyond the scope of intelligence. Art making becomes as quotidian as rest. It is the fitness of the unimportant.

To bring out these ideas in *Three*, I merely said 'Time to be lazy'. Thus it was with laziness that I invited laziness into the work. However this kind of laziness is potentially inviting on a larger scale, as it defends the reason to create through subtraction, wait, think, feel, meet and adapt through the performance. I construe laziness as letting the future remain the future, without control or determination. The laziness of my work is a step toward the confidence to let creativity occur without sense, recognition and application. It is a commitment to a future of adaption.

Conclusion

Three was the most ambitious of my practice as research experiments. It included much more original work than the other two performances. It also staged Bergson's philosophy more directly, and by doing so marked for me a departure from it. *Three* was a great leap forward for me as an artist developing, because facing the future meant taking responsibility for the past and present. I felt I had to make use of the skills at my disposal. To evolve, as an artist, meant working out what was important. That process brought me into contact with what distinguishes my work from my context. I am inspired by Tehching Hsieh, Every House Has a Door

and the three Janez Janšas, which I now realise means that I feel an ethical and creative pressure to take risks on the level that those artists have taken. Doing *Three* has made me realise that when I make something, it is for an empowering nothing, which is to say that nothing becomes a kind of comforting factor to making art as the future evolves.

Conclusion – Performing Time-specificity

Continuing Differently

In this conclusion I will explain the essence of my research project, reconceptualise my methodology, trace the main arguments of each chapter, offer a set of core premises for time-specificity, look to the wider implications of my research, clarify my contribution to knowledge, and finally mark the ways in which this project continues. Because I have offered a research objective of ambitious scope, to understand how temporalities may be performed, the aim of this

conclusion is to draw together the various threads that have emerged through the project. Present, past and future become the forms through which duration, documentation and evolution are activated in performance practice. This is shown in my own work, through the philosophy of Bergson, and in the artists Tehching Hsieh, Every House Has a Door, Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša. Throughout this project my goal has been to elaborate a mode of performance making that is time-specific, which is to say that the work constitutes an active making of time. Overall, performing temporalities is a work of exploring how the theatre becomes a place where time continues differently.

Methodology

In terms of methodology, it is crucial to remind the reader that this text is one element within a wider enquiry that includes practice. The three performances were ways both to establish research findings and to share them. Performance in this project was analogous to both reading and writing. All activities were in reciprocal relationships. Each chapter includes documentation of the performances in order to demonstrate how these pieces are integral to the research as a whole, in addition to further documentation in appendices and an included DVD with video records.

Although each of my performances was a solo work, collaboration was a key element. There are several artists who viewed my work during this research and gave extremely useful feedback. *2: Untitled* travelled more than the other two works

and included notable artists as its audience; anecdotally Anna Halprin called it 'a classic performance' while Robert Wilson called it 'a performance for a museum' and thought I should perform it with large goggles and a bird on my head (Halprin saw the work at Stanford University on 29/06/2013 and Wilson at Watermill Center 11/08/2013). I was extremely honoured to have these artists' attention. None of this project would have been possible without the numerous hours spent by myself in the studio as well as the various people who were willing to watch the works. The performance practice was the backbone of this research and although I performed alone there was an audience for as much of the work as possible.

In terms of the critical evaluation of other artists, while conducting this project an important principle was being able to contact the artists whose work I was looking at. The forms of criticism contained here take an embodied approach, where I have the artists' work and what the artist says about their work in view. Having their words as well as their performances meant I, as a researcher who would also be eventually offering my own works and words, could understand the complex relationship between an artwork, how it is understood by the maker and how others see it. Each of the artists whose work is included here was extremely generous in answering questions about their performance and in the case of *9 Beginnings*, I participated as a choreographed stage hand. This insider knowledge meant that I was able to reflect on each artist's practice through both its shared public forms and through interpersonal communication.

The practice and collaboration of this research was not limited to performance, as publications and conferences throughout the enquiry were another critical element of the overall process. The topic of time and performance seemed to become fashionable during my research, which meant I was privileged to be able to present my work at conferences and publish seven articles in notable journals. In sharing papers and fielding questions I learned how to see the place of my research in the field of theatre and performance studies. Being a part of a wider community strengthened what is contained here. This document is then the textual manifestation of my overall research into time-specificity

In respect of theory, my research began with a speculative question as to what time-specificity might be. As it developed, it became clear that my performance practice required a strong theoretical parallel to serve as a counterpoint. In the philosophy of Henri Bergson I found a relevant set of concepts following a similar trajectory to the one I sought to follow; along the line of present, past and future. Inspired by Deleuze, I traced the important developments of Bergson's philosophy from duration to memory and finally evolution (Deleuze 1988: 113). Bergson's whole project offered an exhaustive set of concepts to work with. Because of so much emphasis on practice in my research, Bergsonian philosophy provided a continual framework through which to understand the operations of the performances I was looking at and making. The theory was as integral to the research as the practice was.

Thus with practice, theory and critical evaluation as primary methodologies, the research developed along those three lines simultaneously, drawing out the thematic concerns of performing temporalities. I have sought to understand how an art work can construct time, which is to say how temporality as a constantly changing force is able to be reframed through aesthetics. My methodology helped me to understand how the present of performance is a qualitative multiplicity of durations, how the past can be a memory document that interpenetrates with the present, and how the future is always evolving. Taking a temporal approach to performance making allows for developing a temporal aesthetics, which reveals time as an active factor of performance. Performance is always time-specific, and I have shown how exactly that can happen.

Chapter Summary

In chapter one, I explored the force of duration. As distinct from clock time, the experience of time passing has no measure. Duration in the Bergsonian sense marks the lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh, who lived entire years under strict constraints as performance. His works show how an application of clock time as a container for performance allows the experience of duration to emerge. With clock time as the counterpart of duration, Hsieh's extensive documentation still leaves so much of his actual performances invisible. The passage of time was the force that drove his works. Overall, the studio practice in this chapter was about how to attend the

passage of time. My performance, *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*, was an act of slow motion walking, as a manifestation of letting time move freely. Performance can reveal time as it is experienced (Cull 2012: 182). The continuous freedom of passing time becomes manifest through showing its counterpart as clock time, which nevertheless cannot ever fully contain duration.

In chapter two the concerns around documentation that emerged as a partial concern of chapter one took their main focus in an extended study of memory, *9 Beginnings* by Every House Has a Door and my work *2: Untitled*. As I had understood after the research into duration, the past interpenetrates with the present. I looked deeply into how memory, as Bergson understood it, might offer models for a reconsideration of performance documentation. The archive was also a critical element, and *9 Beginnings* by Every House Has a Door offered a creative and critical approach to how performance might rearticulate documents. There is a useful parallel between how memories return to the present and how documents of performance make old works reappear. Considering the active use of memories and documents vitalises them and makes the past into a performable element. Reperforming also sheds new light on the past, as Bergson writes that 'one understands only what one can in some measure reinvent.' (Bergson 1946: 87). My practical work *2: Untitled* explored this kind of activity, by bringing to life different kinds of memory all in one work. Through choreography, text, media and even food, this performance accessed and made memories, showing that the past is performed

through memory documents, which work to preserve performance for the future.

The concerns that emerged around the futurity of documentation led to the final chapter on the time-specificity of the future of performance. In this stage of the research I became interested in how performance has a specific kind of future. Having learned from Bergson that predicting what will come involves projecting the past onto the future, and knowing that performance is almost always negotiating the line between repeating a plan and the unknowability of how exactly the future will be; the kind of future I could see bearing most relevance on performance is the temporality of a constant future, always ahead of the present. Here I was focused not on predicting what might come, but on actually performing it. 'The task […] is to make the future, to invent it.' (Grosz 2004: 261). Not only is the future open ended, it is also always changing. Bergson's understanding of evolution was key to realising how constant change is a positive process of indeterminacy. The name change of Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša leaves a constant future open to new creative and critical acts. Here the boundary between art and life is up for renegotiation again. The future becomes a performable temporality through calling to its active force on the present and leaving its evolution open. The name change also questions authorial boundaries, allowing its audience to choose to become makers of the art in unexpected ways. My final work *Three* took up these questions by problematizing the practices of performance in the theatre. The piece is a work

of performance that lets *élan vital*, the force of life, attempt to solve some of the productive problems of performing.

Core Premises of Time-specific Performance Making

Those three chapters draw out a widespread approach to the temporality of performance, fusing criticism, theory and practice together around the question of how to perform time. What they offer taken together is time-specific performance making. I will now set out the core premises that underlie this kind of work.

1. Using clock time as a container for performance encourages the emergence of duration
    a. For example, start a work by deciding how long it will be, down to the second, and fill that time. Stick to the exact time.

This first principle is about turning time into a deliberate aesthetic choice at the beginning of the work rather than composing an action and allowing the duration to be determined by the action, as in most theatre and durational performance. When art is made in this way the passage of time is an active element that performs along with any other element included in the composition, as opposed to a background current that allows the performance to occur.

2. Memories and documents perform the past in the present

a. For example, create a work that comes from different materials of the past. What is repeatable?

The second principle is extremely useful for understanding history. The past is repeated in the present differently from how it was. Working in this way allows for a sense of historical context in which the differences between the past and the present are illuminated. The ability to return to some but not all elements of the past shows how continuity and endurance are mutually dependent, rather than opposed.

3. Use the temporality that is always future and always changing as a focus for performance

    a. For example, without predicting, how might the future play a vital role in how the present is performed?

This third principle demands the effortlessness of letting performance identify the problems it is able to solve. What kind of generative constraints are at work in a given practice? Might those limits lend themselves to experimentation? When such questions guide a work, artists begin to uncover their own fundamental aesthetic issues and by doing so are enabled to redefine them.

Those three principles emerge from each chapter, but this conceptual platform for working with time-specificity also speaks to broader concerns. The main point is to consider temporality as an aesthetic material of performance that requires attention. Time might structure the overall boundaries of a work and it might also be

a key aspect of micro-structures. By this I mean time might be the way to set choreography, light and other theatrical means in addition to narrative, mood, affect, tone and participation. Temporal orders of performance might be established to complement the spatial arrangements and dramaturgical rules of a work. Whole time-specific dramaturgies might emerge alongside performances as well as before and after them, which would reveal exactly how important time is to performance. The platform of time-specific performance making establishes an approach to work that is enmeshed with temporality and entails a sense of how performance makes time and is not only made by it.

Wider Concerns

The wider concerns of this research relate to temporal positioning. Theory and criticism have their own temporalities as practices, and the creativity of duration implies that performance instantiates new ways of acting on all sides of performance. Art can be 'a kind of experiential and inventive field of working together' (Kunst 2009: no page). It is in this sense where the activities around performance, whether they be making, criticising or theorising, all coalesce around a mix of criticality and creativity in constant flux as well as contextual and collaborative. The activities around performance can be positioned in a number of ways, and that positioning is changeable because time continues. it is crucial that my readings of my work do not lock down their potential for continuance. What an

artist says about their work is important, but no more or less important than what someone else says about it. No artwork has a definitive reading.

In a broader and more political sense, this also implies that the creativity and criticality need to enter the broader context of social life, as the temporalities of life and art are so often parallel. As Bergson understands it, each of us is an '[a]rtisan our own life' (Bergson 1946: 94). The sense of making that I have outlined throughout this research is not only relevant to performance but also to wider aspects of social life. As is obvious, performance occurs simultaneous to its reception. There is criticality and creativity on all sides of performance that is coexistent with life.

Those wider implications of time-specificity signal my contribution to knowledge. Thematically, this project's focus on how temporalities are performed is the first of its kind. I have laid out a thorough set of temporal aesthetics of contemporary performance surrounding the deployment of time as dramaturgical material. Theoretically, I have provided a novel and extensive reading of the philosophy of Henri Bergson and made those concepts more available to theatre and performance. In terms of criticism, I have added to the extant literature on Tehching Hsieh, showing how it is by the virtue of Hsieh's use of clock time that duration becomes apparent in his performances., my research is the one of the first to comprehensively look at a recent work of Every House Has a Door, made especially relevant given that *9 Beginnings* shows a creative approach to working with performing documents out of the archive. My study of the name change of

Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez Janša is also one of the first extended analyses in the English language. With their name change I have shown how a radically evolving future creates a new sense of open ended art. Theoretically and critically I have contributed to knowledge by showing how Bergson, an increasingly popular but hitherto understudied philosopher, can be used to make sense of experimental performances.

Contribution to Knowledge

My contribution to knowledge in terms of time-specific performance practice is the most important aspect of this research. I have theorised a practice methodology that sees performing as both an input and output for research. This levels the playing field between practice, theory and criticism, making way for other practice researchers to be able to work in productive ways. Time-specificity is the subject of a practice which is nevertheless in itself conceptual. Temporality is a moving and therefore difficult force to work with. It requires careful consideration, and my pursuit of time-specificity will be useful for others who want to find out how time is integral to performance. While many can agree that time is inherent to theatre and performance, this research project offers a definition of what exactly that relationship between time and performance is. The present, past and future of performance are all active constituents of the multiplicity of theatre and

performance. Temporalities are always being performed and I have thrown light on the process.

Conclusion

I advocate the temporal approach to performance because time-specificity is a provocative way to think long term about art making. Art has its own vital force, which continues to formulate necessary problems to solve. For artists and people around art, that vital force is essentially politically. Creativity is always needed, and especially when that creativity is replete with an active memory. History is just on the edge of repeating itself and yet always generates difference. Artists have the unique ability of being able to take the past and make it active in the present, in order to make new futures possible. For me, this means allowing my art to evolve in indeterminate directions. It also means keeping the past vital and honing what has been done well. For other artists, I hope that time-specificity will function as a marker of permission. Permission in this sense is the ability to allow adaptations to occur exactly because change is continuity. Endurance is a positive action. It is the performance of listening to time, of waiting for the sugar to dissolve. Because so much has happened, and so much more might happen, 'Time is invention or it is nothing at all.' (Bergson 1911: 341). The time of performance is an excellent moment in which to allow creativity to produce new forms of life in duration. Performance is the maker of beauty, dignity and joy through the passage of time.

Appendix

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– Text of Video Programme that accompanies *How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration*

- *2: Untitled* Exhibit Catalogue

- *2: Untitled* Spoken Text

- Notation of Roger Federer's tennis choreography in his match with Janko Tipsarevic as a part of the ATP World Tour Finals held at the O2 Arena London 12 November 2012.

- *Three Score*

How Long a Thing Takes Video Text

"How long a thing takes: an invitation to think duration.

The philosopher Henri Bergson studied lived time, which he calls *la durée*, duration.

If you define la duree, it basically means how long a thing takes.

In Bergsonian terms, the present as duration is heterogeneous, a qualitative multiplicity, nothing like space or clock time and unlike number.

This is a hi-tech way to say that true time is intuitive, something we all experience, but something that doesn't translate to abstract concepts in spatial thinking.

Duration is a force, it is that immeasurable change that happens while you wait for the bus, or in Bergson, for sugar to dissolve in water. You might be able to measure with seconds, but ask ten different people without watches how long it took and you'll get ten different times.

Duration is continuous, but not in the sense of one thing after another. That is a kind of succession that is nothing more than juxtaposition in space, simultaneity even.

Duration is continuous becoming, invention, evolution.

With my research I'm trying to build a notion of time-specificity out of adapting the model of site-specificity to Bergson's idea of duration.

I'm working to clarify the relationship between performance and the passage of time.

So far, one good way to think about it is that emergence of everyone in the room really needing the passage of time. Not because of boredom, but because the performance, through the passage of time, is making a necessary future.

Gilles Deleuze in his book on the painter francis bacon writes that one goal of the artist is to, make time able to be sensed.

So why am I moving in slow-motion?

I've taken up the aim Deleuze suggests and I'm using slow motion to render duration sensible in the following ways.

In slow motion, the focus is on the act of moving, instead of the measurable distance of space that movement travels through. This puts motion into temporal terms, reframing movement as mobility, emphasizing indivisibility, replacing homogeneity with heterogeneity, quantity with quality and event with force. It is the multiplicity that can only be thought of as variety or diversity, never counted.

In slow motion, movement never stops, so it is continuous.

In slow motion, the creativity of the future as newness is simplified. You still might ask, what comes next, because you can never know, even though it'll probably be yet another slow footstep.

And in terms of repetition, in duration repetition isn't ever the same thing, so its not like one thing after another, which is the same as juxtaposing two objects in space. The repeated act of walking, in its continuous endlessness, is a repetition of tension, or thickening.

These are a few of the ideas I'm hoping we all might consider through the experience of this performance.

If nothing else, I'd like the idea of composing the passage of time to be something we walk away with."

2: Untitled

Exhibit Catalogue

1. Madeleines
2. Televisions – (during performance will show Federer match).
3. Book – Henri Bergson *Matter and Memory*
4. Book – Marcel Proust *In Search of Lost Time Volume 1 Swann's Way*
5. Book – Charles Marowitz *Artaud at Rodez*
6. Book – Antonin Artaud *50 Drawings to Murder Magic*
7. Book – Matthew Goulish *Work from Memory*
8. NY Times Article – *Federer as Religious Experience* by David Foster Wallace
9. Cardboard-backed Photograph, black and white – Artaud at Rodez 1
10. Cardboard-backed Photograph, black and white – Artaud's study at Rodez
11. Diagram on paper – Bergson's Memory Cone
12. Diagrams on paper – *Documentation Cone* and *Genealogy of Performance*
13. Bad Memories Eraser
14. Tennis racket (Mine, a replica of Federer's).
15. Tennis balls
16. Tickets from Federer match
17. Scanned diagrams - Schoenberg's system of notation for tennis
18. Typewriter with paper for audience to enter their names

19. Projection of past work
20. My score and documents from *9 Beginnings*
21. Website Images from *9 Beginnings*
22. Flippers from *9 Beginnings*
23. Original notation system of Federer match
24. Score of spoken text in performance
25. This catalogue

2: Untitled Spoken Text

PART ONE – PROUST AND THE MADELEINE

And so it is with our own past. It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all the efforts of the intellect must prove futile. The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that material object will give us). of which we have no inkling. And it depends on chance whether or not we come upon this object before we ourselves must die.

Many years had elapsed during which nothing of Combray, except what lay in the theatre and drama of my going to bed there, had any existence for me, when one day in winter, on my return home, my mother, seeing that I was cold, offered me some tea, a thing I did not ordinarily take. I declined at first, and then, for no particular reason, changed my mind. She sent for one of those squat, plump little cakes called "petites madeleines," which look as though they had been moulded in the fluted valve of a scallop shell. And soon, mechanically, dispirited after a dreary

day with the prospect of a depressing morrow, I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a shiver ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory- this new sensation having the effect, which love has, of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it *was* me. I had ceased now to feel mediocre, contingent, mortal. Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of the tea and cake, but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same nature. Where did it come from? What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it?

I drink a second mouthful, in which I find nothing more than the first, then a third, which gives me rather less than the second. It is time to stop; the potion is losing its virtue. It is plain that the truth I am seeking lies not in the cup but in myself. The drink has called it into being, but does not know it, and can only repeat indefinitely, with a progressive diminution of strength, the same message which I cannot interpret, though I hope at least to be able to call it forth again and to find it there presently, intact and at my disposal, for my final enlightenment. I put down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone can discover the truth. But how? What

an abyss of uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the dark region through which it must go seeking and where all its equipment will avail it nothing. Seek? More than that: create. It is face to face with something that does not yet exist, which it alone can make actual, which it alone can bring into the light of day.

And I begin to ask myself what it could have been, this unremembered state which brought with it no logical proof, but the indisputable evidence, of its felicity, its reality, and in whose presence other states of consciousness melted and vanished. I want to try to make it reappear. I retrace my thoughts to the moment at which I drank the first spoonful of tea. I rediscover the same state, illuminated by no fresh light. I ask my mind to make one further effort, to bring back once more the fleeting sensation. And so that nothing may interrupt it in its course I shut out every obstacle, every extraneous idea, I stop my ears and screen my attention from the sounds from the next room. And then, feeling that my mind is tiring itself without having any success to report, I compel it for a change to enjoy the distraction I have just denied it, to think of other things, to rest and refresh itself before making a final effort. And then for a second time I clear an empty space in front of it; I place in position before my mind's eye the still recent taste of that first mouthful, and I feel something start within me, something that leaves its resting-place and attempts to rise, something that has been anchored at a great depth; I do not yet know what it

is, but I can feel it mounting slowly; I can measure the resistance, I can hear the echo of great spaces traversed.

Undoubtedly what is thus palpitating in the depths of my being must be the image, the visual memory which, being linked to that taste, is trying to follow it into my conscious mind. But its struggles are far off, too confused and chaotic; scarcely can I perceive the neutral glow into which the elusive swirling medley of stirred-up colours is fused, and I cannot distinguish its form, cannot invite it, as the one possible interpreter, to translate for me the evidence of its contemporary, its inseparable paramour, the taste, cannot ask it to inform me what special circumstance is in question, from what period of my past life.

Will it ultimately reach the clear surface of my consciousness, this memory, this old, dead moment which the magnetism of an identical moment has travelled so far to importune, to disturb, to raise out of the depths of my very being? I cannot tell. Now I feel nothing; it has stopped, has perhaps sunk back into its darkness, from which who can say whether it will ever rise again? Ten times over I must essay the task, must lean down over the abyss. And each time the cowardice that deters us from every difficult task, every important enterprise, has urged me to leave the thing alone, to drink my tea and to think merely of the worries of today and my hopes for tomorrow, which can be brooded over endlessly.

And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on those

mornings I did not go out before mass)., when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it; perhaps because I had so often seen such things in the meantime, without tasting them, on the trays in pastry-cooks' windows, that their image had dissociated itself from those Combray days to take itself among others more recent; perhaps because, of those memories so long abandoned and put out of mind, nothing now survived, everything was scattered; the shapes of things, including that of the little scallop-shell of pastry, so richly sensual under its severe, religious folds, were either obliterated or had been so long dormant as to have lost the power of expansion which would have allowed them to resume their place in my consciousness. But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, taste and smell alone, more fragile but more enduring, more immaterial, more persistent, more faithful, remain poised a long time, like souls, remembering, waiting, hoping, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unflinchingly, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection.

And as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me (although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why this memory made me so happy). immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose

up like a stage set to attach itself to the little pavilion opening up onto the garden which had been built out behind it for my parents (the isolated segment which until that moment had been all that I could see).; and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before lunch, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was fine. In that moment all the flowers in our garden and in M. Swann's park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea.

PART TWO – MEMORIES OF ANTONIN ARTAUD (INTERVIEWS BY CHARLES MAROWITZ).

CONVERSATION WITH DR. GASTON FERDIERE, ARTAUD'S PSYCHIATRIST AT RODEZ

As to the specific nature of his madness? This idea of madness is one that leads us all into error. Under the law of 1838, an ancient law by which in France we classify madness, people who are dangerous are certified. Now Artaud had been, and always was, in the truest sense, a dangerous man; a man society should eliminate; from whom society had a duty to protect itself.

I saw a man who had emerged from his withdrawn state, who was not eminently dangerous at that moment, but who, in his attacks of madness, could be. If you would like me to summarize this insanity in a strict psychiatric way, I would say this: In the madness of Artaud, there was a kind of combat, a gigantic combat, a Manichean combat, between God and the Devil. And it was sometimes God who triumphed and made of Artaud a man possessed with a burning faith, going several times a week to Mass, spending hours with the almoner of the hospital, and at other times, a person praying to the Devil, who insulted passing women and spat on imaginary people. And it is for this reason that I cannot make a great mystic of Artaud. I would have to make him a great mystic and a great madman in the same breath. We were concerned here with a madness that was extremely fantastic but with a notable preservation of intelligence and sensibility. To use the word *madness* does not in psychiatry mean "the impairment of intellectual powers".

What I don't want to give here, apropos of Artaud, is a diagnosis because the present-day psychiatrist is wary of diagnoses. To diagnose mental illness, to say one thing is given this name and another thing another name, is a very great danger because one cannot class the mentally sick as one classifies insects, butterflies, or flowers. It is necessary that in each mentally sick person we should, above all, see beyond diagnoses and labels, to the human being. Now as for the human being that was Artaud, what was the matter with him from the point of view of mental illness? Was he a schizophrenic? Well, yes, in a certain sense he was, but

schizophrenia is a veritable cancer which has devoured all our patients, especially those who are touched with hallucinations. For Artaud I would, on the contrary, prefer to put an accent on that intellectual preservation of powers which we had still to prove was in existence because, as I have told you, there was no sign of it at the beginning, and so I would prefer to employ an old word from German psychiatry and say that he was a *paraphrenic*.

What treatment does he receive? First a treatment that I would call physical; to be well fed is an important part of any treatment. He takes a number of tranquilizers, he does not have drugs. And yet, Artaud always remains in a kind of stagnation, in a kind of inactivity which is deeply disturbing. Here we are dealing with one of the greatest poets of his generation. We are dealing with the man who wrote *The Theatre and Its Double*, who was going to revolutionize the contemporary theatre, and here he sits doing nothing, sunk in hidden thoughts. One day, he must be brought out of this and it is for this reason I consider myself authorized to get something moving, to prevent Artaud from sinking hopelessly into insanity- because now it *is* insanity that lies in wait- intellectual weakening this time. I decided to use seismotherapy and Artaud received a number of electric shocks which, it must be admitted, he remembered with horror and if you like, we will speak of how Artaud faced these shocks and I will tell you the truth.

How many electric shocks was he given? I think it must have been nine times- six to nine times. About that- if I remember what was customary then, because medical

custom varies from year to year. These electric shocks, they must have been extremely experimental at this stage? Very little was known about electric shocks in the mid-forties? It was perfectly well known. It's a convulsive therapy, and before electric shock treatment was used, we gave patients other forms of shock-treatment which were perfectly well understood and which were widely used. Instead of producing a kind of epileptic fit through electricity, we administered drugs intravenously, drugs which are called cardisol and I even remember having given patients cardisol in 1940. So we already have convulsive therapy, a classic treatment in the hands of a psychiatrist, and the experimental stage had long since passed. In the psychiatric hospital at Rodez, we dealt with about a dozen electric shock cases each day.

Artaud said that after one of the electric shock treatments he was actually dead for about five minutes. Is that true? Yes, of course, because the electric shock produces an epileptic fit. After an epileptic fit which develops stage by stage, the convulsion stage succeeding the period of stimulation, a coma follows which may last several minutes, even sometimes a little longer. Then a period of sleep, which is very short, finally an awakening. But on waking, as in all epilepsy, there is a gap. The epileptic doesn't know what has happened. The epileptic who has a fit in the street asks the people around him: "Where am I?" Well, Artaud asked the patients around him, the nurses, the passing doctors, "What am I doing here? Where am I? Who am I?" That is absolutely normal, and this kind of sub-anxiety on waking is, on the

psychopathological level, a healthy phenomenon. It forces the patient who has been reduced to nothingness, who has been totally obliterated, to build himself up again and to follow the process of dissolution with the process of reconstruction- which is precisely what we are aiming at. So you see, Artaud suffered no more and no less than the other people. From the electric shocks, he felt absolutely nothing. Electric shock is an entirely painless therapy, of that we are absolutely certain. What is difficult is recovering oneself, finding oneself back again in the world after the electric shock. I could compare it, if you like, to the kind of disorientation you experience when you wake up in a strange bedroom, in a hotel room for example, where the light does not strike your eyes in the same way as in a room to which you are accustomed. That's what its like. Nothing more. And in spite of all that Artaud has said about the horrible electric shocks, the barbarous therapeutic electric shocks, it is by this same electric shock treatment that he was able once more to realize where he was.

Did I know that Artaud was suffering from cancer when he came to Rodez? Artaud never had cancer when I knew him. Artaud's cancer is one of the myths that encumber Artaud's life. Perhaps in the last days he suffered from an acute form of cancer which carried him off, but until further evidence comes up, I refuse to believe there was cancer in Antonin Artaud at Rodez. He never showed the least sign of cancer, certainly no intestinal or abdominal cancer which is what is in question here.

These can easily be detected and are rapid killers. Artaud died very much later without having a single symptom of cancer.

Now so many years afterward, has my impression of Artaud and his treatment altered in my mind? Anyone who saw him regularly, who lived with him and saw him develop, sensed this mental sickness in him a long time before his voyage to Ireland. One knew very well, one day or another, it was going to explode. If it had not blown up on the boat that brought him back from Ireland, it would have happened somewhere else. One fine day after a brawl, they would have taken him to some police station and shut him in a padded cell or to the special infirmary at the Paris police headquarters. We all knew very well that it could only end in that way.

And what do I say to Artaud's friends who claim that Artaud was not actually mad? Its an opinion of those who never saw Artaud, who never knew him. Just show me that man whether he's an engineer or a teacher or a poet or whatever you like who knew Artaud, who saw him living in Paris well before his internment, and who will contend that Artaud did not behave like a tremendously unbalanced person. Those who say he was not mad are his friends who saw him in his last days; those who became the 'Friends of Artaud' after his death. An Artaud myth has grown up and in this myth it is said: he was a very great poet, he was isolated, very set apart and people had attitudes to him which were very uncharitable, almost inhuman. And, in the construction of this myth it has to be said: he was a normal being, he was not at

all mad, and one puts the opposition to this, another person also necessary to the myth: the psychiatrist, the villain, the sadist who makes his patients suffer, a kind of doctor Caligari with a more or less diabolical face- and this is the role into which I have been cast.

Was I in Paris during Artaud's last days? No, I was not in Paris at that time. You are probably referring to the lecture he gave at the Vieux Columbier. I was myself not at this lecture. But my friends who were there were horrified; horrified to see Artaud put on a show in a really terrible state- prey to every sort of delirium and excitement, gesticulating, shrieking, spitting, vituperating- not able to get his words in the right order or read the lecture he had prepared. But what made them even more sick at heart were those who looked on, who had come there just to gape, to *watch* the show, with an all-too-apparent smugness. And I know too there were many people who came out of love for Artaud, saying "Artaud is speaking tonight, we must go." But those came out of the theatre that evening absolutely sickened by the attitude of the audience around them.

Would I say that after Rodez he was not cured? Artaud could never be cured. He had a mental illness that was incurable. What does curing a madness like Artaud's amount to? Simply this: to make it possible for him to live in society. Artaud when he left Rodez was a gentleman who had learned how to behave properly; that is to say, without seizing by the throat the first man that he met or insulting a passing

woman because she was wearing a blouse which displeased him. That is all the cure that was ever possible.

CONVERSATION WITH ROGER BLIN, FRIEND

I never knew so fascinating a man, a man so generous and capable of such kindness and understanding of others. Perhaps he was difficult to live with because of a kind of separation that he tried to establish between himself and others, and also because of the agony he suffered in the face of the almost total incomprehension that surrounded him. I can't speak for anyone else, but for me he was the most fascinating man I ever met.

It was not so much that he had enemies. He had no enemies; people were merely indifferent to him. It was before his departure for Mexico and then later I saw him for a few days before he left for Ireland and then we simply didn't know what became of him. There were some reports that he was dead. He himself, it appeared, was responsible for this rumor and then we learnt he was at the Hospital. As soon as I discovered this, I went to see him but he didn't want to see me anymore- nor did he want to have any contact with any of his former friends. He didn't want to see anyone. He would only accept cigarettes. And I remember I saw him in the courtyard of the asylum with his back against a tree, wearing an enormous beard, and from time to time I would come down to find out how he was. Afterwards, I saw him at the other asylum where he had been sent by the doctors who claimed his case was hopeless: that is, he was absolutely finished, that he might have good

health, but would never recover his reason- that reason which I, for my part, never believed he had lost. I went to visit him as often as I could and eventually, he agreed to see his friends again until the time he was sent to Rodez. Then of course under the Occupation, it was very much more difficult to get through the various zones. We were all living in a state of utter wretchedness in Paris, still, we did what we could.

There were a group of friends who managed to get Artaud out of Rodez by organizing a variety of benefits. The Gallery Pierre had organized an exhibition of his paintings, helped by Picasso, Braque, and others who appreciated Artaud; and there was also a charity performance at the Sarah Bernhardt Theatre in which I took part. This was during the period that Artaud returned to Paris. But he was extremely ill. He already had the cancer from which he was to die eighteen months later. And it was at this time that Artaud and I saw each other more or less every day.

After Rodez, he was extremely changed- physically. That is to say, suddenly he was a man of only fifty who looked seventy, because of hunger, because of cancer, because of the electric shocks he had undergone.

A few months before his death, Artaud wanted to resume contact with his public- the only public he ever really knew- and so he announced a lecture at the Theatre du Vieux Columbier which was to be called THE RETURN OF ARTAUD THE MOMO. "Le Momo" is a slang word from Marseilles which means the Madman. Of course it was a facetious title because he realized that is what he had been called, although

he himself, of course, never truly accepted the label. He had very carefully written and prepared his lecture and to be honest, we were all rather apprehensive for him. Still, no one could dissuade him from delivering it. People have said, and also have written, that we egged him on to do it. Absolutely not! We simply didn't want to prevent him from doing it because he seemed so determined.

Well, in any case, to describe the occasion: Artaud enters and finds himself in front of a full house among whom were Albert Camus, Andre Gide, a great many people, many of them celebrated and all waiting with enormous curiosity. Many with genuine interest and sympathy but many more with naked curiosity. Slowly he assembles his material and he begins to read. For a long time, at the start, his voice was uncertain. He had some very deep bass notes and very high ones and because of his lack of teeth, because of the damage wrought by electro-shock therapy, he no longer had any middle range. It was an extraordinary voice and some recordings of it still exist. He began reading rather solemnly. Then little by little we could see that he became seized with panic. He began to hear his own voice and it frightened him. The full hall, the total and somewhat strained silence of the public, made him feel very ill at ease. Suddenly he made a clumsy gesture and all at once, his notes scattered all over the floor. He tried to pick them up; he tried to improvise. Then, seized with panic and terror, he turned from the platform and fled the building. Afterwards we found him round the back. But it was a devastating affair, an absolutely shattering evening.

The last time I saw him was in a café. It was while he was waiting for the results of a meeting that had just taken place. The directors of the French radio had banned his broadcast "To Have Done With The Judgment of God" which had been heard by a certain number of people who had now gathered together to protest against the ban. I had gone to the café to ask Artaud how the meeting had gone. We had arranged to meet the following day but the pressure of work had prevented me from doing so. And then the next day, Paul Thevenin rang me and told me that Artaud had been found dead that morning. I went immediately to Ivry to his room, and there I saw him. A few friends had gathered there and so had his family, his mother, and his sister. We kept vigil over the body for three nights. We kept vigil in relays- although none of us were very keen on the ceremony, this watch over the dead, but we felt we had to do it because of the rats. For a long time Artaud had been at odds with his family on the matter of religion. And so we kept watch against the rats at night, and against the priests who threatened to visit him by day. But they never came. Then, on the day of his funeral- the family of course had certain rights- he was buried. There were two sets of mourners: his family and his friends. Some people went to shake the hands of the family, but not many, and, as he had wished, there was no religious ceremony. But it was really an occasion of great sadness.

CONVERSATION WITH ARTHUR ADAMOV, FRIEND

What was Artaud like? Artaud was always Artaud. In spite of all his illness, he always retained an extraordinary sense of humour; one of the people with whom you laughed most. Let me give an example of Artaud's humour.

He had a small knife, and in the clinic where we put him after Rodez in the care of Dr. Delmas, he used to amuse himself by carving on the table. Now Dr. Delmas didn't bother about someone carving up his table. He was a very nice man. But then, in the cafes, Artaud used to do the same thing. And one day a friend of ours, Marcel Buziaux who published a great deal of Artaud's last writings, said to him, "Now listen, Antonin Artaud, its very boring of you really, because if you do this kind of thing in the cafes, they will send you back again; they'll say you're not right in the head." Artaud, who was very much like Buster Keaton, very deadpan, turned to him, "But look my dear Marcel Buziaux, I only do it at the Flore and the Deux Magots." In other words, only in the cafes where he was known. Artaud was like that. You *thought* you were going to have trouble with him.

One day I remember, at the home of Marthe Robert who was a great friend, we were having a discussion and Artaud began to exasperate us by insisting that there were lamas in Tibet who were willing his death. I don't quite know why, but we were very irritable that evening. We couldn't really believe he was mad and so we said, "Listen, Artaud, there may well be people who want you dead, but don't tell us they're in Tibet! Don't go on anymore about Tibet," we said to him. And then he was very angry and he left in a huff. After he'd gone I said to Marthe Robert, "We've

been really stupid. We shouldn't have contradicted him like that. You see how angry we made him." Two days later, in the Rue Jacob, I came across Artaud who suddenly burst out laughing and said "You remember that other evening at Marthe Robert's house? There's never been such good talk this side of a Dostoyevsky novel." And that was what Artaud was like. He had an immense and unpredictable sense of humour and the best way to pay homage to Artaud (and it is Blin who has said this). is not to say how sad everything was for him but to laugh uproariously as one recalls the way he used to laugh at almost everything. I think we love people to the degree that we can laugh when we remember them.

But after Rodez he was terribly unhappy? No. On the contrary. It was the one time he actually had some money. It's the family who say he was miserable because the family never even sent him a ration card. Oh, yes, during the Fascist occupation, they sent him one bread card. It's a reactionary Catholic family, rich and disgusting, and they're always bringing lawsuits against Artaud's friends of whom I am proud to be one. And its this family that prevents Artaud's most interesting works from being published. Although we sometimes get works from Gallimard that are interesting, such as "The Theatre and Its Double" that everybody is familiar with, or a few minor things, the family is still opposed to the publication of the great works of Artaud. So we spend time fighting our lawsuits. We have a lawyer and they have a lawyer.

Do I believe Artaud was mad? What is a normal man? What is a mad man? It was Jaspers who said "The majority of people are mentally defective". Now if one

claimed that the normal man is representative of the majority, that would mean to say that the normal man is mentally defective. Not a mad-man, a mental defective. And, without taking up a ridiculously superior attitude, I would say that Jaspers is right. I don't know what is mad or not mad. I know there are people for whom life is very terrible, and what moves me most when I think of Antonin Artaud, what makes him one of the human beings I most love, is that in the middle of an immense poem, I don't remember the title, in the middle of this immense poem, a remarkable work, packed with brilliant images, he suddenly gives some words to the mother of his doctor Madame Dequeker and she speaks this very simple sentence; "And old Madame Dequeker said, 'How it is difficult, comma, (it is I who added the comma). how difficult, how very difficult, how very difficult it is to live." I am grateful to Antonin Artaud because he always spoke of the difficulty, because he had endured it personally. He did not speak only of its absurdity like Monsieur Camus and the other existentialist small fry, no, because Artaud realized the point was not that life was absurd but that it was difficult.

Did I see Artaud in the last days of his life? Unhappily, I did. He was at the end of his tether. He had invented a fable for himself about being the victim of lamas in Tibet. And when they gave him permission to have all the morphine he wanted he understood very well that he was finished. You know that he took drugs all his life. It wasn't a secret to anybody. He suffered terribly. It was obviously cancer and not merely drug addiction as the family contended. The family always wanted to

blame everything on drugs. No, on the contrary, the drugs in the last stages helped him to put up with the sufferings produced by cancer- and when one has a Catholic family… well, lets say no more of that.

What were the general impressions in Paris at the death of Artaud? Feelings were very mixed. Its difficult to say. There were people for who Artaud truly represented the essence of poetry, and there were other people, the hangers-on, who had made a false image of Artaud. It's very complicated to explain. There is a sort of caricature of Artaud which I personally find disagreeable, that makes him very much more insane than he was. In this caricature there is a kind of romantic madness which is played up. Although Artaud was in many senses completely rational… but to talk about Artaud properly would take years.

CONVERSATION WITH MARIE-ANGE MALAUSSÉNA – SISTER OF ANTONIN ARTAUD

This affair is usually treated as an extremely complicated one, in which the family does not exactly play an illustrious role. But no one really knows what it consists of, or why there is an Antonin Artaud 'affair'. It would have no importance to me if my brother's memory had not been damaged. Now it must be said that the picture many people have of Antonin Artaud is a false one. In fact this 'affair' is very simple: the very day of Antonin's death a great conspiracy was mounted against his family with the sole aim of intimidation, for criminal acts had been committed. His room had been thoroughly looted. Everything he possessed- manuscripts, notes,

drawings, books, correspondence- everything had disappeared before we got there… for they had taken care to only notify us 9 hours later.

I want to stand back from my own grief, but I want the public to learn the truth at last. It is with this aim that I offer *my evidence, for which I take full responsibility*. The documents I produce are of unquestionable authenticity and mostly unpublished. I make public the 3 letters which come at the end of my expose, not so much to refute the idiots who echo absurdities as the result of a psycho-pathological auto-experiment. Everyone knows that he took drugs and it has been said that he had the heroism to go through with his mental self-destruction. The truth is quite different. Certainly less melodramatic, but more pitiable in the real meaning of the word.

Antonin Artaud was ill all his life. He suffered the onset of meningitis as a small child. His nerves tortured him all his life. As no therapeutic drug could cure him, the doctors used sedatives; narcotics, in fact. There is no question of vice in his case. Nor of heroism. We should simply be quiet and keep silent.

But as legend made of him a bloodless and fleshless being, having only a brash proclivity toward dementia, one must re-establish the truth and show just how extraordinary a human being my brother was. These letters are the proof. When I had defeated my slanderers, I became silent. If I break that silence today, it is because this magazine, impartial with no vested interests, was the only magazine worthy of enjoying my confidence and of supporting the truth.

Antonin Artaud did not like to talk about his family to just anyone. You had to be close to him. So you must realize that those who say he didn't want to have anything to do with his family weren't close to him. Well, it is exactly these people who boast now, and since his death, that they knew him well. They don't just boast of it, they proclaim it.

It began with a sharp and extremely hurtful attack. A whole page of a newspaper was devoted to it with, in pride of place, a 4 column article in which libel and slander jockeyed for prominence. In this way, for weeks on end, they accomplished innumerable feats. His 'friends' at the end recklessly used everything which could sully, everything which stinks, everything which can kill, to get at the poet's family. They were successful. She whom the poet had loved so, his mother, died. She couldn't withstand such attacks.

This first result did not disarm anyone. On the contrary, they renewed the attack; but with less success. Things were actually going badly, so badly that: by a judgment rendered in the Civil Tribunal, the journal and the author of the article were found guilty of defamation against me. I can not pass over the notorious manifesto which followed the libelous article and was signed by 170 people. This manifesto says: the friends of Antonin Artaud have had neither help nor support of any kind from the poet's family. But it does not say: that at no time did they ever address themselves to that family. It says: they had to act as if that family did not exist- at last something true, quite well expressed, for them. It goes on to say: the

friends got together to get Antonin Artaud out of Rodez asylum. But it does not say: it was in order to put him in the asylum at Ivry. And it adds this manifesto:… and give him a chance to live. But it does not say how he would live.

I must add that there my brother was free to come and go, but at Rodez he wasn't. He was looked after at Rodez and forbidden drugs. He said "When I went into Dr. Ferdiere's office and asked him for 25 drops of laudanum he said, "Not only will I not give you your 25 drops, but I will cure your craving with electro-shock treatment." But at Ivry, as I've just said, he could come and go whenever he liked. He wasn't short of drugs, as he had found some amenable doctors in Paris… And so it was that 18 months after leaving Rodez, Antonin Artaud was dying, alone, abandoned in a squalid room in a dilapidated and isolated summer house, full of chloral and laudanum! The 'extremely precise goal' of the manifesto had been reached!

Dr. Ferdiere knows a lot of things. He knows, for instance, that it was his friend, Robert Desnos, pressed by the poet's mother, who asked him to admit Antonin to the Rodez asylum. He knows, too, that he arbitrarily accepted an abusive release demand from the 'friends of the poet'. He also knows that this was done without telling the poet's mother. And what is more he knows that he helped the libellers by saying that 'The author's family were not interested in him and didn't come to see him at Rodez. That they never sent him any parcels.' But what Dr. Ferdiere does not know is that he is an amnesiac. Look at what he wrote my mother,

'I advise you not to come and see him… I advise you not to send any parcels.' Incredible as it may be, its true! Later on he did not respond to my mother's stream of letters. And as I'm sure that Dr. Ferdiere liked to be written about, here is a passage from a letter which Antonin Artaud wrote to me. 'And in the Rodez asylum I had 50 electric shock comas, it took away my memory and my consciousness for several months because Dr. Ferdiere is a swine, who took heroin, wanted to get rid of me because he was jealous of my activity and my fertile spirit.' I know that mental patients don't like their doctors. But my brother used to speak of Dr. Ferdiere without any hate or anger. But with deep contempt, for he had very unpleasant memories.

May I be allowed to say, that, on the subject of letters constituting formal and tangible proof, I have some myself. I ask you to do the honour of believing me. But as I know that that is a lot to ask from some people, I will give an example to convince them. I speak to all those people who, maliciously or just from esprit-de-corps, have for more than ten years been the mouthpieces for patented libels. Antonin Artaud didn't love his family. Antonin Artaud had rejected his family. Antonin Artaud had been abandoned by his family. I say to all those people: you are servile liars! Because I can confound them, bringing irrefutable proofs against their lies. And these proofs are the marks of a profound affection which Antonin Artaud showed in countless letters to his family. First of all, here is one to his mother!

'My dearest maman, I've got an exit pass which allows me to go all round Rodez and I went specially to the cathedral which is a miracle of the middle ages where you really enjoy praying and where I went specially for holy week. I prayed for all my family: you first of course, Marie-Ange, my sister, her children and her husband. I don't know when we will all see each other again but it would be right if life did a little for all us and we were no longer separated by circumstances. But God will provide and will come back. I embrace you with all my heart, Nanaqui. Antonin Artaud.'

Here is another addressed to me. 'My dearest Marie-Ange, I no longer see things in the same way since I went back to my childhood faith and I have found a chapel in this asylum and an almoner so that I can fulfill all my religious duties.'

And finally a third, to his neice, my daughter. 'The explanation for all my sorrows is that before my journey to Ireland I was thinking outside of God. God has given me strength to look into myself and rid myself of evil, for as you know I came back to him in Dublin. And here at Rodez, there is a chapel and an almoner in the asylum. I took communion today for the feast of epiphany and I had a thought especially for you, Ghyslaine, at the moment of that communion. And God has given you too the strength to find your own soul, for things in this world are heavy and difficult and we do not always know where our soul is nor what it wants. And if it could be applied to all the tasks of this life. But it only needs a light from on high to enlighten us on its real aspirations and its real capacities. God does not ask much in

return, did you know? A little thought, a little true prayer, and if we do not neglect all our duties in this life, then the will to intervene and support us.'

Are these letters not themselves the proof that my brother is not the sacrilegious poet whom some have tried to fix forever in his blasphemy?

PART THREE – A FINAL WORD FROM HENRI BERGSON. PAGES 297 TO 298 IN *MATTER AND MEMORY*

If matter does not remember the past, it is because it repeats the past unceasingly, because, subject to necessity, it unfolds a series of moments which each is the equivalent of the preceding moment and may be deduced from it: thus its past is truly given in its present. But a being which evolves more or less freely creates something new every moment: in vain, then, should we seek to read its past in its present unless its past were deposited within it in the form of memory. Thus, to use again a metaphor which has more than once appeared in this book, it is necessary, and for similar reasons, that the past should be *acted* by matter, *imagined* by mind.

Original notation of Roger Federer's tennis choreography in his match with Janko Tipsarevic as a part of the ATP World Tour Finals held at the O2 Arena London November 12, 2012.

Game 1 F0-T0	Backhand	Backhand
F Serving	Backhand	Backhand
First serve long	Backhand	I/O forehand
Second serve in	BH slice	Backhand
Forehand	Backhand	Backhand
15-Love	Forehand	Backhand
First serve short	Backhand	Backhand
Second serve in	Backhand	30-40
Forehand	Love-15	Return forehand
30-Love	Return forehand	Deuce 1
First serve in	Backhand	First serve out FH
40-Love	15-15	BH slice approach
First serve in	Ace BH side	Forehand volley
Challenge	30-15	Ad out
Switch ends	First serve long BH	Return forehand
Game 2 F1-T0	Return slice backhand	I/O Forehand
T Serving	30-30	BH Slice
Return backhand	Return forehand	Backhand

Game 3 F2-T0

F Serving

First serve in

Forehand

15-Love

First serve short

Second serve in

Forehand

Running forehand

BH slice

Forehand

Forehand

30-Love

First serve in

FH Chip

40-Love

First serve long

Second serve in

Backhand

40-15

First serve short

Second serve short

40-30

First serve long

Second serve in

Switch ends

Game 4 F3-T0

T Serving

15-Love

First serve short BH

Return backhand

Running forehand

30-Love

Return stretch BH

Slice backhand

40-Love

First serve short BH

BH drop shot

Miss BH

Game 5 F3-T1

F Serving

First serve long

Forehand net

Second serve in

I/O forehand

Running forehand

Backhand

Forehand

Backhand

Forehand

15-Love

First serve in

30-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

Forehand

Forehand

Run net FH

Overhead

40-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

Switch ends

Game 6 F4-T1

T Serving

First serve long BH

Second serve ace

15-Love

Return slice BH

15-15

First serve out BH

Return I/O FH

I/O FH

30-15

Return chip BH

Miss FH

40-15

First serve out

Return backhand

Backhand

40-30

First serve out BH

Return Backhand

Switch ends

Game 7 F4-T2

F Serving

First serve in

15-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

I/O forehand

Backhand

Backhand

Forehand

30-Love

Second serve in

Backhand

Forehand

Slice backhand

Slice backhand

30-15

First serve in

Forehand

Running forehand

30-30

First serve in

Slice backhand

40-30

First serve in

Switch ends

Challenge

Called out

Second serve in

Backhand

Forehand

Deuce 1

First serve let

First serve in

Backhand

I/O forehand

Running BH volley

BH volley

Ad in

First serve out

Second serve

Switch ends

Game 8 F5-T2

T Serving

Return stretch FH

Backhand

Forehand lob

Forehand

I/O forehand

Backhand

Backhand

15-Love

First serve long

Return BH

Backhand

30-Love

Return stretch BH

40-Love

First serve out

Return BH

Running forehand

Backhand

Game 9 F5-T3

F Serving

First serve out

Second serve in

15-Love

First serve ace

30-Love

First serve in

40-Love

First serve ace

Switch ends

Set 1 F Wins

F6-T3

Set 2

Game 10 F0-T0

T serving

Return slice BH

Forehand

Forehand

Backhand

Running forehand

Backhand

Backhand

I/O forehand

Running forehand

15-Love

Return slice BH

Stumble FH

30-Love

First serve short BH

Return BH

Forehand

Backhand

Running slice FH

Running lob BH

Running lob FH

40-Love

Return BH

Slice BH

Forehand

40-15

Return slice BH

Forehand

Forehand

Switch ends

Game 11 F0-T1

F Serving

First serve in

15-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

Forehand

30-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

Backhand

I/O forehand

30-15

First serve out

Second serve in

40-15

First serve ace

Game 12 F1-T1

T serving

Return forehand

15-Love

First serve long FH

Return slice BH

Backhand

Forehand

Backhand

Backhand long

Slice BH

30-Love

Return Forehand

Running forehand

30-15

First serve out slice BH

Return slice BH

BH lob

Backhand

Stumble BH lob

Backhand

Forehand

Slice backhand

30-30

Return forehand

I/O forehand

Forehand

Forehand

30-40

First serve out

Second serve let BH

Return slice BH

Backhand

Stretch BH

Deuce 1

Return forehand

Backhand

I/O forehand

Ad in

First serve out

Backhand

I/O forehand

Backhand

Deuce 2

First serve out
Return slice BH
Backhand
Forehand
Backhand
Ad out
Return slice BH
Deuce 3
Return body BH
Forehand
Ad out
Return forehand
New racket

Game 13 F2-T1

F serving
First serve out
Second serve in
Backhand
15-Love
First serve ace
30-Love
First serve in
Approach FH
BH volley
Running BH
40-Love
First serve out
Second serve in

Game 14 F3-T1

T Serving
Return slice BH
15-Love
First serve let
First serve out
Second serve out
15-15
Return forehand
Backhand
I/O forehand
I/O forehand
15-30
First serve let
First serve out *waist
Backhand drop shot
30-30
First serve out BH
Ret. slice BH approach
FH volley
40-30
First serve out
Return backhand
Forehand
Switch ends
Challenge
Deuce 1
Return BH
Backhand
Forehand
FH drop shot
Running BH
Ad out
First serve out
Second serve ace
Deuce 2
Return BH
Ad out
Return FH
Deuce 3
First serve out
Return slice BH
Backhand
I/O forehand
I/O forehand
Ad out
Return BH
Slice BH
Slice BH
Backhand
Backhand
Backhand
Stretch BH
Slice BH
Backhand
Forehand

Backhand

Forehand

Switch ends

Game 15 F4-T1

F Serving

Quick cut

15-Love

First serve in

30-Love

First serve out

Second serve in

BH approach

BH volley

40-Love

First serve in

Forehand

40-15

First serve out

Second serve in

Backhand

Slice BH

Backhand

Slice BH

40-30

First serve in

Game 16 F5-T1

T serving

Return BH

15-Love

First serve out

Return forehand

15-15

First serve let FH

Return slice FH

Slice BH

Running forehand

Forehand

Forehand

Slice BH

Running FH lob

15-30

Return forehand

Backhand

BH drop shot

30-30

Return stretch BH

Stretch slice BH

40-30

First serve out BH

Return BH

Running forehand

Deuce 1

First serve out FH

Return BH

Backhand

Forehand

Slice BH

Slice BH

Forehand

Slice BH

Ad out

Return forehand

Backhand

End

Set 1 F6-T3

Set 2 F6-T1

Three

By Nik Wakefield

a score for performance

(0. begin/end).

Ok this is a beginning of the performance

(1. sugar water 1).

MIX glass of sugar and water

WAIT

‘If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar [dissolves]. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not the mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something *thought*, it is something *lived*.’ Pages 9-10

DRINK

One way of composing is to simplify, to simply demonstrate almost to the point of becoming trivial without mocking anything or anyone.

Ok let’s begin this performance

(2. run human run).

Desire

To catch what I’m chasing

To run as far and as fast as I can

RUN

One thing that is specific to the human body
An evolutionary adaptation
Is the ability to endure running long distance
Several features make it so
     MOVEMENT arch
The arch of the foot
     MOVEMENT neck
The nuchal ligament in the neck
     MOVEMENT sweat wipe and armpits
The ability to sweat
Desire
To spring, for stability, to keep cool
These features are related to other processes
To run down a faster animal, for example,
Requires the ability to track this animal
To keep it in mind when it is out of sight
To hold on to some trace of its actions, blood on a branch
These signal to the human the path of the pursued animal
Till that animal collapses, exhausted
The end of desire
     PAUSE
(3. perfect dirtball human).
     SONG perfect dirtball human
Good thing I have never made
A single mistake in my whole life
I always wake up on time
And I’ve never told a lie
I’m perfect and you are too
Let’s all be perfect together
I’ve got a list of imperfections
And it stretches a mile long
Typed out with a twelve point font
You could see it covering a football field
I’m a dirtball and you’re one too

Let’s all be dirtballs together
You don’t have to make the
Same mistake you made last night
You don’t know
You might mess it up
In a whole new way tonight
I’m human and you are too
Let’s all be human together
PAUSE
(4. pre-performance).
Let’s make a pre-performance
Let’s do something we can’t do right now
Let’s do something right now we can’t do
Let’s go back to the beginning
PAUSE stand
Won’t it be simple
PAUSE paper
Won’t it be composed
PAUSE knife
Won’t it be dangerous
PAUSE magic
Won’t it be magical
PAUSE camera
Won’t it be recorded
PAUSE stand
Let’s go back to the beginning
PAUSE stand + run
Let’s go forward to the end
PAUSE run + stand
MIC/STAND upstage
(5. tortoise vs achilles).
And now the Race of the TORTOISE versus ACHILLES
3 steps forward
Turtle lay dance

3 steps back
2 steps side
1 step forward
Achilles run
2 steps back
2 steps side
3 steps forward
1 step forward
Turtle lay dance
Look back
1 step back
3 steps back
2 steps side
1 step
1 step
1 step
Achilles run + look
3 steps back
2 steps side
3 steps forward
1 step
1 step
Turtle lay dance and laugh ha ha ha

PAUSE

‘We shall not dwell here on the three other arguments of Zeno. It is enough to point out that they all consist in applying the movement to the line traversed, and supposing that what is true of the line is true of the movement. The line, for example, may be divided into as many parts as we wish, of any length that we wish, and it is always the same line. … The absurdity vanishes as soon as we adopt by thought the continuity of which every one of us is conscious whenever he lifts an arm or advances a step. … After a certain number of

steps, Achilles will have overtaken the tortoise. There is nothing more simple.' Pages 310-311

RUN

(6. lifting the arm).

MOVEMENT head, arm

'Let us think rather of an action like that of raising the arm; then let us suppose that the arm, left to itself, falls back, and yet that there subsists in it, striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates it. In this image of a *creative action which unmakes itself* we have already a more exact representation of matter. In vital activity we see, then, that which subsists of the direct movement of the inverted movement, *a reality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself*.' Pages 247-248

MOVEMENT head, arm

'[Evolution] has had no more trouble in making an eye than I have in lifting my hand.' Page 91

MOVEMENT head, arm

Evolution is a lift of the hand, a hand to a door
Simple and precise
Complex and messy
An order not from disorder
Disorder is nothing
Let's talk about nothing
Nothing is more than something
Nothing in this world does not exist

MIC down right

(7. leaving the theatre).

EXIT

RETURN

I wanted to leave the theatre
I found myself in the hallway
I wanted to leave the theatre because
I want this to leave the theatre

EXIT

RETURN

I want to leave the theatre

Because I want this to leave the theatre

But how can I only leave the theatre

Without just going somewhere else?

Nothing in this world does not exist

EXIT

RETURN

MIC/STAND centre

Let's evolve

Let's evolve

PAUSE

Let's evolve for this moment

What do we need for this environment?

The theatre

We need music

GUITAR

(8. music of nothing).

MUSIC complex whole section

'That adaptation to environment is the necessary condition of evolution we do not question for a moment.' Page 101

MUSIC complex -1 section

'The evolution movement… proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly bursts into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long.' Page 98

MUSIC complex -2 sections

'So we come back, by a somewhat roundabout way, to the idea we started from, that of an *original impetus* of life [or *élan vital*], passing from one generation … to the following generation …. This impetus, sustained right along the lines of

evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations,…' Page 87

MUSIC complex -3 sections

'All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push [of *élan vital*]. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.' Page 271

MUSIC complex -4 sections

'The part played by contingency in evolution is therefore great. Contingent, generally, are the forms adopted, or rather invented. Contingent, relative to the obstacles encountered in a given moment, is the dissociation of the primordial tendency into such and such complementary tendencies which create divergent lines of evolution. Contingent are the arrests and set-backs; contingent, in large measure, the adaptations. Two things only are necessary: (1). a gradual accumulation of energy; (2). an elastic canalization of this energy in variable and indeterminable directions, at the end of which are free acts.' Page 255

MUSIC complex -5 sections

'*Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by disassociation and division*.' Page 89

(9. time travel/failing the microphone).

PAUSE

Time to fail

Time to be lazy

PAUSE

Let's go to the future

Let's time travel

Take care

Safe Journey

MOVEMENT attempt jump

We did it

Well done everybody

Now let’s go to the past

Let’s time travel

Take care

Safe journey

MOVEMENT reverse attempt jump

Rats

Time to Fail

Time to be lazy

STAND up left

MIC lay down, attempt jump, rotate, slide under

I did it

MIC up left

To fail

I must succeed at failing

There is no failure

Failure is nothing

This is so political

(10. protest the world’s problems).

SIGN protest this performance

The world’s problems

SPLASH water on eyes

I weep for

PAUSE wipe eyes

What I cannot do

Let’s go back to the pre-performance

Let’s do one we can’t do right now

For a future we might evolve into

A performance that will have left the theatre

Because once performed

It can never be repeated

(11. subtracting janez janša).

PAUSE janez t-shirt
Who is Janez Janša?
I cannot be Janez Janša
There are only four
SHIRT four pieces with knife, display
Creation can come about through division and subtraction
We are doing this now, instead of a million other things
All those options
And we cut them down to these four
The only four Janez Janša's
Of which I cannot be one
I can only be with you right now
PAUSE
MIC/STAND centre
(12. time will tell).
SONG Time Will Tell by Blood Orange
Time will tell if you can figure this and work it out
No one's waiting for you anyway so don't be stressed out
Even if it's something that you kept your eye on
It is what it is
Time will tell if you can figure this and work it out
No one's waiting for you anyway so don't be stressed out
Even if it's something that you kept your eye on
It is what it is
Finishing eight or nine tell me its the perfect time
Told you I'll be waiting hiding from the rainfall
Come into my bedroom come into my bedroom
Come into my bedroom come into my bedroom
Come into my bedroom come into my bedroom
(solo).
Time will tell if you can figure this and work it out
No one's waiting for you anyway so don't be stressed now
Even if it's something that you kept your eye on
It is what it is

Even if its all you know just keep your heart in
Anyway to keep it up just never let yourself down
Even if its something that you kept your eye on
It is what is
Finishing eight or nine tell me it's the perfect time
Told you I'll be waiting hiding from the rain fall
I wasted moments in the Bowery light
Come into my bedroom come into my bedroom
I kept it open
Come into my bedroom come into my bedroom
(solo).

PAUSE

(13. make the future).

MOVEMENT waive

I am this
Nik Wakefield
This performance is three
We are making this right now
And this is making the future
Which we are evolving toward

MOVEMENT bow sideways both ways

Performance makes the future
In a small way
The future is not nothing because it is unknown
That makes it more than something

MOVEMENT waive and bow sideways both ways, waive again

(14. sugar water 2).

MOVEMENT table and water centre down, hide

'Let me come back again to the sugar in my glass of water: why must I wait for it to [dissolve]? While the duration of the phenomenon is *relative* for the physicist, since it is reduced to a certain number of units of time and the units themselves are indifferent, this duration is an *absolute* for my consciousness, for it coincides with a certain degree of

impatience which is rigorously determined. Whence comes this determination? What is it that obliges me to wait, and to wait for a certain length of physical duration which is forced upon me, over which I have no power? If succession, in so far as distinct from mere juxtaposition, has no real efficacy, if time is not a kind of force, why does the universe unfold its successive states with a velocity which, in regard to my consciousness, is a veritable absolute? Why this particular velocity rather than any other? Why not an infinite velocity? Why, in other words, is not everything given at once, [as on film]?

MOVEMENT re-emerge

The more I consider this point, the more it seems to me that, if the future is bound to *succeed* the present instead of being given alongside of it, it is because the future is not altogether determined at the present moment, and that if the time taken up by this succession is something other than a number, if it has for the consciousness that is installed in it absolute value and reality, it is because there is unceasingly being created in it, not indeed any such artificially isolated system as a glass of sugared water, but in the concrete whole of which every such system forms part, something unforeseeable and new. This duration may not be the fact of matter itself, but that of the life which reascends the course of matter; the two movements are none the less mutually dependent on each other. *The duration of the universe must therefore be one with the latitude of creation which can find place in it.*' Pages 339-340

'*Time is invention or it is nothing at all.*' Page 341

DRINK

(0. begin/end).

Ok, that's an end of the performance

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