CHAPTER TWO: NARRATIVE CONTEXTURE

> Art is a device for experiencing the process of becoming: that which has already become is of no importance for art.
>
> Viktor Shklovsky (quoted in Perry 1979, 41)

Even in its graphic, spatialized form as text, narrative is linear, developmental and genetic at its core: it unfolds – or, looked at another way, cumulates – from beginning to end. It would also appear, on the surface, to be mono-linear, consisting only of the spinning-out of a single string of words. In this latter respect it would appear to present an antithesis to music, which, by combining sounds simultaneously, is able to supplement its linearity, its temporality, with the sense of an "aural space", a non-linear architecture, working in conjunction with its linear unfolding.

And yet, at the same time, narratologists have been variously drawn to the notion of narrative as having some kind of "spatial" dimension, whether it be in the form of the reader's construction of a "storyworld" (Ryan 1991; Herman 2002), or of an immanent structure to the text consisting of different levels such as those of "discourse" and underlying "story" (Barthes 1966; Herman 2005). In this chapter I argue for a conception of the spatiality or non-linearity of narrative fiction that differs from both these prevailing models, and that builds on the functionalist view of language described above, in subsection 4 of the previous chapter. My starting-point, in subsection 1.1, is a theoretical perspective that as hitherto had little impact in the mainstream of narratology – that of the Czech structuralists, and in particular Jan Mukařovský. Mukařovský's concept of the literary text as a dynamic system – what he termed a *contexture* – combined Formalist ideas with two other perspectives:

firstly, a semiotic perspective that drew particularly on the functionalism of Karl Bühler; and secondly, a phenomenological perspective elicited by the text's orientation, through its dominant "aesthetic function", to the perception of the reader.

In the following sub-section (1.2), I show how Wolfgang Iser, in his *The Act of Reading* (1973), extended the phenomenological dimension of Mukařovský's conception of the systematicity of the narrative text and tentatively introduced into that conception ideas from contemporary "systems theory". But at the same time there are contradictions and uncertainties in Iser's account of the dynamic systematicity of the reader's interaction with the text which I attempt to resolve in Section 2 by invoking the concept of the *series*. In subsection 2.1 I outline the ways in which the "Tel Aviv school" of textual criticism has focussed on the dynamic and temporal aspects of narrative, and thus revealed the significance of the internal dynamicity of the schemata that are incorporated into the literary text. In subsection 2.2 this account is supplemented by an account of a parallel realization of the enactive dynamicity of schemata to be found in contemporary cognitive science. Building on these analyses, in subsection 2.3 I show how an analogy with dynamic series in music suggests a basic gestalt by which the relationships between temporal series, in narrative and music, are configured: this in turn connects back to the idea of the aesthetic function as outlined in Section One. Section Two concludes by painting a picture of the dynamic systematicity of narrative in which its non-linear dimension is seen not so much as a "space" articulated by "points" (as in Iser's "viewpoints") as a "flow" of differentiated and interacting "series".

In the final section I give substance to these abstractions by showing how the notion of narrative as a dynamic system of simultaneous series is exemplified in the

modern short story. In particular, I focus on one specific way in which the short story has been characterised since Edgar Allan Poe's first and influential polemics on behalf of the form in the mid-nineteenth century: in terms of its *compressed* and *imagistic* quality. Temporally compressed and subject to a "spatial" plotting, the short story becomes a form of *ekphrasis*, a "speaking out" of the narrativity inherent in an image. As I explore in subsection 3.1, photography provides a fruitful way of thinking about the "image" that the short story narrativizes: the photograph demonstrates how maximal temporal compression brings to awareness a simultaneity of temporal, dynamic series. In subsection 3.2 I analyse how the simultaneity of different dynamic series is foregrounded in H.P. Lovecraft's ekphrastic story "The Picture in the House". In particular, I show how the dynamic system instantiated by the narrative – its *contexture* – consists in the traversing by a linear, "reader-oriented" series of a non-linear array of schematic, representational series.

1. Narrative as System and Process

In "Force and Signification" (1963), Derrida characterizes structuralism as a mode of thought that, through a wholly spatialized conception of language, denies its "force": "the notion of structure refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the order of forms and sites" (Derrida 1978, 15). "[T]he very image of the structuralist instrument", Derrida suggests, is represented by the "panoramagram", a nineteenth-century device which projected depth of vision onto a flat surface. Thanks to this "schematization and spatialization", "one can glance over the totality divested of its forces more freely or diagrammatically". With its "spatial models, mathematical functions, lines and forms", structuralism denies "energetics" or "internal historicity"

in favour of the quest for "some absolute simultaneity or instantaneousness" (16, 14). Divested of "the living energy of meaning", language, in Derrida's conception of the structuralist view, becomes an empty shell, "[s]omewhat like the architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art" (5).

Derrida's critique is based on a limited definition of "structuralism", for as I show below, in Czech structuralism of the 1930s and 1940s, especially in the work of Jan Mukařovský, one finds a searching exploration of precisely this question of how "structure" relates to dynamics – to "energetics" or "internal historicity".[1] From this perspective, Derrida's influential polemic is symptomatic of a broader historical contingency that has distorted perceptions of the course and possibilities of structuralist aesthetics. Jurij Striedter has written of

> the neglect of Czech literary structuralism in the French debate. Compared with the strong impact Russian Formalism and its transformations have had in France, Czech literary Structuralism did not play any significant role in the development of French Structuralism. And because French Structuralism became the international mainstream of Structuralism, the polemics during its development and now concerning Poststructuralism have focused on the French version, this further impeding acknowledgment of the earlier and different Czech concept. (Streidter 1989, 156-7. C.f. Galan 1985, 1-2)

In subsection 1.1 I show, as noted above, how Mukařovský combined an account of the dynamism of the artistic object with semiotic and phenomenological

[1] Examples could be multiplied of the "spatialized" thinking of French structuralism. Thus Greimas writes of the generation of narrative by his "semiotic square" that "[a]lthough the message is presented for reception as an articulated succession of significations, that is to say, with diachronic status, the reception can be effectuated only be transforming the succession into simultaneity and the pseudo-diachrony into synchrony [. . .]" (Greimas 1983 [1970], 144). Gérard Genette writes in "Literature and Space" (*Figures II*) of how "the clear spatiality of writing can be taken as a symbol of the profound spatiality of language" (quoted in Kestner 1978, 30) and in "Literary Utopia" (*Figures I*) explores the "vision of literature as a homogenous and reversible space in which individual particularities and chronological presence have no currency" (Genette 1966, 126). For a "postmodern" critique of the geometric spatiality inherent in structuralist approaches to narrative, see Gibson 1996, Chapter 6.

perspectives. The outcome of this synthesis was his formulation of two key, interlinked concepts: the "aesthetic function", which described the dominant (though not exclusive) function of the artistic text, and the "Contexture", which was the term he gave to its dynamic systematicity. In subsection 1.2 I examine Wolfgang Iser's phenomenological account of the reading process against this background, highlighting the importance of his introduction of the concept of schemata (or "schematized viewpoints", to use Iser's own language) into his account of that process.

1.1 Dynamic Systems in Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism

In his *Course in General Linguistics*, Saussure famously demarcated synchronic and diachronic approaches to the study of language, giving primacy to the former in revealing the systematic properties of language (Saussure 1959 [1915], 81). Towards the end of the short-lived Russian Formalist movement, this Saussurean demarcation was challenged, notably in the 1928 Formalist manifesto jointly written by Juri Tynjanov and Roman Jakobson ("Problems in the Study of Literature and Language"):

> The history of a system is in turn a system. Pure synchronism now proves to be an illusion: every synchronic system has its past and its future as inseparable structural elements of the system [. . .] [E]very system necessarily exists as an evolution, whereas, on the other hand, evolution is inescapably of a systematic nature. (Tynjanov and Jakobson 1971 [1928], 79-80)

The idea of art as a *process* rather than a static state had been inherent from the beginning in the Formalist notion of "defamiliarization", whereby the artistic "device" prolongs the difficulty and length of perception, thus putting us back in touch with "the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known" (Shklovsky 1965 [1917], 12). "As a result of this lingering", Shklovsky writes, "the

object is perceived not in its extension in space, but, so to speak, in its continuity" (22). (In terms of narrative, Shklovsky saw these devices not just in terms of linguistic style, but also in "constructional" terms, through devices such as repetition, parallelism, gradation and retardation that manipulate the relationship between *fabula* and *sjuzhet* (Shklovsky 1990; c.f. Steiner 1984, 65-6).) Literary history, in this devices, when they themselves have become "automatized" through time and repetition, are superseded and themselves defamiliarized by new devices.

In this Formalist view of literary history, which saw it as a continual process of reaction and disruption, dynamism has its origins outside the system, rather than being immanent or "structural": as with the Saussurean view of general language change, diachrony consists in a succession of synchronic states rather than in a process of immanent development (Galan 1985, 11). The step forward taken by the Prague School was to identify a process of immanent dynamism and development, and thereby to integrate diachrony and synchrony. The inaugural "Theses" of the Prague Linguistic Circle, presented in 1929, were headed by a discussion of "Language as a Functional System":

> *There is no insurmountable barrier between the synchronic and diachronic methods, as claimed by the Geneva School.* If linguistic elements, from a synchronic standpoint, must be examined in terms of their systematic function, linguistic changes demand the same of diachronic investigation [. . .] It would be illogical to presuppose that linguistic changes are only destructive interventions, purposeless and heterogeneous from the viewpoint of the system. Linguistic changes often reflect the needs of the system, its stabilization, its realignment, and so forth [. . .] On the other hand, *neither can a synchronic description absolutely exclude the notion of evolution,* for such a synchronic moment reflects the disappearing, present, and coming stages. (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 6; emphases in original)

Any synchronic snapshot of language, such as a literary work, will include diachronic elements such as archaisms and neologisms. But diachrony also expresses itself,

crucially, through the capacity of elements of language to change their function: "the dynamic vitality of language," as František Galan characterises the perspective that emerged with the Prague School, "rests in its ability to find new replacements for abandoned means of expression or to rejuvenate ossified forms" (Galan 1985, 13). What for the Formalists had been "devices", now, for the Prague structuralists, became "functions".[2] Every element is both a *synchronic function* with respect to that particular work of art as a system, and also a *diachronic function* in that it can be related to other, past uses of the element in other contexts (Streidter 1989, 91).

The two key concepts in the Prague Structuralists' account of the immanent dynamics of language – of language, in other words, considered as a dynamic system of synchronic and diachronic functions – are "actualization" and "the dominant". I dwell on these concepts now because of their significance for the concept of non-linear systematicity to be developed later in the chapter. The concept of actualization, or "deautomatization", represented a development of the opposition between the "practical" and "poetic" uses or functions of language that had earlier been set out by linguistically-minded Formalists such as Roman Jakobson and Lev Jakubinsky:

> As early as 1919 Jakobson stated that "practical language" was language in its "communicative function"; poetry, however, he said to be "language in its aesthetic function", defining the aesthetic function of language more closely as "utterance organized with an intention toward expression . . . by laws that are, as it were, intrinsic." (Striedter 1989, 90)

[2] As Jurij Streidter points out, this move from "device" to "function", from "formalism" to "functionalism", was a logical development of the Formalist notion of "defamiliarization" and its opposite "automatization": "[I]t followed from [the Formalist] evolutionary scheme that particular devices, which had a defamiliarizing effect under particular conditions, under altered circumstances occurred as something now automatic, features that had to be defamiliarized. Thus it was not sufficient to point up general defamiliarizing devices and to erect a theory of literature on them. What had also to be shown was why, under different conditions, the same devices achieve different effects (becoming or not becoming defamiliarizing devices according to the particular effect)" (Streidter 1989, 96).

In their inaugural Theses of 1929, the Prague Linguistic Circle similarly make the distinction between language in its *communicative function*, which is "directed toward the object of expression", and language in its *poetic function*, which is "directed toward the expression itself" (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 12). Poetic language had to be understood against the background not just of the traditions of poetic language to which it responded, but also of contemporary communicative language, which is transformed by its incorporation into the new "functional structure" of the poetic work (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 16). The shift from communicative to poetic function entailed a realignment of the "hierarchy of values" implicit in the language:

> *From the thesis that poetic speech is directed at expression itself it follows that all the levels of a system of language that play only an ancillary role in communicative speech acquire a greater or lesser autonomous value in poetic speech. The linguistic devices grouped in these levels and the interrelation among the levels, often automatized in communicative speech, tend to become deautomatized in poetic speech.* (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 15; emphasis in original).

In an essay from 1932, "Standard Language and Poetic Language", Mukařovský uses the term "actualization" for the process of deautomatization, and emphasises that "actualization of any element [. . .] is necessarily accompanied by automatization of one or several other elements" (quoted in Galan 1985, 29); actualization entails a re-formation of the internal relations of the system:

> The reciprocal relationships of all the poetic work's elements, actualized as well as non-actualized, create its *structure*. This structure is dynamic, containing both the tendencies of convergence and divergence, and is an artistic phenomenon which cannot be taken apart since each of its elements gains value only in a relationship to the whole. (30)

Jakobson, too, saw language as "a regulated system not merely on the vertical axis of synchrony but also on the horizontal axis of diachrony" (quoted in Galan 1985, 17):

"The spirit of equilibrium and the simultaneous tendency toward its rupture constitute the indispensable properties of that whole that is language" (quoted in Galan 1985, 14). As Galan summarises, Jakobson succeeded in demonstrating that "language preserves its homeostatic character in diachronic motion as much as in the momentary synchronic stasis of the system": through the ceaseless, intricate mutual readjustments of actualized and automatized elements, the system "maintains internal stability and adjusts itself to any inside or outside disturbance" (Galan 1985, 202).

Like the concept of actualization, or deautomatization, the concept of the "dominant" had its origins in Formalist thought. Boris Eikenbaum, in 1922, had written of the work of art as "the product of a complex conflict between different formative elements, always a kind of compromise. The elements do not simply coexist and do not simply 'correspond' to each other. Depending on the general character of the style some element or other operates as an organizing *dominant*, prevailing over the others" ("The Melodics of Russian Lyrical Verse" quoted in Striedter 1989, 225). In a lecture delivered in Brno in 1935, Jakobson described the concept of the dominant as "one of the most crucial, elaborated, and productive concepts in Russian Formalist theory", defining it as "the focusing component of a work of art", which "rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure" (Jakobson 1971 [1935], 82). The dominant is thus defined by Jakobson with reference to the structure: it is that which determines the orientation and interrelation of the other components of the system. Jakobson gives the example of the development of Czech verse. In the fourteenth century, rhyme was the dominant component in the formation of the poetic line, whereas in the "Realist" verse of the late C19th it was the

syllabic scheme, and in the poetry of his own time it was intonation. All three – the rhyming, the syllabic and the intonational – are continuously present, but each era presented a different "hierarchy of values" whereby one particular component determined "the role and the structure of the other components" (82-3).

The dominant is thus, clearly, to be distinguished from a "theme" (the product of an interpretation), though it may serve to highlight such a theme: the dominant is an immanent quality of the system that guarantees its integrity and overall orientation. In "Standard Language and Poetic Language", Mukařovský develops the dynamic conception of the dominant, describing it as a "'unity in diversity,' a dynamic unity in which one can sense at the same time both harmony and lack of harmony, rather like convergence and divergence. Convergence is determined by a striving toward the dominant, diversity by a resistance to the striving which can be seen in the static background of non-actualized components" (quoted in Striedter 1989, 225-6). One could compare the role of the dominant in the self-regulation of the poetic system, as conceived by the Prague structuralists, with that of the "attractor" in contemporary dynamic systems theory: the "attractor" is an orientation of the dynamic system, both constituting and constituted by the interactions of the system, such that "the system converges to the attractor" (Kelso 1995, 53).

Jurij Streidter (1989, 89-95) has described three phases in the "evolutionary series" of Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism, each phase being determined by a distinct conception of the systematicity of the work of art. The first two we have already referred to: firstly, the Formalist notion of the work of art as a system of devices that defamiliarizes perception, and, secondly, the notion, belonging to both late Formalism (for example Tynjanov and Jakobson's previously quoted 1928 manifesto) and Prague structuralism, of the work of art as a dynamic, interactive

system of synchronic and diachronic functions. Streidter's third phase, which fully distinguishes Prague Structuralism from Russian Formalism, sees the crucial fusion of this synchronic/diachronic systematicity with a *semiotic* approach: the work of art is now seen as "a sign in an aesthetic function" (Streidter 1989, 87).

Formalism, in its opposition to all forms of "psychologism" (seeing the work of art, for example, as an expression of the "spirit" or "world-view" of the author) had been concerned with the "materiality" of the aesthetic object (its phonics, for example, or its formal "construction") rather than its signification (its intersubjective meaning).[3] By contrast, in the joint statement that launched their journal *Slovo a Slovesnost* ("The Word and Verbal Art"), the Prague Linguistics Circle proclaimed "the problem of the sign" to be "one of the most pressing philosophical problems of the cultural rebirth of our era": the reason for this importance lay in the fact that "all of reality, from sensory perception to the most abstract mental constructions, appears to modern man as a vast and complex realm of signs" (quoted in Steiner 1982a, 203).

This "semiotic turn" to Prague structuralism had complex roots, of which Saussurean linguistics – with its central distinction between the material sign (the *signifiant*) and its meaning (the *signifié*), determined by social codes – was only one. Mukařovský begins his paper "Art as a Semiotic Fact" (1934) by placing the turn to semiotics in a much wider context:

> It has become increasingly clear that the framework of individual consciousness is constituted, even in its innermost layers, of contents belonging to the social consciousness. As a result, the problems of sign and meaning become more and more urgent, for all psychic content exceeding the

[3] Peter Steiner (1982a, 203) argues that this self-imposed limitation should be seen in terms of literary evolution – specifically, in the context of the Formalists' viewing themselves as antithetical to the Symbolist school in the arts.

> limits of individual consciousness acquires the character of a sign by the very fact of its communicability. The study of the sign (semiology according to Saussure, sematology according Bühler) must be elaborated in its entire scope. (Mukařovský 1934, 82)

Mukařovský's framing of the issue, in terms of the "individual consciousness" being constituted "even in its innermost layers" by the "contents belonging to the social consciousness" brings to mind the Vygotskian concept of "internalization" discussed in Chapter One: we shall examine this confluence of semiotics and phenomenology ("the individual consciousness") later in this section, when we consider the final direction which the Prague Circle's semiotic turn would take. For now, our concern is with the communicability of the sign, and the relation of this communicative function to its aesthetic function.

Of the two names that Mukařovský references, that of Karl Bühler, the German psychologist who was closely associated with the Prague Circle, is the more forgotten in Anglophone contexts. In section 4 of the previous chapter I outlined his "Organon model" of language, which identifies three factors that come into play in any linguistic communication: the sender of the communication, the receiver, and the referent (the object/state of affairs/event(s) that are being talked about). Bühler's model is crucial to understanding both the basis of the Prague School's functionalist orientation and the phenomenological direction in which that orientation would lead.

As we saw above, Bühler identified three "functions" of language, with the *referential* or *representative* function being oriented towards the object, the *expressive* or *emotive* function oriented towards the sender, and the *appellant* or *conative* function oriented towards the receiver: in any particular communication, one of these functions will be the "dominant", subordinating the others and

determining the overall character of the communication. A key concept that Bühler transmitted to the Prague Circle was thus that of (to use the term employed by Jakobson and Mukařovský) *polyfunctionality* (Steiner 1995, 40n):[4] any piece of discourse simultaneously (i.e. non-linearly) will hold in play, in dynamic tension, a number of different functions, any one of which may at any time (or under different readings) be dominant, though not to the total exclusion of the others.[5] Jakobson and Mukařovský, as I shall explore in a moment, would add to Bühler's model of the communicative function of language (itself made up of three functions, as outlined above) a parallel and quite distinct function – the aesthetic function. Jakobson (1960) would later famously enlarge still further on Bühler's concept of polyfunctionality, adding to Bühler's three functions and Mukařovský's "aesthetic function" two additional functions (influenced by information theory) – the "phatic" (which serves merely to keep the line of communication open, without communicating information) and the "metalingual" (which checks whether the same code is being used by both parties). The important initial point to emphasise is that all these polyfunctional elaborations of Bühler's triadic model involve a conception of function and functionality quite different from the mono-functional "devices" that underpinned Formalism's initially mechanistic view of systematicity. In these polyfunctional models, the dynamics of the system are not exclusively linear: the

[4] Thus, to anticipate the discussion of the "aesthetic function" that I will undertake below, Mukařovský writes in his lecture "On Structuralism" (1946) that "it is [. .] because of the aesthetic function that art tends toward as rich and as many-sided polyfunctionality as possible" (Mukařovský 1977 [1946], 12)

[5] As Mukařovský writes of the "dominant" and the other functions in a work of art: "[A] work is capable of fulfilling several functions simultaneously. It can also alter its functions in the course of time. Most often, such a shift in function has the appearance of a shift in the dominant of the system of possible functions; a change in the dominant function necessarily manifests itself in a shift in the total meaning of the work" (Mukařovský 1977 [1946], 12).

diachronic process of the system inhabits a non-linear space mapped out by the array of simultaneous functions at work in the language.

As František Galan points out, the distinction between the communicative and the aesthetic is one that Jakobson had made as far back as 1921, though at that time he formulated the distinction in purely Formalist terms, as a contrast between the "literariness" of poetic devices and the automatized communicativeness of ordinary language (Galan 1985, 107). By the time of his paper "What is Poetry?" (1933), by contrast, this distinction is refined in light of the new turn to semiotics and functionalism. "What we emphasise," he now writes, "is not the separatism of art but the autonomy of the aesthetic function" (quoted in Galan 1985, 106). The aesthetic function is to be distinguished from the "work of art": the work of art will contain other functions (for example the referential function), although these will be subordinated to the aesthetic function. And conversely, the aesthetic function can be seen to be at work in non-artistic contexts. Mukařovský, in a paper from the year after Jakobson's "What is Poetry?" ("Art as a Semiotic Fact" (1934)), argues that all works of art carry not only the aesthetic function of an "autonomous sign", but also a parallel communicative function: this is particularly evident in those arts (literature, for example) with a "subject" (i.e. theme or "content") that "seems at first glance to function as the *communicative* meaning of the work" (Mukařovský 1977 [1934], 85). He notes that the evolution of literature, especially the novel and short story, is marked by the "dialectical antinomy" between these parallel functions pertaining to the "communicative sign" and the "autonomous sign".

But what does it mean to function as an "autonomous sign"? What *is* the "aesthetic function"? The answers that Jakobson and Mukařovský developed to that question will both connect back with the emphasis given to de-contextualization in

Chapter One, and also look forward to the phenomenological perspective that will emerge later in this chapter and in Chapter Three. In the paper quoted above, "What is Poetry?" (1933), Jakobson describes the aesthetic function, with a glance back at Bühler's referential and expressive functions, as being operative when

> the word is felt as a word and not merely as a stand-in for the designated object or as an outburst of emotion; when words and their organization, their signification, their internal and external form do not point indifferently to reality but rather acquire a weight and value of their own. (quoted in Galan 1985, 108)

Jakobson then enquires into the motivation behind this process: what purpose can the aesthetic function serve? Why is it necessary, through the aesthetic function, to break that "natural" bond between sign and thing that is the basis of language in its communicative function? His answer is that the aesthetic function is vital to any sign-system:

> [b]ecause besides the immediate awareness of the identity between sign and thing (A equals A_1), it is necessary that there be an immediate awareness of the inadequacy of that identity (A is not A_1). Such antinomy is vital because without contradiction there is neither movement of concepts not movement of signs: the relationship between concept and sign becomes automatized, the process [of understanding] comes to a halt and the awareness of reality dies away. (108-9)

Thus the aesthetic function, according to Jakobson, plays a crucial role in our very use of signs by refreshing ("actualizing") our awareness of them *as* signs. In Chapter One we saw how the de-contextualization inherent in narrative "holds up" the representation of actions and events for joint attention, and thereby offers affordances for new meanings. We can now understand this process as an instance of the aesthetic function in Jakobson's characterization: an actualization or bringing to

awareness of the slippage or sliding-over between sign and thing, of the vital "looseness" that allows room for the development of new concepts.[6]

The third of Jurij Striedter's three phases of Russian Formalism and Czech structuralism was marked, as we have seen, by the turn to semiotics (as in the broadening of the frame of analysis from "poetics" to "aesthetics"). But in the later work of Mukařovský, and more specifically in his development of the concept of the "aesthetic function", we find a further "turn": towards phenomenology.[7] This can be seen if we compare the formulation of the "aesthetic function" in "Art as a Semiotic Fact" (1934) (the paper cited earlier as marking the "semiotic turn" (the third of Striedter's three phases)), with that in "The Place of the Aesthetic Function among the Other Functions" (1942). In the former, we find the distinction between the "communicative" and "autonomous" sign framed as that between, on the one hand, a sign "oriented toward a distinct reality, for example, a definite event or a certain personage", and, on the other hand, a sign which is "characterized only by its serving as an intermediary among the members of the same collectivity". The work of art, as an autonomous sign, refers not to a distinct and particular reality (as it would in a purely communicative function) but to "the total context of so-called social

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[6] In *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, Yuri Lotman makes a parallel distinction between the communicative and the aesthetic functions, based on the same connection between the aesthetic function, indeterminacy (or "unpredictability") and the development of new concepts. He reduces "intelligence", in its "semiotic aspect", to three functions:

1. the transmission of available information (that is, of texts);
2. the creation of new information, that is, of texts which are not deducible according to set algorithms from already existing information, but which are to some degree unpredictable;
3. memory, that is, the capacity to preserve and reproduce information (texts).

He continues: "In texts intended to communicate the first function predominates, while in artistic texts it is the capacity to generate new information" (Lotman 1990, 2).

[7] Among the texts in which Mukařovský adopts the phenomenological perspective are "The Place of the Aesthetic Function among the Other Functions" (1942) and "Intentionality and Unintentionality in Art" (1943). On Mukařovský's "phenomenological turn" see Galan 174-81 and Steiner 1977, xxvii-xxviii. According to Galan, Mukařovský's turn to phenomenology "was not a sudden about-face but, rather, the culmination of a growing acquaintance with Husserlian philosophy [. . .] Allusions to phenomenology [. .] are interspersed throughout the writings of the Prague scholars from the beginning" (Galan 1985, 175). In 1935 Husserl delivered in Prague the lectures that would be published as *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

phenomena – for example, philosophy, politics, religion, and economics" (Mukařovský 1977 [1934], 84). Referring to Saussure's concept of the *signifié* (the meaning of the sign as constituted by social codes), he goes on to characterize the work of art as existing "as an 'aesthetic object' lodged in the consciousness of a whole collectivity" (87).

Thus in this 1934 paper we find the de-contextualization that creates the autonomy of the "autonomous sign" described in terms of the abstraction from a particular, individual situation to a globalized context of social phenomena. In "The Place of the Aesthetic Function among the Other Functions" (1942), by contrast, Mukařovský explores fully the implications of the concept of polyfunctionality that Bühler's theory of the linguistic sign had proposed. He points out that it is when we are oriented towards the *object* that we are tempted to think mono-functionally, "for an object, a human creation, will always bear more distinct traces of its adaptation to that single purpose for which it was produced" (Mukařovský 1977 [1942], 38). If, by contrast, we orient ourselves to the point of view of the *subject*,

> we shall immediately see that every act by which man orients himself toward reality in order to affect it one way or another corresponds simultaneously and jointly to several purposes which sometimes not even the individual who originates the act is able to differentiate. Hence the uncertainty about the motivation of actions. Social coexistence, of course, compels man constantly to limit his functional many-sidedness, but it never succeeds in making him a biological monofunctional creature such as a bee or an ant. As along as man is man, various functions will necessarily contend with one another, will be arranged hierarchically, will intersect, and will interpenetrate in each of his acts. (38)

It is precisely this orientation of point of view to that of the subject, according to Mukařovský, that is effected by the aesthetic function, which finds its *raison d'être* not in a specific practical end, but in the fact that "it adds a facet to the acting individual's functional diversity in some way" (38). The aesthetic function is oriented

towards the subject rather than the object:[8] this is how it brings to awareness the polyfunctionality of the object. It is also semiotic or mediated, rather than immediate, in the sense that the sign is no longer conceived of as merely an instrument for access to reality (the "immediate object"), as it is in the practical function, but as an (semiotic, mediated) *object*.

Thus Mukařovský now locates the aesthetic function according to two axes – one phenomenological in inspiration, the axis of orientation according to the subject or object, and the other semiotic in inspiration, the axis of mediation vs immediacy. This produces four major types of function:

	Immediate (Sign as "instrument")	Semiotic/mediated (Sign as "object")
Orientation to Subject	Theoretical	Aesthetic
Orientation to Object	Practical	Symbolic

Thus the aesthetic function can be distinguished from the theoretical in that while in its theoretical function the sign is an "instrument", a means towards the end of producing in the subject "a total and unifying *image* of reality" (reality being the "immediate object"), in its aesthetic function the sign "establishes a unifying *attitude*

[8] John Dewey expresses the same idea in his account of the "act of expression" in *Art as Experience* (1934): "Man whittles, carves, sings, dances, gestures, molds, draws and paints. The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that *its* qualities *as perceived* have controlled the question of production. The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate experience of perceiving has qualities that a spontaneous or uncontrolled activity does not have. The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works" (Dewey 1934, 48). The correspondences between, on the one hand, Mukařovský's concept of the "aesthetic function", and, on the other hand, Dewey's account of "aesthetic perception" and the "act of expression", will be discussed further in Chapter Three, subsection 3.1.

toward it" (42; emphases in original).[9] Equally, the aesthetic function can be distinguished from the "symbolic" in that while the aesthetic function orients the sign towards the subject (by maximizing interpretive possibilities, for example), the symbolic function is oriented towards the effectiveness (the automatization, one might say) of the relation between the sign and the thing signified. Thus a national flag is primarily a symbol rather than an aesthetic object, in that its function is to cement an identification between itself and the thing signified (the nation) – to the extent, for example, that citizens will feel an insult to the one to be an insult to the other: reality and sign become enmeshed.[10]

One might compare a flag, for example, with a painting (or, more pointedly perhaps, with a painting *of* a flag, such as Jasper Johns' famous stars-and-stripes canvas). The difference between a flag and a painting, according to Mukařovský's model, is that while in the case of the flag the symbolic function directs the reference of the sign to a specific, determinate portion or aspect of reality, in the case of the aesthetic function the subject is invited – through the aesthetic sign's indeterminacy – to refer the sign to the *whole* of the subject's reality (42). This reference to the individual subject is what crucially marks out the later, phenomenological Mukařovský from the Mukařovský of "Art as a Semiotic Fact" who had written of the "'aesthetic object' lodged in the consciousness of a whole collectivity" (Mukařovský 1977 [1934], 87).

[9] The shift from "image" to "attitude", as between theoretical and aesthetic functions, is precisely the shift from a focus on an *immediate* object (i.e. an object considered independent of mediation or "attitude") to a *mediated* or semiotic object (an object constituted by mediation or "attitude"). An example of the difference between an immediate object and a mediated or semiotic object would be the difference between the "reality" described by a scientific text and the "reality" ("storyworld") evoked by a novel.

[10] In literature the symbolic function will make itself felt in the tendency towards allegory (41).

It is because it refers potentially to the whole of the subject's reality, Mukařovský suggests, that the aesthetic sign comes to be seen as "typical" of its era or society. But equally important is that the aesthetic sign itself is perceived *as a whole*, for it is only as a whole that it can be perceived as an aesthetic sign. In any work of art, the aesthetic function will be only one of the functions potentially at play, though it will be the dominant one, determining the interrelation of the others. In a narrative fiction, for example, there may be many instances of language used in its communicative functions (as representation, for example, or expression), but these functions will be subordinated to the dominant aesthetic function – that is, they will refer primarily not to a reality beyond the sign, but to their internal "context" *within* the sign.[11]

"Context" is put in scare quotes here because Mukařovský makes a distinction between the *context* of a practical, communicative sign and the *contexture* of an autonomous, aesthetic sign. In "Poetic Designation and the Aesthetic Function of Language" (1938) he invites the reader to consider a sentence such as "Dusk is approaching". If this sentence is perceived according to a practical, communicative function then our first questions will be regarding its context understood in terms of its relationship to reality: Is it a true report of a state of affairs in reality? Or is it, perhaps, an example from a textbook illustrating a point of grammar, rather than pointing to any particular material condition? In either case, it is the nature of the relationship between the sign and the thing designated that is at issue. If, by contrast,

[11] Conversely, a non-fictional narrative (journalistic, historical, (auto)biographical) may employ within itself aesthetic forms of configuration, such as suspense, even though these are subordinated to an overall "communicative" function. In the terms discussed in the following paragraph, all narratives are to some degree a "contexture", and the question of whether the aesthetic or communicative functions are predominant in a particular case may be ambiguous (an ambiguity richly exploited in the history of the novel, as in the case of W.G. Sebald's narratives discussed in Chapter Three). The distinction put forward here thus complements and cuts across the (porous) generic distinction between fiction and non-fiction.

the sentence is perceived according to the aesthetic function – as a quotation from a poem or story, for example – our questions will be of a quite different sort, and will concern its relation to the *contexture* created by the aesthetic sign as a whole: Is it an opening line, or a closing line? Or perhaps it is the refrain of a poem? In short: what comes before and what after? (Mukařovský 1977a [1938], 65-6).[12]

Mukařovský returns to the concept of contexture in "The Concept of the Whole in the Theory of Art" (1945). Here, he places emphasis on its temporal quality:[13] a contexture is

> a sequence of semantic units (e.g., words, sentences), a sequence unalterable without a change in the whole, in which the meaning accumulates successively [. . .] At the end, the entire sequence, at first given successively, is accumulated simultaneously in reverse order. Only when the contexture has been completed, do the whole and each of the individual partial meanings acquire a definite relation to reality (most obvious in detective stories where the last page can change the meaning of everything that has preceded). As long as the contexture is not completed, its total meaning is always uncertain, but the semantic intention tending toward the wholeness of the contexture accompanies its perception from the first word. (Mukařovský 1977b [1945], 73-4).

It is in terms of this concept of *contexture* that Mukařovský both identifies the nature of the internal self-reference of the sign under the aesthetic function and clarifies the dynamic nature of the autonomous aesthetic sign. It is with reference to a whole contexture (whether projected or achieved) that the aesthetic sign is perceived, and it is as a whole that the aesthetic sign refers, potentially, to the whole of the perceiver's

[12] This orientation of the aesthetic sign to its contexture, Mukařovský argues, helps to explain the tendency of poetic language toward figurative, non-automatized imagery – "because a radical shift in verbal meaning is possible only on condition that the surrounding contexture alludes with sufficient clarity to the reality for whose designation the given word-image has been unusually and unexpectedly employed. In this way the contexture imposes on the reader the meaning given to the word through the poet's individual and unique decision" (Mukařovský 1977a [1938], 66-7).

[13] Mukařovský describes contexture as being most marked in literature, but as also occurring in other arts, "and even non-temporal ones": "We can even speak about contexture in a painting, especially if we realize that the perception of a painting is a temporal process" (Mukařovský 1977b [1945], 73).

reality. (The dynamics of this relationship between the internal "whole" of the aesthetic sign's self-reference and the external "whole" of the perceiver's reality will be explored below, in Chapter Three.)

It is significant that Mukařovský takes a narrative form as his example of contexture, for the concept has three aspects that relate it closely both to the argument that has been developed both in this chapter and the previous one:

> a) a contexture is a structure that generates, internally, its own "context": we have seen this process at work, in Chapter One, in the affordances that narrative offers for de- and re-contextualization.
>
> b) a contexture is a genetic, irreversible sequence
>
> c) a contexture has inextricably related linear and non-linear dimensions. Thus Mukařovský distinguishes between, on the one hand, a contexture, and, on the other hand, a "pattern" or "composition" such as proportionality or symmetry: "compositional" features do not interpenetrate, but "the individual semantic units composing the sequence of the contexture [. .] do interpenetrate in two directions: successively and regressively" (Mukařovský 1977b [1945], 74).[14]

Section Two of this Chapter will explore further the notion of sequence suggested by Mukařovský – in particular his suggestion of a simultaneity of "successive" and "retrospective" sequences. First, though, I will consider briefly the contribution of Wolfgang Iser to this concept of *contexture* (though Iser himself does not use the term).

[14] The OED [Third Edition, 1973] defines contexture as "1. The action of weaving together; the being woven together; texture 1649 Also *transf.* and *fig.* 2. A mass of things woven together 1603; a fabric 1603 3. The weaving together of words, sentences, etc., in connected composition; the structure of a literary composition; a connected passage 1603. 4. = CONTEXT 1608."

1.2 Process and System: Wolfgang Iser

In the theory of "aesthetic response" proposed by Wolfgang Iser (1978), we find significant continuities with the approach that Mukařovský arrived at in his final, phenomenological phase. We also find new developments. Of these, the most important for our purposes are

> a) an extension of the phenomenological approach (which remains in an embryonic form in Mukařovský's writings) in the direction of a rich experiential description of the reader's interaction with the narrative text.[15]
>
> b) a placing of the concept of literary narrative as a (dynamic) "structure" or "system" within the context of general theories of systems emerging from the biological, social and computer sciences.
>
> c) the introduction of the concept of "schemata" (or "schematized views", to use Iser's preferred term) as a key component of the reader's interaction with the text.

As I hope to show, there is an unresolved tension in Iser's theory between the first two elements, which is a tension essentially between first-person and third-person perspectives.[16] (In Section Two of this chapter I will endeavour to show how a step can be taken towards resolving this tension by updating Iser's conception of schemata or schematized views to encompass recent research from embodied and enactive cognition.)

As we have seen, Mukařovský's late work saw a decisive move beyond the Saussurean notion of meaning as a conceptual object lodged in the "collective

[15] Although Iser proposes a general theory of the reader's aesthetic response to literary texts, the vast majority of his examples are drawn from novels and stories (Iser 1978, xii).
[16] As I will discuss further in Chapter Three, below, this is a general tension felt in contemporary attempts to "naturalize" phenomenology, as in the concept of "neurophenomenology".

consciousness", and towards the phenomenological subject, the perceiver, as the focus of investigation for discovering how that meaning is generated. This, too, is Iser's starting-point, though he is more explicit on the process of *interaction* in the relation of text to reader:

> Reading is [. .] the focal point of this study, for it sets in motion a whole chain of activities that depend both on the text and on the exercise of certain basic human faculties. Effects and responses are properties neither of the text nor of the reader; the text represents a potential effect that is realized in the reading process (Iser 1978, ix)

"Meaning," he writes of his approach, "is no longer an object to be defined, but is an effect to be experienced" (10) – thus "it is in the reader that the text comes to life" (19). For Mukařovský, too, "the structure of an individual work is an event, a process, not a static, precisely defined whole" (Mukařovský 1977b [1945], 77).[17]

We have seen above how (in the second of Striedter's "three phases" of Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism) Tynjanov, Jakobson and others developed a concept of the work of art (and of art forms) in terms of dynamic, interacting systems of synchronic and diachronic functions. Non-linear systematicity is crucial, too, for Iser's approach. At its heart is what he calls the "repertoire" – that is, a selection of cultural norms and models that connect the text to extra-textual reality. These cultural frameworks (and through them the cultural systems of which

[17] For both writers – though much more prominently in the case of Iser – a precedent for the phenomenological account of the reading process was provided by Roman Ingarden (1973a, 1973b). On the influence of Ingarden on Czech Structuralism, see Galan 1985, 73-5; Striedter 1989, 123-6. For Iser's view of Ingarden, see Iser 1978, 170-82. While both the Czech Structuralists and Iser adopt the term "concretization" from Ingarden for the realization by the reader of the potentialities in the text, both Iser and the Czech Structuralists are critical of the implications of Ingarden's "classical" aesthetics. (Ingarden saw the "polyphony" of the text, constituted by the varied "schematized aspects" it presents, harmonized in the "intentional object" that forms the highest level of "concretization" of the text.) Iser's criticism of Ingarden's concept of concretization – that Ingarden "uses it as if it denoted the act of communication, whereas in actual fact, it merely describes the actualization of schemata potentially presented by the text" (173) – is congruent with the Czech Structuralists' basic distinction between the "communicative" and "aesthetic" functions: Iser identifies Ingarden's failure to develop the concept of "aesthetic value" as "a central gap in his whole system" and points to Mukařovský work as an example of how that gap could be filled (179).

they are part) are recontextualized in the literary text, where they are placed in new relations with other frameworks and models (68-73). The repertoire forms "an organizational structure of meaning which must be optimized through the reading of the text" (85). Iser directly quotes from Mukařovský in order to clarify what is meant by structure in this context:

> As a unity of meaning, a structure is more than a mere additive whole, arising through a mere aggregation of parts. The structural whole *signifies* each of its parts, and each of these parts in turn signifies the whole. Another essential feature of the structure is its dynamic nature, a result of the fact that every individual component has a particular function in the common unity which incorporates it and binds it into the structural whole. The dynamism of the structural whole is created by the energetic nature of these individual functions and their interrelations, which are prone to constant change. Therefore the structure as a whole is in constant motion, whereas the additive whole dissolves through change. (Mukařovský 1941, 69-70 quoted in Iser 1978, 85)[18]

Thus for both Mukařovský and Iser, the dynamism, the energy, of the text is not mono-linear, as it is in the additive model. Rather, it is driven by the non-linear relations between functions.

In Iser's model, this non-linearity is concentrated in the concept of the "blanks" between the schematized viewpoints that make up the repertoire. These blanks are areas of indeterminacy as to the relation between the schematized viewpoints presented in the text, an indeterminacy generated by the "depragmatization" of the schemata and their re-contextualization within the text, where they are tested through juxtaposition (which "simultaneously offsets and

[18] I have used the English translation from Steiner's collection rather than Iser's English rendering of the German translation. I have also included two sentences at the beginning of the extract that are omitted in Iser's quotation.

relates the perspectives [in a] process of reciprocal spotlighting") with different, sometimes contradictory, schemata (114).

This de-contextualization of the schematized viewpoints from their original systems of norms and behaviour, and their re-contextualization in the text, accounts for the tendency of literature to probe the limits and boundaries of existing systems:

> Instead of reproducing the system to which it refers, [the literary text] almost invariably takes as its dominant "meaning" those possibilities that have been neutralised or negated by that system [. . .] [O]ne might say that the borderlines of existing systems are the starting point for the literary text. It begins to activate that which the system has left inactive. (72)

Many examples of the role of embedded joint attention as a mediator between conflicting schematized viewpoints could be cited from *Don Quixote*. At a basic level, the juxtaposition of the schemata that Don Quixote absorbs from chivalric romances with the schemata of ordinary contemporary life is mediated through the observation of Don Quixote's acting-out of the chivalric schemata by those around him. Or to take a more concentrated example that was discussed in Chapter One, in the First Story of Day One of Boccaccio's *Decameron* the schema of the deathbed confession, with its idea of final judgment, is tested through its re-contextualization in the story, juxtaposed with the schema that has been presented of Ciappelletto as a thoroughly evil individual. (In fact this layering of schemata is more complex still, for mixed with it is another, conflicting schemata – that of a generous, even admirable gesture (by which Ciappelletto is helping the Florentine brothers out of an awkward situation).) Significantly, the "blank" here is articulated by an act of joint attention (the brothers listening from behind the partition): here we see an example of how the kind of reframing of attention that was analysed in Chapter One can play an important mediating role in what Iser calls the "switching" between schematized viewpoints.

The non-linear structure of embedded viewpoints is both bound together and articulated by acts of joint attention: it is through these processes of embedded triadic semiosis that, to cite again the passage from Mukařovský quoted above, "[t]he structural whole *signifies* each of its parts, and each of these parts in turn signifies the whole" (Mukařovský 1941, 69).

This model of a structure articulated by the switching between schematized viewpoints presents a third-person description of the conceptual space articulated by the narrative considered as a system with diachronic and synchronic ("horizontal" and "vertical") dimensions. But Iser also characterises the reading process with a first-person description:

> [T]he whole text can never be perceived at any one time. In this respect it differs from given objects, which can generally be viewed or at least conceived as a whole [. . .] We always stand outside the given object, whereas we are situated inside the literary text. The relation between text and reader is therefore quite different from that between object and observer: instead of a subject-object relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which travels along *inside* that which it has to apprehend. This mode of grasping an object is unique to literature. (Iser 1978, 108-9)

The reader is always, in a sense, inside and at the invisible heart of the narrative, generating it around him/her:[19] there is an echo, here, of Mukařovský's insight that elements of the artistic text, under the influence of the overall aesthetic function, refer internally to the totality of the autonomous (aesthetic) sign – or rather, in genetic, dynamic terms, to the cumulative *contexture*.

[19] Citing semioticians Charles Morris and Umberto Eco (both working in a Peircean tradition), Iser describes a literary work as an "iconic sign" in the sense that it is "an organization of signifiers which do not serve to designate a signified object, but instead designate instructions for the production of the signified": the words of a fictional narrative, rather than denoting an object, "themselves constitute what is denoted" (Iser 1978, 65).

As we have seen in previous section, however, Mukařovský identifies another kind of reference of the aesthetic sign. The aesthetic sign refers internally, to itself as totality. But also – simultaneously, and by virtue of its being a sign that has become a depragmatized *object* (i.e. no longer a practical *instrument*) – it refers to the *totality* of the perceiver's existence: this kind of reference comes from a reverse, external point of view, by which the textual elements are seen through the prism of the totality of the aesthetic sign-as-object. The mutual interpenetration of these two mutually reversed points of view – one looking out from the inside, the other looking in from the outside – is well captured by Georges Poulet, in his classic essay on the "phenomenology of reading", in passage that I cited in the Introduction:

> [T]he extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the falling away of the barriers between you and it. You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside [. . .] [W]hat I glimpse through the words are mental forms [that] do not seem to be of a nature other than my mind which thinks them. They are objects, but subjectified objects. In short, since everything has become part of my mind, thanks to the intervention of language, the opposition between the subject and its objects has been considerably attenuated (Poulet 1969, 55-6).

Poulet highlights with greater clarity than Iser the challenge that narrative fiction poses to conventional notions of the subject-object relation. Iser elaborates on the notion of seeing the narrative world "from the inside" with an image, drawn from Fielding and Walter Scott, of the wandering viewpoint of the reader being analogous to a traveller in a stagecoach, journeying through the novel as though through a landscape (Iser 1978, 16). While attractively picturesque, a moment's reflection reveals that this image for what Iser calls the "wandering viewpoint" is misleading: if the reader is truly *inside* the fictional world in the way that has been described above (generating it at every point from the inside in a way that is incompatible with a conventional subject-object relation), then the reader would have to be considered not only as inside the landscape considered as a whole, but also as inside the objects

of the landscape that he supposedly looks out on as objects.[20] In Chapter Three, I will undertake to sketch an answer to this paradox of the mutual interpenetration of inside and outside in the experience of reading.

This difficulty I have just described in Iser's formulation of his theory – a difficulty regarding the compatibility of his characterizations of first-person and third-person perspectives on the reading process – concerns the vertical, synchronic dimension of the contexture: it concerns the question of reference and directionality across the non-linear space between textual element, aesthetic whole and perceiving consciousness. But there is a parallel difficulty, or incompatibility, that Iser encounters in relation to the horizontal, diachronic dimension of narrative, its linearity. On the one hand, he appeals to phenomenological concepts such as "theme-and-horizon" (Alfred Schütz) (97-8) and "protension/retention" (Husserl) (110-2): these are temporal groupings that resist analysis into a mere succession of discrete states. But on the other hand, the semiotic, vertical dimension (the "switchings" between viewpoints) implies just such a succession of discrete states. Iser never convincingly resolves the two perspectives. One step towards their resolution, I will suggest in the following section, is to restore to the notion of schemata their internal "temporal" quality. This in turn will lead us to the notion of the *series* as the basis of

[20] A parallel dissonance between outside and inside views can be seen when Iser attempts to synthesize the wandering-viewpoint perspective with the schematized viewpoints/blanks model: "As the reader's wandering viewpoint travels between all these segments, its constant switching during the time-flow of reading intertwines them, thus bringing forth a network of perspectives, within which each perspective opens up a view not only of others but also of the intended imaginary object, of which it only forms one aspect. The object itself is a product of interconnections, the structuring of which is to a great extent regulated and controlled by blanks [. . .] [T]he segments of characters, narrator, plot, and fictitious reader perspectives are not only marshalled into a graduated sequence, but are also transformed into reciprocal reflectors" (Iser 1978, 197). The confusion here is as to whether the reader's viewpoint is to be conceived of as outside the segments (so that they become objects to be "marshalled" or "intertwined") or inside them (which is inherent in the metaphor – which Iser uses repeatedly – of "switching" between the viewpoints inherent in the segments, and thus enabling their "reciprocal reflection").

the "threads" that make up the *contexture* of the narrative (the narrative, that is, as a dynamic non-linear system).

This turn to the concept of the *series* is motivated too, by a consideration of the practical, communicative functions of signs (that is, in Bühler's terms, functions that serve as "instruments" or tools for pursuing some intention with respect to external reality – representing it, or expressing it, or changing it in some way). For any function implies a sequence of coordinated actions and movements of which it forms an integral part: a tool such as a hammer is perceived as functional insofar as it offers affordances for incorporation into sequences of grasping, gripping and wielding. In the following section, I will consider how this applies to the communicative language incorporated into narrative fiction, and also how, parallel to these communicative, practical configurations of dynamic series out of functions, there is a mode of configuring the serial, linear dimension of narrative that corresponds to the aesthetic function – that refers the series, that is, to the cumulative *contexture* of the whole.

2. Narrative Series

In Section One, through a consideration of Czech Structuralism and of Iser's account of the reading process, we have been led to a notion of narrative *contexture*. The contexture is the dynamic, cumulative system of interrelations between the array of viewpoints or perspectives presented by the narrative: this array – which is characteristically articulated by shifts in forms of joint attention (whereby, for example, "narrators" share the viewpoint of characters, or characters that of other characters etc) – constitutes the structure, the non-linear mental space, through which the narrative, as a dynamic system, moves. These perspectives draw on schemata from systems of language, thought and behaviour outside the text, which are given new meaning through being depragmatized and recontextualized in the contexture. Shifts in *function* are a particularly important aspect of these recontextualizations: various forms of language and thought, various patterns of behaviour, are given new purposes, and thus come to fulfil different functions from those originally intended.[21] If, as Jerome Bruner has argued in a passage already quoted in Chapter One, narrative is concerned with the "vicissitudes of intention", then one aspect of this – the vertical aspect, if you will – is the way in which the same object (for example a schema of thought or behaviour, once it has been objectified by de- and re-contextualization) can simultaneously serve different functions.

In the previous section I identified problems with Iser's formulation of the process of reader-interaction with the text: these problems concerned the congruence of first-person and third-person perspectives on this process. How, in

[21] Thus in the story of Ciappelletto, the "deathbed confession", a schema whose customary functional context is that of divine judgment and eternity, is given a quite different, prosaic and mundane function: it becomes merely a means of helping the two Florentine brothers out of an awkward social situation.

particular, do we reconcile an internal perspective, whereby the aesthetic function refers embedded elements of the text outwards to the totality of the contexture, the aesthetic sign, with an external perspective that sees the outside of the totality of the aesthetic sign and refers it to the totality of the reader's existence? How, in short, can the reader be both inside and outside the narrative? In Chapter Three I will attempt to show how this paradox of narrative fiction requires the formulation of a new kind of dynamic topology regarding the relation of inside and outside, a topology to which we can find pointers in phenomenology and contemporary neuroscience.

The other problem of congruence between internal and external perspectives in Iser's theory concerned the diachronic dimension: there is a dissonance between, on the one hand, the phenomenological aspect of his theory (which emphasises the way in which experienced time cannot be reduced to the "clock time" of a succession of discrete instants), and, on the other hand, what one might call the *semiotic* aspect of his theory – the switching between schematized viewpoints that themselves appear, in Iser's formulation as without any temporal extension or dimension. How, in short, are the schemata to be integrated into the phenomenologically conceived temporal structure of the narrative?

2.1 A Multiplicity of "Ordering Principles"

The "Tel Aviv school" of poetics, associated with the Porter Institute and the journal *Poetics Today*, has made a particular study of the temporal, dynamic dimension of narrative and poetry (McHale and Ron 2005; Perry 1979, 35 n.1). Below (Section 2.3), I will consider Meir Sternberg's analysis of *suspense*, *curiosity* and *surprise* as distinct modes of narrative dynamism. Here, I am concerned with how Menakhem Perry, in his essay "Literary Dynamics" (Perry 1979), offers a dynamic, diachronic construal of schemata as they are incorporated in literary narrative.

Perry's starting-point, in accord with that of Iser, is that the literary text is received by the reader through a *process* of concretization. Its verbal elements "appear one *after* another, and its semantic complexes (e.g. scenes, ideas, characters, plot, value-judgments) build up 'cumulatively', through adjustments and readjustments" (Perry 1979, 35). The ordering and distribution of elements determines the process by which they are concretized, and thus both effects and affects their meaning. Principles of ordering and distribution in a text operate simultaneously at different levels, from the global (over an entire text or extended segment of text) to the local. But even a global principle of ordering will not exhaust all the semantic elements of the text, but merely a selection, "leaving a residue to be organized by other, complementary or even competing ordering principles" (36).

A given text, then, may manifest simultaneously a number of "ordering principles" (or *series*, to use the term that will be adopted here) operating at different levels of temporal magnification. Perry identifies two basic types of motivation behind these ordering principles: "rhetorical or reader-oriented motivations" and "'model'-oriented motivations". The former occur where "[t]he sequence is justified

through its *effect* on the reader" (40): I shall consider such dynamic effects as *curiosity*, *suspense* and *surprise* in more detail below, in Section 2.3. The latter kind of "ordering principle" or series – those which are derived from a "model" – correspond in broad terms to Iser's "schematized viewpoints": "'model'-oriented motivations" are manifested when "the ordering of a group of textual elements is justified by regarding the text as adhering to some order familiar to the reader, an *extra-textual* order which the text 'obeys' or 'imitates'" (36). These "frames" may take the form of "the description of some particular space, the forty-year history of the relationship between a woman and her fellow-townspeople, a certain argument, a sonnet, a tragedy, a series of items in a person's consciousness, a series of items typical of some official form, a hierarchically organized group of people, and so on" (37).

In all these cases, Perry points out, the "frames" involve a "dimension of order". Within this dimension, the principles behind the particular ordering may vary considerably. They may take the form of

> a temporal-chronological order, or else a spatial, formal, linguistic, logical or pseudo-logical order, or else a conventional order anchored in a social or a literary convention (genre), or else an order of conceptual grading based on a scale or a ranking of oppositions ("Friends, Romans, countrymen"), etc. (37)

In the following sub-section (2.2.), I shall discuss other examples of such iconicity, drawn from Ronald Langacker's theory of "cognitive grammar". The art of rhetoric provides many parallel instances: as Mark Turner has demonstrated, an important legacy of classical rhetoric is a "poetry of argument" consisting of the metaphoric projection, into sequences of language, of sequences of location and movement (we "advance an argument", we "meet our opponent halfway", we "share common

ground" or "stand firm to our position" etc) (Turner 1991, 99-120).[22] In his essay "Figure", Turner cites an example from Kenneth Burke's *Rhetoric of Motives*:

> Who controls Berlin, controls Germany; who controls Germany, controls Europe; who controls Europe, controls the world.

As Burke comments:

> By the time you arrive at the second of its three stages, you feel how it is destined to develop – and on the level of purely formal assent you would collaborate to round out its symmetry by spontaneously willing its completion and perfection as an utterance. (Quoted in Turner 1998, 51)

We are drawn to the form, according to Burke – and perhaps drawn to project some of its attraction onto the content – by "some 'universal' appeal in it". As I shall explore below, in the following sub-section (2.2), Perry's wide field of application for the concept of "ordering principles" is supported, through their metaphoric projection into diverse forms of discourse, by a dynamic, enactive conception of image schemata.

To return to Perry's account of the incorporation of these series in narrative fiction: the series activated by particular model-orientated frames may remain "virtual" if the actual series as presented in the text deviates from its customary sequential form. In these cases the frame continues to serve as a "guiding norm", so that "deviation from it becomes perceptible and requires motivation by another frame or principle. The order here is not simply an "absent" aspect; it is an *existing* minus device" (37). In the case of reader-oriented frames generated by the text, these often create expectations that are then negated by further developments. But they do not disappear as a result:

[22] Mark Johnson has similarly analysed classical logic in terms of underlying image schemata such as CONTAINMENT (Johnson 1989, 37-40).

> Tentative hypotheses may affect [. .] the mode of perception and organization of material following them prior to the stage of the text-continuum where they are rejected. And the rejection of the hypotheses themselves does not always extend to the effects they had on the comprehension of material which came after their formation but before their rejection. In themselves they may not be "legitimate" in terms of the final stage, but some of their effects, "chain-reactions" set off by them, may very well remain stable. (Perry 1979, 49)

Discarded or negated series thus remain gathered into the cumulative contexture of the text.

Perry's multi-linear approach to what I am calling the "serialism" of the literary text leads him to argue that the conventional narratological distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzet* (between "natural", chronological sequence and its textual manifestation) is misleading – firstly because elements of the text "may participate in several temporal frames at once (the 'natural' sequence of an 'external' occurrence; the 'natural' sequence of a character's consciousness; the sequence within a block of information transmitted from one character to another, etc)", and secondly because it "confers upon temporal order an exclusive role in the organization of narrative sequence", where non-temporal ordering principles (whether actualized or virtual) may play an equal or greater role (40-1). This is an important point that needs emphasis: a series may often take the form of a temporal unfolding, but it may equally take the form of a "non-temporal ordering" (an argument, or explication, or description, for example). As noted above in relation to the metaphoric basis of rhetoric, "literal" and "figurative" sequences may be closely bound up together.

Thus Perry proposes a concept of narrative in terms of multiple layers of series at different levels of durational magnification, these series being motivated either by their "reader-orientation" or by a "model". The two motivations constitute two perspectives on a single process, and the oscillation between them reflects the

interactive relationship between text and reader, with its continual processes of re-contextualization:

> In delineating model-oriented motivations, the reader replies to the question: what are the text's frames of reference? The frames themselves occupy the focal point of the text's "intent". In sketching reader-oriented motivation, on the other hand, the focus is on the *perception process* of the text, or on the *process* of constructing the frames by the reader. Here the question to be answered is: which phenomena in the process of the concretization of the text by the reader does the text "intend"? (42)

I will expand on Perry's notion of the two kinds of motivation in Section 2.3, below, where I outline two distinct ways of configuring series, the difference between them being dependent on whether the objectivity of events or the subjectivity of their meaning for the reader is the focus.

2.2 Enactive Schemata

The concept of "image schemata" is at the heart of second-generation cognitive science and its project of reconnecting mind, body and environmental interaction. Mark Johnson defines an image schema as "a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience" (Johnson 1989, xiv). Raymond Gibbs summarises the thinking that motivates the concept:

> A great deal of our conceptual and linguistic knowledge arises from our bodily interactions with the world. Such knowledge is not static, propositional and sentential, but grounded in recurring patterns of bodily experience. These patterns emerge throughout sensorimotor activity as we manipulate objects, orient ourselves spatially and temporally, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes. (Gibbs 1994, 444)

Key examples of schemata are SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER, CENTRE-PERIPHERY and SYMMETRY.[23] Image schemata form the ground for "conceptual metaphor theory", which sees language and thought as shaped by complex mappings of these experiential patterns onto abstract domains. Thus the ubiquitous metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY ("I didn't get to where I am today . . ." etc) maps the concept of a journey (with its internal SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure) onto that of a human life. At a greater level of abstraction this can also be seen as an instance of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor underlying many other conceptual metaphors such as EVENTS ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS ("This interview is just something I've got to get through"). According to Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner such "conceptual blending" generates structures of thought and language inaccessible to any of its input domains individually (Fauconnier and Turner 2002).[24]

The concept of image schemata has recently been subjected to scrutiny regarding the question of whether, in some formulations, the concept of image schemata can lead back to a classical cognitivist notion of "mental representations" (Hampe (ed.) 2005). At the heart of such critiques is the dynamic, enactive nature of image schemata:

> [M]ost of the literature on image schemata implicitly assumes that these entities are encoded as explicit abstract mental representations in long-term memory [. . .] [whereas] image schemata are best understood as experiential gestalts which momentarily emerge from ongoing brain, body and world interactions. Image-schematic reasoning, such as that seen in linguistic

[23] For an inventory of basic image schemata as they have been identified by cognitive linguists, see Hampe 2005a, 2-3.

[24] Key texts in conceptual metaphor theory are Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Johnson 1989; Gibbs 1994; Lakoff and Johnson 1999. For a survey of the origins and history of metaphor theory, see Katz 1998. For recent overviews see Grady 2007 and Gibbs 2008. Much recent research and debate around image schemata has concerned their possible neural basis in neural simulation ("mirror neurons") (Dodge and Lakoff 2005; Gibbs 2005; Rohrer 2005).

> understanding, involves the embodied simulation of events, and is not simply a matter of activating pre-existing representational entities (Gibbs 2005, 115).

Image schemata, for Gibbs, thus have a "kinaesthetic feel" that is lacking in descriptions of them as fixed visual patterns. For Tim Rohrer, it is what we are calling here the "serial" character of schemata that is responsible for their power to generate inferences:

> The temporal character of image schemata creates the possibility of a normal pattern completion, which in turn serves as the felt basis for their inferential capacity. Image schemata are thus temporally dynamic in the sense that once they are triggered, we tend to complete the whole perceptual contour of the schema. (Rohrer 2005, 169)

Image schemata are thus to be conceived of as experiential rather than representational, as process rather than product. To transpose the words of Viktor Shklovsky that head this chapter, they are about "experiencing the process of becoming" rather than "that which has already become".

Even where the image schema appears to represent static relations, the *construal* of those relations is a dynamic process. Thus Robert B. Dewell has argued that "even static locational relations" such as CONTAINMENT "are structured as dynamic processes that incorporate image-schema transformations and scanning processes by a ceaselessly active conceptualizer":

> CONTAINMENT is analyzed as a merger of two basic experiential patterns, ENTRY and ENCLOSURE, and both patterns are grounded originally in the construal of motion events. The construal processes that originally accompany objective motion acquire schematic status of their own and come to characterise even timeless locational relations. (Dewell 2005, 369)

This notion of dynamic "construal" has been developed with reference to grammatical construction by Ronald Langacker. I turn now to his theory, because in addition to providing a vivid illustration of the dynamicity of language – its tendency, that is, to form itself around conceptual motions and gestures – it also suggests a

differentiation between two distinct qualities of such dynamic sequence: this differentiation will be further developed, and its wider application illustrated, in the following sub-section (2.3).

Where Chomsky's "generative grammar" had been based on a separation of semantics and syntax, Ronald Langacker sees grammatical constructions as carrying inherent meaning in the form of experiential images: grammatical units are "intrinsically symbolic" (Langacker 1991a, 16).[25] This symbolism is inherently dynamic:

> Cognitive grammar, defines the meaning of a complex expression as including not only the semantic structure that represents its composite sense, but also its 'compositional path': the hierarchy of semantic structures reflecting its progressive assembly from the meanings of its component expressions. (Langacker 1991a, 10)

Grammatical forms are thus not abstract algorithms but dynamic and "imagic" figures that encompass not only referential aspects of a scene but also particular construals of it. "When we use a particular construction or grammatical morpheme," according to Langacker, "we thereby select a particular image to structure the conceived situation for communicative purposes" (Langacker 1991a, 12).

Key to the notion of construal in Langacker's cognitive grammar is his dynamic reformulation of the Gestalt notions of *figure* and *ground* as *trajector* and *landmark*. The *trajector* is "the entity construed as being located, evaluated or described", while the landmark forms a "secondary focus":

> The lamp (*trajector*) is above the table (*landmark*).
>
> The table (*trajector*) is below the lamp (*landmark*). (Langacker 2008, 70-1)

[25] Principal presentations are to be found in Langacker 1987a and 1991a. Important later elaborations and summaries are Langacker 1991b and 2008.

The effect of switching trajector/landmark relations can be seen in the different construals (here within a temporal domain) provoked by the following sentences:

> The explosion took place after the opening ceremony.
> The opening ceremony took place before the explosion.

According to Langacker, the importance of word order in construal (whereby, to take the simplest example of such "iconicity", "She quit her job and got married" means something different from "She got married and quit her job") highlights the fact that "conceptualization is necessarily dynamic [. .] it emerges and develops through processing time" (Langacker 2005, 167).[26] The term that Langacker uses to capture the dynamism inherent in the construal of grammatical forms is "*scanning*". In a case such as "The balloon rose over the hill" the scanning involves actual movement, whereas in "The path rises steeply near the top" the motion of the scanning is "virtual" (the path is actually motionless) (Langacker 2005, 175).

In a famous chapter ("The Stream of Thought") in *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), William James discusses this experience of dynamism, of felt motion, in thought and language. "What strikes us first," he writes of the "stream of our consciousness", is that "[l]ike a bird's life, it seems to be made up of an alternation of flights and perchings." In language this is expressed in the grammatical rhythm of sentences. The points of rest, the "perchings", are images ("sensorial imaginations") which can be "held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing", while the "flights", the "transitive parts", are, while *felt*, harder to pin down and visualise (James 1950 [1890], 243):

[26] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make a similar point with reference to the sentence "John got out of bed and put on his shoes.": "This would normally be understood as indicating that John first got out of bed and then put on his shoes, not the reverse. In such sentences, the order of the clauses indicates the order of the actions" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 465). This subject of the iconicity of sequencing had previously been explored by Charles Peirce (see the discussion in Ungerer and Schmid 1996, 250-1).

> The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing but *signs of direction* in thought, of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever [. . .] These bare images of logical movement [. .] are psychic transitions, always on the wing, so to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in flight. Their function is to lead from one set of images to another. (James 1950 [1890], 252-3)

Mark Johnson, expanding on James' description, has emphasised the "felt experience" of thinking engendered by its different senses of "forward motion":

> Thinking moves in a direction, *from* one thought *to* another, and we have corresponding feelings of how this movement is going: we feel the halt to our thinking, we feel the tension as we entertain possible ways to *go on* thinking, and we feel the consummation when a line of thought runs its course to a satisfactory conclusion. Such are the aesthetic dimensions of our thinking. (Johnson 2007, 97)

For Johnson, then, it is *movement* that is the key to thought and language – and not simply as an objectively described (third-person) motion through an idealised Euclidean space, but as different qualities of felt (first-person) movement, recruiting all our kinaesthetic and proprioceptive senses.[27] He also draws on the research of Daniel Stern (1985) into the importance for infant development (including the acquisition of language) of "vitality affects" (cross-modal patterns, rhythms and contours) that are entrained through interactions with carers.[28]

[27] Johnson draws on the work of phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011 [1999]), who distinguishes between four "primary qualitative structures or parameters of bodily movement: Tension, Linearity, Amplitude and Projection" (Johnson 2007, 21-4).

[28] "[T]he emotional salience of vitality-affect contours in image schemata shows that image schemata are not mere static 'representations' (or 'snapshots') of one moment in a topographic neural map. Instead, image schemata operate dynamically in and through time" (Johnson 2007, 144). Stern's "vitality affects" and are congruent with developmental psychologist Colwyn Trevarthen's concepts of "musicality" and the "Intrinsic Motive Pulse" (Trevarthen 1999). See Walsh 2011 for a review of Trevarthen's research and its significance for music and narrative.

In Langacker's account of the felt movement, the "scanning", engendered by grammatical form, he draws particular attention to the distinction between two principal forms that it can take:

There is a bridge across the river.

A hiker waded across the river.

In the first case, the bridge simultaneously occupies all the points on a path leading from one bank of the river to the other. "The component states," as Langacker writes, "are activated successively but cumulatively (i.e. once activated they remain active throughout), so that eventually they are all coactivated as a simultaneously accessible whole." This cumulative dynamic, by which the components, once activated, remain current, in active relation with the cumulating whole, Langacker calls "*summary scanning*".

In the second case, by contrast, *across* has been subsumed to a verb, a process. This construction invites a "*sequential scanning*", in which "[t]he successive states of the conceived event are activated serially and more or less instantaneously, so that activation of one state begins to decline as that of its successor is initiated." Thus Langacker attributes the semantic difference between *across* in the two sentences not to the "intrinsic content" of the two sentences, but rather to the "mode of scanning employed in their activation" (Langacker 1991a, 22).[29] The two modes of dynamically perceiving a sequence are, on the one hand, to construe it as a segmented succession, or, on the other hand, to construe it as a cumulated whole. In the following sub-section I review the operation of this differentiation between two

[29] On "summary" and "sequential" scanning, see also Langacker 1987a 101-9, 144-6, 209-13; Langacker 1987b, 70-5. For an overview, see Ungerer and Schmid (1996) pp.192-4.

ways of perceiving series across a number of domains, beginning with its manifestation in the experience of music.

2.3 Successive and Holistic Series in Music and Narrative

In 1973, at the height of general interest in Noam Chomsky's linguistic theories, conductor Leonard Bernstein suggested in the Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard that the model of Chomsky's "generative grammar" could be applied to music: as with understanding spoken language, the mental processes involved in the perception and understanding of music could be seen as consisting of the progressive organization of raw sound through a hierarchy of "levels of representation" (Bernstein 1976). The idea that beneath the "surface structure" of music (its particular presentation of pitches, durations, timbres etc) there lie deeper levels of organization (particularly in terms of large scale harmonic movements relative to a tonal centre), is one that has a long history in musical analysis. Musicians had long recognised the importance of relating the musical surface to underlying structures - it is only by doing so that, for example, Bach's *Goldberg Variations* can be heard precisely as variations rather than thirty-one separate pieces. In order to do so, the listener must make discriminations as to the relative importance of particular pitches and intervals as s/he listens, arranging them into a hierarchy. The highly influential musicologist Heinrich Schenker (1868-1935) proposed that this structure, which assigns importance to pitch events relative to a hierarchy, was a universal quality of tonal music. [30]

[30] For a brief introduction to Schenkerian analysis and its points of similarity to Chomskyan linguistics, see Sloboda 1985, 11-17.

Inspired in part by Leonard Bernstein's suggestion, in *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (1983) musicologist Fred Lehrdahl and cognitive psychologist Ray Jackendoff identified two parallel "reductions" in the cognition of tonal music.[31] In the first place, the listener segments the music according to its organization into a hierarchy both of motifs, phrases etc ("grouping structures")[32] and of weak and strong metrical beats ("metrical structures"). This first type of reduction Lerdahl and Jackendoff call the *time-span reduction*. "The listener," they write, "attempts to organize all the pitch-events of a piece into a single coherent structure, such that they are heard in a hierarchy of relative importance" (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 106). The hierarchy or "reduction" can be schematised by the kind of tree diagram familiar from Chomskyean generative linguistics. Figure 1 shows a time span reduction for the opening four bars of the slow movement of a Mozart piano sonata. The grouping and metrical structures – which carry out the fundamental segmentation of the musical surface, and on which the time-span reduction is ultimately based – are shown by, respectively, the square brackets above and the dot notation (more dots representing greater metrical stress) below the staves:

[31] For a recent overview of the influence of Lerdahl and Jackendoff's theory, see Imberty, 2011.
[32] "[W]hen hearing a piece of music, the listener naturally organizes the sound signal into units such as motives, themes, phrases, periods, theme-groups, sections, and the piece itself" (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 12).



Figure 1

But in addition to the time span reduction, Lerdahl and Jackendoff propose a second form of reduction, which they call the *prolongational reduction*. In the case of the time-span reduction, the selection of significant events in the musical surface is constrained by the local segmentation established by the grouping and metrical structures. The prolongational reduction, by contrast, is based on the intuition that this segmentation of the musical surface that forms the basis of the time-span reduction (derived from the grouping and metrical structures) is unable to account fully for the larger scale harmonic movements of tonal music. These harmonic movements relative to the "gravitational" pull of the tonic (the "home key") cut across the structures on which the time-span reduction are based: they are "prolonged" through these groupings and segmentations.

Where the time-span reduction is a static structure governed by the relative importance of events within segmentations and domains built up recursively from the bottom up, the prolongational reduction "places pitches in a dynamic

relationship" according to their role in large-scale harmonic movements relative to the tonic (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 284). These relations are characteristically felt as patterns of tension and release. As was the case with the time-span reduction, the prolongational reduction is recursive: large-scale waves of tension and release (the movement away from and back to the tonic over a symphonic movement, for example) incorporate more local contours of tension and release. And as with the time-span reduction, the recursive structure of the prolongational reduction is expressed by Lerdahl and Jackendoff in the form of a tree diagram.



Figure 2

In Figure 2a, event *y* represents a movement away from an event *x* where *x* is more harmonically "consonant". This increase in "dissonance" is felt as an increase in tension ("t"). In Figure 2 b, by contrast, the movement from relatively more dissonant *x* to more consonant *y* is felt as a relaxation ("r") (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 191).[33] As these tree-diagrams for prolongational reductions are built up, they can reveal characteristic patterns of tension and relaxation:

[33] This is a simplified version of Lerdahl and Jackendoff's construction of tree diagrams for prolongational reductions. In fact there are different forms of "prolongation" corresponding to different relationships between particular kinds of pitch-event and underlying harmony, but these technical details are irrelevant to the present broad characterization of the differences between the two main forms of reduction.



Figure 3

According to Lerdahl and Jackendoff, in Western tonal music the pattern represented by Figure 3d is typical at all levels: "a tonal phrase or piece almost always begins in relative repose, builds toward tension, and relaxes into a resolving cadence. This is the most essential way in which the idiom achieves the aesthetic effects of balance and closure. ([Figures 5a, 5b and 5c)] would all give an 'open-ended' effect)" (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 198).

How does this model of two concurrent modes of perceiving tonal music relate to the experience (specifically, the diachronic, "horizontal" experience) of reading narrative fiction? One starting-point for answering that question is to be found near the beginning of Roland Barthes' *S/Z*, in the section from which I quoted in the Introduction with reference to the "concurrence" of codes in the text: here we find some elliptical but suggestive remarks concerning the relation between narrative and music. He presents his "codes" of narrative ("Proairetic", "Hermeneutic, "Semic", "Cultural" and "Symbolic") in tabular form, as the "full score" of a piece of music. He then comments:

> We can attribute to two lines of the polyphonic table (the hermeneutic and the proairetic) the same tonal determination that melody and harmony have in classical music: the readerly text is a *tonal* text (for which habit creates a reading process just as conditioned as our hearing: one might say there is a *reading eye* as there is a tonal ear, so that to unlearn the readerly would be the same as to unlearn the tonal), and its tonal unity is basically dependent on two sequential codes: the revelation of truth and the coordination of the actions represented: there is the same constraint in the gradual order of melody and in the equally gradual order of the narrative sequence [. . .] [O]f the five codes, only three establish permutable, reversible connections, outside the constraint of time (the semic, cultural, and symbolic codes); the other two impose their terms according to an irreversible order (the hermeneutic and proairetic codes). (Barthes 1974 [1970], 30)

The vague references to "melody" and "harmony" can be discounted. But if one substitutes for them the concept from Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff of two distinct modes of perceiving the series, the segmented ("time-span") and the holistic/continuous ("prolongational"), then the beginnings of an analogy begin to emerge, with the "proairetic code" (the code of actions) being analogous to the segmented, "time-span" reduction in the musical model, and the "hermeneutic code" (the code of interpretation "by which an enigma can be distinguished, suggested, formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed" (19)) as analogous to the continuous, "prolongational" movement by which tonal music is pulled towards its tonic.

But this is only the beginnings of an analogy. To take it further, one can look to the work on narrative dynamics of Meir Sternberg (whose name we have already cited as a member of the "Tel Aviv school"), and its extension by Raphaël Baroni.[34]

[34] Barthes is of no further help to us: enchanted by the poetic possibilities of the analogy, he surrounds his suggestive insight with a haze of impressionism ("What sings, what flows smoothly, what moves by [. . .] controlled ritardandos through an intelligible progression (like the melody often given the woodwinds) is the series of enigmas, their suspended disclosure [. . .] [W]hat sustains, [. . .] brings everything together, like the strings, are the proairetic sequences, the series of actions, the cadence of familiar gestures" (29)).

Through them we can see, in much richer detail, the concurrent presence in narrative fiction of those two potential qualities of the series – the segmented-successive and the continuous-holistic – that we have seen in the experience of music. Sternberg's theory of narrative dynamics has its roots in Aristotle, who defined tragedy (which he took to be the paradigm of narrative) as an imitation of action, but of a particular kind: it is "an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude" (Aristotle 1941, 1462). As a "whole" (*holos*), it has its own duration, it has a "beginning, middle, and end" (1462). It is thus to be distinguished from a mere chronicle (1465-6). In "complex" plots such as *Oedipus Rex*, however, the presentation of the action is not simple and direct: the causal, action-based chrono-logic of the "whole" is perturbed by a second kind of ordering which introduces "discoveries", as when Oedipus discovers the secret of his birth (1465).

This emplotment is based on a different kind of teleology – a poetic one. As Meir Sternberg notes, Aristotle's distinction between "whole" (*holos*) and "plot" (*mythos*) involves

> two forces or faces of teleo-logic: the one lifelike (e.g., the advance from the hero's character as cause to his misfortune or surprise as effect); the other born of art and going in reverse (the work's need for tragic misfortune or surprise effect to "cause" the hero's character, i.e., leading the tragedian to invest him with such features as will generate the needed action or reaction in the guise of human probability). (Sternberg 1992, 508)

One logic, the logic of action, proceeds from the beginning by an immanent process of causality. The other logic, the other form of teleology, configures events in a different way, so that the beginning is determined by the end, the text by the contexture. The unresolvable tension between the two forms of teleology – whereby the one cannot be reduced to or derived directly from the other – forms the focus of

Jonathan Culler's argument that the narratological categories of story and discourse may not be compatible:[35]

> [E]ither the discourse is seen as a representation of events which must be thought of as independent of that particular representation, or else the so-called events are thought of as the postulates or products of a discourse [. . .] (Culler 1981, 186)

Culler concludes that "[i]n the absence of the possibility of synthesis, one must be willing to shift from one perspective to the other, from story to discourse and back again" (108).

It is precisely this shifting from the one perspective to the other – from one kind of teleology, one kind of series, to another – that, for Sternberg, forms the basis of narrativity:

> What distinguishes narrative effects as such from all others is less their play over time than their interplay between times. For it is the interplay of the represented and the presented dynamics, whether in "iconic" concordance or pattern. (Sternberg 1992, 519)

This distinction between what he calls "mimetic" and "artistic" teleology forms the basis of the three "master functions" in Sternberg's account of narrative dynamics: *Surprise*, *Curiosity* and *Suspense*.[36] "Surprise" (as in Oedipus' discovery of his parentage) and "Curiosity" are based on de-alignments of the two series. In "Surprise", the reader/audience (perhaps through a protagonist, as in the Oedipus example) becomes aware, through its sudden filling-in, of a previous gap in his knowledge (i.e. a previous lack of alignment between, on the one hand, the action

[35] Sternberg notes "the affinity of the Aristotelian 'whole'-versus-'plot' dichotomy to later pairings: the Renaissance opposition of the 'natural' to the 'artificial' or 'poetic' order; the Russian Formalist Fabula/Sjuzet opposition, with its assorted Structuralist offspring, such as Tzvetan Todorov's histoire/discours and Genette's histoire/recit" (Sternberg 1992, 479).

[36] In his extension of Sternberg's account of narrative dynamics – which, among other refinements, places it within a cognitive framework – Raphaël Baroni brings Curiosity and Suspense together under the general rubric of "narrative tension". Narrative "tension" – in both its "Curiosity" or "Suspense" manifestations – is based, according to Baroni, on a "*reticence*" of narrative, a holding-back that operates against the grasping of the whole (Baroni 2007).

series of the represented world and, on the other, the series of its presentation). With "Curiosity" the converse is the case: here the reader is aware of a mismatch and searches for an explanation that will retroactively fill the "gap" by bringing the two series into alignment. In both these cases, the orientation of the reader is retrospective. In the case of "Suspense", by contrast, the effect of tension is produced by the reader's prospectively awaiting the outcome of a series that has been initiated but not completed. Here there is no necessary de-alignment of the narrating and narrated, as there is with the effects of curiosity and surprise:

> To direct (misdirect, redirect) notice to the narrative past, already complete at the moment of narration, you must gap and deform it out of time sequence. But to achieve the same with regard to the narrative future – its expanses still open or veiled by every (ontological/epistemological) definition, its secrets remote if born at all, its conflicts yet to sort themselves out – nothing need be done beyond following developments in their proper sequence. Here the play between times, unique to all three narrative interests, requires no more than the built-in discrepancy between what has happened to the best of our knowledge and what will or may happen in the still-dark sequel. (Sternberg 1992, 527)[37]

Raphaël Baroni makes the important observation that suspense is characteristically marked by an orientation of the narrative towards the perspective of the protagonist (Baroni 2007, 270-2):[38] it is from the perspective of the actor that the action or course of actions is seen as a whole, the whole being intended in the course of actions from its very inception.[39]

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[37] In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari discuss the distinction between the "novella" and the "tale" (Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1980], 212-28): "It is not difficult to determine the essence of the 'novella' as a literary genre: Everything is organized around the question, 'What happened? What could have happened?' The tale is the opposite of the novella, because it is an altogether different question that the reader asks with bated breath: What is going to happen. Something is always going to happen, come to pass" (212-3).

[38] See also the analyses by Vera Tobin and Todd Oakley of how joint attentional perspective is manipulated in film and narrative fiction to generate narrative tension (suspense/surprise) (Tobin 2008, 105-113; Tobin 2009; Oakley and Tobin 2012).

[39] Marc Jeannerod (2007) has pointed out that a key feature of the "action representations" that make up "motor" schemata, as opposed to "perceptual" representations, is that the former are anticipatory and prescriptive rather than merely descriptive (Jeannerod 2007, 1-2): they "include the goal and the

Where one series configures the whole as the completion by a process of aggregation (the action is accomplished . . .) of what was initiated by the beginning, the other configures the whole by a circular gesture of gathering the beginning up with the end in a contexture (the beginning "prefigures" the end). Compare how Paul Ricoeur, in his essay "Narrative Time", explicates "the recollection of the story governed as a whole by its way of ending":

> By reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end, we learn also to read time itself backward, as the recapitulating of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences. (Ricoeur 1981, 176)

Ricoeur's starting point is Heidegger's distinction between, on the one hand, the "Within-time-ness" of "preoccupation" (the time of "having time to", of "taking time to", of "wasting time"), and on the other hand, cosmological or linear time, the time of the clock. The former, Ricoeur suggests, is of cardinal importance in narrative: "Following a story [. .] is understanding the successive actions, thoughts and feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness [. . .] The art of storytelling is not so much a way of reflecting on time as a way of taking it for granted" (Ricoeur 1981, 170). But on the other hand: "There is no story if our attention is not moved along by a thousand contingencies. This is why a story has to be followed to its conclusion" (170). This disjunction leads him to the distinction between "sequence" and "pattern" in narrative:

> [E]very narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one chronological and the other nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension, which characterizes the story as made out of events. The

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means of a potential action" (115). Thus in the execution of smooth physical action such as grasping a coffee cup, a projection of the entire sequence is contained in its inauguration (the shape and rate of widening of the aperture created by the fingers, for example, or the vectoral path of the hand). Jeannerod quotes Nicholas Bernstein, one of the early proponents of the concept of "motor schemata", for whom representation of an action must contain, "like an embryo in an egg or a track on a gramophone record, the entire scheme of the movement as it is expanded in time. It must also guarantee the order and the rhythm of the realization of this scheme [. . .]" (quoted in Jeannerod 2007, 11).

> second is the configurational dimension, according to which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events. (174)[40]

Where, in the "episodic" dimension of narrative time, "the 'then' and 'and then' structure that provides an answer to the question 'What next?' suggests a relation of exteriority between the phases of the action", the configurational dimension "makes the succession of events into significant wholes that are the correlate of the act of grouping together" (175).

This basic configuration – this "dynamic gestalt", as one might call it – that sets series of segmentation and holistic grouping in oscillation with one another, can be seen, too, in Yuri Lotman's account of the "re-coding" that he sees as being intrinsic both to artistic texts (in which category he includes visual as well as verbal "texts") and to human cultures as wholes. In *Universe of the Mind* Lotman states that "[a] minimal thinking apparatus must include at least two differently constructed systems to exchange the information they each have worked out" (Lotman 2001, 36). These systems, these "consciousnesses", operate both at the level of individuals and of culture. The first of these systems is a "discrete form of coding" that produces "texts which come together like linear chains of linked segments":

> In this system the basic bearer of meaning is the segment (= the sign), while the chain of segments (= the text) is secondary, its meaning being derived from the meaning of the signs. (36)

In the second system, by contrast, the text "is not discrete but continuous": "Its meaning is organized neither in a linear nor in a temporal sequence, but is 'washed

[40] "[T]he act of emplotment combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, one chronological and the other not. The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which the plot transforms the events into a story. This configurational act consists of 'grasping together' the detailed actions of what I have called the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events that unity of one temporal whole" (Ricoeur 1984, 66). In Volume Two of *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur writes of "the competition between the sequential and the configurational dimensions of narrative – a competition which makes of narrative a successive whole or whole succession" (Ricoeur 1985, 47).

over' the n-dimensional semantic space of the given text" (36). There is a constant exchange of texts and message between the two systems, but this exchange cannot take the form of a direct translation, as in translation between two natural languages, where mutually equivalent relationships have been established between the units of the two systems. Between discrete and continuous systems there can only be "approximate equivalences determined by the cultural-psychological and semiotic context common to both systems". Yet this form of "illegitimate" translation is "one of the most important features of creating thinking [. . .] provok[ing] new semantic connections and giv[ing] rise to texts that are in principle new ones" (37). The prime example of such interchange between "discrete" and "continuous" systems, for Lotman, is that involved in tropes (metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche) (37-44).

I began this chapter with a brief history of the concept of the systematicity of the literary text as it emerges in Russian Formalism and Czech structuralism. We have seen that the key innovation of Czech structuralism – closely linked to its turn to semiotics – is its functionalism: language, like any system of signs, is a *tool* or *instrument* that can be used in different ways. Bühler had identified three distinct such ways within the context of language in its communicative function. But to this communicative function the Czech Structuralists added another, parallel function: the aesthetic. In this function, the sign detaches itself to some extent from immediate pragmatic and communicative contexts and reflects on itself, thereby deautomatizing and bringing to awareness the previously automatized relation of sign and referent. This function of language, the Czech Structuralists pointed out, is far from being a "luxury" or optional extra as far as the development of language is concerned: rather, it is vital to the development of new concepts.

I have spoken of "functionalism" in relation to Czech Structuralism, but it would be more accurate to speak specifically of *polyfunctionality*: language – like physical objects, tools – can simultaneously serve more than one function, depending on how it is viewed. The distinction between communicative and aesthetic functions is not an absolute or mutually exclusive one, nor does it coincide neatly with that between "artistic" and "non-artistic" phenomena: the aesthetic function – the turning of attention to the act of signification itself – is present even in ordinary discourse whose primary purpose is communicative (as, for example, when the speaker momentarily relishes a turn of phrase).[41] Conversely, the text whose dominant function is aesthetic (a narrative fiction, for example) will contain – subsumed within that aesthetic function – many instances of the communicative function (e.g. the language of "narrators"). Function, then, does not inhere exclusively in the properties of the object, but depends on the perspective that is brought to the object (is the barber's basin a helmet?).[42] Polyfunctionality is thus closely linked to the varied forms of attention that can be brought to objects or to language, and thus to the kind of structures of joint attention that I described in Chapter One.

Functions, as we have seen, have a sequential, dynamic aspect, since a particular function implies a particular series of coordinated movements and actions: insofar as an object such as a hammer is perceived as serving a particular function, it is because it offers affordances for particular sequences of grasping, gripping and wielding, for particular "motor schemata". Polyfunctionality thus implies a multi-linearity whereby different kinds of *series*, corresponding to different functions, are

[41] Bühler, within the context of his theory of practical, communicative language, writes of what he calls *Funktionslust*: in his book on child development he characterises it as the pleasure taken in "[t]he activity as such, the appropriate, smooth, unimpeded functioning of the bodily organs without regard to any result that the activity could bring about" (quoted in Bühler 1990 [1934], 488).
[42] In Chapter One we saw how in the *Decameron* tales hinge on the same words simultaneously meaning different things to different people.

simultaneously available. Language, too, in so far as it is viewed as a *tool* in practical, communicative situations, implies different forms of what Perry calls "temporal ordering" (what I am terming "series"). In practical, communicative language these series can take many forms, corresponding to the many ways in which, to use Bühler's trichotomy, language has been used to represent, express or influence reality. As Perry demonstrates, such "model-orientated" series are a vital part of the comprehension of narrative fiction.

But narrative fiction, as he makes clear, also generates motivations for configuring series that are motivated not by orientation toward practical "models", but by orientation to the reader's very act of configuration. Sternberg's and Baroni's explications of these "reader-orientated" configurations organise them into two basic types: *curiosity* and *suspense*. In both cases, the configuration is both towards the reader (and hence, following Mukařovský, to the *whole* of the reader's experience) and towards the reader's experience of the narrative *as a (cumulative) whole*, as a contexture. In the case of curiosity, the orientation towards the whole takes the form of the projection of the reader "forward" into a situation in which the dissonant features of the narrative as it is being experienced can be configured, retrospectively, as a harmonious whole. In the case of suspense, the reader projects forward towards the completion of an action with which s/he identifies, but whose outcome is uncertain. These "reader-orientated" configurations represent, in the terms we have drawn from Czech structuralism, the aesthetic function as applied to the perception of series.

The model of the dynamic systematicity of language that emerges from the foregoing is one of model-oriented series (practical, communicative) traversed by reader-oriented series (aesthetic). The two kinds of series are concurrent and

simultaneous (the relationship, in other words, is non-linear), because they pertain not to an inherent quality of the words themselves, but to the kinds of attention that are brought to them (just as, in a piece of music, a particular note may belong, simultaneously, to more than one series (harmonic, rhythmic, melodic etc)).

3. Narrative Contextures

In this section I take the modern short story as an example of a narrative mode in which, through temporal compression, the *contexture* described above – a dynamic system of interacting simultaneous series – is brought into relief and highlighted.[43] In subsection 3.1, having briefly surveyed the history of thinking about the modern short story as "imagistic" or "ekphrastic", I focus on photography as an analogy for the temporally compressed and imagistic quality of the short story. In this connection I invoke a perspective on the semiotics of the photograph that supports the notion of a dynamic systematicity consisting in the "vertical" coincidence of multiple temporalities. In subsection 3.2 I illustrate this model with a reading of H.P. Lovecraft's short story "The Picture in the House".

3.1 Photographic Narrative: Ekphrasis and the Short Story

In his famous review of Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Twice-Told Tales*, Poe defines the short story as first and foremost a narrative that can be read at one sitting ("requiring from a half-hour to one or two hours for its perusal") (Poe 1994, 61). It is

[43] In the Conclusion to the thesis I indicate how the model of Contexture I have proposed here can begin to be applied to wider fields of narrative.

this unity of impression, according to Poe, that distinguishes the short story from the novel – which by contrast, because of the inevitably episodic, fragmented nature of its reading, is denied "the immense force derivable from *totality*" (61).[44] From the perspective of the writer of the short story, he begins with "a certain unique or single *effect* to be wrought out", and then invents incidents and events whose combination

> may best aid him in establishing this preconceived effect [. . .] In the whole composition there should be no word written, of which the tendency, direct or indirect, is not to be the one preestablished design. And by such means, with such care and skill, a picture is at length painted which leaves in the mind of him who contemplates it with a kindred art, a sense of the fullest satisfaction. (61)

Poe's identification of the short story with "unity of impression" is reiterated at the beginning of the twentieth century by Brander Matthews (1901) and by the Russian Formalist Boris Eichenbaum, for whom the short story "amasses its whole weight *toward the ending*. Like a bomb dropped from an airplane, it must speed downwards so as to strike with its war-head full-force on the target" (Eichenbaum 1925, 81).

Poe was influenced in his theory and practice of the short story by the German Romantics – who, beginning with Goethe's *Conversations of German Refugees* (1795), revived the idea of the Boccaccian collection of novellas.[45] Paul Heyse, in his so-called *Falkentheorie*, asserted the need for a novella to be based around a central "motif" or symbol (Good 1994, 155).[46] In Ludwig Tieck's "The Runenberg" (1797), to take a striking example, the story revolves around the hero's

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[44] For radically opposed contemporary views on the question of whether the short story is a distinct form, compare Pratt 1994 and May 1994a: Pratt regards the short story as a fragmentary (and inferior) derivative of the novel, whereas May regards the short story as embodying a "mode of knowledge" that is distinct from (and aesthetically superior to) that embodied in the novel. For reviews of the debate about the difference between novel and short story see Pasco 1994.

[45] The influence of Boccaccio is made explicit in Friedrich Schlegel's *Essay on the Poetical Works of Giovanni Boccaccio* (1811).

[46] The "falcon" reference is to the Ninth Tale of the Fifth Day of the *Decameron*, in which a pet falcon is the hinge on which the story turns.

discovering, in the mountain of the title, a mysterious stone tablet inlaid with jewels in "a strange, inscrutable pattern of lines" which wakens in him "[a] vision of harmony and of beautiful figures, of ecstasies and longings": "He felt a completely different person" (Tieck 1797, 41). In Poe, too, the visual motif is central to many of his most famous tales of horror – the old man's eye in "The Tell-Tale Heart" (Poe 1843); the description of the exterior of the building, with its "vacant, eye-like windows" (Poe 1839, 62), that opens and closes "The Fall of the House of Usher".

The subsequent development of the short story can be characterised in terms of an increasing concentration on the instantaneous visual impression of the motif at the expense of its role (in the tradition of Boccaccio) as a plot-device. Suzanne C. Ferguson (1994) has argued that the modern short story (she is referring to the period from the late nineteenth century onwards) represents not so much a radically different genre, compared with the contemporaneous post-Flaubert novel, as an intensification of a trend to be found in both long and short forms towards "impressionism". She ascribes seven principal features to "impressionism":

> (1) limitation and foregrounding of point of view, (2) emphasis on presentation of sensation and inner experience, (3) the deletion or transformation of several elements of the traditional plot, (4) increasing reliance on metaphor and metonymy in the presentation of events and existents, (5) rejection of chronological time ordering, (6) formal and stylistic economy, and (7) the foregrounding of style. (Ferguson 1994, 219)

The deletion of traditional elements of "plot" creates unexpected, contingent juxtapositions and relations, or invites the reader to fill in for him/herself the chains of narrative causality that could have led to the presented crisis. These "elliptical" or "metaphoric" plots

> affirm Joseph Frank's conception of a spatially rather than temporally organized form in modern fiction. In focussing on the crisis of a hypothetical

> narrative, or in representing that narrative only in figures or analogues, such plots devaluate temporal sequence and the chain of cause and effect. The deemphasis of the orderly unfolding of an action is closely related to the emergence of "epiphany" as an ordering device. The notion of single "moments" of experience as determiners of the quality of a whole life [. .] has become characteristic of modern fiction both as an item of belief and as a structural principle. (Ferguson 1994, 225)

According to this perspective, the short story acquires through its compression a relation to the temporal order that challenges Lessing's absolute distinction between the *temporal* arts such as narrative, and the *spatial* arts such as painting and sculpture (Lessing 1984 [1766]): narrative becomes not so much the laying out of a linear line of events as a form of ekphrasis whereby by the narrativity of a single instant, a single impression, is released.

There is nothing new or controversial in such views, which have been echoed by many practitioners. Nadine Gordimer has said of short story writers that "theirs is the art of the only thing one can be sure of – the present moment . . . A discrete moment of truth is aimed at – not *the* moment of truth, because the short story doesn't deal in cumulatives" (quoted in May 1994b, 208). I quote Julio Cortázar's formulation of the same idea at length because it suggest a way of thinking about the short story's compression and imagistic quality that will lead us back to the concept of contexture that I have been developing in this chapter:

> I don't know if you have ever heard a professional photographer talk about his art; I have always been surprised by the fact that, in many cases, they talk much as a short-story writer might. Photographers like Cartier-Bresson or Brassai define their art as an apparent paradox: that of cutting off a fragment of reality, giving it certain limits, but in such a way that this segment acts like an explosion which fully opens a much more ample reality, like a dynamic vision which spiritually transcends the space reached by the camera. While in films, as in the novel, a more ample and multifaceted reality is captured through the development of partial and accumulative elements, which do not exclude, of course, a synthesis which will give a climax to the whole work. A

> high quality photograph or story proceeds inversely; that is, the photographer or short story writer finds himself obliged to choose and delimit an image or an event which [. .] is capable of acting on the viewer or the reader as a kind of opening, an impetus which projects the intelligence and the sensibility toward something which goes well beyond the visual or literary anecdote contained in the photograph or story. (Cortázar 1994, 246-7)[47]

The most suggestive phrases in this passage are the references to the photograph or story as a "dynamic vision", an "explosion" that opens up – though not, somehow, through a process that is primarily linear – "a more ample reality". But how can a "vision" become something "dynamic", something that can "explode"?

Clive Scott, in *Street Photography: From Atget to Cartier-Bresson* (2007) gives a suggestive answer to that question. He argues that the photograph, as it becomes detached in time from the original circumstances of its creation, ceases to be a "slice of time" that could hypothetically be reinserted into the continuum from which it was taken. Instead, it becomes what he calls an "instant", which is "not a slice of some other temporality, outside it, but a momentary gathering together of its own spatiality and temporality" (Scott 2007, 46). Scott's characterization of the photograph's "gathering together of its own spatiality and temporality" suggests how one might start to think of the photograph – and, to pursue the analogy taken from Cortázar, the short story – as a *contexture*. For Scott identifies as the key feature of the "instant" of the photograph that it "immobilises not only the totality of space but also the totality, not of time, but of available temporalities" (46): "[t]he instant of the [. .] photograph is the moment of the coincidence of different durations" (47).

[47] The rich and complex (but relatively under-explored) question of the relation between photography and literature (and in particular the short story) lies beyond the scope of this thesis. For general surveys see Brunet 2007 and Rabb 1995. Rabb 1998 is a critical anthology of short stories that take photography as an explicit theme. The incorporation of photography into narrative fiction will be discussed below, in Chapter Three subsection 3.2.

Figure Four

Every photograph "has a slight tendency to become a photogram (film still), to extend into a temporal rather than a spatial blind field" (199), but this "extension" takes a particular, multiple form: not the continuum of a single line of "time", but the efflorescence, within the contexture (the "gathering together") of the photograph, of a palimpsest of temporalities. Scott takes the example of André Kertész's *Steps of Montmartre* (1925-27) (Figure 4). Here, he argues, the power and poignancy of the photograph lies not just in its "composition", but in the coincidence and concurrence of different "times" represented by the shadows (the cyclical passage of night and day) and by the objects and people in the photograph:

> [T]he railings are moving faster through existence than the trees, whose cyclical time is also more resilient than the linear time of the human figures; the male figure sitting at the base of the lamp post borrows some of the lamp post's immutability, while the walking woman is peculiarly alone in her transience. (46)

Through isolating them in the contexture of an "instant", a photograph thus brings to consciousness the simultaneous multiplicity of temporalities and velocities in the world – velocities not just of spatial movement, but of temporal existence (stability, mutability, perishability).[48]

If we map Scott's analysis back on to Cortázar's account of the analogy between the photograph and the short story, we can begin to see a way of unpacking Cortázar's reference to the "dynamic vision", the "explosion", of the short story: through its temporal compression (Eichenbaum's bomb hitting its target), its striving towards an elimination of linearity (towards a concentration on the image, the instantaneous impression), the short story intensifies the awareness of a multidimensional universe of temporalities contained in the instant (an awareness that may be "flattened out" by the linearity of longer forms). The "explosion" of the short story into a "more ample reality" is a "vertical", non-linear explosion, the instantaneous creation of a vertiginous space of simultaneous durations and velocities.

3.2 The Short Story as Explosion of Temporalities: H.P Lovecraft's "The Picture in the House"

H.P. Lovecraft was a follower (and occasional parodist) of Poe, and his short story "The Picture in the House" (1921) (Lovecraft 1999 [1921]) reads as a text-book example of Poe's theory of the short story's "unity of effect", its directedness towards its denouement.[49] (The end, indeed, reads as a literalization of Eichenbaum's

[48] "A closed book is 'slower', more 'durable', than an open one, a knife set perpendicularly top the table-edge more stable, 'slower' than one set diagonally; a chair is slower than a fruit, a building than a cloud" (46).
[49] See the Appendix for a full text of the story.

metaphor of the story as a missile exploding onto its target.) "The Picture in the House" is typical of Lovecraft's many horror stories: I choose it here because it provides a particularly striking example of a story shaped by lines of interpretative, conceptual and physical motion. (An added attraction of this particular story for my purposes is that many of these series are shaped here by the joint attentional dynamics that were discussed in Chapter One.) These series interact with one another, subsuming or activating one other in the same way that, in music, a harmonic series can be repeated to a different rhythm, or a rhythmic series take on a different harmonic colouring.

More specifically, I will refer in the following discussion to two kinds of series corresponding to the "reader-oriented" and "model-oriented series" described in Section 2.3, above. I use the term *linear series* to refer to the former, to the series motivated by the reader's configuration of the whole – the series of *curiosity*, *surprise* and *suspense*. I use the term *non-linear series* to refer to the "model-oriented" series derived from schemata and other extra-textual temporal and dynamic orderings. Though this term is perhaps at first confusing (are all series not in some sense "linear"?) it has the advantage of highlighting two important features of such series in narrative. In the first place it highlights the fact that the originary motivation for the presence of such series is to do with selection rather than with linear combination (in Jakobson's terms, they are paradigmatic rather than syntagmatic): as in non-linear film editing, they are constituted by extraction from a "vertical", virtual array rather than by (re)arrangement of the linear, "horizontal" array. And secondly, it highlights the fact that, in the accumulating contexture of the story, the growing multiplicity of these model-oriented series constitutes a non-linear array of potentialities that is activated and transformed by the linearity of the text.

Combining the two kinds of series, one can say that the model being offered here is one of a virtual, non-linear space (a "state-space", to use the language of dynamic systems theory) constituted by the accumulating array of *non-linear series*: this state-space is traversed by the *linear series*, and in so doing the linear series activate the non-linear series in different ways, binding them through various transformations into the story's contexture.

The narrator of "The Picture in the House" describes how, while cycling through the backwoods of New England in November 1896, he gets caught in a rainstorm and takes shelter in a remote wooden farmhouse. Receiving no reply to his knocking, he goes in and, looking around the bare and archaically furnished sitting room, finds lying on the table a sixteenth-century illustrated book on the Congo. The book falls open at a plate illustrating "in gruesome detail a butcher's shop of the cannibal Anziques" (Lovecraft 1999 [1921], 37). A few moments later he hears footsteps in the room overhead. The footsteps descend the staircase, and an old man appears in the doorway. He is of striking appearance – six foot tall, powerfully built, with a face that seemed "abnormally ruddy and less wrinkled than one might expect" (38). The old man, speaking in a dialect that the narrator had thought long extinct, invites him to sit down, and after some conversation the narrator asks him about the old book. The old man talks volubly as they look at it together, describing how it had been traded to him by a former merchantman captain. In passing he mentions various local people – schoolmasters and the like – who have disappeared or died suddenly over the years. He turns to the illustration of the cannibal butcher's shop, describing it as something to "make yer blood tickle" (40). He describes how he had taken to looking at the picture before killing sheep for market, because "killin' sheep was kinder more fun arter lookin' at it" (41). Then he tells the narrator, sitting next to

him, that killing sheep couldn't satisfy his hunger "*fer victuals I couldn't raise nor buy*" and that since he had heard that meat gives you new life, he had come to wonder if it couldn't make you live longer and longer if it was "*more the same*". At that moment a red drop falls on the open page between them. They both look up to see a crimson stain spreading across the ceiling above. A moment later, the storm that has been building outside comes to a climax and there is a "titanic thunderbolt of thunderbolts", "blasting that accursed house of unutterable secrets and bringing the oblivion which alone saved my mind" (42).

This, then, is a summary of the principal action of "The Picture in the House". But like many of Lovecraft's stories, it opens not with the action proper, but with a frame that primes the reader for forthcoming revelations of horror.[50] Here the frame takes up three substantial paragraphs, in which the priming for horror is woven into an account of the narrative's geographical and cultural-historical context. It also introduces two of the three principal non-linear series that make up the contexture – series that are associated, on the one hand, with (as one of its manifestations) *the picture*, and, on the other hand, with *the house*. (These two series are highlighted in the title.) The third non-linear series, associated above all with *the old man*, is introduced later.

The first non-linear series, which will come to be associated above all with the picture, I call the ARCHAISM series. It is announced in the opening sentences:

> Searchers after horror haunt strange, far places. For them are the catacombs of Ptolemais, and the carven mausolea of the nightmare countries. They climb

[50] Compare, for example, the following openings: "Life is a hideous thing, and from the background behind what we know of it peer daemoniacal hints of truth which make it sometimes a thousandfold more hideous." ("Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family") (Lovecraft 1999, 14); "Of Herbert West, who was my friend in college and in after life, I can speak only with extreme terror" ("Herbert West – Reanimator") (Lovecraft 1999, 50). Here, as elsewhere, there is an element of imitation/parody of Poe.

> to the moonlit towers of ruined Rhine castles, and falter down black cobwebbed steps beneath the scattered stones of forgotten cities in Asia. (34)

But what "the epicure in the terrible" prizes most highly, the narrator continues, are "the ancient, lonely farmhouses of backwoods New England", where generations of Puritans, in slavery to "the dismal phantasms of their own mind", have succumbed to "dark furtive traits from the prehistoric depths of their cold Northern heritage" (34-5). This ARCHAISM series, as we shall see, has its own internal dynamic structure, which is born of an inner tension: for, combined with the attraction engendered by curiosity (by a desire to traverse depths of time in order to possess what is secret and hidden), there is an opposing sense of repulsion at the actual object of the curiosity: we desire what repels us.[51] This tension is central to the story.

The second non-linear series, the one associated with *the house*, is introduced in the second paragraph, where these backwoods farmhouses are described as having windows which "still stare shockingly, as if blinking through a lethal stupor which wards off madness by dulling the memory of unutterable things" (34).[52] At the end of the third paragraph, to conclude the framing, the narrative returns to this series:

> Only the silent, sleepy, staring houses in the backwoods can tell all that has lain hidden since the early days; and they are not communicative, being loath to shake off the drowsiness which helps them forget. Sometimes one feels that it would be merciful to tear down these houses, for they must often dream. (35)

The dynamic image here is one of a blankness, a stupor, which is terminated by a tearing-down, a demolition. I call this the OBLITERATION series. It is prominent here, at the beginning, where it is associated above all with the "bleared windows" of the

[51] This tension can be felt in the opening phrase ("Searchers after horror"), given that horror is normally considered something one is repelled from rather than attracted to or searching for.
[52] C.f. the "vacant, eye-like windows" in the description already quoted from the opening of "The Fall of the House of Usher" (Poe 1839, 62). Poe stories, here as elsewhere, provide an important inter-textual model for the construction of this series.

exterior of the house. When the protagonist goes into the house it is submerged and becomes latent, only to resurface dramatically at the end. As with the ARCHAISM series it has its own internal dynamic structure, here consisting of a (horrific) continuity terminated by a blankness.

I turn now to the linear series – that is, to the series motivated by the reader's configuration of the entire contexture. A distinction was made above between *curiosity* and *suspense* as two principal modes of such configuration. But this a distinction that can only be rigidly held in theory: in practice, particular configurations will mix the two modes in different proportions and through different forms of interrelation. Thus, for example, generic considerations will often motivate a mixture of *suspense* with *curiosity*, and this may tip over into pure *curiosity*: when watching a James Bond film, knowledge of the genre turns the narrative tension of climactic scenes from an uncertainty as to *whether* Bond will extricate himself to a curiosity as to *how* he will extricate himself (Baroni 2007, 277).

A parallel dynamic in part animates "The Picture in the House" – only here, as we have seen, the reader has been primed from the beginning to expect catastrophe and horror: the question (the *curiosity*) that this expectation arouses concerns *how* this catastrophe and horror will come about. But in this case the series of *suspense* ("What is going to happen to the protagonist next?") is not obliterated: rather, the reader's overall linear configuration is a matter of how the two series, the series of *suspense* and *curiosity*, will come together. (How, in other words, the "What?" of "What is going to happen to the protagonist next?" will meet the "How?" of "How (in what form) will the catastrophe, the horror, take place?") Thus I will label this particular linear series – which is itself a particular blend of series of curiosity and

suspense – the series of CONVERGENCE, referring precisely to this projected convergence of the two sub-series.

In the opening paragraphs, this *teleological* series of CONVERGENCE (leading to closure or consummation) expresses itself through a progressive narrowing of the frame of attention, from the general observations concerning "searchers after horror", through the focus on backwoods New England farmhouses, to the concentration on the particular farmhouse to which the narrator is led. This process of ever-narrowing joint attention between narrator and reader continues through the narrator's entry into the house to his discovery first of the book, and then of the picture in the book. In this form, the CONVERGENCE series finds its ultimate expression in the drop of blood that falls on the picture at the end.

This linear series of CONVERGENCE is the dominant linear series of the story, in keeping with the conception of the short story (as we have seen adumbrated by Poe and Eichenbaum) as a swift homing-in on the denouement. But it is worth reiterating here the important point that linear series *traverse* – move *across* or *through* – the non-linear series. Thus while the dynamic teleological structure of the CONVERGENCE series expresses itself exclusively in the opening pages to the ARCHAISM series, with the appearance of the old man in the latter half of the story, as we shall see, it shifts its primary field of operations to the non-linear series associated with *the old man* – much as in music a persistent rhythmic cycle may attach itself to different harmonic sequences and/or different instrumentation.

Following the three paragraphs of framing, the principle action of the story is initiated:

> It was to a time-battered edifice of this description that I was driven one afternoon in November, 1896, by a rain of such chilling copiousness that any shelter was preferable to exposure. (35)

This represents the initiation of a new non-linear series – one which works in direct tension with the CONVERGENCE series: this is a series that represents the everyday contingencies of the mundane world, the world of the present-day (as opposed to the world intended by the ARCHAISM series). It works in tension with the CONVERGENCE series because it opens the narrative (albeit only in momentary glimpses) to the possibility of being otherwise, to being open rather than closed. I call this series the CONTINGENCY series.

The CONTINGENCY series plays a secondary (though vital) role in "The Picture in the House": its main function at first is one of *retardation*, acting as a momentary brake on the operations of the predominant CONVERGENCE series.[53] Thus during the interchanges between the narrator and the old man over the book it expresses itself through social schemata (or "sub-series") of *class difference* and *decorum*:

> I was amused at the childish fondness of this ignorant old man for the pictures in a book he could not read [. . .] This revelation of simplicity removed much of the ill-defined apprehension I had felt [. . .] (40)

The introduction of familiar, everyday schemata ("this ignorant old man") eases for a moment the sense of inevitability. But as the interchange proceeds, in a sinister twist, this retardatory series is "flipped over" and subsumed to the teleological CONVERGENCE series. When the narrator begins to get nervous, the old man himself adopts these social schemata of class difference and hospitality ("[H]ere, young Sir,

[53] In a more novelistic narrative, what we are calling here the CONTINGENCY series – and regarding as merely one of the non-linear series that are "recruited" or "traversed" by the linear series of CONVERGENCE – would play a more active, linear role in shaping the reader's gathering sense of the significance of the story as a whole: it would be, in fact, something more like Barthes' "proaire tic" or "code of action". (In such a novelistic narrative, for example, the social differences between the narrator and the old man might play an active and independent role, rather than being subsumed in different ways to the CONVERGENCE series.)

don't git skeert – [. . .] – here, set still, what's ailin' ye?" (41)), but now they are being used by the old man to lull the narrator into a false sense of security (and hence hasten the end).

With the appearance of *the old man* we experience the introduction of the remaining non-linear series, which I term the series of PARADOX. Even before his appearance at the door of the sitting room the old man is associated with incongruity, with a dynamic of unstable oscillation between different frames:

> The tread was heavy, yet seemed to contain a curious quality of cautiousness; a quality which I disliked the more because the tread was heavy. (37)

The description of the old man, when he does appear, is full of such anomalies, clustered around the notion of *unnatural vigour*:

> His face, almost hidden by a long beard which grew high on his cheeks, seemed abnormally ruddy and less wrinkled than one might expect [. . .] His blue eyes, though a trifle bloodshot, seemed inexplicably keen and burning. (38)

Here, the PARADOX series subordinates the CONTINGENCY series (in the form of *social difference* and *decorum*:

> [. .] I almost shuddered through surprise and a sense of uncanny incongruity when he motioned me to a chair and addressed me in a thin, weak voice full of fawning respect and ingratiating hospitality. (38)

The PARADOX series runs throughout the old man's long speech. There is his chuckling, his "feverish geniality", when discussing the random disappearances and sudden deaths in the community. And when talking about the picture of the cannibal butcher's shop, despite his "shocking ecstasy", his voice "sank rather than mounted", becoming a whisper "with a huskiness more terrible than a scream" (41).

As outlined above, during the opening of the story, until the appearance of the old man, the CONVERGENCE series had seemed to be exclusively and inextricably

linked to the ARCHAISM series, and thus motivated by the *curiosity* of the narrator/reader. But as the old man launches on his long speech, there is a swift reorientation of agency and "point of view" (understood here in a loose sense). The CONVERGENCE series, hitherto felt through the dynamics of the narrator/reader's curiosity, is transferred to the agency of the old man, and hence to the PARADOX series through which he is presented. The transformation is analogous to the ubiquitous one in music that sees, for example, a rhythmic pattern that has been linked to a particular melodic contour or harmonic progression become detached from it and attracted to a new field of operations to which it can apply itself. The convergence now is that between the old man's mounting hunger for human meat and his circumspection (recalling the "cautious" tread on the stairs), a convergence whose consummation will take the projected form of his eating his visitor. Thus as he turns to the page in the book with the picture of the cannibal butcher's shop:

> The old man's speech grew a trifle thicker and his eyes assumed a brighter glow; but his fumbling hands, though seemingly clumsier than before, were entirely adequate to their mission. (40)

The CONVERGENCE that had first expressed itself through the ARCHAISM series is continued through a projected convergence, a consummation, of the PARADOX series (the paradox, ultimately, of a human being eating "*more the same*"): the old man's fumbling hands are now "adequate to their mission".

These, then are the principal series that have been introduced into the cumulative contexture of the story:

Linear series:-

> CONVERGENCE of series of *curiosity* and *suspense*, leading to closure and consummation

Non-linear series:-

ARCHAISM Attraction to/repulsion from the remote and obscure object of curiosity

OBLITERATION A continuum of blankness (in the face of horror) terminated by catastrophe

CONTINGENCY Retardatory interventions by social schemata from everyday modern life

PARADOX Unstable oscillation between conflicting perceptual/conceptual frames

The relationship between the series is dynamic, interactive and ever-changing: series may subsume each other by "coming into phase". The various non-linear series such as ARCHAISM and PARADOX are traversed by the dominant, linear CONVERGENCE series (i.e. a series by which the reader configures the totality of the contexture): at the beginning, the CONVERGENCE series expresses itself through the ARCHAISM series, but later comes into phase with the PARADOX series. And there are other, embedded or nested levels of this phasing and traversal: as we have seen, for example, the PARADOX series (itself subsumed by the CONVERGENCE series) comes to subordinate the CONTINGENCY series. To return to an analogy that I have used throughout to express the relation between series, the situation is akin to the way, in a piece of music, rhythmic, harmonic, melodic or timbre-oriented series will traverse each other, moving in and out of phase as, for example, a particular rhythmic series will attach itself first to one harmonic sequence, and then another.

As we have argued in the previous section, this quasi-musical structure of simultaneous series interacting with one another is particularly marked when temporal compression compels the narrative to a form of ekphrasis, a "speaking out" of the image. As with the photograph, this compression, this squeezing of the temporal dimension, brings to consciousness a synchronicity of series. The overriding importance of this serial structure for "The Picture in the House" can be

seen if we turn now to how Lovecraft solves the problem of how to end his story. Final CONVERGENCE in the form of a consummation of the old man's hunger would be impossible without a radical last-minute shift of framing (understood in terms of the point of view – the narrator speaking from beyond the grave, for example). On the other hand, a physical confrontation and escape by the narrator would run the risk of deflating the cumulative effect of the preceding CONVERGENCE, and hence spoiling the story's "unity of effect".[54]

Lovecraft's solution is to reintroduce – in short order, and to tumultuous effect – earlier series that had been subsumed by (but remained latent during) the old man's speech. The sequence begins with a reintroduction of the CONTINGENCY series (the rain which is "quite unusual for the season"), and by the OBLITERATION series from the opening (the windows, the house shaking to its foundations):

> The tone of the old man now sank very low, sometimes becoming so faint that his words were hardly audible. I listened to the rain and to the rattling of the bleared, small-paned windows, and marked a rumbling of approaching thunder quite unusual for the season. Once a terrific flash and peal shook the frail house to its foundations, but the whisperer seemed not to notice. (41)

The old man continues with his confession of his hunger for "*more the same*", but at this point there is a hiatus, and the narrator seems to toy with the different series that could be continued here:

> But the whisperer never continued. The interruption was not produced by my fright, nor by the rapidly increasing storm [. . .] (41)

In fact the interruption returns us to the dynamic of the narrowing field of attention that, through the ARCHAISM series, had led us in the first half of the story from

[54] In Poe's terms, such an ending would be more characteristic of a novelistic "coda" than the *denouement* proper to the short form.

general considerations of "Searchers after horror" to the picture in the book in the house:

> As the old man whispered the words "*more the same*" a tiny spattering impact was heard, and something shewed on the yellowed paper of the upturned volume [. . .] On the butcher's shop of the Anzique cannibals a small red spattering glistened picturesquely, lending vividness to the horror of the engraving. (41-2)

This brief, vivid re-introduction of the ARCHAISM series acts as an upbeat – an upbeat figured in the upward glance of both men to the crimson patch on the ceiling – to a final downbeat produced by the CONVERGENCE of CONTIGENCY and OBLITERATION:

> I did not shriek or move, but merely shut my eyes. A moment later came the titanic thunderbolt of thunderbolts; blasting that accursed house of unutterable secrets and bringing the oblivion which alone saved my mind. (42)

From the point of view of verisimilitude the ending is disastrous (How does the narrator survive? Has he survived? Does the story "make sense"?):[55] it is, rather, an ending dictated by the interactive dynamics of the series. As a narrative, it is more like a musical score than a representation of events.

[55] The problem is compounded rather than solved by the curious prolepsis which Lovecraft introduces just before the falling of the drop of blood onto the picture: "The interruption was not produced by my fright, nor by the rapidly increasing storm *amidst whose fury I was presently to open my eyes on a smoky solitude of blackened ruins*" (41, emphasis added).

CHAPTER THREE: NARRATIVE DISCLOSURE

In Chapter Two we saw how Mukařovský came to see the aesthetic function as oriented not just to the *whole* of the sign itself, but also to the perceiver. Crucially, though, the aesthetic function does not orient the sign simply to a particular aspect of the reader's existence, as would be the case with the communicative function, but to the *whole* of the reader's existence.[56] And this "whole" includes every resource – intellectual, emotional, imaginative, kinaesthetic – that can be brought to it:[57] under the aesthetic function, the sign can offer affordances for any and all of these interactions.[58] The whole includes, as we have seen in Chapter Two, the whole contexture perceived *dynamically* – as an "event" or "performance", as Iser says.

In this Chapter, I pursue this phenomenological inquiry by taking as a case study the phenomenon of "experientiality" in relation to narrative fiction. I say "in relation to" because I wish experientiality to be understood here not just as the representation of experience *in* narrative fiction, but also as the experience *of* narrative fiction:[59] my argument is that the two senses of "experience" and "experientiality" in this context are closely linked through their both being configured by a particular kind of series that I call the series of *disclosure*. This series

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[56] I underline once more that we are looking at situations where the aesthetic function is the "dominant": communicative functions may be subsumed or "nested" within (in the form of Iser's repertoire, for example), but their *overall* orientation (towards the contexture of which they are a part) is determined by the aesthetic function.

[57] One major weakness of Iser's theory of the reading process is its cold-blooded quality – its failure to take account of the importance of the reader's emotional response. As Jenefer Robinson argues, Iser's description of "gap-filling" fails to acknowledge the role that such responses play in determining when and how "gaps" in the text are filled by the reader (Robinson 2005, 120).

[58] As Mukařovský points out, the aesthetic function tends to multiply and perpetually differentiate between the functions subsumed by it (and therefore to multiply the potential interactions) – hence the indeterminacy of fictional characters.

[59] On the "experientiality" of fiction as being a matter of the experience *of* rather than merely *in* fiction, see also Caracciolo 2012a and b.

– with its own characteristic dynamic topology – is a specific historical development, and has come to be a defining feature of modern narrative fiction. Section Two of this chapter is devoted to explicating this concept of the series of *disclosure* and its phenomenological basis.

In Section One I prepare the ground for this presentation by establishing its basis in the *dynamic interaction* between text and reader. Thus in subsection 1.1 I distinguish this interactive approach from an objectivist approach that conceives of the relation between text and reader in terms of mental representations. In subsection 1.2 I return to a theme that has run throughout this thesis: the formative influence of different forms of semiotic mediation on narrative. In this particular context, I show how the articulation of experience in narrative fiction draws on the full semiotic resources of narrative fictions as graphic signs and material objects (that is, as *books*). In subsection 1.3 I discuss the argument that modern forms of evoking experience and consciousness – in particular "Free Indirect Discourse" – represent a progressive detachment of narrative discourse from oral and "communicational" models.

My presentation of the concept of *disclosure* in Section Two falls into two parts. I start in subsection 2.1 by discussing the differentiation that has been found in modern fiction between "pre-reflective" and "reflective" consciousness. Building on the analyses by Ann Banfield and Monika Fludernik of this linguistic feature of modern fiction, and bringing a phenomenological perspective to bear on them, I argue that the cyclical alternation of these linguistic modes of evoking consciousness is *experienced* cumulatively by the reader as a series of topological inversions whereby what was "inside" becomes "outside" and what was "outside" becomes "inside". Here I point to a correspondence between, on the one hand, this

phenomenological perspective on the reader's experience of fiction, and, on the other hand, the account presented by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio of the relation between what he terms "core" and "extended" consciousness: both, I argue, are characterised by this same topological series whereby an "inside" becomes an "outside" for a further "inside". In subsection 2.2 I make a further link – this time between, on the one hand, this idea of a series passing through topological inversions of inside and outside, and, on the other hand, the phenomenological concept of consciousness as a process of "disclosure". My principal argument here is that the dynamic series described in the previous subsection represents a semiotic extension of the version of "disclosure" presented in his late writings by Merleau-Ponty: here, the "disclosure" of consciousness is presented in fully *embodied* terms, in terms of the particular characteristic of the body, the flesh, as that which is both seeing and seen, touching and touched.

In Section Three I offer two further case studies, beyond the particular linguistic example presented in subsection 2.1, of the disclosure series in modern narrative. In subsection 3.1 I discuss the use of imagery and images for evoking experience and consciousness in modern fiction. In particular, I focus on how this use of imagery introduces a new level at which the disclosure series unfolds itself: where in subsection 2.1 we had been dealing with the relation between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, here we are dealing with an intensification of the series whereby it operates purely at the level of pre-reflective awareness. Drawing again on Damasio's account of consciousness, and on John Dewey's account of aesthetics in terms of "experience" – I show how the use of imagery in the evocation of consciousness reflects a fundamental, pre-conceptual interactivity between consciousness and environment. Finally, in subsection 3.2, I examine how the use of

photographs in narrative fiction offers new affordances for realizing the cycles of mutual disclosure between subjectivity and objectivity, inside and outside.

1. Narrative and "Bringing to Consciousness" through Writing

This section serves as an introduction to the presentation of the concept of the series of *disclosure* that I offer in Section Two. In subsection 1.1 I give a brief overview of the place of experientiality or consciousness in narrative theory, relating it to the development of "consciousness studies" in the cognitive sciences. I focus in particular on an "objectivist" or "representational" approach that reflects a different perspective on the relation between reader and text from the one offered here. In subsection 1.2 I take Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* as a case-study for thinking about the evocation of consciousness in modern fictional narrative not merely in linguistic terms, but also in terms of the narrative as a graphic sign, a material symbol with its own distinctive semiotics and forms of interaction with the perceiver. In subsection 1.3 I firstly trace the history of the view that that modern narrative has moved beyond oral, "communicational" models of language to a distinctively *written* form of linguistic mediation, and then relate that view to the account of the impact of literacy on consciousness – drawing on theorists such as Walter Ong and David Olson – that was touched on in subsection 2.1 of Chapter One.

1.1 Narrative Theory and Consciousness

Prior to the 1990s, considerations within narrative theory of the relationship between consciousness and narrative were confined to studies of Free Indirect Discourse (FID) (Pascal 1977; Cohn 1978; Banfield 1982) and of "stream of

consciousness" techniques (Humphrey 1954; Friedman 1955; Steinberg 1979). The main focus of these studies was modernist literary narrative, which was interpreted in terms of a turn towards narrative as "a record of the 'inwardness' of experience" (Edel 1955, 12; c.f. Kahler 1973).[60] Since the 1990s, on the other hand, there has been a growing interest in the dimension of experientiality in fiction (Fludernik 1993, 1996) and in the (historically particular) ways in which narrative fiction has represented mental life and consciousness (Lodge 2002; Palmer 2004, 2010; Zunshine 2006; Herman 2011). More recently, Marco Caracciolo (2012a, 2012b, 2014) has challenged the notion that the consciousness of fictional characters is "represented", drawing instead on enactivist approaches in philosophy of mind to argue that characters' experiences are, rather, "undergone" or *experienced* by authors and readers. The series of *disclosure* that I set out in Section Two of this chapter can be read as a response to Caracciolo's call (echoing, for example, Iser) for an account of the reading process which is phenomenological, dynamic and performative.

Fludernik's research, which I shall return to in the course of this chapter, presents a case for seeing experientiality as being the essence of narrative. "The central aim of narrative", she proposes, is "[t]he representation of human experience" (Fludernik 1996, 51): "all narrative is built on the mediating function of consciousness" (49). She draws attention, for example, to the importance of the advent of the "consciousness scene" – a scene structured around an evaluation, the response of a consciousness to narrative action, rather than around narrative action itself – for the development of the novel (Fludernik 1996, 153-9): the history of the

[60] For a critique of this interpretation of modernist narrative in terms of a shift from "outer" to "inner", see Herman 2011b.

development of literary narrative is thus essentially the history of the expansion of this experiential aspect of narrative, such that "narrative [. . .] properly comes into its own in the twentieth century when the rise of the consciousness novel starts to foreground fictional consciousness" (27). The modern "consciousness novel", far from being a retreat from narrative into non-narrative subjectivity, is "the culmination point in the development of narrative realism" (170).[61]

This growing interest in the role of consciousness in fiction has been paralleled by (and in some cases has been occasioned by) the development, over the past thirty years, of consciousness as an object of study in the cognitive sciences. While at the end of the nineteenth century the phenomenological examination of consciousness had played a central role in William James' *Principles of Psychology* (James 1950 [1890]),[62] for much of the twentieth century it was eclipsed by the behaviourist emphasis on the experimentally measurable outputs of mental processes: consciousness from a behaviourist point of view was an "epiphenomenon" with no significant independent role in cognition.[63] With the first "cognitive revolution" this neglect continued: consideration of consciousness was limited to specific aspects, such as attention and memory, that clearly belonged within the frame of cognitive mental processes.[64] But since the 1980s the situation has transformed entirely, and "Consciousness Studies" (embracing cognitive psychology,

[61] Fludernik's analysis of narrative in terms of "experientiality" has a predecessor in Franz Stanzel's theory of narrative, which foregrounds narrative "mediation" (Stanzel 1984). She also echoes Ann Banfield, for whom "[t]here is [. .] something essential to fiction in its representation of consciousness" (Banfield 1982, 260).
[62] In his *Psychology: The Briefer Course* (1892), James quotes with approval George Trumball Ladd's definition of psychology as "the description and explanation of states of consciousness as such" (quoted in Thompson 2007, 4).
[63] As Merlin Donald has observed, behaviourism "managed to ban the word 'consciousness' from American experimental psychology for more than fifty years" (Donald 2001, 216).
[64] For a more nuanced version of this very broad-brush sketch, see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 3-4.

neuroscience and philosophy of mind) has become an important growth-area in the cognitive sciences that has also attracted wider public interest.[65]

Three principal strands to this growth of "consciousness studies" can be identified. In first place there has been the "turn to the brain" provoked in part by the rapid development, since the 1980s, of brain scanning technologies: these have begun the process of mapping the electrical and chemical activity of the brain, the continual and reciprocal firing of groups and populations of neurons. The search for a neural substrate of consciousness has issued in a broad consensus that there is no single localizable centre of consciousness in the brain, and that if a neural substrate is discovered it will take the form not of the firing of particular neurons but of particular patterns of interconnectivity between the many systems that make up the complex architecture of the brain (Donald 2001, 68).[66] Secondly, these developments in neuroscience have sparked an intense philosophical debate (a revival, in effect, of the old "mind-body problem") as to whether such "third-person" descriptions of brain-states could ever comprehend the irreducibly "first-person" quality of conscious experience.[67] For sceptics such as philosopher David Chalmers, this is the "Hard Problem" facing neuroscientific theories of consciousness (Chalmers 2007). A third strand is phenomenology, in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, which takes the structures and dynamics of lived experience as its starting-point: in recent

[65] The establishment and breadth of the "field" is reflected in the appearance of publications such as the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, in textbooks such as those by Blackmore (2004) and Dietrich (2007), and in survey-anthologies such as those edited by Velmans and Schneider (2007), Zelazo *et al* (2007) and Bayne *et al* (2014). Wider public interest is reflected in the accounts in part directed at a non-academic readership by, among others, Oliver Sachs (1985, 1990), Daniel Dennett (1991) Gerald Edelman (1992) and Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003, 2010).

[66] Hence, for example, theories of consciousness that focus on synchronicity and periodicity of neuronal firing as a key threshold of consciousness (Singer 2007; Thompson 2007, 329-38).

[67] The most public manifestation of this debate in the 1990s was the stand-off in the pages of the *New York Review of Books* between two heavyweights of American philosophy of mind, John Searle and Daniel Dennett, with Searle defending the irreducible subjectivity of conscious mental states against Dennett's materialist and behaviourist account (Searle 1997).

years there has been a significant attempt to bring about a convergence ("neurophenomenology" or "naturalized phenomenology") between this perspective and neuroscientific research (Petitot *et al* 1999; Thompson 2007).

It is this third strand, the phenomenological perspective – but also its convergence with what neuroscience has discovered about the mind/brain/body/environment nexus – which underlies the approach I take to the fictional "representation" of consciousness.[68] The reasons for adopting this approach will be clear from the discussion of Jan Mukařovský's semiotics in Chapter Two: the aesthetic sign (that is, the narrative, say, considered as a whole contexture) is oriented towards the subject's *whole* existence. The fusion of phenomenology and semiotics being proposed here will become clearer if we contrast it with an approach that regards the sign as being oriented not towards the subject, but towards the *object*, in the sense that the narrative is seen primarily in terms of that facet of it that is a *representation* of the object.

It is this latter, "objectivist" view that, as we have seen above in Chapter One (subsection 3.3), underlies the treatments of consciousness and mental life in fiction by Alan Palmer (2004, 2010) and Lisa Zunshine (2006).[69] This research has produced many valuable insights into "character" and the "social" in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels, but is limited by its adherence to an objectivist view of the relationship between reader and text – to a view, that is, which sees that relationship in terms of the construction of mental representations in the mind of the reader. This view is quite different to those presented above in Chapter Two, where

[68] My reasons for putting "representation" in scare quotes here will become clear below.
[69] I will postpone discussion of Fludernik's (1993, 1996) analysis of "experientiality" in fiction to Section 1.2, below, because, as I shall argue, it suggests a different line of development to that offered by the approaches I discuss here.

the emphasis was on *process* rather than on representation, on reading as an event or performance involving *interaction* with the text.

The core thesis of Alan Palmer's *Fictional Minds* (2004) is that "narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning" (Palmer 2004, 5). His primary concern is with "the constructions of the minds of fictional characters by narrators and readers": these constructions draw on observation of "minds in action" in the form of characters' speech and behaviour (11). Here Palmer is correcting what he sees as the bias of previous theorists such as Dorrit Cohn (1978), who had privileged "inner speech" (in the form of *direct* and *free indirect thought*)[70] as the prime means of representing fictional minds: Palmer points instead to the importance in narrative of the *thought report*[71] in the form of "report[s] of such states of mind as emotions, sensations, dispositions, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motives, and reasons for action" (13). In cases such as this, as Palmer points out, the distinction between thought and action is not clear-cut. Emotions, for example, are both private and public – for example, Jane Austen's Emma blushing (112). Rather than a *distinction* between thought and action, Palmer proposes a "*thought-action continuum*", since "the mental and physical sides of action and behaviour coexist and interpenetrate to the point where they are difficult to disentangle" (120).

Drawing both on Vygotsky and on recent cognitive theories of the enactive and extended mind, Palmer builds on this idea of the thought-action continuum to make a convincing case for the intersubjective nature of character in fiction: the "fictional mind" is above all a *social mind*. Here, however, I am concerned with the objectivist

[70] Direct thought: "The train pulled away. He thought, 'Why the hell am I still waiting for her?'" Free indirect thought: "The train pulled away. Why the hell was he still waiting for her?" (Palmer 2004, 13)
[71] Thought report: "The train pulled away. He wondered why he was still waiting for her." (Palmer 2004, 13)

terms in which Palmer casts his account – terms, that is, that assume a separation between subject and object, between observer and observed. The embedded narratives by which characters are read by other characters, by narrators, and by readers, are, according to Palmer forms of "action description" by means of which representations of other minds are formed in the mind of "observers" or "onlookers" (Palmer 2004, 121). In this respect, according to Palmer, fictional characters are observed and their behaviours reported as if they were real people:

> The relationship between the actor and the observer, in the case of "natural" action, is similar to the relationship, in the case of fictional action, between the character and the narrator and also the character and the reader. (Palmer 2004, 121)

One could object that in most cases of "observing" the actions of others in real life, i.e. in everyday social interaction, the observer is implicated in the action that is being observed: what is at stake is not merely a representation (the "report" of an "onlooker"), but, precisely, an *interaction*:[72] within the context of interaction, representations are *situated* relative both to the implication of the observer in the action and to a dynamic context of the unfolding *process* of interaction.

The work of Palmer and other researchers raises one of the most interesting and complex questions in cognitive narrative theory: what are the commonalities and differences between, on the one hand, real-world intersubjectivity and, on the other, the relation between reader and fictional character? In a recent intervention, David Herman (2011a) has cast doubt on what he terms the "Exceptionality Thesis" – that is, the proposition that the reader's experience of fictional characters (of "fictional

[72] Of course, people every day observe behaviours in which they are not personally implicated. But unless the behaviours have an inherent salience (one witnesses a murder, for example), they will probably be of negligible importance compared with cases of interaction: witnessing a murder is the exception proving the rule that the most important forms of representing others' behaviour involve interaction.

minds") is different in kind from the experience of the encounter with other minds in the real world. He identifies this view, in particular, with the claim of Käte Hamburger (1973), corroborated by Dorrit Cohn (1978) and Ann Banfield (1982), that "[e]pic fiction [i.e. third-person fictional narration] is the sole instance [. .] where the subjectivity [the "I-originarity"] of a third-person figure *qua* that of a third-person can be portrayed" (Hamburger 1973, 139). As Herman points out, from an enactivist perspective – according to which cognition is "distributed" or "extended" across external vehicles and affordances for action – Hamburger's claim is susceptible to the charge of being based on a false, Cartesian dichotomy between "inner" (subjective) and "outer" (objective) (Herman 2011a, 8-9). The Exceptionality Thesis can be challenged, Herman argues, from two directions. In the first place, the comprehension of fictional characters draws on folk-psychological heuristics that, while not making other minds "transparent" (to use Dorrit Cohn's term), does give access to another's "subjectivity" in terms of intentionality or "reasons for action" (12-15). Secondly, the Exceptionality Thesis is challenged by the phenomenological view (put forward, for example, by Shaun Gallagher (2005)) that other minds are directly experienced as forms of expression by the other, rather than mediated through propositional or folk-psychological thought (Herman 2011a, 15-18).

While it would take us too far from the main argument of this chapter to enter fully into this debate, one can draw out three perspectives on it from the theoretical framework offered here. Two of these perspectives support Herman's argument against the "Exceptionality Thesis", while the third, while not contradicting it, suggests a qualification. In the first place, the emphasis on joint attention as the basis both of narrative and everyday communication is congruent with Herman's claim of a continuity between the encounters with fictional and with real minds: the sharing

of attention with the other through language or gesture gives access to the intentionality of the other, and is thus a prime example of "how in contexts of everyday interaction another's I-originarity is not locked away inaccessibly in some inner recess of the self, but rather spread out across the elements of a given social encounter and situated within that encounter's spatial environment and temporal flow" (Herman 2011a, 10-11).

Secondly, and on the other hand, the emphasis given in Chapter One (subsection 3.3) to the semiotic dimension of fictional character, as well as the argument put forward in Chapter Two that the aesthetic function orients the elements of a narrative to the whole of the narrative *as a sign*, emphasises the ontological distinction between collections of words on a page and real human beings. Although characters in novels may be constructed in part according to the frames that we bring from real life, we know, of course, that fictional characters have no agency, their actions are those that have been intended for them, and they will remain suspended for ever in the contexture of which they are an inextricable part. There is a difference – no less important for being obvious – between the indeterminacy of fictional characters and the unpredictability of real people. The indeterminacy of fictional characters derives from the indeterminacy inherent in all signs: as touched on in Chapter One, they are both "objects" in a fictional world and also signs (in a way that real people, whose existence is open-ended rather than intended toward a contexture, are not). As we saw in Chapter Two, we read them *as* signs in a way that we don't do with real people. No matter how quixotically swept up we are in a book, we know in our saner moments that the characters have no real life outside the sign (that is, the book, the narrative) of which they are a part (and towards which they are oriented through the aesthetic function). From this

perspective, the agency of fictional characters (though the apprehension of it may draw on the cognitive and affective resources offered by real-life encounters) is coloured by its aesthetic and semiotic context. I will return to this aesthetic dimension below, when I consider Mikhail Bakhtin's contribution to this debate.

Thirdly, there is the phenomenological perspective on the issue presented in this chapter, which takes as its starting-point the *reader's* experience of narrative and its characters, rather than the *character's* experience (as semiotically mediated to the reader). In Herman's reading, Hamburger's distinction between the "inner" I-originarity of the character and the "outer", third-person perspective is symptomatic of an adherence to fixed Cartesian categories. But from the phenomenological perspective it is also possible to see this distinction not in terms of static categories, but rather as phases in a performative process of disclosure, as described in the following section. According to this perspective, Free Indirect Discourse – which forms the focus of Hamburger's claim for the uniqueness of fiction – becomes above all a transitional form, a means of articulating the reader's movement between outer and inner perspectives. Marco Caracciolo, in *The Experientiality of Narrative* (2014), uses the terms "consciousness-attribution" and "consciousness-enactment" to describe, respectively, the representational and expressive dimensions of the reader's experience of these outer and inner perspectives (Caracciolo 2014, 114). In support of Herman's argument, but from a phenomenological point of view, he points out that "consciousness-attribution and consciousness-enactment are [. .] strategies that readers derive from their interaction with real people" (113): we can not only observe people, but also *empathise* with them. The difference between the encounter with fictional characters and the encounter with real people becomes, in Caracciolo's view, one of degree rather than kind: by doing away with the

psychological and ethical costs of real-world empathy, fiction allows us to empathise more freely (113; see also Caracciolo 2014).

Mikhail Bakhtin's essay "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" (Bakhtin 1990 [1920-23]) offers a phenomenological perspective on the relationship between author/reader and fictional character that both clarifies the way in which that relationship can be seen as a phenomenological *process*, and also answers the second of the three points made above, concerning the role of the aesthetic function in this relationship. To address this latter issue first: for Bakhtin the aesthetic encounter between author/reader and fictional character is a distillation of the dialogic encounter between two consciousnesses. The author

> intonates every particular and every trait of his hero, every event of his life, every action he performs, all his thoughts and feelings, just as in life, too, we react valuationally to every self-manifestation on the part of those around us. (Bakhtin 1990 [1920-3], 4)

In real life these reactions to another consciousness have a "scattered quality" and, crucially, are constrained by particular practical circumstances and needs, whereas in art – and here Bakhtin strikingly anticipates Mukařovský's description of the aesthetic function – the reaction is one "to the *whole* of the hero as human being, a reaction that assembles all of the cognitive-ethical determinations and valuations of the hero and consummates them in the form of a unitary and unique whole that is [. .] also a whole of meaning" (4). This crucial process of "consummation" hinges, according to Bakhtin, on the asymmetric relation between a self that is the unique origin of a subjectivity and a self that presents itself as an object to that subjectivity: there will always be an "excess" of the one over the other, whereby the "horizon" of the subjectivity exceeds that of the self that it encompasses as object (22-23). (And this relation is reciprocal or dialogic: this perceiving self is itself only fully

consummated through the excess, the encompassing horizon, by which it becomes an object for the other.) The process of consummation consists in two phases or "constitutive moments": (1) a "projection" by which the self empathizes or identifies with the other ("see[ing] his world axiologically from within him as *he* sees this world"),[73] and (2) a "return" whereby that projection is experienced not as one's own, but as that of the other, and hence encompassed in "a consummating environment" created "out of [the] excess of my own seeing, knowing, desiring, and feeling" (25).[74]

For Bakhtin, the "aesthetic" relationship between author/reader and fictional character, constituted by this two-phase process of "consummation", is an ideal type of interaction between two consciousnesses. ("Aesthetic consciousness [. .] is a consciousness of a consciousness: the author's (the *I*'s) consciousness of the hero's (the *other*'s) consciousness" (89).) His answer to the question raised by Herman – that of the exceptionality or otherwise of the encounter between author/reader and fictional character – is a striking one. There is indeed, for Bakhtin, a continuity (a continuum, a scale) between the aesthetic encounter with a fictional character and real-world encounters, but in the case of the latter it is only specific kinds of encounter that are coloured by aesthetic consciousness: the "creative reaction" by which the author/reader "consummates" the character, seeing him both from within and as a whole from without, has its corollary in

> the relation of an unmotivated valuation to the object of such a valuation ("I love him, whatever he may be" [. .]); the relation of a confirmative acceptance to the one accepted and confirmed; the relation of a gift to a need; of an act of freely granted forgiveness to a transgression; of an act of grace to a sinner. (90)

[73] A term that Bakhtin uses repeatedly for this phase of the relationship between reader and character is "co-experiencing", as opposed to the "co-creation" that is shared by reader and author (64).
[74] Bakhtin's two phases can be correlated with Caracciolo's distinction between an expressive "consciousness-enactment" and a representational "consciousness-attribution".

For Bakhtin then, *contra* Käte Hamburger, it is not only in fiction that "the subjectivity [the "I-originarity"] of a third-person figure *qua* that of a third-person can be portrayed". But the roots of this portrayal are existential, in the sense of deriving from the basic situation of an encounter between two consciousnesses, rather than representational, in the sense of remaining at the level of "identification" or "empathy" with the other.

Bakhtin's essay highlights the different levels at which the encounter between reader and character draws on real-life intersubjectivity. The moment or phase of identification or empathy, of "consciousness-enactment" in Caracciolo's terms (with the sub-personal neural mechanisms of simulation that may support it), draws on all the means (themselves at different simulative, "theoretical" or joint attentional levels) by which we identify with the intentionality of others in real life. But this is only one phase, for simultaneous with it is a further movement – a movement also found in everyday life, though fully realized only on rare and valuable occasions – by which this expressive enactment is consummated as a meaningful whole in an encompassing consciousness. In Section Two, below, I describe an instance of this process, of this motion from inner to outer, in the form of a phenomenological "series" of *disclosure* characteristic of modern fiction.

1.2 Writing and the Bringing to Awareness of Experience

> Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank, and of having nothing to do: once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or conversations in it, "and what is the use of a book," thought Alice, "without pictures or conversation?" (Carroll 1962 [1865/72], 23)

Alice's Adventures in Wonderland famously had its origins in Charles Dodgson's telling the story to the Liddell sisters while floating down the Isis at Oxford. But this

"paratext", which portrays it as an oral tale, is belied by the text itself, which is full of elements that are difficult or impossible to reproduce in an oral telling. Not only are there "pictures" (John Tenniel's famous illustrations) and "conversations" – Alice's dialogues with the creatures she meets – but throughout both *Alice* books we find a use of typographical and orthographical devices – the Mouse's tale in the form of a tail (48-9), for example, or the mirror-writing of the poem "Jabberwocky" (201), or the use of a different typeface size for the "extremely small" voice of the Gnat (222-4).

Alice's complaint about her sister's book serves as a reminder that from its inception as distinct genre in the mid-eighteenth century, children's literature has been focussed on the book not just as a vehicle for "immaterial" language, but as a material object which the child can visually scan and manually manipulate in different ways. As Gillian Brown has observed, this attitude to children's books had been endorsed from a pedagogic point-of-view by John Locke, in his highly influential 1693 treatise *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, where he argues that teaching children to read should "be made a Play and Recreation to Children" (Brown 2006, 352):

> Locke imagines educational toys, such as "Dice and Play-things, with Letters on them, to teach Children the Alphabet by playing" or an ivory ball with letters pasted upon it or games based upon vowels and consonants. Playing with these toys, children could "be taught to read, without perceiving it to be anything but a Sport" (352).

Pioneering publications of narratives specifically aimed at children, such as John Newbury's *A Little Pretty Pocket Book* (1744), echoed this imperative to mix



Figure 1

"instruction with delight" (Figure 1), as did publications such as "hieroglyphic" bibles (Figure 2). Matthew Grenby's forensic study of actual texts used by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century children – in particular the marginalia and other markings in them – has revealed the intensity and importance of the child's interaction with the book as a material object (Grenby 2011).



Figure 2

As Brown observes, Locke's suggestions concerning pictures and other devices does not simply reflect a desire to distract the child or to "sugar the pill" of instruction, but, rather, stress "the intimacy between mental operations and material objects":

> [R]eading proceeds not ex nihilo, but from the child's familiarity with images in the world. The abstraction of letters and words, their representation of meaning, integrally cooperates with their materiality, their appearance as shapes and symbols in the world. (Brown 2006, 353)

Thus eighteenth-century producers of alphabet cards would visualize the letters as gymnastic poses of the human body. When Locke suggests books with pictures "will entertain [children] much the better, and encourage [them] to read,"

> he is not only acknowledging visual pleasure and the pedagogical uses of pleasure, but more importantly presenting reading as an encounter between readers and objects. The material paraphernalia with which eighteenth-century publishers embellished and sold children's books thus bear witness to the Locke's understanding that mental processes rely on images, whether actual, remembered, or imagined. (353)

Locke developed his thoughts on the importance of pictures for children into a theory of adult reading on the model of the active perusal of the text as an object, rather than on that of the text as a communication that is merely "received" by the reader. As Brown writes, quoting Locke's *Conduct of Understanding*:

> [R]eading appears an energetic course of mental movements, a more extensive version of what children do with pictures. From the paradigm of the child's encounter with an image, Locke develops an interactive model of reading in which books are objects to be considered against our experience with other objects. Like all encounters with objects, reading proceeds by the senses. Unless 'we ourselves see [what a book asserts] with our own eyes, and perceive it by our own understandings, we are as much in the dark and as void of knowledge as before' reading the book. (354)

The view of reading proposed here by Locke, and endorsed by the development of children's print culture, is one that derives our understanding of texts not from an oral/aural model by which we "hear" narrative "voices" (above all that of the "narrator") but from a visual and tactile model of scanning, perusing and handling objects.

In Chapter One (subsection 2.1) I raised the issue of the impact of writing on narrative, citing David Olson's account of "literate culture" in *The World on Paper*. There, the emphasis was placed on the writing's inherent decontextualization, and hence the imperative for writing to recover the illocutionary force of language by incorporating "context" into itself (by becoming, to use the term developed in Chapter Two, a *contexture*). Here, in the context of the consideration of the relationship between writing and consciousness, it is necessary to follow Olson's

argument further. According to Olson, the decontextualization of writing necessitated the turning of non-lexical properties of speech – not only pragmatic context, but also such features as stress, intonation or accompanying gesture – into lexical ones (Olson 1994, 111), leading to the development of ever finer-grained vocabularies of expressive intent (to "insist" or to "imply", for example). When nominalized, these new vocabularies yield "concepts" such as "conjectures" or "statements" or "implications" (107-8). The objectification in writing of the illocutionary force of language raises the problem of the *intent* of language, the mental motivation behind it:

> [O]nce the illocutionary force of a text is recognised as the expression of a personal, private intentionality, the concepts for representing how a text is to be taken provide just the concepts necessary for the representation of mind. The theory of mind is nothing other than the set of mental concepts which correspond to the expression of the illocutionary force of utterances. (270)

Thus "literate thought" and "literate culture", Olson claims, brings to consciousness concepts and differentiations of intentionality and subjectivity that had previously merely been latent in language: this bringing to awareness has great significance for the development of Western epistemology and psychology.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for example, when England was in the process of becoming a "literate culture",[75] there was (as noted above in Chapter One subsection 2.1) a wave of incorporations of terms from Latin into English, a conspicuous part of which consisted of "speech act and mental state verbs" which, Olson argues, would come to play an important part in modern psychology and philosophy of mind (108). But equally apparent is the importance of such a

[75] In an English context, recent research on literacy in the early modern period has made a crucial distinction between reading and writing, which were taught separately at this time: it now seems that the former was much more prevalent, across social classes, than previously thought (Hart 2011, 108-9).

vocabulary – concerning itself with the interpretation of actions and words, the recovery of their illocutionary force – for the development of "evaluative" and "experiential" elements in literary narrative. This development is the subject of Monika Fludernik's (1996) historical survey of the growth of "experientiality" in literary narrative of the early modern period, which, as I now hope to demonstrate, is consonant with Olson's characterization of literacy as involving a shift from "thinking about things to thinking about representations of things, that is, thinking about thought" (282; c.f. Hart 2011, 110-12).

Fludernik draws on the basic structure of oral narrative posited by William Labov (Labov and Waletzky 1997 [1966]).[76] Of particular importance for Fludernik are the elements of "orientation" and "evaluation" that Labov identified as structural components of oral, anecdotal narrative. Labov's model involves a differentiation, in Fludernik's words, between

> a plotline and off-plotline level of the story, in which the plotline includes the initial orientation, the story episodes and the final result and evaluation, whereas the off-plotline level combines embedded orientation and interspersed evaluative or explicatory commentary. (Fludernik 1996, 63)

The extension and development of these elements of oral narrative in literary narrative establishes the basis of Fludernik's claim that her account of "experientiality" in the development of literary narrative constitutes a "natural" narratology. But Fludernik is also clear that as well as continuity between oral and written forms there is also transformation: she describes her historical account as

> [tracing] a development from what are traditionally believed to be oral kinds of narrative to texts allegedly modelled on the oral pattern to texts which have become emancipated from the oral tradition and have initiated a new (written) mode of *écriture*. (Fludernik 1996, 92)

[76] Labov's model has been an important point of reference for narrative theory: in addition to Fludernik see, for example, Pratt 1977 38-78. On Labov's research and its impact on wider narrative theory, see Toolan 2001 [1988], 143-77.

Olson's proposals concerning the re-structuring of consciousness and cognition through literacy suggests a change of emphasis from the framework proposed by Fludernik. In the first place it suggests more of an emphasis on the transformation (the "emancipation", as Fludernik has it in the passage quoted above) wrought by the technology of writing. And secondly (and more fundamentally) it suggests that in a literate culture the lines between "oral" and "written" cannot be neatly drawn: in a literate culture, "literate thought" becomes part of oral communication (Olson 1994, 281): modern media have ushered in an age of "secondary orality", which is "essentially a more deliberate and self-conscious orality, based permanently on the use of writing and print, which are essential for the manufacture and operation of the equipment and for its use as well" (Ong 1982, 136).

The combination of continuity and transformation that Fludernik describes in the transition from oral to written narrative can be recast in the terms offered by Olson, for whom, while "[s]peech is primary in expressive power", what writing provides is "consciousness of the implicit structure of speech" (Olson 1994, 265). The oral dimension of narrative, in other words, is not superseded or "lost" in the transition to literacy, but is brought to consciousness in a new way: writing recovers the illocutionary and expressive force of language by objectifying it – not only by turning it into concepts, but also by using graphic devices.

Alice provides a good illustration of this. As Gillian Brown points out in her commentary on the paragraph quoted above, conversation (with all its complex notation of graphic marks) represents, like pictures, precisely those elements of a narrative that are attuned to its visualization and spatialization by the text:

> Carroll presents [. .] conversation in a typography conspicuous for its abundance of punctuation marks – quotations, periods, commas, dashes,

> parentheses, italics, and question marks, thereby showing what Alice didn't find in her sister's books [. . .] [S]eeing printer's symbols for conversation is like seeing a picture [. . .] (Brown 2006, 355)

But the most important of the many conversations that populate *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* is the one that Alice has with herself. ("She generally gave herself good advice, (though she very seldom followed it), [. .] for this curious child was very fond of pretending to be two people" (Carroll 1962 [1865/72], 31).) Although it is written in the third-person, *Alice* is both a narrative and a "stream of consciousness": it is the record of a dream.

Thus in the same way that he turns conversation into a visible object, so Carroll uses typographical devices to articulate this stream-of-consciousness and to present visual analogues for the levels of discourse ("external" narration as against "internal" thought and feeling, for example) for a text that is both narrative and stream of consciousness.[77] This is apparent even before Alice starts talking to herself, in the use of italics to signal shifts towards subjectivity, in the form of evaluations ("*very*") or the focussing of visual attention ("*took a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket*"):

> There was nothing so *very* remarkable in that; nor did Alice think it *very* much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself, "Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!" (when she thought it over afterwards, it occurred to her that she ought to have wondered at this, but at the time it all seemed quite natural): but when the Rabbit actually *took a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket*, and looked at it, and then hurried on, Alice started to her feet [. . .] (Carroll 1962 [1865/72], 24)[78]

[77] On the use of typographical devices to differentiate levels of consciousness in modernist fiction (Joyce, Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, Waldo Frank, Dos Passos, Faulkner) see Humphrey 1954, 57 -61.
[78] We find the same device used at the opening of *Through the Looking Glass And What Alice Found There*: "One thing was certain, that the *white* kitten had had nothing to do with it: – it was the black kitten's fault entirely. For the white kitten had been having its face washed by the old cat for the last quarter of an hour [. .] so you see that it *couldn't* have had any hand in the mischief" (Carroll 1962 [1865/72], 187).

When Alice starts her internal dialogue, as here when she falls down the rabbit-hole, punctuation – the graphic visualization of linguistic expressivity – is used to articulate both, on the one hand, spoken and unspoken dialogue-with-self (quotation marks) and the differentiation of narrative "levels" (parentheses):

> "Well!" thought Alice to herself, "after such a fall as this, I shall think nothing of tumbling down stairs! How brave they'll think me at home! Why, I wouldn't say anything about it, even if I fell off the top of the house!" (Which was very likely true.)
>
> Down, down, down. Would the fall *never* come to an end! "I wonder how many miles I've fallen by this time?" she said aloud. "I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth. Let me see: that would be four thousand miles down, I think –" (for, you see, Alice had learnt several things of this sort in her lessons in the schoolroom [. .]) (25)

Towards the end of the chapter – as though marking the limits of verbalization, and the possibilities of graphic representation beyond it – Carroll uses a cloud of asterisks to signal the further transitions of consciousness and body-state when Alice shrinks (30) and then grows again (32). The same device is used in *Through the Looking Glass* to signal the transitions from one square of the chessboard to another.

In a writer of adult fiction such as D.H. Lawrence, the use of such graphic devices may not be so playful or abundant, but its effect may be all the more telling for that relative scarcity, as in this passage from his short story "The Man Who Loved Islands":

> Once, when he went to the door, he saw the black heads of men swimming in his bay. For some moments he swooned unconscious. It was the shock, the horror of unexpected human approach. The horror in the twilight! And not till the shock had undermined him and left him disembodied, did he realize that the black heads were the heads of seals swimming in. (Lawrence 1982, 476)

The movement here is from an external to an internal view, and back out to an external view. "The horror in the twilight!" marks the furthest extreme of this

gesture, and the exclamation mark is vital to its expressive (as opposed to representational) force: indeed, if Lawrence had omitted the exclamation mark the effect would have been marked, since it would seem to imply a sudden switch to external commentary, breaking the smoothness of this narrative gesture.[79]

The objectification of language's illocutionary and expressive force – and hence of the intentionality and subjectivity behind it – thus takes place at multiple levels. It takes place, for example, in the development of new vocabularies and concepts, as Olson has demonstrated. And it takes place at the graphic level of language-as-picture. But as we have argued in the previous section and in Chapter Two, the process of reading has to be understood dynamically and cumulatively, in terms of its orientation towards a whole – a contexture, an aesthetic sign – that will be perceived with relation to, potentially, the whole of the reader's existence. Thus, in terms of the present case, it is necessary to understand the objectification of subjectivity in literary (written and printed) narrative not just in terms of particular features, lexical or graphic, but in terms of its phenomenology, its dynamic and genetic process of construction.

1.3. Representing Thought in Writing

The idea that the sentences of Free Indirect Discourse (FID) are "narratorless" in the sense of belonging exclusively to writing rather than to oral communication is one that is associated principally with linguist Ann Banfield (1982). But as emerges from Roy Pascal's account of the early history of the theoretical investigation of FID,

[79] The full expressive subjectivity of "The horror in the twilight!" is prepared for by the stuttering syntax of the previous sentence, with its evocation of a subjectivity that might evaluate the difference between a "shock" and a "horror". On the role of repetitions, ellipses, interjections and exclamations (all relying heavily on orthographical devices) in signalling transitions to subjectivity, see Fludernik 1993, 237-44.

it is one that can be discerned in the early debates surrounding the nature and significance of the phenomenon (Pascal 1977, 8-30). "Style indirect libre" was first fully described and given a label in 1912 by Charles Bally, a pupil of Saussure. According to Pascal's summary, Bally defined "three possibilities of rendering the words or thoughts of a character, the first two being long known to grammarians":

> 1. *oratio recta* (direct speech): He stopped and said to himself, 'Is that the car I saw here yesterday?'
>
> 2. *oratio obliqua* (indirect speech): He stopped and asked himself if that was the car he had seen there the day before.
>
> 3. an unrecognized form (*style indirect libre*): He stopped. Was that the car he had seen here yesterday? (Pascal 1977, 8)

The third of Pascal's examples clearly demonstrates the most well-known characteristic of the style – its combining of the "narratorial" mode (the third-person and historic tense of the verb), on the one hand, with, on the other hand, deictics ("here", "yesterday") and expressive qualities (the question form) that reflect the subjectivity of the character. Pascal's summary emphasizes the continuity of the narrative voice:

> the narrator, though preserving the authorial mode throughout and evading the 'dramatic' form of speech or dialogue, yet places himself, when reporting the words or thoughts of a character, directly into the experiential field of the character, and adopts the latter's perspective in regard to both time and place. (Pascal 1977, 9)

This interpretation of the phenomenon, emphasizing the role of a narrator, gives rise to Pascal's characterization of free indirect discourse as involving a "dual voice".

But while the characterization of FID on which Pascal settles maintains the presence of a narrator, his account of the debates surrounding the first appearance of the concept demonstrates how fragile that presence may be under different interpretations of FID. As Pascal observes, Bally himself comes to the conclusion

> that [FID] does not occur in common linguistic usage and is purely a product of writing. He therefore calls it not a figure of speech but a 'figure of thought' ('figure de pensée'), which he defines as 'a type of thought characterised by a conflict between the thing thought and the linguistic signs by which it is expressed'. (Pascal 1977, 13)

As the term "style *indirect* libre" indicates, Bally regarded the phenomenon as to be associated, on syntactical grounds, more with indirect than direct speech (10). But a contrary interpretation was put forward by two German respondents to Bally's account, Etienne Lorck and Eugen Lerch. Both Lorck and Lerch supported Bally's identification of the phenomenon – and agreed with him that it was a distinctively literary phenomenon, not to be found in normal linguistic usage – but criticized his characterization of it as an "indirect" style: for them, the style was – despite its syntactical affinities with indirect speech – closer in substance to direct speech (14-15). Lerch tried out two terms – "the imperfect tense of speech" and "speech as fact" ("Rede als Tatsache") – but it was Lorck who came up, to quote the title of his 1921 book, with the term that has stuck in German: *Die 'Erlebte Rede'*. As Pascal summarises, the term "*erlebte Rede*" ("experienced speech") captures what Lorck thought was most important about the form – that it demonstrated that there were two sorts of language, the "imaginative" and the "rational", corresponding to two uses of language, "one to communicate experience and the other to communicate information" (23).[80]

Lorck's interpretation of "*erlebte Rede*", the "imaginative" communication of "experience", remained impressionistic: as a form of communication, he likened it to the audience's feelings of empathy with a character in the theatre, while for the writer

[80] Ann Banfield cites quotations from Dujardin, de Magny and Vološinov (who draws on Lorck) to similar effect, i.e. that "represented thought and speech" (the third of Bally's possibilities for rendering a character's thoughts and speech) is "non-communicative" in the sense of not transmitting information to an addressee (Banfield 1982, 136-7). On the debate between Swiss and German linguists over this terminology see Fludernik 1993, 82-3.

it was associated with heightened moments of creativity and identification in the absorption of written composition (Pascal 1977, 23). It was only later in the century that we find scholars begin to analyse the linguistic basis of "non-communicative" language in literary narrative (i.e. language that does not imply a speech act communicating information between a narrator and narratee).[81] Emile Benveniste (1972 [1966]) argues that the temporal system of French grammar consists of two separate realms, "*discours*" and "*histoire*" that correspond, respectively, to the use of the *passé compose* and the aorist, and to oral "communication" as against writing, especially historical writing and the "third-person" novel. Käte Hamburger, similarly, focuses on verb tense as indicative of the fact that literary narrative is not "communicational" in the sense that speech is. In literary narrative, she observes, "[t]he grammatical past tense form loses its function of informing us about the pastness of the facts reported" (Hamburger 1973, 70-1):[82] in other words, narration can be abstracted from any "narrative instance" or putative speech-act originating in a subject. This is decisively demonstrated, she argues, in the fact that "deictic temporal adverbs can occur conjointly with the past tense" (71). (Thus, in the example quoted above: "*Was* that the car he had seen here *yesterday*?" (rather than

[81] There is a significant problem of terminology here. S. Y. Kuroda (1976; 1979), Banfield (1982) and Sylvie Patron (2008; 2009; 2010/2011; 2013) concur in restricting the term "communication" to that which passes between a speaker and hearer (i.e. to what has been characterized in this thesis as "dyadic" signification), and thus characterise their own theories of narrative as being "non-communicational" or "non-communicative". (Patron refers to "poetic" theories of narration (Patron 2010/2011).) This restricted use of "communication" will be followed here, on the understanding that in a wider sense – through the process of joint attention, for example – meaning can be "communicated" in ways other than according to the dyadic, speech-act model. Patron, in her discussion of this issue, uses the phrase "co-intentionality", which comes close to the concept of joint attention drawn on in this thesis:

> Reading a third-person fictional narrative implies recognizing the author's intentions relative to the objective or subjective character of sentences or contexts. In this sense, there is indeed a form of communication or co-intentionality between author and reader, but Kuroda and Banfield prefer to limit the term *communication* to communication between speaker and addressee properly speaking [. . .] (Patron 2013, 246)

[82] Not all languages, of course, have a "literary" past tense such as the French aorist and the Russian preterite. In this context Banfield argues that "the existence of a literary tense in only certain languages can be taken as a direct realization in a linguistic form of a distinction which exists in universal grammar, but whose realization in other languages is indirect" (Banfield 1982, 302).

"the day before").) This "deictic shift",[83] whereby deixis is originated not from any enunciating subject but from "experiencing-I", forms the basis for Hamburger's celebrated claim that "[e]pic fiction [i.e. third-person narration] is the sole instance [. .] where the subjectivity of a third-person figure *qua* that of a third-person can be portrayed" (139).[84] S.Y. Kuroda (1976, 1979) draws on examples from Japanese to corroborate the claims of Benveniste and Hamburger that "there exist certain grammatical features that put some uses of sentences, mostly in writing, outside the realm of speech discourse in the usual sense" (Kuroda 1979, 11). As Sylvie Patron summarizes his findings:

> Sentences which use the adjectival form of the adjective/verb pair for expressing feeling (*kanasii* instead of *kanasigaru* ["sad"]) or the word *zibun* ("self") for representing "point of view" or the "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) of one or more characters in the third person cannot be described adequately within the framework of the communicational theory of linguistic performance which is based on the concepts of speaker and receiver. (Patron 2010)

As Kuroda himself writes of a sentence employing the Japanese "self" (*zibun*) in a third-person narrative context:

> Reading this sentence we obtain an image or knowledge of an event, but we do not assume the existence of any consciousness which has judged the occurrence of this event and communicated it to someone. Simply the sentence creates in us the image or knowledge of the event. This and this much is the function of the sentence vis-à-vis the reader. (Kuroda 1976, 134)

This "objective" function of language, according to Kuroda, is distinct from – and more basic than – its communicative function. The distinction points to the fact that "any sentence which has been created as a real entity in the world calls up a meaning

[83] Karl Bühler devotes a considerable part of his *Theory of Language* to deixis (Bühler 1990 [1934], 93-166). The phenomenon of deictic shift is explored from a cognitive point of view in Duchan *et al* 1995.
[84] This central theme of Hamburger's is developed (to embrace, for example, first-person narration in the past tense) by Dorrit Cohn (1978).

in the mind of the person hearing or reading it – and does so whether the sentence is materialized in a situation of communication or not" (Patron 2010/11).

Banfield (1982) has demonstrated that uniquely in the Free Indirect Discourse (or "Represented Speech and Thought", to use Banfield's own term) of literary narrative, the "expressive" function of language can be decoupled from its "communicative" function (Banfield 1982, 63). The "expressive" features are those indices of subjectivity, such as exclamations, repetitions, hesitations, inverted questions ("Was that the car [. . .]?" in the example above) and other syntactical markers, that are lost if one attempts to derive indirect discourse from direct discourse by way of Chomskyan "transformations" from the "deep" to the "surface" structure of a sentence:[85] indirect discourse abstracts from direct discourse only its propositional content and illocutionary force, and is thus interpretative rather than imitative (Banfield 1982, 41-58; Fludernik 1993, 370). In the spoken language, in direct speech, expressivity is inseparable from communication, whereas the language of narrative creates "a uniquely literary form of reporting speech and thought which ultimately allows us to establish the independence of expression from communication" (Banfield 1982, 63). Banfield likens the form of representation manifested by "Represented Thought and Speech" to that which can be discerned in the "echo question" of conversational discourse:

> "I'm going to Slough for my holiday."
> "You're going to *Slough* for your holiday?"[86]

[85] For a detailed inventory and analysis of expressive features that builds on Banfield's initial survey, see Chapter 4 "Indirect and free indirect discourse: deictic features and expressivity" in Fludernik 1993, 227-79.

[86] The same effect as the echo question can be seen in the contemporary use of "like": "I was like, 'You're going to *Slough* on your holiday?'", where this could be either a thought- or speech-representation.

Both represented speech and thought in narrative and the echo question are neither a direct imitation, nor an interpretation, but rather "heard speech" (Banfield 1982, 128) – or, one might substitute, "*erlebte Rede*" ("experienced speech").[87]

Banfield describes third-person literary narrative as being made up of two distinct kinds of sentence, both of which are "unspeakable" in the sense of lying outside the communicational framework of ordinary face-to-face discourse:

> narrative fiction [is] linguistically constituted by two mutually exclusive kinds of sentences, optionally narratorless sentences of pure narration and sentences of represented speech and thought. Both of these sentences are "unspeakable". (Banfield 1982, 185)

The first is the sentence of pure narration – which, following Benveniste and Hamburger, she sees as positing no originating "speaker" or "narrator". The second is the sentence representing consciousness, in which the expression of subjectivity emanating from a "self" has become dissociated from any sense of that "self" also being a "speaker". In the latter case, subjectivity is objectified: in Hamburger's words, "the subjectivity of a third-person figure *qua* that of a third-person" is portrayed (Hamburger 1973, 139).

Fludernik (1993) builds on Banfield's central insight into the "non-communicational" function of literary narrative,[88] but develops Banfield's model in

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[87] Fludernik discusses the relation of the echo question to FID, but focuses on the issue of the challenge that the example of the echo question poses to Banfield's presentation of FID as an exclusively written as opposed to oral phenomenon (Fludernik 1993, 170-76). In the context of this characterization of represented speech as "heard" or "experienced" speech, it is appropriate to mention José Ángel Garcia Landa's article "Overhearing Narrative", in which he describes instances where "[d]issonant reception, the gap between the actual reader and the implied reader, places the actual reader in the position of an eavesdropper on a discourse which is addressed to the implied reader. The communicative context, including presupposition and shared knowledge, is 'seen from the outside' when we overhear. Overhearing thus acts as an embedding of contexts" (Landa 2004, 202). Landa is primarily concerned with the connection between this notion of "overhearing" and Erving Goffman's analyses of different forms of communicative social interaction, rather than with the possible connection with "narratorless" models of narrative mediation. Vera Tobin (2008, 81-5; 2014) specifically links the concept of the reader "overhearing" narrative with that of joint attention.

[88] "[T]he very spirit and function of the linguistic paradigm [i.e. the "communicational" model] [. .] is alien to the structure and function of literary texts" (Fludernik 1993, 60).

the direction of greater nuance, flexibility and inclusiveness. She demonstrates, for example, that, contrary to Banfield's representation of FID as being exclusively a modern literary invention, FID can in fact be found both in oral discourse (as in the echo question and use of "like" discussed above) and (in the form of scattered examples) in medieval and early modern texts (Fludernik 1993, 83-4, 93-9). She demonstrates, also, that FID is a property of the *discourse* in the sense that it operates contextually and cannot be reduced to grammatical, syntactical rules operating solely at the level of the sentence: movements from indirect discourse to FID, for example, may be comprehensible only in the context of the broader flow of the narrative (Fludernik 1993, 285-97). (These contextual and dynamic aspects of FID will be explored further below, in Section 2.1.)

In summary, then, we find a convergence between the notion of narratorless *écriture* proposed by Benveniste, Kuroda, Banfield, Patron and (with significant qualifications) Fludernik, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the accounts given by Olson, Donald and others of the active restructuring of cognition and consciousness by writing: the interaction with written narrative brings to consciousness the illocutionary force of language as a distinct realm, as a distinctively narrative dimension of evaluative experience. Subjectivity is objectified (or rather, as we shall see below, subjectivity and objectivity are subject to a mutual involution, an involution that, in turn, involves the "involvement" of the reader). As Banfield writes:

> The linguistic division between subjectivity and objectivity becomes possible only when the hold of the communicative intent over language guaranteed by the dominance of speech over writing is broken. Once divided, their conjunction – because it does not assimilate one to the other – allows them to be grasped as the two faces of knowledge contained in language. (Banfield 1982, 17)

In Chapter Two, we saw how the aesthetic function of language involves an objectification (that is, a constituting as a semiotic object) of the relation between sign and object: this relation is no longer automatized, but, rather, becomes itself an object for thought and questioning – just as, as we saw in Chapter One (subsection 1.4), the narratives of very young children can become decontextualized semiotic objects). The objectification of subjectivity that we find developed in modern narrative fiction can now be seen as an extension of this function, made specifically possible by the semiotic possibilities of writing and print.

2. Narrative and Phenomenological Disclosure

In an exemplary piece of research at the intersection of historical, cognitive and narratological concerns, Nicholas Dames (2007, 2011) has explored the work of an eclectic group of mid-Victorian psychologists and critics who developed a "physiological" account of reading. Their approach was, in Dames' words, "a processual, affective, reader-centred methodology whose notion of 'form' was thoroughly temporal" (Dames 2007, 10). I will return to this group below, in Section 2.1, when I discuss "pre-reflective consciousness" in narrative fiction. Here I cite Dames' account of the perspective on the process of novel-reading provided by G.H. Lewes (partner of George Eliot), for whom

> the novel, by providing a perfect field for the exercise of silent reading, starts to shape itself more and more closely to the form of consciousness itself – that is, the novel's "patterns" become identical to the "patterns" of [. .] consciousness, because silent reading is where the flux of consciousness is most evident. (Dames 2007, 51)

This perspective on how silent reading interacts with the form of literary narrative underlines a point that has run through this thesis: the inadequacy of models based purely on an oral/communicative paradigm to account for the process of reading fiction.

More immediately, though, it also underlines the point made at the beginning of this Chapter (subsection 1.1): that consciousness is not simply "represented" in fiction, but *enacted* through the reader's interaction with the text. "[F]ictional consciousnesses", as Marco Caracciolo writes in a recent study of the "experientiality" of narrative, "are 'enacted' (in the sense of 'performed')" (Caracciolo 2012, 45).[89] In this Section, building on the account of represented thought in subsection 1.3, above, I attempt to describe the form that that enaction takes – to describe how, in Dames' words, narrative fiction "starts to shape itself more and more closely to the form of consciousness itself". This will lead me, as it does Lewes/Dames, to the idea of "patterns" – but here, rather than "patterns", I shall use a much more late-twentieth- and twenty-first century concept: topology. To understand how "mind" and "consciousness" are constituted in fiction, I suggest, we must start engaging in *topological* thinking – a thinking that may incorporate haptic as well as visual metaphors. This perspective is supported by the argument, presented in sub-section 2.2, that the experience of consciousness in modern fiction involves a bringing-to-awareness, an objectification, of the process of phenomenological "disclosure".

[89] The theoretical framework offered in this thesis is congruent with Caracciolo's important attempt to "rethink the representationalist foundations of narratology" through an enactivist account of the reader's *experience* of consciousness in narrative (Caracciolo 2014, 9; see also Caracciolo 2012).

2.1 Representations and Experience: Cycles of Objectivity and Subjectivity in the Narrative Evocation of Consciousness

I return to the passage from D.H. Lawrence that I quoted above (sub-section 1.2.) on account of its use of the exclamation mark:

> Once, when he went to the door, he saw the black heads of men swimming in his bay. For some moments he swooned unconscious. It was the shock, the horror of unexpected human approach. The horror in the twilight! And not till the shock had undermined him and left him disembodied, did he realize that the black heads were the heads of seals swimming in. (Lawrence 1982, 476)

There I described the movement of this passage as being from an external to an internal view, and back out to an external view, with "The horror in the twilight!" (with its exclamation mark) marking the furthest extreme of this gesture. But this remains an objectivist, third-person description, cast in terms of movements within a Euclidean conceptual space. One could apply to it the words that Dames chooses to characterise the view of the novel promoted by Henry James and Percy Lubbock (in contrast to the "physiological" view that had preceded them): "a spatialized form dedicated to epistemological processes" (Dames 2007, 37).

Though such a description may have value as a theoretical construct, a heuristic, it does not describe the experience of reading. The conceptual space through which the reader moves in the act of reading is not a fixed and stable Euclidean space, but a space that changes with every reading moment, through the accumulation of what has gone before and the fresh anticipations ("protentions", to use Husserlian language) of what is to come. The problem with the objectivist, third-person description is that while it correctly describes a movement from external to internal and back to external, it implies that, in that movement, those positions of exteriority and interiority are "left behind" as the narrative "moves on": whereas

what happens in practice is that what has gone before is gathered up and becomes part of what is now and to come.

Thus to return to the paragraph from Lawrence, the extreme subjectivity and expressivity of "The horror in the twilight!" is gathered up and becomes a part of the "object" that is described in the last sentence:

that the black heads were the heads of seals swimming in.

Where "The horror in the twilight!" is *expressed* – its trajectory is from *within* – in this final sentence the narration looks, along with the protagonist, from the *outside* – at the experience realized as an object. In the course of these two sentences, the inside has become part of the outside. Or rather, taking the passage as a whole, and beginning from its "external" starting-point, one could say that in the course of five sentences an outside has become an inside which has in turn become an "outside"...

How, then, is one to re-conceptualize the "space" and "perspective" of the *experience* of a passage of narrative such as this? How is it constituted in the consciousness of the reader? As a starting-point for answering these questions, I return to Ann Banfield. In *Unspeakable Sentences*, Banfield demonstrates the linguistic means by which literary narrative is able to articulate two distinct "levels" of consciousness – "non-reflective" consciousness, which corresponds to the pre-reflective perception, the pure sense impression prior to any mental or verbal report, and "reflective" consciousness, which refers, roughly, to the contents of "thought" (Banfield 1982, 203-6).[90] Banfield draws attention, for example, to the difference between the following:

[90] Fludernik describes Banfield's account of this distinction as "perhaps [her] most valuable contribution to the field" (Fludernik 1993, 376).

> (a) It was seven o'clock, and it was coming a little bit light. He could see the houses.
> (b) Yes, it was seven o'clock, and it was coming a little bit light. He heard some people calling. The world was waking. A grey, deathly dawn crept over the snow. Yes, he could see the houses. (D.H. Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*) (Banfield 1982, 203)

Here, (a) can be read in both ways, as non-reflective or reflective – as the representation of passive perception yet to be articulated as thought, or as a perception that has been raised in awareness to become articulated in and *as* thought. In the case of (b) there is a disambiguation, and the passage is a clear representation of reflective consciousness. Both passages share the "deictic shift" characteristic of represented consciousness in narrative, especially the shift of the "now" of the experiencing consciousness into a past tense and the use of "shifted" modals such as *could, should, would* or *might* where direct discourse would have *can, shall, will* or *may* (Banfield 1982, 200-1). But in (b) the exclamation "Yes" evokes a report or reflection on the perception. The transition from the one to the other can be articulated, too, by the use of "parentheticals". Banfield cites a sentence from Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway*: "It was raining, she saw". Here, as Banfield points out, the meaning is not that she saw it raining, "but that she discovered or realized that it was raining." The sentence involves, in other words, a bringing to awareness, a disclosure, of something that had been latent and unexpressed at another level of consciousness: it is a "'knowing that' and not the kind of knowledge which underlies our awareness of some sensible fact" (Banfield 1982, 205).

Banfield argues that in its representations of reflective and non-reflective consciousness, "the language of narrative has the resources for a picture of the activities and states of the mind commensurate with the most sophisticated theories of knowledge and consciousness" (Banfield 1982, 210). She calls on a disparate

collection of authorities to support the notion of an "unconscious knowledge" embodied in "non-reflective consciousness", from Descartes and Peirce to Bertrand Russell and Chomsky (the notion of linguistic "competence"). By way of philosophical antecedents, she cites Descartes' distinction in *Meditation VI* between "a passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible things," as opposed to "another active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas" (quoted 197). She also cites Bertrand Russell's observation that "It is necessary [. .] to distinguish between experiences that we notice and others that merely happen to us" and Sartre's distinction, in the Introduction to *Being and Nothingness*, between "non-thetic" (non-reflective) and "thetic" (reflective) consciousness – non-thetic consciousness being the tacit knowledge one has of one's own body as a subject, while thetic consciousness posits one's own body as an *object* for reflection (Banfield 1982, 197-9).[91]

One of Fludernik's (1993) criticisms of Banfield's theory is that Banfield does not sufficiently ground this distinction between two kinds of "knowledge" ("knowing that" as against "knowledge as awareness") in the crucial difference between what she (Fludernik) calls "the representation of utterances and that of consciousness" (Fludernik 1993, 310-1):

> Whereas utterances, like events, can be experienced objectively, that is to say are empirically verifiable between observers (listeners), thought processes, attitudes, intuitions and emotions *cannot* be "observed" except by self-

[91] As Evan Thompson writes, adopting Merleau-Ponty's term "prereflective" for Sartre's "non-thetic": "[M]ost of the time one's own body is not present as an intentional object but is experienced in an implicit, tacit, and prereflective way [. . .] Prereflective experience is logically prior to reflection, for reflection presupposes something to reflect upon; and it is temporally prior to reflection, for what one reflects upon is a hitherto unreflected experience" (Thompson 2007, 249-50). As this formulation implies, the "prereflective" or "non-thetic" consciousness is also a *self*-consciousness (corresponding, as we shall see below, to Antonio Damasio's "core self"). For a discussion of this key phenomenological proposition that pre-reflective consciousness is also a form of self-consciousness see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 46-51.

> distancing (introspection), nor can they be "known" except by the experiencer her-/himself. (Fludernik 1993, 312)

For psychologist Alberto Rosa, the distinction manifests itself as that between two facets of "experience" – experience, on the one hand, as referring to "what the senses present, and thus [. .] to how one gets to know the real", and experience, on the other hand, as *learning*, as (objectively observable) alterations in behaviour ("utterances", for example, that constitute "beliefs") that become dissociated through, and feed back into, the interaction with the "real" so constituted:

> [Experience] makes beliefs about the real [. .] appear as separate from what the senses present. The consequence is the development of consciousness – the capability of producing conceptions of the real, related but not exclusively dependent on what the senses present. (Rosa 2007, 293)

Experience, in other words, is the interaction between *how* we "know" the world and what we know *of* it in the sense of what we learn from it, of that which is actualized by and in reflective consciousness.

In Nicholas Dames' account of the mid-Victorian "physiological" theory of the novel, already referred to, he writes of the "Victorian unconscious" as manifested in mid-nineteenth century "sensationalist" fiction. In Dames' account, this is not a Freudian, repressed unconscious, but rather "the body's ongoing register of experience, capable at any moment of being activated into something at the center of one's attention" (Dames 2011, 223). He is invoking here the theory of consciousness that has been proposed by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003, 2010), and Damasio's ideas can equally help elucidate and develop Banfield's distinction between non-reflective and reflective consciousness.

Damasio's central distinction is between, on the one hand, "core" consciousness, which he regards as common to all mammals, and, on the other hand,

"extended" or "autobiographical" consciousness, which is displayed most powerfully in humans. Core consciousness consists in the brain's ongoing "mappings" of the interactions that are taking place between organism and environment. At the most basic level, the organism's brain constantly constructs neural maps of the state of its own body. It also constructs maps of any external object with which it is interacting; these latter maps are to be found in the sensory and motor structures of the brain that are activated by the interaction with the object. These two kinds of maps Damasio refers to as "first-order" maps (Damasio 1999, 169). Crucially, these two forms of mappings (pertaining, on the one hand, to the organism and, on the other, to the object) interact, in that the sensorimotor maps pertaining to the object cause changes to the maps pertaining to the organism. These interactions between the two first-order maps are themselves subject to "second-order neural maps" which provide a "swift nonverbal account of the events that are taking place in the varied brain regions activated as a consequence of the object-organism interaction" (170): this second-order account is what constitutes "core consciousness". To elucidate it, Damasio draws out a metaphor that will become pertinent to the discussion, below, of the cycles of objectivity and subjectivity (of "representation" and "experience") in the presentation of consciousness in narrative fiction: "[O]ne might say that the swift, second-order nonverbal account narrates a story: *that of the organism caught in the act of representing its own changing state as it goes about representing something else*" (170; emphasis in original). Core consciousness is a "wordless narrative" (171).

The key to the development of "extended" or "autobiographical" consciousness, according to Damasio, lies in *memory*. The ability to retain specific

episodes of core consciousness in memory transforms them into *objects* for further interaction and mapping:

> The secret of extended consciousness is revealed in this arrangement: autobiographical memories are *objects*, and the brain treats them as such, allows each of them to relate to the organism in the manner described for core consciousness, and thus allows each of them to generate a pulse of core consciousness, a sense of self knowing. In other words, extended consciousness is the precious consequence of two enabling contributions: First, the ability to learn and thus retain records of myriad experiences, previously known by the power of core consciousness. Second, the ability to reactivate those records in such a way that, as objects, they, too, can generate 'a sense of self knowing,' and thus be known. (196-7)

Extended consciousness thus operates across wider time-frames than core consciousness, creating a sense of "autobiographical self" through the interaction with memory. But core consciousness remains vital to extended consciousness, for it is the "re-entry" of core consciousness, the ability of the object of consciousness to generate a pulse of core consciousness, that imparts to the organism a "sense of self knowing".[92]

Damasio's theory of "core" and "extended" consciousness has two features lacking in Banfield's model of "levels of consciousness" (Banfield 1982, xx). In the first place, where the quotations from Descartes and Russell describe what Banfield calls "pre-reflective consciousness" in passive terms, Damasio's "core consciousness" is the dynamic mapping of pulsations of *interaction* with the environment. And secondly, the "objectification" of the experiences of core consciousness by extended consciousness suggests a topology of consciousness, and a trajectory of the self through its various forms, quite different from the notion of a movement *from* one "level" *to* another: core consciousness is not superseded or "left behind" by extended

[92] The notion of a genetic, quasi-recursive process of "re-entrant mapping" is central to neuroscientist Gerald Edelman's "biological theory of consciousness" (Edelman 1989; 1992).

consciousness, because core consciousness "returns", so to speak, as the mapping of its own interactions with its own experiences, now transformed, through memory, into objects. While Banfield's is essentially a static, spatial concept, in other words, Damasio's is genetic.

In free indirect discourse, narrative fiction reflects the distinction we have been discussing between two kinds of knowledge, non-reflective and reflective, through an oscillation between internal and external views. For theorists coming from a "narratorial" perspective, this oscillation, this opalescence, represents the "dual voice" of free indirect discourse, its mingling of the "voice" of the character with that of the narrator:

> [Free indirect discourse] serves [. .] a double purpose. On the one hand it evokes the person, through his words, tone of voice, and gesture, with an incomparable vivacity. On the other, it embeds the character's statement or thought in the narrative flow, and even more importantly in the narrator's interpretation, communicating also his way of seeing and feeling. (Pascal 1977, 74-5)[93]

Banfield had demonstrated that the notion of two "voices" is misconceived, and that the essence of the effect produced by FID lies in an abstraction of subjectivity from enunciation – an abstraction which is difficult and unnatural for speech but natural to writing. Yet, as Fludernik's detailed analysis demonstrates, while such features as deictics, syntactical transformations, lexical choices and markers of expressivity can all be important indicators of a shift to this external, third-person evocation of subjectivity, individual grammatical features alone cannot disambiguate individual sentences taken individually; any individual sentence must be read contextually (Fludernik 1993, 75, 80). Nor can these features be convincingly corralled into a

[93] For a survey of the "dual voice" approach to Free Indirect Discourse – which is precisely the tradition opposed by Banfield in her notion of "unspeakable sentences" – see Fludernik 1993, 322-3.

single linear sliding-scale ranging from the external to the internal (Fludernik 1993, 309-12).[94]

Indeed, as Fludernik points out, one of the oddities of Free Indirect Discourse involves the fact that it is at the point in the scale when it is most internal, in the sense of being expressive of Banfield's "non-reflective consciousness", that it is at the same time capable of being read simultaneously as lying at the extreme external end of the spectrum (Fludernik 1993, 431). As one moves towards the more internal, subjective end of the spectrum, from verbalized, reflective consciousness to pre-verbal unreflective consciousness, there is at the same time a paradoxical strengthening of the narrative's "objectivity":

> the less reflective instances reside in the area of narrativized representations of consciousness, in which the character's increasingly mute feelings and emotions are portrayed from a necessarily external perspective. The more unaware a character is of the thought content described, the more one reverts to an external description of that consciousness, and returns to the narrative proper. (Fludernik 1993, 431)

Thus, for example, representations of reflective consciousness, a form of "interiority", may simultaneously be manifestations of external "psycho-narration":

> Banfield's category of reflective consciousness [. .] straddles the divide between free indirect discourse and psycho-narration and extended narrated perception, or – put differently – it draws the lines between these three types of speech or thought representation not according to semantic *content* (utterance by a character, description of a consciousness by a reporting instance, description of a character's perception), but in accordance with expressive features which imply awareness [. . .] (Fludernik 1993, 378)

In other words, through the transformations made possible by articulation in written narrative, this awareness (this "knowledge *of*", to return to the terms used earlier) can open up a new third-person perspective, as psycho-narration.

[94] Fludernik also argues that a single scale cannot accommodate the difference between speech- and thought-representation (Fludernik 1993, 310-11).

Another example of this recycling between subjectivity and objectivity concerns Fludernik's category of "narrated perception" ("the presentation of events in a manner evocative of a character's perceptual experience" (267)). Here, the evocation may be as allusive as a word-order that might suggest an order of perceptual experience:

> He turned to see, entering the door, his father, his mother, and his aunt. (James Baldwin, *Go Tell It on the Mountain* quoted in Fludernik 1993, 305)[95]

While this hint of expressive iconicity suggests subjectivity, the proposition is simultaneously "objective", and hence potentially susceptible to be read "externally". Here, again, we see – and from points at further ends of the linear inner-outer spectrum than was the case with transformation between psycho-narration and reflective consciousness – an instance of subjectivity opening out into objectivity.

Following on from these ambiguities, Fludernik notes the important function that Free Indirect Discourse serves as a transition between different presentations of speech, thought or perception:

> [F]ree indirect discourse is notable precisely because it facilitates [. .] smooth transition between different types of discourse representation. Such formal camouflaging of moves from potentially more mediated to less mediated speech and thought report can serve a variety of textual functions from the gradual zooming in on a character's psyche to the clever manipulation of figural discourse within an ironic, narratorial argument. (Fludernik 1993, 310)

Fludernik's use here of the terms such as "moves" and "zooming in" highlights the third-person nature of her description: we are back to the problem highlighted at the beginning of this sub-section – that of how the transitions between different types of consciousness-representation (for example, between prereflective and reflective

[95] Fludernik's observations are supported by Ronald Langacker's theory (discussed in Chapter Two sub-section 2.2, above) that grammatical constructions are "imagistic" in character and informed by particular dynamic "construals".

consciousness) can be described. Is there a way of describing these transitions that is more true to the first-person, phenomenological experience of the accumulating contexture of the narrative than is the case with this positing of "moves" between "levels"?

To begin to answer that question, I take an example from the opening of John Updike's novel *Rabbit, Run* (1960):

> (1)Boys are playing basketball around a telephone pole with a backboard bolted to it. (2) Legs, shouts. (3) The scrape and snap of Keds on loose alley pebbles seems to catapult their voices high into the moist March air blue above the wires. (4) Rabbit Angstrom, coming up the alley in a business suit, stops and watches, though he's twenty-six and six three. (5) So tall, he seems an unlikely rabbit, but the breadth of white face, the pallor of his blue irises, and a nervous flutter under his brief nose as he stabs a cigarette into his mouth partially explain the nickname, which was given to him when he too was a boy. (6) He stands there thinking, the kids keep coming, they keep crowding you up. (Updike 1990 [1960], 3)

The transitions between external and internal views are more complex here than was the case with the Lawrence example. In the first three sentences we are given an objective, external description of the basketball game. The fourth sentence begins in the same vein, though turning to a different object. But with the words "stops and watches", things are subtly turned around: we are offered the potential of the foregoing description being gathered up into Rabbit's subjective view. The extent to which this potential is realized – the extent to which the sentences are retrospectively read as narration or narrated perception – will depend on the individual reader: under a strong reading of this gathering-up, for example, attention will be drawn to the disjointed syntax of sentence (3) ("Legs, shouts.") as an expressive marker of (Rabbit's) subjectivity.

But the reader is compelled to realize this potential to at least *some* extent, if one is to conceive Rabbit as being not just a part of the scene but perceiving it as well (as we are told he does, and as is necessary to make sense of sentence (6)). We are thus faced with a transition whereby an objective, external view has become simultaneously a subjective, internal view (the correlate of Rabbit's "stopp[ing] and watch[ing]). (I say "simultaneously" because the objectivity of the first three sentences is not lost or left behind in the transition (as it would be with a purely geometric, Euclidean conception of these relations), but is rather *embedded* in the subjectivity by a move that is both linear and non-linear.) The situation, though, is more complex than that, because the transition that we have just described is itself embedded in an external view of Rabbit that is presented as seamless with the external view of the basketball game that, with "stops and watches", has become gathered into Rabbit's subjectivity. (I shall return to this strange form of circularity.) After "stops and watches" (4), the external view of Rabbit is extended and accentuated in (5) before it morphs into a narrated thought (6) that – with its strong traces of expressivity (the repetition of "keep"), and therefore subjectivity – reads as a highly reflective correlate of the more prereflective perception contained in the first three sentences. The final sentence of the paragraph thus gathers up the whole of the paragraph not only thematically, but also in the sense of construing it as a movement (albeit, as we have seen, with convolutions along the way) from prereflective perception ((1) – (3)), through selective attention ("stops and watches" (4)) to highly reflective consciousness (6).

If this exposition does indeed seem convoluted, then the convolutions are necessary to convey the interweaving of external and internal perspectives by which Rabbit appears as part of the scene simultaneously with the scene appearing as the

object of his subjective perception (as a "part of him", so to speak). Throughout *Rabbit, Run* (and indeed, throughout his *oeuvre*) the smoothness and seamlessness of these transitions from external to internal to external views is key to the "lyricism" for which he is celebrated (or sometimes excoriated). I take one more example, from the very end of the novel, because it demonstrates the (perhaps somewhat self-conscious) artistry and virtuosity with which Updike can make ever finer distinctions between, for example, prereflective and reflective consciousness. Rabbit is walking the streets near his house:

> (1) Although this block of brick three-stories is just like the one he left, something in it makes him happy; the steps and windowsills seem to twitch and shift in the corner of his eye, alive. (2) This illusion trips him. (3) His hands lift of their own and he feels the wind on his ears even before, his heels hitting heavily on the pavement at first but with an effortless gathering out of a kind of sweet panic growing lighter and quicker and quieter, he runs. (4) Ah: runs. (5) Runs. (Updike 1990 [1960], 177)

While the whole passage is constructed around successive, cumulative switches between prereflective and reflective consciousness, I will concentrate here only on the last three sentences, and especially the last two.[96] The long sentence (3) contains, to simplify matters considerably, an expressive, subjective element (the "aesthetic" rhythm of "lighter and quicker and quieter") embedded in an "objective" view ("His hands lift . . . he runs"). But in sentence (4) this latter, objective view is itself embedded – by the expressive "Ah" and the purely graphic mark of the colon – in Rabbit's subjectivity. The final, one-word sentence is profoundly (or playfully, depending on one's perspective) ambiguous, bearing out to an extreme Fludernik's point that in actual discourse sentences can only be understood in context. It is

[96] It is worth noting, though, the pivotal role of the trip caused by the "illusion" he has momentarily been immersed in: such interruptions to the smooth functioning of automatic actions are characteristically instances of prereflective consciousness (of the automatic action) being brought to the awareness of reflective consciousness.

possible to read it simply as a return to the objectivity of, for example, "trips" in sentence (2). But this is an impoverished reading, and one that halts the momentum of the embeddings that precede it. This momentum impels one to the notion that this objectivity is simultaneously embedded in the subjectivity of the sentence that leads up to it: that Rabbit has taken ownership of it, of his world, in a last-moment, one-word burst of confidence that sweeps him out of the frame of the novel (and into the next in the tetralogy). And at the same time, of course, the sequence "he runs. Ah: runs. Runs." is an artistic arabesque, highlighting through the repetitions of runs how the skilful writer can (in line with the analysis presented in sub-section 1.2, above) achieve the subtlest effects through the purely graphic means of punctuation.

It is time now to step back and return to the question that was posed at the beginning of this sub-section: How to describe the *experience* of the reader's involvement in the narrative? More specifically: How to describe the *experience* (rather than just the "representation") of consciousness in modern narrative fiction? For that element of experience is crucial: when, in the paragraph from the opening of *Rabbit, Run*, Rabbit "stops and watches", the representations contained in the previous sentences become experiences which the reader, through joint attention, experiences with him. So how can we describe these cycles of objectivity and subjectivity, of representation and experience, that are characteristic of the experience of consciousness in modern fiction? What kind of "series" do they represent?

It is a series, in the first place, that it is hard to map onto a conventional, Euclidean notion of space, for it involves a process of inside-becoming-outside-becoming-inside, of "dehiscence" (a "gaping, opening by divergent parts" (e.g. by fruits to discharge their mature contents) [OED]) or perhaps, conversely, of

"invagination" (the "action of sheathing or introverting; the condition of being sheathed or introverted; intussusception" [OED]). But these organic metaphors describe a single rather than continuous action. So one could turn to a *topological* model such as the "Möbius strip" or "Penrose triangle" (Figure 1).[97]



Figure 3

In the case of the Möbius strip, the effect is produced by a two-dimensional surface having been twisted in the third dimension. In the case of the "Penrose triangle", a three-dimensional object has been twisted in a fourth dimension. The reader's trajectory through the oscillations of objectivity and subjectivity, of representation and experience could be described in terms the trajectory of a line traced on the surface of the Möbius strip, or the advance of a plane through the Penrose triangle.[98]

But these borrowings from topology, while providing attractive theoretical models, remain third-person descriptions. They solve the problem of adhering to conventional conceptions of space, but still represent a first-person process in terms of a third-person object. For a first-person description of the process, I turn in the next sub-section to some formulations of the phenomenological notion of "disclosure". My suggestion, ultimately, is that, rather as (as we saw above) G.H.

[97] The "strip" is named after mathematician August Ferdinand Möbius (1790–1868), the "Penrose triangle" after physicist Roger Penrose (1931).
[98] Floyd Merrell (2003) invokes these two figures to describe the "flow" both of Peircean semiosis and of "core" and "extended" consciousness in Damasio's theory (114-17).

Lewes saw the "patterns" of the novel converging with the "patterns" of consciousness through silent reading, so the experience of "reading consciousness" in fiction brings to awareness, discloses through objectification, an isomorphic process in consciousness itself. This process is what Merleau-Ponty calls "disclosure of the world" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xx), operating through the intentionality of consciousness.

2.2 Phenomenological Disclosure and the Narrative Evocation of Consciousness

An important theme running through the previous two chapters was the idea that language embodies different forms of directedness or intentionality towards the world. In Chapter One this theme manifested itself as "joint attention" and "joint intention", in Chapter Two as the "functionalism" whereby language is regarded as a tool for relating to the world in different ways. For phenomenology, this intentionality is generalized to perceptual consciousness: "It is intentionality," Husserl writes, "which characterizes *consciousness* [. .] and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of *one* consciousness" (Husserl 1931 [1913], 242). In this sub-section I will show how a particular reading of phenomenological intentionality, as a form of disclosure of the world and its objects, can be correlated with the dynamics of experiencing consciousness in narrative identified in the previous sub-section. Two formulations of phenomenological disclosure are discussed – one, by Mark Rowlands, which draws attention to the role played by external "vehicles" for phenomenological disclosure, and the other, by Merleau-Ponty, which focusses on the role of the body in disclosing the world. Drawing on these formulations, I argue that the experience of consciousness in modern narrative fiction, consisting of the reader's interaction with

the text, articulates and brings to consciousness the process of phenomenological disclosure by which the world is constituted as an object of consciousness. I conclude the section by relating this argument to the discussion in Chapter Two of the "aesthetic function" by which the whole of the aesthetic sign is correlated with the whole of the subject's existence.

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl makes the distinction – paralleling Gottlieb Frege's distinction between "reference" and "sense" – between the "object which is intended" by language and "the object *as* it is intended": "the victor of Austerlitz" and "the initiator of the French legal code" intend the same person, but the object *as intended* differs (Gurwitsch 1982, 62). The latter constitutes the "meaning" of the words: many different meanings can refer to the same object, which "transcends" any particular designation. The distinction can be generalized to perceptual experience:

> The perceived thing in general, and all its parts, aspects and phases, whether the quality be primary or secondary, are necessarily transcendent to the perception [. . .] The *same* colour appears "in" continuously varying patterns of "*perspective colour-variations*" [. . .] One and the same shape (given *as* bodily the same) appears continuously ever again "in another way", in ever-differing perspective variations of shape. (Husserl 1931 [1913], 242)

The particular aspect under which the object falls at any moment Husserl calls the "*noema*" or "object *as* it is intended", and he distinguishes it both from the object *that* is intended (Frege's "reference") and from the particular act of intention, e.g. perceiving, remembering, imagining etc., which he terms the "*noesis*".[99] When we experience an object, we experience it as capable of appearing under different,

[99] Multiple noetic acts can converge on the same noema, as when we perceive a particular person and later remember them. Equally, multiple noemata can refer to the same object.

further aspects. This capacity, in the words of Aron Gurwitsch, constitutes the "directedness" of intentionality:

> Experiencing an act of consciousness, we are directed to an object insofar as in the structure of the noema corresponding to the act there are inscribed references to further noemata, to different manners of presentation of that object. (Gurwitsch 1982, 65-66)

As Gurwitsch notes, the theory of the intentionality of consciousness entails a revision of our ideas of "subjective" and "objective". A particular meaning or noema may be regarded as objective seen from the point of view of the multiple subjective perceptive acts that may intend it (as, for example, when these noetic acts are distributed among a number of people sharing attention/intention towards an object). But at the same time, "[a] particular noema, defined as the thing appearing under a certain aspect, is in turn to be characterized as subjective with respect to the perceived thing itself, of which the former is a one-sided perceptual adumbration" (Gurwitsch 1982, 69). The totality of things perceived constitute what Husserl calls the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), but "life-worlds" are in part social constructs (the agglomeration of everything a particular culture or society regards as "real"), and so could be regarded as subjective from the point of view of an "objective world" in the more universally "human" sense of "a set or system of invariant structures, universal insofar as they are by necessity exhibited by every socio-historical life-world" (Gurwitsch 1982, 69). And further, as Gurwitsch points out, there is the world described by modern science, the world of sub-atomic particles and genes: "From the point view of the universe of science, the world of perceptual experience appears in turn as subjective" (Gurwitsch 1982, 70). Through these nestings of subjectivity and objectivity, we can see that under the theory of intentionality, subjective and objective become relative rather than absolute (Cartesian) terms.

Below, I will discuss how Merleau-Ponty's focus on the living body complicates this account of intentionality: this embodied perspective will be important in relation to the aesthetic function's orientation towards the *whole* of the subject's existence. But first, I want to look at how Mark Rowlands (2010) has developed Husserl's notion of intentionality from the point of view of extended cognition: Rowlands' focus is on how a material entity external to the body (such as, to take an example from Rowlands himself, a narrative in a book) can become a vehicle for intentionality.

Phenomenological intentionality, in Rowlands' summary, has a tripartite structure comprising: (i) the act, (ii) the object, and (iii) the mode of presentation of the object (Rowlands 2010, 182). The mode of presentation thus mediates between act and object. Rowlands draws on Frege's distinction, mentioned above, between sense as the object of thought, as that which can be apprehended, and sense as the determinant of reference. This second characterization of sense implies that for any intentional object of a mental act, there must be a further sense that determines the reference of that intentional object (Rowlands 2010, 170 -3). This second, referential aspect of sense is, in Kantian terms, *transcendental*, in that it creates the "conditions of possibility" of that intentional sense (169):

> Understood transcendentally, sense is what permits any given mental act to have or take an intentional object. As such, sense is not an object of *that* intentional act (although nothing has been said that precludes it from being the object of other intentional acts). Transcendentally, with respect to intentional act *A*, the sense of *A* is not an object of awareness for *A*'s subject because this sense is what permits *A* to have an object. If the sense of *A* were to be made into an object, there would have to be another sense that allowed it to appear as such. (Rowlands 2010, 177)

Returning to the distinction between the act, the object and the mediating role of "mode of presentation", Rowlands argues that to the two Fregean aspects of sense

there correspond two modes of presentation: as an intentional object of thought, the object appears under an "empirical" mode of presentation, whereas

> in its transcendental role, a mode of presentation is a *condition of possibility* of intentional objects. A transcendental mode of presentation is what makes a given empirical mode of presentation *possible*. This, ultimately, is what justifies the rubric *transcendental*. (185)

Rowlands rephrases this distinction between the empirical and transcendental modes of presentation of the object in terms of a distinction between *vehicle* and *content*. Under the empirical mode of presentation the object is a content of consciousness, an "intentional object": the *vehicle* for this content, by contrast, is the transcendental mode of presentation that makes the empirical mode of presentation possible.

If it is the case, as Rowlands claims, that for any intentional object of a mental act there must be a further sense that determines the reference of that intentional object, and if this transcendental sense can itself become an intentional object, necessitating a further sense that determines its reference, then we have entered a potential infinite regress. But Rowlands argues that although for every object or content of consciousness there is always a mode of presentation by which that object is constituted as an object, there is no inherent necessity for that vehicle to be raised to awareness and become itself an object. Rather than a regress, Rowlands proposes a "*noneliminable intentional core*" of experience, a thread of pure intentionality that always exceeds, points beyond, the phenomenal "things" of awareness (Rowlands 2010, 183-6). This noneliminable intentional core of experience manifested in the transcendental mode of presentation of the contents of consciousness Rowlands identifies with a process of *disclosure*: "intentional directedness toward the world consists in a form of *revealing* or *disclosing activity*" (Rowlands 2010, 186).

Rowlands' argues that the phenomenal disclosure of the world is extended beyond the body through external vehicles: the disclosure that pertains to intentionality is a "travelling through" – a passage through different material realizations, vehicles – that may take in both brain and external objects such as interactive features ("affordances") of the environment or "cognitive artefacts" (tools, symbols, language) (Rowlands 2010, 196-202). As an illustrative example of how consciousness "travels through" vehicles which may not themselves rise to awareness as objects, Rowlands cites the reading of fiction:

> Suppose you are utterly engrossed in a novel. Your consciousness passes through the words on the page – these are not explicit objects of your awareness – through to the characters and plot-lines these words communicate. (Rowlands 2010, 199)

As this thesis has explored, the "passing through" from "words on the page" to "characters and plot-lines" is considerably more involved than is allowed for in Rowlands' broad-brush characterization. But the philosophical point he is seeking to make is apposite, and can be turned back to illuminate the inner workings of this "passing through" the words on the page: as is realized in modern fictional techniques for the representation of consciousness, written narrative has the capability of enabling the consciousness involved in the reading of fiction to "pass through" analogues for precisely those transformations between subjectivity and objectivity that we have seen to be characteristic of phenomenological intentionality.

This can be seen if we refer back to the discussion in the previous sub-section (2.1) of what I termed there the cycles of "representation" and "experience" in narrative fiction: for we can apply to Banfield and Fludernik's distinction between non-reflective and reflective consciousness, and also to Damasio's account of how the experiences of core consciousness are transformed by extended consciousness, the

same vehicle-content distinction that Rowlands applies to the relation between transcendental and empirical modes of presentation. A content of consciousness is something we have knowledge *of*, a dynamic object of consciousness recordable in memory. Its vehicle, on the other hand, is the subtended process (the non-reflective consciousness, Damasio's "core consciousness") *by virtue of which* we have that "knowledge *of*", but *of* which we have no explicit knowledge unless it itself becomes an object of reflective awareness. In the cycles and embeddings that we have seen at work in the genetic, progressive presentation of consciousness in modern narrative fiction, we find a constant recycling of objective representation as vehicle for subjective experience, with this subject then being available for external, objective representation.

I wrote above of narrative fiction's providing an analogue, through the cycles of experience and representation, for the trajectory of intentionality through vehicles and contents (as Rowlands terms it, its ceaseless process of *disclosure*). But is this relationship more intimate than one merely of theoretical construct, of analogy? I will now endeavour to show how a consideration of Merleau-Ponty's development of Husserl's "intentionality" towards a fully *embodied* phenomenology will suggest just such a more intimate relationship. The role of the body in intentionality, its peculiar capacity to generate invaginations and dehiscences of subjectivity and objectivity, not only provides a more first-person account of the dynamic topologies presented in the previous sub-section (2.1): we shall also see, referring back to our discussion of the aesthetic function in Chapter Two, that it is to this bodily, incarnate existence that the artistic sign *as a whole* is oriented. The contexture speaks directly to the lived body, as that which constitutes the whole of the subject's (reader's) existence.

In his essay "The Philosopher and his Shadow" (1959), Merleau-Ponty draws out some particular observations of Husserl's in *Ideas* that complicate the conception of phenomenological intentionality as an "aiming at" the world. He cites the fact that "[w]hen my right hand touches my left, I am aware of it as a 'physical thing.' But at the same moment, if I wish, an extraordinary event takes place: here is my left hand as well starting to perceive my right [. . .] The physical thing becomes animate" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 166). There is in this phenomenon "a kind of reflection" that is no longer a unidirectional relationship of perceiver and perceived:

> The relationship is reversed, the touched hand becomes the touching hand, and I am obliged to say that the sense of touch is here diffused into the body – that the body is a "perceiving thing," a "subject-object" (166)

This phenomenon of the touching and touched hand runs as a *leitmotif* through Merleau-Ponty's work. It is there in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945), where, among other points, Merleau-Ponty observes that the two hands are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched and touching to each other:

> When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set-up in which both hands can alternate the roles of "touching" and being "touched". (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 93)

In "The Philosopher and His Shadow", Merleau-Ponty goes on to develop the vital connection between the phenomenon that has just been described and intersubjectivity. When I shake another man's hand – "or just look at him" – the other's body becomes animate in the same way. This is not an intellectual process of comparison or analogy, or of "projection" (not a question, one might say, of "Theory of Mind"):

> The reason why I have evidence of the other man's being-there when I shake his hand is that his hand is substituted for my left hand, and my body annexes the body of another person in that "sort of reflection" it is paradoxically the

> seat of. My two hands "coexist" or are "compresent" because they are one single body's hands. The other person appears through an extension of that compresence; he and I are like organs of one single intercorporeality. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 168)[100]

This "carnal intersubjectivity" belongs to "the pre-theoretical, pre-thetic, or pre-objective order" (172), to the "Logos of the esthetic world" (173).

In a chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible* (his last, unfinished book) titled "The Intertwining – The Chiasm" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 130-55), Merleau-Ponty expands on this idea that the flesh, the living body, is both "subject" and "object" of experience – sees and is seen, touches and is touched. Recognition of flesh's "double reference" (137), of the intimate relation of "the obverse and the reverse" (138) in its being both "seer" and "visible", means that in describing it we have to reject the traditional topologies of both idealism and materialism:

> We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box. (138)

The "reciprocal insertion and intertwining" (138) of visible and seer, of tangible and touching is disclosed above all in the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, in the moment when seeing becomes visible:

> [T]hrough other eyes we are for ourselves fully visible [. . .] For the first time, the seeing that I am is for me really visible; for the first time I appear to myself completely turned inside out under my own eyes [. . .] [T]he body is lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the unique occupation of floating in Being with another life, of making the outside of its inside and the inside of its outside. (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 143-4)

[100] For Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues, "the experience of others is first of all 'esthesiological'" (i.e. pertaining to the senses, especially to *feeling*) (168).

In the inaugural event of intersubjectivity, in other words, the transcendence by which we intend a world, by which we open our experiences to a world, presses on through a reciprocal "coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body" (146).[101]

We have seen how Husserl's phenomenological intentionality – the directedness of consciousness towards the world – entails a continual flipping (potential or actualized) between objectivity and subjectivity, and also how, as Merleau-Ponty makes explicit, the body is the both the origin and the nexus of these transformations. It now remains to relate these observations to the reader's experience of the narrative contexture and to the aesthetic function that gives rise to that contexture. In the chapter of the *Phenomenology of Perception* titled "The Synthesis of One's Own Body", Merleau-Ponty argues that the unity of the body is not that simply of a coordination of parts. Movement and perception cannot be analysed merely into correlations or linear series: the unity of the body is originary and performative rather than summative and functional (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 149-51).[102]

Nor does the unity of the body consist in that perceptual unity, given by perspectival variation, that we find in physical objects. In this, according to Merleau-Ponty, "[t]he body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art" (150):

> A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning accessible only through direct contact [. . .] It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a nexus of lived meanings, not the law for a certain number of covariant terms. A certain tactile experience felt in

[101] Here, perhaps, we can see a fulfilment of his claim, in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, that "the chief gain from phenomenology is to have united extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xix).

[102] Thus, to refer back to an example already given (Chapter Two sub-section 2.3), the whole action of grasping an object is given in the action's initiation. The inadequacy of mechanical and behaviourist accounts of movement and perception constitutes a major theme of Merleau-Ponty's first book, *The Structure of Behaviour* (Merleau-Ponty 1964 [1942]).

> the upper arm signifies a certain tactile experience in the forearm and shoulder, along with a certain visual aspect of the same arm, not because the various tactile perceptions among themselves, or the tactile and visual ones, are all involved in one intelligible arm, as the different facets of a cube are related to the idea of the cube, but because the arm seen and the arm touched, like segments of the arm, together *perform* one and the same action. (151)

We are back to the question of "objectivism" with which I opened this chapter (sub-section 1.1.): one does not encounter a novel or a story in the manner that one encounters a physical object. Rather, one experiences it more in the manner that one experiences another person, or one's own body.

And we are back, also, to the notion of the contexture and the aesthetic function that I discussed in Chapter Two. The aesthetic function, we saw there, is the function that relates the *whole* of the sign (thereby subordinating communicative functions that may be contained within it) to the *whole* of the subject's existence. In the *wholeness* to which it continually points, the aesthetic sign, the contexture, is comparable to another human subject, whom we do not construct by a series of propositions but whose subjectivity (which is all we can ever know of them for sure) we experience all at once, corporeally:

> When a different behavior or exploring body appears to me through a first "intentional encroachment," it is the man as a whole who is given to me [. . .] I know unquestionably that the man over there *sees*, that my sensible world is also his, because *I am present at his seeing*, it *is visible* in his eyes' grasp of the scene. And when I say I see *that* he sees, there is no longer here (as there is in "I think that he thinks") the interlocking of two propositions but the mutual unfocussing of a "main" and a "subordinate" viewing. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 169)

Toward the end of this passage on the primordial intersubjective encounter that constitutes the "sensible world", Merleau-Ponty invokes the moment of joint attention/intention as being the moment when the "form that resembles me" becomes a man, and simultaneously the sensible world comes into existence:

> Suddenly a gleam appeared a little bit below and out in front of its [the form's] eyes; its glance is raised and comes to fasten on the very things that I am seeing. Everything which for my part is based upon the animal of perceptions and movements [. .] falls at once into the other person. I say that there is a man and not a mannequin, as I see that the table is there and not a perspective or an appearance of the table. (169-70)

In Chapter One, I argued for the importance of this joint attentional moment both in the developmental origins and the historical development of narrative: narrative both actualizes this moment at its genesis, by giving it dynamic form, and endlessly elaborates it, through multiplying differentiations of its internal structure, in its historical development.

Intentionality, then, is fundamental to narrative (Herman 2013, 23-99). In Chapter Two, drawing on Mukařovský, I showed how this intentionality, originally imparted to the narrative by the joint attention that constituted it, is gathered up into its *contexture* – that is, into its orientation toward its *whole* as an aesthetic sign. But this orientation towards the whole of the sign is also an orientation towards the reader, for it is only through the reader that this orientation, this intentionality of the text, is realised – in the form, for example, of such linear or reader-oriented series as curiosity or suspense.[103] Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the unity of the body (and his comparison with the unity imparted by the aesthetic function), as well as his account of the primordial intersubjective encounter, highlights this common thread of intentionality that runs through both the contexture of narrative fiction and our experience both of our bodies (and hence of other bodies) and of the world. In

[103] The intentionality of the text is thus not simply a matter of the intentions of the author (though these play a part): it is, rather, a matter of the complex interaction constituted by the joint attention of author and reader – which, as we have seen in Chapter One, may embrace many embedded forms of joint attention within it. Herman (2013) describes narratives (adopting a term from Daniel Dennett) in terms of "intentional systems" (16, 23, 44, 73).

modern narrative fiction, this thread of intentionality is itself brought to awareness in the form of the series of *disclosure*.

3. Image and Consciousness in Modern Narrative

In previous section of this chapter I outlined a process of *disclosure* characteristic of the reader's experience of consciousness in modern fictional narrative. This process, I argued, was marked by dynamic, cumulative transformations whereby what was internal and subjective is turned inside-out to become external and objective, and vice versa. In third-person terms, this series of disclosure could only be described by complex, multidimensional topologies such as the Möbius strip and Penrose triangle. In first-person terms, I argued, it can be read as the bringing to awareness of a dynamic inherent in the intentionality with which we perceive and interact with the world, a dynamic of disclosure whereby consciousness unfolds and passes through successive modes of presentation: coincident historically with the bringing-to-awareness of this dynamic in modern fiction has been its bringing-to-awareness in the phenomenological tradition.[104]

The mutual involutions of objectivity and subjectivity characteristic of this process of disclosure were illustrated with examples of how modern experiential narrative characteristically describes a trajectory of self-absorbing cycles of subjectivity and objectivity, of experience and representation, in the linguistic differentiation of pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. Here, in this section, I examine how this series of *disclosure* expresses itself in two other areas. In

[104] For an overview of the relation between phenomenology and modernism in the arts, see Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg 2010.

subsection 3.1 I examine its expression in the use of imagery to evoke pre-reflective consciousness. And in subsection 3.2 I examine how, in the work of Georges Rodenbach and W.G. Sebald, it acquires a new form, directly attuned to the visual and material quality of modern narrative, through the incorporation of photographs into the text.

3.1. Verbal Imagery and Pre-Verbal Awareness

In *Consciousness and the Novel*, David Lodge highlights the importance of metaphor for representing what philosophers refer to as *qualia* – that is, the immediate and subjective "what-it's-like" qualities of consciousness. Lodge begins by citing a passage from Anne Michaels's novel *Fugitive Pieces*:

> The winter street is a salt cave. The snow has stopped falling and it's very cold. The cold is spectacular, penetrating. The street has been silenced, a theatre of whiteness, drifts like frozen waves. Crystals glisten under the streetlights.

> This illustrates one of the primary means by which literature renders qualia – through metaphor and simile. Whiteness is white, coldness is cold. There is no literal, referential description of such things that is not tautological. But in literature, by describing each quale in terms of something else that is both similar and different – "a salt cave," "a theatre of whiteness," "like frozen waves" – the object and the experience of it are vividly stimulated. One sensation is invoked to give specificity to another. The nonverbal is verbalised. (Lodge 2002, 13)

In this subsection I explore the paradox pointed to by Lodge: that the specificity of things, their unlike-anything-else-ness, should be conveyed by translating their qualities into the qualities of something else – so that, for example, the qualities of Anne Michaels' snowdrifts become the qualities of "frozen waves". I will argue that this use of imagery for evoking the preverbal "feeling" of consciousness reflects, and brings to awareness, the capacity of perception, at a pre-conceptual, pre-verbal level, to integrate the objectivity of the object with the subjectivity of the subject's

reception of that object. In making this argument, I call again on Antonio Damasio's account of consciousness in terms of "first-order" and "second-order" mappings. I also invoke John Dewey's (1934) analysis of art in terms of the way in which to have an "experience" is to both transform and be transformed by what is experienced: in Dewey's terms, the use of imagery discloses the dual process of "doing" and "undergoing" inherent in experience.

In section 2.1, above, I discussed how – utilizing the resources of a *written* language liberated from its communicative function, as described by Ann Banfield – narrative fiction moved in the modern period to an exploration of the most private, pre-reflective and pre-verbal layers of consciousness. This tendency was manifested at its strongest in the form of "stream-of-consciousness" narrative (Humphrey 1954; Friedman 1955; Steinberg 1979; Fernihough 2007). As a genre of *novel*, stream-of-consciousness saw its high-water mark in the period 1890-1930 (for example in works by James Joyce, Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf and William Faulkner): as a genre of *narrative discourse*, it has subsequently percolated much wider, mixing with other genres (Humphrey 1954, 113-19).[105]

A number of commentators have noted how, in the form of the stream-of-consciousness narrative's tendency to evolve a private, subjective system of associations, affinities can be discerned between these new narrative techniques and

[105] "Stream-of-consciousness" is a contentious term. Dorothy Richardson, to whose writing it was first applied by May Sinclair (Sinclair 1979, 93), described it as "perfect imbecility" (Richardson 1979, 76). Robert Humphrey and Alan Palmer have both highlighted the fact that it cannot be strictly defined in narratological terms – that is, in terms of a single, isolatable "technique" (Humphrey 1954, 23; Palmer 2004, 23-5). Palmer, though, does concede that "the ostensive and practical definitions are very precise" in the form of their reference to the canonical authors of the period 1890-1930 cited above (Palmer 2004, 24). The practical, *generic* approach that underlies my discussion here is that of Melvin Friedman in his *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method* (1955): "'Stream of consciousness' designates a type of novel in the same way that 'ode' or 'sonnet' designates a type of poem" (Friedman 1955, 3).

symbolism (Humphrey 1954, 76-84; Edel 1955, 123; Friedman 1955, 79-80). Friedman describes the "stream of consciousness novelists" as "the inheritors of Symbolism via Dujardin" (Friedman 1955, 79).[106] Humphrey, who defines the "symbol" as "a truncated metaphor [. .] a metaphor with the first term lacking" (Humphrey 1954, 78),[107] has analysed how – either in the form of a *leitmotif* or, at a deeper level, as a structuring device – it has informed the novels of Joyce, Woolf and Faulkner (Humphrey 1954, 80-3, 90-4, 99-104, 110-1).

One way of interpreting this turn to symbolism that we see in the stream-of-consciousness novel is in terms of "inward turn", a turn to the "inner", the "subjective", the "unconscious" (Herman 2011b, 250-4).[108] Thus Leon Edel characterizes the modernist project in terms of the construction of an "interior" world: what the nineteenth-century novelist hadn't realized, Edel writes, was

> the possibility of the artist's creating the *illusion* that we are inside the mind of the character by the same process through which, say, Balzac creates the illusion that we are inside the Maison Vauquer: by the massing of detail in such a way that the interior comes alive, so that we feel ourselves within the boarding-house and among its people as the story unfolds. (Edel 1955, 21)

Robert Humphrey, by contrast, defines the stream-of-consciousness genre in terms of the light it sheds on consciousness as a form of *mediation*: stream of consciousness novels are "novels which have as their essential subject matter the consciousness of one or more characters; that is, the depicted consciousness serves as a screen on which the material in these novels is presented" (Humphrey 1954, 2).

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[106] Édouard Dujardin was the symbolist poet whose novel *Les Lauriers sont coupés* (1887) was acknowledged by Joyce as an influence on *Ulysses* (Friedman 1955, 145).
[107] Humphrey continues by observing that the symbol is "a device for concentrating the expression of a comparison; it is at the same time, [. .] like all metaphor, a device for expanding meaning" (Humphrey 1954, 78). Below, I shall discuss John Dewey's account of art in terms of "expression".
[108] Among those who have characterized modernism in terms of "inwardness" or "subjectivity" Herman cites Leon Edel (1955), Erich Kahler (1973), Randall Stevenson (1992) and Jesse Matz (2004) (Herman 2011b, 250-1).

He defines "consciousness" as indicating "the entire area of mental attention, from preconsciousness on through the levels of the mind up to and including the highest one of rational, communicable awareness" (2). These latter levels, he observes, are common to all "psychological fiction": what marks out "stream-of-consciousness fiction" is that "it is concerned with those levels that are more inchoate than rational verbalization – those levels on the margin of attention" (2-3).

Humphrey's approach, then, differs from the idea of an "inward turn" in that it emphasises the *mediating* role of consciousness, particularly of pre-reflective consciousness: it is oriented, in other words, *outwards* towards the object. "Sensation," Joyce says in an interview with Arthur Power, "is our object, heightened even to the point of hallucination" (Power 1979, 73). There are echoes in this of Baudelaire's symbolist concept of *surnaturalisme*:

> In certain, almost supernatural, spiritual states, the profundity of life is revealed in all its fullness in the thing, however banal, which one is looking at. It becomes the symbol of that profundity. (Quoted in Scott 1991, 211)

In his commentary on this, Clive Scott describes Baudelaire's *surnaturalisme* as being "a state of perception which intensifies the existence of things, makes them *hyperbolically* themselves" (Scott 1991, 210). This conception of the symbol is oriented towards the object – it is the "fullness of the thing" that itself becomes the symbol – but is at the same time subjective, a "spiritual state". In the interview quoted above, Joyce describes the project of modernism as being "to create a new fusion between the exterior world and our contemporary selves." What is normally described as "objective", he dismisses as "a pattern which has been laid out by other people in another generation, an objective pattern imposed on us by church and state." In these circumstances, he concludes, the writer "must maintain a continual struggle against the objective: that is his function" (Power 1979, 73). And yet he goes

on to warn against any flight from contemporary reality into "idealism", because "[m]ost lives are made up like the modern painter's themes, of jugs, and pots and plates, backstreets and blowsy living-rooms inhabited by blowsy women, and of a thousand daily sordid incidents" (74). Joyce's argument, then, seems to be not with objects, or even "objectivity" if it is construed in the right way, but rather with a particular, publicly sanctioned (above all literary) construal of objectivity: what he wants is an objectivity that is true to the *sensation* – a "subjective objectivity", one might say.

Similarly, in the essay on Dorothy Richardson quoted above, May Sinclair cites J.B. Beresford's Introduction to Dorothy Richardson's *Pointed Roofs*, in which he confesses that when he read the novel in manuscript he decided that it "was realism, was objective", but that when he read it in typescript he thought: "This [. . .] is the most subjective thing I have ever read." For Sinclair, the anecdote underlines the imperative "to throw off the philosophic cant of the nineteenth century" with its "distinction between idealism and realism, between subjective and objective" (Sinclair 1979, 91).[109] These distinctions have their origin in Descartes, and David Herman (2011b) has pointed out the challenge that modernist narrative poses to Cartesian notions of the separation of mind and world, of "inner" and "outer". He posits instead an approach based on "enactive" theories that see cognition as constituted by sensorimotor couplings with the environment (Thompson 2007; Varela et al 1991): modernist narratives, under Herman's approach "stage the

[109] To take another example of the same thought, Clive Scott writes that "[w]hen we shift from the first line of Ezra Pound's celebrated 'In a Station of the Metro' to the second,

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
> Petals on a wet, black bough.

we pass through that 'precise instant' which, Pound tells us, this poem is all about, 'when a thing outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective'" (Scott 2007, 43).

moment-by-moment construction of worlds-as-experienced through an interplay between agent and environment" (Herman 2011b, 250).

My argument is slightly different, and suggests a path by which the concept of "coupling" between agent and environment can be deepened. The use of imagery and metaphor in the representation of preverbal consciousness, I want to suggest, reflects an interactivity between agent and environment at that level of pre-verbal "pure sensation" – an interactivity that expresses itself, in its verbal representation in modern narrative, in the form of extensions and translations of *quality*, of *likeness*. In Peircean terms, these are processes of *abduction* pertaining to the realm of "Firstness", the realm of pure quality and possibility where "qualities merge into one another. They have no perfect identities, but only likenesses [. . .]" (Peirce 1955, 77).

I am switching focus, in other words, from the interactivity between agent and environment at the level of "affordances" for action, of "representations", to the interactivity between agent and environment at the level of preverbal "experience". In *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (2007), Mark Johnson describes his own trajectory as a philosopher from a concern with "structural aspects of our bodily interactions with our environment" (in other words, those forms of interaction on which Herman focusses) to an exploration of "the qualities, feelings, emotions, and bodily processes that make meaning possible" (Johnson 2007, x). These latter, for Johnson, constitute the "aesthetic dimension" of our existence:

> [A]ll our meaning, thought, and language emerge from the aesthetic dimension of this embodied activity. Chief among those aesthetic dimensions are qualities, images, patterns of sensorimotor processes, and emotions. (Johnson 2007, 1)

"Meaning", according to Johnson's embodied, naturalistic theory, is not something intellectualist that is imposed from the top down, but something that emerges "from the bottom up' through increasingly complex levels of organic activity" (10). The trajectory of Johnson's philosophical interests, then, describes the kind of switch I am making.

My focus is on the first and last of the "aesthetic dimensions" that we have seen Johnson list above: qualities and emotions. As a first step towards seeing how they are connected, I return to the passage from Anne Michaels's *Fugitive Pieces* quoted at the beginning of this subsection:

> The winter street is a salt cave. The snow has stopped falling and it's very cold. The cold is spectacular, penetrating. The street has been silenced, a theatre of whiteness, drifts like frozen waves. Crystals glisten under the streetlights. (Quoted in Lodge 2002, 13)

To describe the snow drifts as like frozen waves is to give them not just a visual specificity, but an emotional colouring, in this case arising from the image itself – from the schemata it invokes and from the different ways in which those schemata can be conceived to interact with schemata invoked by the original object. To speak of a "frozen wave", for example, could be to invoke not just coldness, but also the idea of an unnatural stasis – and this quality of immobility, of dynamism halted (of powerlessness, perhaps, to achieve an object or discharge an emotion), felt as a quality of the experience, may find similarities, analogues, in other qualities of the narrative (one of the characters, for example), or of the reader's experience. Or the reader's thought may take a different direction: if the drifts are individual frozen waves, then the entire city can be a (frozen) ocean, and the feeling becomes one of an (inhuman) vastness – a feeling which, again, can in turn seek out its own analogues. I

offer these only as possible and indicative examples:[110] the important point is that, in both cases, the key to the emotional colouring lies in the interaction between extensions of the schemata pertaining to the object and extensions of the schemata pertaining to the image. The feeling arises at the point of contact, the membrane, between two semantic fields: it is, essentially, a *topological* relationship.

In the previous paragraph, I slipped from referring to "emotions" and "emotional colouring" to referring to "feelings". Antonio Damasio (whose notions of "core" and "extended" consciousness I discussed above, in subsection 2.1) makes a distinction between emotion and feeling which can help us understand why the topological relationship inherent in imagery should play such an important part in the evocation of preverbal consciousness. Emotions, according to Damasio, are changing states of the body and central nervous system – of the body's internal chemical milieu; of the state of viscera; of the contraction of the musculature; and of the neural structures that activate and register these changes (Damasio 1999, 282; Damasio 2003, 53). They are observable and measurable, "outwardly directed and public".[111] "Feelings", on the other hand, are "inwardly directed and private" (Damasio 1999, 36). They are the mind's "interactive perceptions" of these changes in body-state (Damasio 2003, 91).[112]

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[110] There is, of course, no limit to the analogues that can be found – in the case of both examples, the path of thought is potentially endless: ultimately, in this Peircean realm of "Firstness", everything could be said to resemble everything else. . . I will discuss this open-endedness of similarity further in the next subsection, in the context of the incorporation of photography in fiction.

[111] They are also few in number, and are biologically determined by evolution – though the stimuli that provoke them and the manner of their expression will show wide cultural and developmental variation.

[112] Damasio's distinction was anticipated by William James, with the important provisos that (1) James confined emotions to the body (as opposed to Damasio's inclusion of the brain), and (2) Damasio extends the compass of the emotional "objects" of feelings to include not just the body and brain's response to external objects, but also "virtual" or "as-if" responses where the brain has simulated responses (Damasio 1999, 287-8).

Feelings, then, are (to use a term that Damasio doesn't employ) *mediated*. The form that this mediation takes is the same process of "mapping" that we have already seen in Damasio's account of consciousness (subsection 2.1, above).[113] Perception of an emotionally salient object activates (consciously or unconsciously) particular structures of the brain (emotion-induction sites) that in turn unleash the repertoire of body- and brain-responses: these changes are registered in "first-order" neural maps. These maps constitute the "emotions" that are the objects of feelings, and they come to awareness in core consciousness in the same way as do external objects, by the brain's formation of "second-order" maps that map the dynamic interaction of the "proto-self" (itself constituted by neural mappings of the whole organism in all its dimensions) with the emotion (that is, the "first-order" maps of activity in the emotion-induction sites) (Damasio 1999, 50-3, 281-4). Feelings, then – the qualia, in other words, or phenomena of "preverbal consciousness", that we have been discussing in the context of narrative – are mediated in the sense that they are second-order maps of the interaction of first-order maps: the brain is, in this sense, analogue rather than digital.[114]

"The secret of making consciousness," Damasio writes, "may well be this: that the plotting of a relationship between any object and the organism becomes the feeling of a feeling" (Damasio 1999, 313): the "swift, second-order nonverbal" story that core consciousness tells, as we saw above (subsection 2.1.), is "*that of the*

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[113] The topological notion of "mapping" is key, too, to Gerald Edelman's account of the brain and consciousness (Edelman 1992; Edelman and Tononi 2000; Edelman 2004). Here, a key concept is that of the interconnectedness of the brain through "re-entrant mapping": "re-entrant mapping" is a form of signalling that involves "topographical" correlations between multiple neural maps. Recursively, from this process of selection through topographical correlation, there emerge "global mappings" of the entire organism (Edelman 1992, 85-90).

[114] "In its style of operation," writes evolutionary psychologist Merlin Donald, "the brain is really not at all like a digital computer. It may be more like a very large network of extremely fuzzy analogue computers. The difficulty with this is that analogue computation is not well understood. Analogue devices do not employ symbols in the classic definition of that term. They acquire impressions, make transformations and comparisons, and integrate actions, without explicit labels" (Donald 2001, 102).

organism caught in the act of representing its own changing state as it goes about representing something else" (170; emphasis in original). The "feeling of a feeling" that constitutes the most basic awareness of core consciousness, in other words, includes not only the representation of the changing state of the organism as it interacts with the object, but also the representation of the object itself: it includes both the "inside" and the "outside" of the experience. This duality is reflected in the ambiguity of the word "feel" (and "feeling") itself, which carries both a transitive meaning ("[t]o perceive by the sense of touch", or, "more widely, to perceive through those senses which are not referred to any special organ") and an intransitive meaning ("[t]o have sensations of touch, etc."). Both these meanings are gathered up in the general, experiential meaning ("To be conscious of; to experience") (OED Third Edition).

In *Art as Experience* Dewey, like Mukařovský, argues that what he calls "aesthetic perception" is not confined to the "artistic", but rather constitutes "the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience" (Dewey 1934, 46). "Experience" is the key concept for Dewey, and his development of it relates both to Damasio's account of "the feeling of a feeling", and to our original question concerning the use of imagery in the representation of preverbal consciousness. An "experience", for Dewey – as opposed to a sensation, or a succession of sensations – has a unity:

> The existence of this unity is constituted by a single *quality* that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for these terms name distinctions that reflection can make within it [. . .] In going over an experience in mind *after* its occurrence, we may find that one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterizes the experience as a whole [. . .] Yet the experience was not a sum of these different characters; they were lost in it as distinctive traits. (Dewey 1934, 46)

This unifying quality of an experience that Dewey identifies has a number of interconnected aspects. It is dynamic, in that it "moves toward a close, an ending, since it ceases only when the energies active in it have done their proper work" (41). It has – as we have already quoted Dewey as saying – an emotional aspect (which is closely connected with the dynamic aspect, since emotions are not static things but have a contour that unfolds over time) (41-2). It also, crucially, always involves an *interaction* between the individual and the environment.

It is this *interaction* that can help us to understand the salience of imagery in the representation of preverbal consciousness. Dewey takes as an example of an experience a man lifting a stone:

> In consequence he undergoes, suffers something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine further doing. The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else the properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. (Dewey 1934, 44)

The properties of the object emerge only as a result of the work that is done on it, and these emergent properties in turn determine the nature of the further work that is to be done. In Dewey's terms, "doing" and "undergoing" are integrally linked (one cannot have the one without the other): an *experience* is located at the balance-point between action and receptivity (44-5). Experience emerges through the interaction between "material" and the work that is done on it.

This interaction of work and material is key to Dewey's notion of the "act of expression", which he sees as the basis of art. As I have already highlighted (in Chapter Two (subsection 1.1)), for both Mukařovský and Dewey the "aesthetic sign" (Mukařovský) or "act of expression" (Dewey) is oriented towards the perceiver. To quote Dewey's words once more:

> Man whittles, carves, sings, dances, gestures, molds, draws and paints. The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that *its* qualities *as perceived* have controlled the question of production. The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate experience of perceiving has qualities that a spontaneous or uncontrolled activity does not have. The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works. (Dewey 1934, 48)

Where Mukařovský's principal concern, as we saw, was with the way that the whole of the artistic sign, the "contexture", is oriented towards the whole of the perceiver's existence, Dewey's focus is on how, in the expressive act, the "material" of any act or experience becomes a *medium*. He takes as a basic example the transition from a young child's crying purely as an emotional discharge (albeit that the cry may appear "expressive" from a third-person perspective, in the sense of indicative of a certain state (distressed, hungry, tired etc.)), to a genuinely expressive act, where the same cry is used as medium for achieving a particular effect on the perceiver (i.e. getting them to do particular things) (Dewey 1934, 62). If – to return to the example cited earlier – the man picking up the stone is doing so as an expressive act (for example, as part of a theatrical performance), the material on which he works, as well as the work itself, has become a *medium* by which to affect the audience.

This *mediation* is central to Dewey's account of the act of expression (and hence of art): the expressive act is distinguished from the mere discharge of emotion by the fact that the former is mediated and hence *constrained*. He points to the etymology of "express": the "expression" of juice from the grape is not a spontaneous discharge, but comes about through the interaction of something external to it:

> It takes the wine press as well as grapes to ex-press juice, and it takes environing and resisting objects as well as internal emotion and impulsion to constitute an *expression* of emotion. (Dewey 1934, 64)

In the act of expression, the artist works on his material: stone is chipped, paint is put on canvas, or particular words are put in a particular order. But, Dewey continues,

> [i]t is not so generally recognised that a similar transformation takes place on the side of "inner" materials, images, observations, memories and emotions. They are also progressively re-formed [. . .] As the painter places pigment upon the canvas, or imagines it placed there, his ideas and feeling are also ordered. As the writer composes in his medium of words what he wants to say, his idea takes on for himself perceptible form [. . .] [T]he physical process develops imagination, while imagination is conceived in terms of concrete material. Only by progressive organization of "inner" and "outer" material in organic connection with each other can anything be produced that is not a learned document or an illustration of something familiar. (75)

In the work of art, inner motivation and outer material are folded in so closely together, "worked in" to each other so thoroughly, as to form an *involvement* unique to that work.

At this point it should be recalled that this act of expression itself has its origins, according to Dewey, in the aesthetic perception that constitutes an experience. Both the act of expression and the aesthetic perception are governed by interactive cycles of action upon, and receptivity to, the material: "art [. .] unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience" (Dewey 1934, 48). In both cases, the cycles of doing and undergoing become so rapid and mutually determining as to become fused in the simultaneity of the single aesthetic perception, just as Damasio's second-order mappings capture in a single representation mappings both of the active perception of the object and of the changing states of the organism wrought by the undergoing of that perception:

> As we manipulate, we touch and feel, as we look, we see; as we listen, we hear. The hand moves with etching needle or with brush. The eye attends and

> reports the consequences of what is done. Because of this intimate connection, subsequent doing is cumulative [. . .] In an emphatic artistic-esthetic experience, the relation is so close that it controls both the doing and the perception. (Dewey 1934, 50)

The work of art (the narrative text, for example), as an "expressive object", is the "report and celebration" of the dynamic fusion of action and perception, of organism and environment, inherent in experience (103).

With Dewey's account of experience and the act of expression in mind, we can now see how a focus on the role of imagery in the representation of consciousness can extend David Herman's (2011b) post-Cartesian, "enactive" analysis of modernist narrative in terms of "couplings" with the environment. The use of imagery at the level of preverbal consciousness, of qualia, reflects the *activity* of the organism at the most basic level of awareness. At this most basic level, consciousness both works on its "material", drawing out its quality through an analogue mapping, and is simultaneously transformed by that activity through the emotion-inducing "undergoing" of that transformed material.

3.2 Photography in Narrative Fiction: Rodenbach and Sebald

So far in this chapter, I have considered the interactivity between expressivity and representation, subjective and objective, within the contexts both of Free Indirect Discourse and of the use of imagery to evoke preverbal consciousness. As already noted, these forms of discourse have become pervasive in modern narrative fiction. But not entirely so: I now turn to a writer who almost entirely eschews these devices. As I shall explore below, W.G. Sebald's narratives are written almost entirely in an "objective" and "detached" style – in Ann Banfield's terms, they are overwhelmingly sentences of "pure narration", without "expressivity".[115] While the "first-person" predominates, either in the form of the narrator's narration or of long stretches of reported speech, the result, as Martin Swales puts it, "is not confessional prose. While it may feel personal, it is in fact meta-subjective" (Swales 2005, 86). In the context of the near-ubiquity in modern fiction of the kind of expressive devices that I have been discussing earlier in this chapter, this peculiar "objectivity", this "meta-subjectivity", is felt as an absence.[116] My argument in this subsection is that this "absence" of expressive subjectivity in Sebald's prose is complemented by the crucial role that the embedded photographs play in the text: deeply conversant with the theory and practice of photography (Scott 2011), Sebald's use of these images exploits the capacity of the photograph to intensify the interrelation between extremes of objectivity and subjectivity. Like the "symbol" in stream-of-consciousness narrative, the photograph is both intensely focussed on the object, and

[115] I use the term "narratives" in acknowledgment of the frequently noted fact that the works for which Sebald is principally known – *Vertigo* (1990), *The Emigrants* (1993), *The Rings of Saturn* (1995) and *Austerlitz* (2001) – cross conventional categories of fiction, memoir, history and essay. This is true even of *Austerlitz*, which is at one level the most "novelistic" in that it features a fictional "protagonist".

[116] "Sebald's extraordinary prose [. .] resists momentousness, hindsight, prefiguration, speculation, psychologisation, conclusiveness. It is curiously decentred, absent rather than present" (Swales 2005, 86).

simultaneously, through the endless affordances it offers for resemblance, association and memory, the revelation through that objectivity of an inner world.

This connection between the symbol and the photograph is manifest in Georges Rodenbach's *Bruges-la-Morte* (1892), the first narrative fiction to include photographs as part of its conception rather than as added illustration.[117] Rodenbach, a Belgian symbolist poet and member of Mallarmé's circle, makes it clear in his Foreword that the thirty-five photographic views of Bruges incorporated in the text were intended to play more than simply an illustrative or documentary role:

> [I]t is the town which directs all that occurs there [. .] its urban landscapes are not mere backdrops, settings selected almost haphazardly, but are fundamentally linked to the main action of the novel.
>
> It is because of this essential connection between these scenes of Bruges and the events described in the story that photographic reproductions of the former have been inserted in the text – the quays, deserted streets, old dwellings canals, *béguinage*, churches, goldsmith's shops where sacred objects are made, belfries, – so that all those who read this work may themselves feel the presence and the influence of the city, experience the contagiousness of the waters, and be conscious of the long shadows of the high towers as they fall across the text. (Rodenbach 1993 [1892], 15)

The photographs do not merely authenticate, but enable the reader to "feel", to "experience", to "be conscious of" the melancholy ambience of the town. More than simply an *effet de réel*, this ambience, this atmosphere that is captured in the grainy

[117] For a survey of the use of photography in fiction, see Bryant 1996. François Brunet (2009, 129-40) places the incorporation of photographs in the fictional narrative in the context of earlier traditions of using photographs to illustrate pre-existing texts (for example, Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Marble Faun* (1860), Julia Margaret Cameron's photographically illustrated edition (1875) of Tennyson's *Idyll's of the King*, and Alvin Langdon Coburn's photographs for the 1904 New York edition of Henry James' novels). Contemporary writers other than Sebald who have incorporated photographs in their fictions include Michael Ondaatje, Roberto Bolaño, Javier Marias, Hervé Guibert, Shehan Karunatilaka and the collaborators Marie-Françoise Plissart and Benoît Peeters, and Christian Brunel and Xavier Lanbours (Brunet 2009, 139-40; Scott 1999, 214). Art historian Terry Pitts maintains a database and other material on the intersection of fiction and photography at https://sebald.wordpress.com/ [accessed 04/08/14].

black-and-white images, plays an active role in the interior life of the protagonist and hence in the unfolding of the plot.



Figure 4: Photograph from Bruges-la-Morte (Rodenbach 1993 [1892], 15)

Hugh Viane, the protagonist of the novel, is a widower paralyzed with grief for his young, dead wife, with whom he had spent ten years of married bliss. He has sought out Bruges, a silent, brooding city of canals and churches, because it corresponds with his own state of mind:

> Bruges revealed itself to his mind by a sympathetic intuition as an oasis in the desert. A mysterious equation established itself between his own spirit and that of the place. In the eternal fitness of things a dead town furnished the corresponding analogy to that of a dead wife [. . .] His longing was for an infinite silence into which no disturbing note ever penetrated, and an existence so exempt from feverishness that it should resemble a species of Nirvana. (21)

The silent melancholy of the town is not only a symbol, for Viane, but an all-pervasive experience. Like Sebald's narrators and protagonists, he is given to solitary wandering – here in order to immerse himself in this symbolic mediation of his grief:

> At the approach of the evenings, he derived a melancholy solace from the analogies which he devised between the mournfulness of his own destiny and that of the forsaken canals and decaying churches that instinctively attracted his footsteps. (18)

The idea of "analogies", "likenesses", "resemblances" is key to the novel. During one of his wanderings, Viane sees a woman in the street who bears a striking resemblance to his dead wife. Especially striking is her "strangely characteristic amber-coloured hair", which matches exactly his dead wife's hair, locks of which he keeps in a household shrine to his beloved (26). He follows the woman, becomes obsessed with her, and they form a relationship. Jane, the woman he has fixed on, is an actress (and, it is inferred, a prostitute) who proceeds to manipulate and steal from Viane. In a climactic scene at the end, when Jane violates the shrine to the dead wife and taunts Viane, he reacts by strangling her with his dead wife's hair.

Despite the cavalier treatment that the photographs have received in subsequent editions (with some or all of them omitted, or, in the case of a recent English edition (Rodenbach 2005 [1892]), replaced by new photographs), the selection and placement of the photographs was deliberate and thought-through (Edwards 2000). The text, too, reflects the tones of the grainy black-and-white images, as when Viane broods on the "phenomenon of resemblance" that has caused the "merging of his destiny into that of the greyest of grey towns":

> An ineffable charm of melancholy rests always upon the grey Bruges streets, over which there broods always the sentiment of an All Saints' day. The grey blends and contrasts with the snowy caps of the nuns and the black cassocks of the priests, who pass and repass almost unintermittingly. The paramountcy

> of the colour invested Bruges with the mystery of a half-eternal mourning. (Rodenbach 1993 [1892], 48)

Reflections form a recurrent motif in the text – the ever-present reflections in the town's canals, but also his wife's mirrors, which he keeps in his shrine and which, he believes, "retained in their depths the slumbering image of her beauty" (19): these textual allusions find their reflection in the photographs themselves, in which the long exposure-times have smoothed any ripples on the canals' surfaces to a glassy sheen. (The chosen photographs are almost entirely devoid, too, of people – an absence which reflects the "infinite silence" and stasis of the protagonist's grief.) The photographs in *Bruges-la-Morte*, then, play the roles simultaneously both of objective documentary authentication and of deeply subjective association. As Paul Edwards writes, "what we have is a Symbolist novel, a fantasy that requires an undercurrent of realism the better to set off subjective visions which border on hallucination" (Edwards 2000, 74). Like the symbol, the incorporation of photographs represents – to return to the terms I used in the previous subsection – both the "hyperbolic" manifestation of the "fullness of the thing", and (simultaneously, through that manifestation) the fecundity of the "inner" world of the imagination.

In his article on the use of photographs in *Bruges-la-Morte*, Paul Edwards points to the importance of "relics" and "traces" in the novel (highlighted in Viane's shrine to his dead wife), and links this with the photographs: the motionless grey photographs of the "dead" town, associated in the protagonist's mind with his dead wife, evoke the idea, prevalent in late twentieth-century writings on photography, that "photography is a reminder of death, and a vehicle for nostalgia, for being a

trace or relic of the real" (Edwards 2000, 71).[118] Canonical works of photographic theory by Susan Sontag (1979) and Roland Barthes (1984 [1980]) – works with which Sebald was intimately familiar (Scott 2011) – dwell on the idea that "the photograph possesses an evidential force, and that its testimony bears not on the object but on time" (Barthes 1984 [1980], 89). The photograph is not, for Barthes, "a 'copy' of reality, but [. .] an emanation of *past reality*: a *magic*, not an art" (88). For Sontag, photography is the "inventory of mortality [. . .] Photographs state the innocence, the vulnerability of lives heading toward their own destruction, and this link between photography and death haunts all photographs of people" (Sontag 1979, 70).[119]

This "haunting" of photographs by death – and the haunting of the living by the photographs of the dead – plays a leading part in Sebald's narratives.[120] In the "Paul Bereyter" story in *The Emigrants*, the narrator describes looking through the photograph album that documents the life of his former schoolteacher, who has committed suicide:

[118] "Nostalgia" is not the best word here: as Sebald's narratives demonstrate, the affect of the "traces" of photography can be more unsettling or "uncanny" than that conveyed by the term "nostalgia".
[119] André Bazin opens his essay "The Ontology of the Photographic Image" (1967) by invoking the mummification of the dead by the Ancient Egyptians: in the case of photography, it is no longer a case of belief in life after death, but rather "of a larger concept, the creation of an ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny" (Bazin 1980, 238).
[120] There is already a quite considerable secondary literature on Sebald's use of photographs, but much of it is from the perspective of "trauma theory" (see, for example, Duttlinger 2004; Barzilai 2006): consideration of this interpretative strategy lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Clive Scott's (2011) essay on the annotations in Sebald's personal collection of books on photography is especially revealing on his involvement with the medium.

> Again and again, from front to back and from back to front, I leafed through the album that afternoon, and since then I have returned to it time and again, because, looking at the pictures in it, it truly seemed to me, and still does, as if the dead were coming back, or as if we were on the point of joining them. (Sebald 1996, 46)

Figure 5: Photograph from *The Emigrants* (Sebald 1996, 47)

As Clive Scott writes, "photographs, for Sebald, are not passive, they do not 'get smaller' as they age, do not increasingly surrender life-value for sign-value; on the contrary, one might say, their power grows, they cast longer shadows" (Scott 2011, 232). When, in *Austerlitz*, Jacques Austerlitz reflects on the "higher form of stereometry" by which the dead see us ("we appear in their field of vision"), he could be describing photography itself:

> It does not seem to me, Austerlitz added, that we understand the laws governing the return of the past, but I feel more and more as if time did not exist at all, only spaces interlocking according to the rules of a higher form of stereometry, between which the living and the dead can move back and forth as they like, and the longer I think about it the more it seems to me that we who are still alive are unreal in the eyes of the dead, that only occasionally, in certain lights and atmospheric conditions, do we appear in their field of vision. (Sebald 2002, 261)

Photography, in Sebald's vision, embodies an involution whereby the dead, through these material traces they have left, become the living, and the living, by confronting their own mortality in the form of the photograph, become the dead.

Figure 6: Cover image from *Austerlitz* (in text: Sebald 2002, 258)

Towards the end of *Austerlitz*, Jacques Austerlitz gives the narrator the keys to his house in London and invites him to stay there whenever he likes "and study the black and white photographs which, one day, would be all that was left of his life" (Sebald 2002, 408). Many of these photographs – some purportedly taken by Austerlitz himself, who in addition to being an architectural historian is an amateur photographer – are included in the text.[121] The only photograph *of* Austerlitz is one taken of him at the age of four, dressed in a pageboy costume. It is the only surviving relic, the only trace, of his life in Prague before he was put on a Kindertransport for England, before his parents disappeared forever, before his memory was obliterated. The moment that Austerlitz is given this photograph, and his reaction to it, illustrates well the detached style of Sebald's characteristic reported speech, his refusal to use expressive language even at this emotionally charged juncture:

[121] As Carolin Duttlinger observes, of all Sebald's books, "*Austerlitz* is the work where photography is most extensively and systematically thematised within the narrative itself" (Duttlinger 2004, 156).

> That evening in the Športova, when Věra put the picture of the child cavalier in front of me, I was not, as you might suppose, moved or distressed, said Austerlitz, only speechless and uncomprehending, incapable of any lucid thought. Even later nothing but blind panic filled me when I thought of the five-year-old page. (Sebald 2002, 260)

Instead of figurative language to evoke his inner state, we get an extended *ekphrasis* ("I have studied the photograph many times since [. . .] I examined every detail under a magnifying glass" (259-60)), culminating in a moment of anguish that speaks immediately from the object, as though it were under the hallucinating gaze of the symbolist:

> And in doing so I always felt the piercing, inquiring gaze of the page boy who had come to demand his dues, who was waiting in the grey light of the dawn on the empty field for me to accept the challenge and avert the misfortune lying ahead of him. (260)[122]

The moment is characteristic of Sebald's work, bringing together a narrative reticence of expression with an ekphrastic speaking out of the photographic object: subjectivity is disclosed in the object. One could say – following Mark Rowlands' phenomenological take on the "extended mind" hypothesis (subsection 2.1., above) – that these objects become "vehicles" for the subjectivity of Sebald's characters.

[122] This passage can be linked (c.f. Duttlinger 2004, 165) with the following passage from Barthes' *Camera Lucida* relating to his thesis, referred to above, that the "testimony" of the photograph "bears not on the object but on time": "I read at the same time: *This will be* and *this has been*; I observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute past of the pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future [. . .] In front of the photograph of my mother as a child, I tell myself: she is going to die: I shudder [. .] *over a catastrophe which has already occurred*. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe" (Barthes 1984 [1980], 96). Sebald extends this notion of the "dual temporality" of the photograph by "folding in", by "involving", the "objectivity" of time (*this has been*) into the "subjectivity" of the photograph (the "piercing, inquiring gaze" of the boy): the object of the boy's inquiry is an objectivity ("the misfortune lying ahead of him") that would, were it not for what Barthes (as we have seen) calls the "magic" of the photograph, lie beyond him. (There are, of course, other, enframing twists to these involutions: the boy's subjectivity (embodied in the "piercing, inquiring gaze") is, from the point of view of Austerlitz's subjectivity, the ekphrastic "speaking out" of the photographic object, while Austerlitz's subjectivity is an ekphrastic "speaking out" of the object constituted by the subjectivity of narrator and reader.)

But as the image of Jacques Austerlitz bent over the photograph with his magnifying glass reminds us, access to the past, to the dead, through the photographic object is never absolute or determinate. (To complete the quotation cited above: "I examined every detail under a magnifying glass *without once finding the slightest clue*" (Sebald 2002, 260; emphasis added).) Austerlitz himself emphasises the transitory, material quality of the photograph, as of a memory trace in the brain:

> In my photographic work I was always especially entranced, said Austerlitz, by the moment when the shadows of reality, so to speak, emerge out of nothing on the exposed paper, as memories do in the middle of the night, darkening again if you try to cling to them, just like a photographic print left in the developing bath too long. (109)

Photographs decay, they are indeterminate, and they can also deceive (Furst 2006). As Martin Swales observes, Sebald's photographs "are not glossy, nor are they in the service of glossiness" (Swales 2005, 81). They are materially fragile[123] – grainy, printed straight onto the paper of the text. For the most part, too, they are the kind of "snapshots" that invite contextualizing speculation rather than artistic appreciation. "Sebald's photographs are unframed," Clive Scott points out, "and let us easily into their blind fields": "the ekphrasis of the Sebaldian photo is an ekphrasis of the blind field, spatial [. .] and temporal", an ekphrasis that is "more interested in narrativizing than in interpreting", that is "metonymic rather than metaphorical" (Scott 2011, 220). The dynamic of the photographs, one might say, is not centripetal, drawing

[123] The photographs thus partake of the entropy, the dissolution of the material, that runs through Sebald's work. J.J. Long, for example, has drawn attention to the "visions of entropy" in *The Emigrants* by which "nature is constantly [. .] attempting to reclaim the products of civilization and turn them back into the dust from which they originated: witness the buildings that are slowly being reclaimed by sand [. .], or Dr Abramsky's dream of his asylum slowly succumbing to an army of woodworm and collapsing into a pile of dust" (Long 2003, 122).

interpretations into itself, but centrifugal, spinning narratives off itself:[124] it is oriented, to use the influential terms that Barthes coined in *Camera Lucida*, to the *punctum* rather than the *studium*.[125]

In these ways, then, Sebald's photographs constitute not documentary anchors for the narratives, but, rather, openings into what Lilian Furst has referred to as the narratives' "associative labyrinths" (Furst 2006, 219): they form an integral part of their distinctive *contexture*. Characteristic of the contexture of Sebald's narratives is a "narratorial vertigo" (Hutchinson 2006, 171) induced by the reader's looking down at the narrative "matter", the "story", through multiple embedded frames of reported speech, recollection, association or (as in the journals that feature prominently in the "Ambros Adelwarth" and "Max Ferber" sections of *The Emigrants*) of written manuscript.[126] The photographs form an integral part of this structure. If one were to regard them as unproblematically "documentary", one would think that they constituted a stable base at the end of these vertiginous perspectives: in fact, as the joint attention of reader and narrator (or of reader and narrator and character) pass through the photographs , is mediated by them, they add a distinctive level of perspectival diffusion, integrated into the purely verbal

[124] For Deane Backler, Sebald's use of photographs is a way of "engaging the disobedient reader's capacity for thought and imagination" (Backler 2007, x).
[125] The *studium* according to Barthes, is the generalised "interest" of a photograph relating to systems of political or ethical values. The *punctum* is the aspect of a photograph that "punctures" the *studium* for an individual viewer – an "element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me": it may typically take the form of an "accidental" detail ("a cast of the dice") (Barthes 1984 [1980], 26-7).
[126] Vertigo, as a concept and as a physical sensation, is a recurrent motif in Sebald's narratives (Hutchinson 2006; Leone 2004). An example bearing on a passage from *Austerlitz* quoted above (on the notion of time as spatialized by a "higher form of stereometry") is this, from the end of the "Ambros Adelwarth" section of *The Emigrants* (where the narrator is quoting the journal which I have referred to here in the main text): "Memory, he added in a postscript, often strikes me as a kind of dumbness. It makes one's head heavy and giddy, as if one were not looking back down the receding perspectives of time but rather down on the earth from a great height, from one of those towers whose tops are lost to view in the clouds" (Sebald 1996 [1993], 145).

layers of framing, for which Sebald calls on those peculiar semiotic possibilities with which he was familiar through his reading about, and practise of, photography.

The integral role that photographs play in Sebald's narratives poses a challenge to traditional narratological categories based on a model of linguistic communication. (Do the photographs belong to the "narration", or are they part of what is "narrated"?) To understand that role, it is necessary to place these narratives within a wider semiotic context that acknowledges the different and complementary forms of mediation involved. The incorporation of photographs in narrative fiction can be seen as an extension of the process discussed above (Chapter One and in subsection 2.1 of this chapter) whereby the mediation of language through graphic technologies of writing and print creates the potential for new differentiations (for example, as between different "levels of consciousness) and hence new forms of narrative contexture.

The effect of this appreciation by Sebald of the way that thoughts and feelings are mediated by different forms of semiosis (oral narratives, historical and topographical discourse, photographs, documents etc) – of the way that they are, to use the language of contemporary cognitive science, "distributed" of "extended" across these vehicles – can be seen if we compare how memory works for Sebald with a well-known passage by Proust from *Contre Sainte-Beuve*. Proust is describing how the experience of an external object, a taste of tea and cake, can reawaken, like a Japanese paper flower unfurling in water, an entire world that had lain dormant:

> [W]hen from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, still, alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear

> unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection (Proust 1979 [1908], 84)

For Proust, direct interaction with reality ("the smell and taste of things") awakens a "vast structure of recollection" within the subject. In Sebald's narratives, by contrast, we discover that interaction, and hence the recollection, mediated through (distributed across) the photograph. In place of the verbal imagery, and the involutions of perspectival "objectivity" and "subjectivity", that were discussed earlier in the chapter, we find a peculiarly indeterminate form of disclosure between subjectivity and objectivity, expressivity and representation, that pertains particularly to the photograph.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued for the importance of mediation and dynamics in the experience of reading narrative fiction. In Chapter One I presented the case for seeing the primary form of semiotics in narrative as being a triadic *mediation* (as opposed to a dyadic "communication") involving not just the parties to the communication but also their joint attention on the *object* of their communication. At the end of Chapter One I drew out the *functionalist* implications of this concept of mediation. Chapter Two put forward the argument that this functionalism is the basis for a particular kind of dynamic systematicity characteristic of narrative fiction, which I called, following Mukařovský, its *contexture*. One of the most important features of the contexture, I argued, was its holistic appeal (for which I adopted the term "aesthetic function") to the entirety and open-endedness of the perceiver's *experience*. Chapter Three identified this *experientiality* as a key feature of modern fiction, and put forward the argument that experience *of* and *in* modern narrative are connected through the process of phenomenological *disclosure*. I also suggested that modern narrative's bringing-to-awareness of this process of disclosure utilizes paradoxical relations of inside and outside integral to the dynamics and development of narrative mediation.

At the beginning of the Introduction, I justified my use of the rather cumbersome term "theoretical framework" (rather than "theory") on principled grounds – in which context I invoked the term "dimensions" as a possible alternative. But the use of the term "framework" also serves as an acknowledgment that the completed structure has gaps, and raises as many (perhaps more) questions than it answers. For example, there is the question of the relation between the joint

attentional dynamic discussed in Chapter One and the functions-based systematicity proposed in Chapter Two. In Chapter Two I showed how "reader-oriented" series such as curiosity and suspense manifest a dominance of the aesthetic function, orienting the text to the reader's experience of the narrative as a *whole*: here, the joint attentional framing is that between author and reader on the narrative *as a whole*, with the narrative *as a whole* thus acting as a mediation between them. But a complete working-through of this part of my framework will entail an examination of the inner differentiations and articulations between the many other functional series contained within that overall dominance – for example, in terms of the model of polyfunctionality proposed by Mukařovský, the differentiation between series based on various forms of "symbolic", "theoretical", "practical" or "aesthetic" function.

This examination would focus on how these differentiations are articulated by joint attentional framings, in the sense of the reader's alignment with different viewpoints embedded at various levels (for example at the level of character and focalization) in the narrative. Some indications of what such an examination might look like were given in the case of *Don Quixote*, where "perspectivalism" is foregrounded: a fuller treatment would look at how a wider spectrum of perspectival differentiation generates functional series. It is through this kind of detailed textual analysis that the model of joint attentional structure put forward in Chapter One can be integrated with the concept of functionalist systematicity proposed in Chapter Two.[127]

[127] There is a diachronic dimension to this, since this examination of the joint attentional substrate of functional series would take in the link between, for example, the distribution of viewpoints (and hence of functional perspectives), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the historical development of diverse (generic) models of the distribution, forms of interaction and relative (epistemological/political) "importance" of characters and groups of characters. For an example of such a perspective, see Wolfgang Iser's remarks, in *The Act of Reading*, concerning historical changes

But I mention this large area of research, relating to the transition from joint attentional to functionalist perspectives, only in passing: the bulk of this Conclusion I will now devote to a discussion of two important issues relating to, respectively, the first and second chapters of this thesis. The first concerns the relation of *character* to joint attention. The second concerns the concept of the *series* and the applicability of that concept beyond the exposition of it given in Chapter Two. In both cases I am concerned with the future direction of research opened up by the theoretical framework offered here.

In Chapter One I presented the case for seeing the triadic semiotics of joint attention, rather than the dyadic semiotics of "communication", as being fundamental to narrative fiction. In section four of Chapter One I examined the complex dynamics of joint attention in *Don Quixote* and went on to suggest, drawing on the work of René Girard and Rick Altman, that these dynamics play an important part in the constitution and development of "character". This suggestion opens up a large area of investigation that was left unexplored. Here, I will look briefly at an important recent piece of research by Alan Palmer (2010), that is congruent with the approach I take in terms of its stress on the importance of intersubjectivity, but that comes at the question of intersubjectivity from a different theoretical perspective.

In *Social Minds in the Novel* (2010), Alan Palmer adopts an "externalist" approach to character: whereas an "internalist" perspective stresses the introspective, the individual, the "psychological", the "externalist" "stresses those aspects that are outer, active, public, social, behavioural, evident, embodied and engaged" (Palmer 2010, 39). The focus of the book is on the nineteenth-century

in the "perspective arrangement" as between "hero" and "minor characters" (for example from "hierarchical" structures to more "flattened-out" "serial" arrangements (Iser 1978, 100-3).

English novel, and its centrepiece consists of close, fascinating readings of *Middlemarch* and *Little Dorrit*. These explore the importance for both novels of what Palmer calls the "intermental units" and "intermental thought": intermental thought is "joint, group, shared, or collective, as opposed to *intramental*, or individual or private thought. It is also known as *socially distributed*, *situated*, or *extended cognition*, and also as *intersubjectivity*" (41).[128] In his reading of *Middlemarch*, Palmer dissects the novel to reveal the webs of intersubjectivity that compose it: he shows convincingly how much of the thought and subjectivity in the novel is attributed to "intermental units" – above all to the town itself ("the Middlemarch mind"), but also to various sub-groups within that unit ("upper-class, middle-class, and working-class minds") and to "[a] large number of other ephemeral, localized, contextually specific groups" (75, 80). He demonstrates meticulously the attention that Eliot gives to these "intricately interlocking subgroups" and how "[t]he language meditates on the difficulty of pinning down precisely how these fluid and protean minds are initially and temporarily constituted, dissolve, reform and dissolve again" (82). He also shows how "intramental" (individual) and "intermental" minds can be "embedded" in each other in the form of "double cognitive narratives", or "versions of characters' minds that exist within the minds of other characters", and how Eliot maintains a "delicate balance between intramental and intermental thought" (88, 84).[129]

Much of Palmer's analysis of intersubjectivity in the nineteenth-century novel could, I believe, be re-written in the language of intersubjective mediation and joint

[128] C.f. John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble's (2014) analysis of "group agency" in Lloyd Jones' historical novel about a cricket team, *The Book of Fame*.
[129] "*[C]ognitive narrative* [. .] designates a character's whole perceptual, cognitive, ethical, and ideological viewpoint on the storyworld of the novel and [. .] conveys the fact that each character's mental functioning is a narrative that is embedded within the whole narrative of the novel" (88).

attentional dynamics that was used in Chapter One of this thesis. But there are important theoretical differences between our approaches which it is instructive to draw out. These bear in part on the examples we have each chosen. *Don Quixote*, many critics have observed, is a "perspectival" novel in which "reality" itself becomes something hard to pin down. "Minds" in *Don Quixote* are slippery or fragile things, forever liable to come under the influence of others through seeing things as they see them: hence the emphasis on *mediation* that I tried to draw out in my reading in Chapter One. A reading such as Palmer's might have less traction with *Don Quixote* than it does in *Middlemarch*'s more stable epistemological world. To take one example, the pairing of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza is, as I discussed in Chapter One, crucial to the novel, and would qualify, in Palmer's terms as one of the book's most important "intermental units". Yet as I also discussed, the Don Quixote-Sancho Panza pairing operates less as a "mind" than as an interactive, autonomous system of two minds, a system whose internal dynamics are constantly under the external influence of different and changing ways of looking at (at *mediating*) the world around them.

Of course, Palmer is more than aware of the fact that, for example, "the Middlemarch mind is not completely monolithic and can be soft or fuzzy round the edges" (74). And his analysis of intermental minds clearly points to something there in the novel: the term "the Middlemarch mind", for example, is not something he has foisted onto the text, but is used by Eliot herself. The difference made by a translation of Palmer's analysis into the terms of joint attentional dynamics might only be one of emphasis – with more of an emphasis, perhaps, on the moments when minds (intra- or intermental) are in a state of flux, influenced by the views of other minds. Palmer, in other words, has identified a phenomenon and a territory that is

entirely congruent with the joint attentional approach I set out in Chapter One, but done so from a different theoretical perspective.

The differences in our respective theoretical approaches are significant: they are in opposition – but perhaps, ultimately, in the sense of being complementary. Palmer's underlying perspective in both *Fictional Minds* and *Social Minds* is behaviourist and third-person (Palmer 2004, 108, 124; 2011, 30, 51-2).[130] (It is no coincidence that among the philosophers he quotes most frequently are the behaviourist Gilbert Ryle and Ryle's pupil, Daniel Dennett.) It is this behaviourist perspective that makes his approach so well attuned to how, in novels as in real life, so much of mental life is enacted before and with others. The approach that I take in Chapter One, by contrast, is phenomenological and semiotic. Palmer's approach brings out brilliantly how, in the novels he describes, the mental life of the characters is extended out into (or to put it in the terms I use in Chapter One, is *mediated* by) their environment. But this process is described in third-person terms – in terms of series of representations ("attributions" or "ascriptions") (Palmer 2004, 137-47). A phenomenological and semiotic approach, by contrast, brings another factor into the equation, in form of the interactivity not just of the characters with their environment, but of the reader with the text. From this perspective, "ascription" or "attribution" is only one factor – though it may be a very important one in the novels Palmer studies – in a much broader process of immersion. The aesthetic function, as Mukařovský says, appeals, potentially, to the *whole* of the perceiver's existence, and the detached, third-person perspective is only one part of that existence. Palmer

[130] In *Fictional Minds* Palmer describes his own position as a "balance between observation of behaviour and awareness of consciousness" (2004, 140), but it is clear nevertheless that he approaches that point of balance from the behaviourist direction.

shows how minds in novels are not detached or isolated, but *interact* and *extend* beyond the skin: a semiotic approach extends that insight to the reading of the text.

I turn now to the second major area of the thesis that needs further development and explication: the concept, introduced in Chapter Two, of the *series*. *Series*, as I characterised the term there, pertain to the linearity of narrative: they are unfolding sequences, which may take an explicit form, such as an account of an action, or a more implicit form, such as the working out of the dynamics inherent in an image or concept. Series, in my account, are *simultaneous*, in the sense that any given words may belong at the same time to more than one series. In music we see the same simultaneity of series, in that any given note may belong at the same time to different series: in the case of music, these simultaneous series pertain to the different "dimensions" of sound (pitch, rhythm, timbre etc). In narrative fiction, I proposed, a parallel multi-dimensionality is achieved through exploitation of the *polyfunctionality* of language. I identified two principal kinds of series: 1) *linear* series such as curiosity or suspense that are determined by the aesthetic function and, as a result, are oriented both towards a configuration of the narrative whole and towards the experience of the perceiver; 2) *non-linear* series that are motivated by various representational schemata. Non-linear series are so called because they are envisaged as being laid out in a conceptual, non-linear "state space": this state space is traversed by the linear series, which activate, modify or de-activate the non-linear, representational series that act as its vehicles during its passage.

In Chapter Two I illustrated this model from the short story, arguing in the first place that the characteristically imagistic, ekphrastic character of the modern short story, by compressing the linearity of the narrative, brings into relief its non-linear dimension, and then by analysing an H.P. Lovecraft story in terms of the

differentiation and interactivity of its linear and non-linear series. The large question remains, though, of how far this model is relevant not just to other examples of the short story beyond the H.P. Lovecraft piece which I analysed, but to more extended narratives such as novels: as in the case discussed above of the connection between character and joint attention, a large field has been opened up. And as in the previous case, I will offer a road-map of that future research, highlighting signposts that have been left by past theorists. I will focus on two aspects of the concept of series in particular that need to be developed to give the concept greater traction over a wider territory: the first concerns the scope or "amplitude" of the non-linear, schematic series; the second concerns an expansion, from the account given above in Chapter Two, of the terms in which the "musicality" of the narrative text is understood.

As regards the non-linear series, the crucial questions for the widening of the model's applicability concern the scope or "amplitude" of schemata. Across how wide a domain can a single schema operate? Or alternatively, how do schemata combine to create larger structures? Michael Kimmel (2005a, 2005b) has explored this question from the point of view of cognitive linguistics and discourse analysis, building on the work of Mark Turner (1996) among others. The basic idea he puts forward is that our cumulative comprehension and recall of extended literary narrative (he takes Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* as an example) does not simply take a propositional form, but is also experienced in terms of global dynamic gestalts or "megametaphors": the work of image schemata does not stop at the micro-level of the individual sentence, for these schemata interact to form complex or "compound" image schemata (Kimmel 2005b, 286; c.f. Cienki 1997). Higher-level gestalts encompassing the whole work emerge from a continuous *interaction* between these

schematic complexes (Kimmel 2005a, 229). This process cannot be conceived in purely linear terms: its continuous nature means that "a merely additive characterization of metaphor interaction in literature remains incomplete" (229). Kimmel describes his model as structuralist to the extent that it "specifies how various levels of textual knowledge are matched and interwoven into a symbolic fabric" (234).

Kimmel's model – which combines, on the one hand, a cognitive perspective on the processes "text- and context-directed compression, schematization, superimposition, and dynamization of gestalt imagery" (231), with, on the other hand, a structuralist conception of the different "levels" at which the narrative is represented – is congruent with the model presented in Chapter Two of the "contexture" (the orientation towards the whole) of the narrative arising out of the cumulative interaction of multiple series. Particularly significant in this respect is the fact that, in describing the way in which image schemata combine to form "compound" or "complex" schemata, Kimmel invokes the same account by Langacker of different forms of dynamic "scanning" as was used above (Chapter Two, subsection 2.2) to characterise the differences between linear (reader-oriented) and non-linear (schemata-oriented) series: a translation of Kimmel's line of research into the serial model proposed here would look at how linear series operate simultaneously at different hierarchical levels (with different linear series nested in each other) to form progressively local and global configurations of the narrative.[131]

[131] To return to the comparison with music that was explored in Chapter Two subsection 2.3, this recursive aspect to linear series is reflected in the fact that Lerdahl and Jackendoff's "prolongational reductions" of the musical score reveal waves of tension and release forming part of larger such waves operating over larger temporal frames.

Kimmel points to another perspective on this question of the bridging of the gap between individual schemata and larger-scale structures: the formative part played in the constitution of schemata played by the mediation of social and cultural practices (Kimmel 2005b, 297-99). These issue in socially engrained forms of, for example, posture and gesture, as captured in sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* – a type of "body language" that "roots the fundamental structures of the group in the primary experiences of the body" (quoted in Swartz 2013, 93). Bourdieu's early research, for example, was on the Berbers, a society where "the opposition between masculinity and femininity . . . constitutes the fundamental principle of division of the social and the symbolic world": in his research he showed how this opposition was "realized in posture, in the gestures and movements of the body", thereby instilling "a sense of the equivalences between physical space and social space" (93). In Kimmel's terms, such examples show how "complex" or "compound" schemata are not always formed "from the bottom up".

Another source for thinking about how local and global schemata can be linked is Bakhtin's concept of the "chronotope", which represents "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships" – and in which, so far as literature is concerned, "the primary category [. .] is time" (Bakhtin 1981, 84-5). (A classic example of a chronotope, which Bakhtin discusses in detail, is that of the "road".) The terms in which Bakhtin characterizes the chronotope have strong affinities with the concept of the "image schema". In the first place, the chronotope is not merely a literary figure, but derives its force from everyday life.[132] Secondly, its

[132] "Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of the representation) emerge the reflected and *created* chronotopes of the world represented in the work (in the text)." (Bakhtin 1981, 253)

primary importance is "*representational*" in a *figurative* sense, as opposed to the mere transmission (or "communication") of information:

> An event can be communicated, it becomes information, one can give precise data on the place and time of its occurrence. But the event does not become a figure [*obraz*]. It is precisely the chronotope that provides the ground essential for the showing-forth, the representability of events [. . .] [T]he chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materializing time in space, emerges as a center for concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel. (Bakhtin 1981, 250)

Bakhtin also saw chronotopes as multiple, interactive, and nested in one another at different hierarchical (non-linear) levels: they are "mutually inclusive, they coexist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships" (252).

As a basic instance of such an interrelation – specifically, of the nesting of one chronotope inside another – one might take the example with which Bakhtin begins his survey of the history of the chronotope: the Greek romance. In these narratives, as Bakhtin describes, the plot can be reduced to a basic sequence: meeting of lovers – separation of lovers – long sequence of separate adventures (shipwrecks, pirates, kidnapping, false suitors etc) – reuniting and marriage of lovers. In Bakhtin's analysis, the "adventure-time", with all its various chronotopic components – is framed by a completely different kind of "time", that of the biographical world in which the lovers first meet and then at the end – having gone through no kind of biographical development as a result of their long immersion in adventure-time – are reunited:

> The gap [. .] between these two strictly adjacent biographical moments and in which, as it were, the entire novel is constructed is not contained in the biographical time-sequence, it lies outside biographical time; it changes nothing in the life of the heroes, and introduces nothing into their life. It is,

> precisely, an extratemporal hiatus between two moments of biographical time. (Bakhtin 1981, 89-90)

In the terms that I used in Chapter Two, the heroes are vehicles for two different kinds of series, two different temporalities, with one, in this case, framing the other. Running through Bakhtin's analyses is the concept of "temporal sequences": different chronotopes are marked by differences in the kind of temporality they embody – the linear "time" of *the Road*, for example, with its contingency and movement, as against cyclical, settled "time" of *the Idyll*. Each has its own "rhythm".

In the course of his historical survey of the development of different chronotopes in European literature, Bakhtin highlights different ways in which interaction within and between chronotopes produces different kinds of interrelation between temporal sequences. Thus in early forms of the ancient Greek chronotope of *metamorphosis*, according to Bakhtin, we find a harmonious isomorphism between the simultaneous series: in Hesiod's *Works and Days* and his *Theogony* he observes

> a variety of sequences [. .] : a specific genealogical series unfolding, a distinctive sequence of shifts in ages and generations (the myth of the five ages: Golden, Silver, Bronze, "Trojan" or Heroic and Iron), an irreversible theogonic sequence of metamorphosis in nature, including the cyclical series of metamorphosis for grain and an analogical series of metamorphosis in the vine of the grape [. . .] [E]ven the cyclical sequence of everyday agricultural labor is structured, in its own way, like a "metamorphosis of the farmer". (Bakhtin 1981, 113).

In Bakhtin's reading of Apuleius' *The Golden Ass*, by contrast, we find relations more complex than the "vertical" isomorphism of temporalities he finds in Hesiod. Here the cyclical temporal sequence of Lucius' metamorphosis – his punishment by being turned into an ass; his eventual redemption and return to human form at the hands of the goddess Isis – is combined with two others: on the one hand the adventure-time already met with in the romance, and on the other hand the time of everyday

life. Lucius' adventures as an ass preserve some of the outward form of the adventure-time of the romance – in particular, the rhythm of his chance encounters along "the road" – but chance is now subject to the higher teleology of Lucius' transformation:

> Thus we see that the adventure sequence, governed as it is by chance, is here utterly subordinated to the other sequence that encompasses and interprets it: guilt → punishment → redemption → blessedness. This sequence is governed by a completely different logic; one that has nothing to do with adventure logic. (118)

In the case of Bakhtin's discussion of the relation between metamorphosis and the time of everyday life in *The Golden Ass*, we find yet another kind of relation between series. Lucius's metamorphosis takes place not in the context of the cyclical rhythm of the agricultural world (as metamorphosis is situated in Hesiod), but in a context of discontinuous episodes from the "underside" of everyday life – sexual exploits, crimes, beatings etc:

> The separate episodes – and this is especially true of the inserted novellas dealing with everyday life – are rounded-off and complete, but at the same time are isolated and self-sufficient. The everyday world is scattered, fragmented, deprived of essential connections. It is not permeated with a single temporal sequence, which has its own specific systematization and ineluctability. These temporal episodes from everyday life are [. .] arranged [. .] perpendicular to the pivotal axis of the novel, which is the sequence guilt → punishment → redemption → purification → blessedness [. . .] Everyday time is not parallel to this basic axis and not interwoven with it, but separate segments of this time – those parts into which everyday time breaks down – are perpendicular to this basic axis and intersect with it at right angles. (128)

Bakhtin's account of the historical development of chronotopes is permeated by this notion of the concurrence within chronotopes, and within combinations of chronotopes, of different temporal sequences:[133] these give rise to different forms of

[133] See for example his discussion of how, in Dante, the vertical "simultaneity" of the circles of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise are in tension with the historicity of the people who populate them, so that

non-linear relation, as described in the two passages on *The Golden Ass* quoted above. The first of these, describing the relation between metamorphosis and adventure-time in Apuleius' novel, is particularly valuable in the context of this thesis for its congruence with the discussion in Chapter Two subsection 2.3 of how linear series "traverse" non-linear series, assimilating them as "vehicles" as they do so.

I have looked briefly at how cognitive linguistic and Bakhtinian perspectives might contribute to answering the question the scope or amplitude of series across longer narratives. I turn now to the second aspect of the concept of series that I identified as needing to be developed: the analogy with music. For this aspect, too, can help give substance to the notion of a non-linear array of narrative series. In Chapter Two subsection 2.3, the "musicality" of narrative fiction was characterized solely with reference to what I termed a "dynamic gestalt" arising from the concurrence of "segmented" and "holistic" series (in musical terms, the concurrence of "time-span" and "prolongational" reductions in Lerdahl and Jackendoff's model). Here, by contrast, I wish to focus on a basic connection that goes to the heart of the nature of the series: rhythm. Narrative and music, Richard Walsh points out, "are temporal forms not because they persist in time but because they are articulated in time; that is, they give structure to the flux of experience": and it is rhythm that is "our most basic experience of temporal structure" (Walsh 2011, 65).

There is one aspect of rhythm on which I wish to focus here: its recursive potential. Walsh, in the article on the connections between narrative and music cited above, has pointed to the significance for these connections of the fact that "[despite]

"the images and ideas that fill this vertical world are in their turn filled with a powerful desire to escape this world, to set out along the historically productive horizontal, to be distributed not upward, but forward" (157).

the prominence linguists give to recursion as a defining feature of human language, [. .] recursion is not itself linguistic in origin or limited to verbal phenomena, but is also a feature of musical structure, appearing in such elementary musical hierarchies as meter" (Walsh 2011, 54). (The "time-span" reduction in Lerdahl and Jackendoff's model is based on such a recursion.) It is this recursive potential – "the layered, hierarchical quality of our rhythmic sense; more specifically, the capacity for different rhythms to synchronize to a common beat" – that enables the somatic basis of rhythm (heartbeat, breathing, walking etc) to have multiple frames of reference (57).

Here, in the recursive possibilities of rhythm – already hinted at in the discussion of Bakhtin's "temporal sequences" – we have another perspective on the non-linear differentiation of series. Walsh's focus is on how "narrative rhythm" can be thought of as manifested "through the interplay of two conceptual temporal structures – that of the narration and that of the narrated events" (58). The model of multiple series presented in Chapter Two – along with the developments of it along Bakhtinian and cognitive linguistic lines proposed above – would suggest that this conception of narrative rhythm can be given wider scope than the relation just of these two series. Ironically, an excellent illustration of this is to be found in the theorist most routinely associated with the story/discourse distinction – Genette.

Arguably the most striking and memorable chapter of *Narrative Discourse* – the part where Genette seems to come closest to the essence of his conception of Proustian style and psychology – is that dealing with "Frequency" (Genette 1980, 113-60). "Narrative frequency" Genette defines at the outset of the chapter as "the relations of frequency (or, more simply, of repetition) between the narrative and the diegesis" (113), but what is striking is how, the further Genette advances into the

labyrinth of Proustian temporality, the more this original relation is left behind. For the most important temporal relation in Proust, it becomes clear, is not the theoretical, narratological one between narrating discourse and narrated story, but that between what Genette terms the "singulative" (that is, the narrating of something that happened just once) and the "iterative" (the narrating of something that happened habitually, on a number of occasions).

It is possible here only to illustrate Proust's protean ramifications of this simple distinction, as they are revealed by Genette's intricate analysis. The important point for our present purposes is that these ramifications involve differentiations through various forms of recursion. Within iterative series, for example, there are divisions into sub-series by specifications of the type *sometimes . . . on other occasions*, with each of these specifications subject to further internal sub-division (133-39). Genette explicitly refers to Chomsky in the context of these "'immanent' temporal structures" that constitute "[t]he complete iterative system". And, like Lerdahl and Jackendoff in their analyses of the temporal structure of music, he uses tree diagrams to reveal "under the apparently even continuity of the text, a more complex and more entangled hierarchical structure" (137).

In "classical narrative" up to and including Balzac, Genette points out, the function of the iterative had been to "provide a sort of informative frame or background" for the singulative – reflecting the affinities between the iterative and description (117). But Proust's "intoxication with the iterative" produces much more complex forms of embedding than this classical relation, such as "the iterative section with a descriptive or explanatory function subordinated to (and generally inserted within) a singulative scene (example, the *wit of the Guermantes* in the dinner at Oriane's)," or "the singulative scene with an illustrative function

subordinated to an iterative development (example, the *steeples of Martinville*, in the series of walks to the Guermantes)" (143). Then again, the singulative may serve the function of articulating a diachronic alteration within an iterative series:

> [T]he love between Swann and Odette, between Marcel and Gilberte, will develop to some extent by iterative plateaux, marked by a very characteristic use of those *thenceforth's*, *since's*, *now's*, which treat every story not as a train of events bound by a causality, but as a *succession of states* ceaselessly substituted for each other [. . .] (142)

Or the structures may be more complex still, as "when [. .] a singular anecdote illustrates an iterative development that is itself subordinated to a singulative scene [. .] or inversely, when a singulative scene subordinated to an iterative section calls up in its turn an iterative parenthesis" (143). Sometimes the interaction between iterative and singulative can become so involved that "the relationship eludes all analysis", giving rise to "the impression – a rather disconcerting one – of *floating*" (151). We have moved a long way from the simple relation "between the narrative and the diegesis" with which the chapter began.

I enumerate these examples from Genette to establish the importance of various forms of recursive embedding – as we have already seen in Bakhtin's account of the relationship between temporal sequences in chronotopes. It is this recursion, with the endless ramifications that it offers, that makes possible the constitution of what Genette calls a "temporal structure". And it is here that the connection with the recursive potential in rhythm, highlighted by Walsh, becomes important. Genette's/Proust's "iterative" and "singulative" series, like Bakhtin's "temporal sequences", represent the rhythm of the characters' lives not only informationally but also *iconically*: this iconicity is not at the "surface" level (in the "rhythm of the prose", for example), but is rather to be located in the recursive relationships that

establish a non-linear temporal space and make possible the kind of non-linear systematicity that I proposed in Chapter Two.

It is along these lines – in the analysis of how recursive, "non-linear" differentiations are made between different kinds of "rhythmic" series – that the "musicality" of the narrative text is to be discovered. Such a research project, as I have indicated, would have as one of its principal challenges a synthesization of the bottom-up cognitive approach with the top-down approach of narrative theorists such as Bakhtin and Genette. But as I indicated at the end of Chapter Two, this description and analysis of a ("musical") systematicity represents a third-person perspective, to which can be counterpoised the phenomenological series of "Disclosure" that is the subject of Chapter Three. Genette notes in *Narrative Discourse* that Proust is sparing in his use of the kind of linguistic devices for representing levels of consciousness that I discussed in Chapter Three (Genette 1980, 173-81). Instead, perhaps, in Proust we find the involutions of inside and outside characteristic of "disclosure" within memory, in the dynamic interrelation of the iterative and singulative – as when, in the case of an iterative passage embedded in a singulative scene, "the temporal field covered by the iterative section [. .] extends well beyond the temporal field of the scene it is inserted into": in these cases, "the iterative to some extent opens a window onto the external period" (118). At the same time (only from a simultaneous third-person perspective), this phenomenological process of disclosure can itself be re-described as another series, subject to the contexture of which it is part. It is indeed the case, as Genette observes in the course of his analysis of temporality in Proust, that "the conditions of existence [. .] of the text" are to be found "not [. .] by reducing the complex to the simple, but on the

contrary by revealing the hidden complexities that are the *secret* of the simplicity" (137-38).

APPENDIX

"The Picture in the House"
H. P. Lovecraft (1999 [1921], 34-42)

Searchers after horror haunt strange, far places. For them are the catacombs of Ptolemais, and the carven mausolea of the nightmare countries. They climb to the moonlit towers of ruined Rhine castles, and falter down black cobwebbed steps beneath the scattered stones of forgotten cities in Asia. The haunted wood and the desolate mountain are their shrines, and they linger around the sinister monoliths on uninhabited islands. But the true epicure in the terrible, to whom a new thrill of unutterable ghastliness is the chief end and justification of existence, esteems most of all the ancient, lonely farmhouses of backwoods New England; for there the dark elements of strength, solitude, grotesqueness, and ignorance combine to form the perfection of the hideous.

Most horrible of all sights are the little unpainted wooden houses remote from travelled ways, usually squatted upon some damp, grassy slope or leaning against some gigantic outcropping of rock. Two hundred years and more they have leaned or squatted there, while the vines have crawled and the trees have swelled and spread. They are almost hidden now in lawless luxuriances of green and guardian shrouds of shadow; but the small-paned windows still stare shockingly, as if blinking through a lethal stupor which wards off madness by dulling the memory of unutterable things.

In such houses have dwelt generations of strange people, whose like the world has never seen. Seized with a gloomy and fanatical belief which exiled them from their kind, their ancestors sought the wilderness for freedom. There the scions of a conquering race indeed flourished free from the restrictions of their fellows, but cowered in an appalling slavery to the dismal phantasms of their own minds. Divorced from the enlightenment of civilisation, the strength of these Puritans turned into singular channels; and in their isolation, morbid self-repression, and struggle for life with relentless Nature, there came to them dark furtive traits from the prehistoric depths of their cold Northern heritage. By necessity practical and by philosophy stern, these folk were not beautiful in their sins. Erring as all

mortals must, they were forced by their rigid code to seek concealment above all else; so that they came to use less and less taste in what they concealed. Only the silent, sleepy, staring houses in the backwoods can tell all that has lain hidden since the early days; and they are not communicative, being loath to shake off the drowsiness which helps them forget. Sometimes one feels that it would be merciful to tear down these houses, for they must often dream.

It was to a time-battered edifice of this description that I was driven one afternoon in November, 1896, by a rain of such chilling copiousness that any shelter was preferable to exposure. I had been travelling for some time amongst the people of the Miskatonic Valley in quest of certain genealogical data; and from the remote, devious, and problematical nature of my course, had deemed it convenient to employ a bicycle despite the lateness of the season. Now I found myself upon an apparently abandoned road which I had chosen as the shortest cut to Arkham; overtaken by the storm at a point far from any town, and confronted with no refuge save the antique and repellent wooden building which blinked with bleared windows from between two huge leafless elms near the foot of a rocky hill. Distant though it was from the remnant of a road, the house none the less impressed me unfavourably the very moment I espied it. Honest, wholesome structures do not stare at travellers so slyly and hauntingly, and in my genealogical researches I had encountered legends of a century before which biassed me against places of this kind. Yet the force of the elements was such as to overcome my scruples, and I did not hesitate to wheel my machine up the weedy rise to the closed door which seemed at once so suggestive and secretive.

I had somehow taken it for granted that the house was abandoned, yet as I approached it I was not so sure; for though the walks were indeed overgrown with weeds, they seemed to retain their nature a little too well to argue complete desertion. Therefore instead of trying the door I knocked, feeling as I did so a trepidation I could scarcely explain. As I waited on the rough, mossy rock which served as a doorstep, I glanced at the neighbouring windows and the panes of the transom above me, and noticed that although old, rattling, and almost opaque with dirt, they were not broken. The building, then, must still be inhabited, despite its isolation and general neglect. However, my rapping evoked no response, so after repeating the summons I tried the rusty latch and found the door

unfastened. Inside was a little vestibule with walls from which the plaster was falling, and through the doorway came a faint but peculiarly hateful odour. I entered, carrying my bicycle, and closed the door behind me. Ahead rose a narrow staircase, flanked by a small door probably leading to the cellar, while to the left and right were closed doors leading to rooms on the ground floor.

Leaning my cycle against the wall I opened the door at the left, and crossed into a small low-ceiled chamber but dimly lighted by its two dusty windows and furnished in the barest and most primitive possible way. It appeared to be a kind of sitting-room, for it had a table and several chairs, and an immense fireplace above which ticked an antique clock on a mantel. Books and papers were very few, and in the prevailing gloom I could not readily discern the titles. What interested me was the uniform air of archaism as displayed in every visible detail. Most of the houses in this region I had found rich in relics of the past, but here the antiquity was curiously complete; for in all the room I could not discover a single article of definitely post-revolutionary date. Had the furnishings been less humble, the place would have been a collector's paradise.

As I surveyed this quaint apartment, I felt an increase in that aversion first excited by the bleak exterior of the house. Just what it was that I feared or loathed, I could by no means define; but something in the whole atmosphere seemed redolent of unhallowed age, of unpleasant crudeness, and of secrets which should be forgotten. I felt disinclined to sit down, and wandered about examining the various articles which I had noticed. The first object of my curiosity was a book of medium size lying upon the table and presenting such an antediluvian aspect that I marvelled at beholding it outside a museum or library. It was bound in leather with metal fittings, and was in an excellent state of preservation; being altogether an unusual sort of volume to encounter in an abode so lowly. When I opened it to the title page my wonder grew even greater, for it proved to be nothing less rare than Pigafetta's account of the Congo region, written in Latin from the notes of the sailor Lopez and printed at Frankfort in 1598. I had often heard of this work, with its curious illustrations by the brothers De Bry, hence for a moment forgot my uneasiness in my desire to turn the pages before me. The engravings were indeed interesting, drawn wholly from imagination and careless descriptions, and represented negroes with white skins and Caucasian features; nor would I soon

have closed the book had not an exceedingly trivial circumstance upset my tired nerves and revived my sensation of disquiet. What annoyed me was merely the persistent way in which the volume tended to fall open of itself at Plate XII, which represented in gruesome detail a butcher's shop of the cannibal Anziques. I experienced some shame at my susceptibility to so slight a thing, but the drawing nevertheless disturbed me, especially in connexion with some adjacent passages descriptive of Anzique gastronomy.

I had turned to a neighbouring shelf and was examining its meagre literary contents—an eighteenth-century Bible, a *Pilgrim's Progress* of like period, illustrated with grotesque woodcuts and printed by the almanack-maker Isaiah Thomas, the rotting bulk of Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana,* and a few other books of evidently equal age—when my attention was aroused by the unmistakable sound of walking in the room overhead. At first astonished and startled, considering the lack of response to my recent knocking at the door, I immediately afterward concluded that the walker had just awakened from a sound sleep; and listened with less surprise as the footsteps sounded on the creaking stairs. The tread was heavy, yet seemed to contain a curious quality of cautiousness; a quality which I disliked the more because the tread was heavy. When I had entered the room I had shut the door behind me. Now, after a moment of silence during which the walker may have been inspecting my bicycle in the hall, I heard a fumbling at the latch and saw the panelled portal swing open again.

In the doorway stood a person of such singular appearance that I should have exclaimed aloud but for the restraints of good breeding. Old, white-bearded, and ragged, my host possessed a countenance and physique which inspired equal wonder and respect. His height could not have been less than six feet, and despite a general air of age and poverty he was stout and powerful in proportion. His face, almost hidden by a long beard which grew high on the cheeks, seemed abnormally ruddy and less wrinkled than one might expect; while over a high forehead fell a shock of white hair little thinned by the years. His blue eyes, though a trifle bloodshot, seemed inexplicably keen and burning. But for his horrible unkemptness the man would have been as distinguished-looking as he was impressive. This unkemptness, however, made him offensive despite his face and

figure. Of what his clothing consisted I could hardly tell, for it seemed to me no more than a mass of tatters surmounting a pair of high, heavy boots; and his lack of cleanliness surpassed description.

The appearance of this man, and the instinctive fear he inspired, prepared me for something like enmity; so that I almost shuddered through surprise and a sense of uncanny incongruity when he motioned me to a chair and addressed me in a thin, weak voice full of fawning respect and ingratiating hospitality. His speech was very curious, an extreme form of Yankee dialect I had thought long extinct; and I studied it closely as he sat down opposite me for conversation.

"Ketched in the rain, be ye?" he greeted. "Glad ye was nigh the haouse en' hed the sense ta come right in. I calc'late I was asleep, else I'd a heerd ye—I ain't as young as I uster be, an' I need a paowerful sight o' naps naowadays. Trav'lin' fur? I hain't seed many folks 'long this rud sence they tuk off the Arkham stage."

I replied that I was going to Arkham, and apologised for my rude entry into his domicile, whereupon he continued.

"Glad ta see ye, young Sir—new faces is scurce arount here, an' I hain't got much ta cheer me up these days. Guess yew hail from Bosting, don't ye? I never ben thar, but I kin tell a taown man when I see 'im—we hed one fer deestrick schoolmaster in 'eighty-four, but he quit suddent an' no one never heerd on 'im sence—" Here the old man lapsed into a kind of chuckle, and made no explanation when I questioned him. He seemed to be in an aboundingly good humour, yet to possess those eccentricities which one might guess from his grooming. For some time he rambled on with an almost feverish geniality, when it struck me to ask him how he came by so rare a book as Pigafetta's *Regnum Congo*. The effect of this volume had not left me, and I felt a certain hesitancy in speaking of it; but curiosity overmastered all the vague fears which had steadily accumulated since my first glimpse of the house. To my relief, the question did not seem an awkward one; for the old man answered freely and volubly.

"Oh, thet Afriky book? Cap'n Ebenezer Holt traded me thet in 'sixty-eight—him as was kilt in the war." Something about the name of Ebenezer Holt caused me to look up sharply. I had encountered it in my genealogical work, but not in any record since the Revolution. I wondered if my host could help me in the task at which I was labouring, and resolved to ask him about it later on. He continued.

"Ebenezer was on a Salem merchantman for years, an' picked up a sight o' queer stuff in every port. He got this in London, I guess—he uster like ter buy things at the shops. I was up ta his haouse onct, on the hill, tradin' hosses, when I see this book. I relished the picters, so he give it in on a swap. 'Tis a queer book—here, leave me git on my spectacles—" The old man fumbled among his rags, producing a pair of dirty and amazingly antique glasses with small octagonal lenses and steel bows. Donning these, he reached for the volume on the table and turned the pages lovingly.

"Ebenezer cud read a leetle o' this—'tis Latin—but I can't. I hed two er three schoolmasters read me a bit, and Passon Clark, him they say got draownded in the pond—kin yew make anything outen it?" I told him that I could, and translated for his benefit a paragraph near the beginning. If I erred, he was not scholar enough to correct me; for he seemed childishly pleased at my English version. His proximity was becoming rather obnoxious, yet I saw no way to escape without offending him. I was amused at the childish fondness of this ignorant old man for the pictures in a book he could not read, and wondered how much better he could read the few books in English which adorned the room. This revelation of simplicity removed much of the ill-defined apprehension I had felt, and I smiled as my host rambled on:

"Queer haow picters kin set a body thinkin'. Take this un here near the front. Hev yew ever seed trees like thet, with big leaves a-floppin' over an' daown? And them men—them can't be niggers—they dew beat all. Kinder like Injuns, I guess, even ef they be in Afriky. Some o' these here critters looks like monkeys, or half monkeys an' half men, but I never heerd o' nothing like this un." Here he pointed to a fabulous creature of the artist, which one might describe as a sort of dragon with the head of an alligator.

"But naow I'll shew ye the best un—over here nigh the middle—" The old man's speech grew a trifle thicker and his eyes assumed a brighter glow; but his fumbling hands, though seemingly clumsier than before, were entirely adequate to their mission. The book fell open, almost of its own accord and as if from frequent consultation at this place, to the repellent twelfth plate shewing a butcher's shop amongst the Anzique cannibals. My sense of restlessness returned, though I did not exhibit it. The especially bizarre thing was that the artist had made his

Africans look like white men—the limbs and quarters hanging about the walls of the shop were ghastly, while the butcher with his axe was hideously incongruous. But my host seemed to relish the view as much as I disliked it.

"What d'ye think o' this—ain't never see the like hereabouts, eh? When I see this I telled Eb Holt, 'That's suthin' ta stir ye up an' make yer blood tickle!' When I read in Scripter about slayin'—like them Midianites was slew—I kinder think things, but I ain't got no picter of it. Here a body kin see all they is to it—I s'pose 'tis sinful, but ain't we all born an' livin' in sin?—Thet feller bein' chopped up gives me a tickle every time I look at 'im—I hev ta keep lookin' at 'im—see whar the butcher cut off his feet? Thar's his head on thet bench, with one arm side of it, an' t'other arm's on the graound side o' the meat block."

As the man mumbled on in his shocking ecstasy the expression on his hairy, spectacled face became indescribable, but his voice sank rather than mounted. My own sensations can scarcely be recorded. All the terror I had dimly felt before rushed upon me actively and vividly, and I knew that I loathed the ancient and abhorrent creature so near me with an infinite intensity. His madness, or at least his partial perversion, seemed beyond dispute. He was almost whispering now, with a huskiness more terrible than a scream, and I trembled as I listened.

"As I says, 'tis queer haow picters sets ye thinkin'. D'ye know, young Sir, I'm right sot on this un here. Arter I got the book off Eb I uster look at it a lot, especial when I'd heerd Passon Clark rant o' Sundays in his big wig. Onct I tried suthin' funny—here, young Sir, don't git skeert—all I done was ter look at the picter afore I kilt the sheep for market—killin' sheep was kinder more fun arter lookin' at it—" The tone of the old man now sank very low, sometimes becoming so faint that his words were hardly audible. I listened to the rain, and to the rattling of the bleared, small-paned windows, and marked a rumbling of approaching thunder quite unusual for the season. Once a terrific flash and peal shook the frail house to its foundations, but the whisperer seemed not to notice it.

"Killin' sheep was kinder more fun—but d'ye know, 'twan't quite *satisfyin'*. Queer haow a *cravin'* gits a holt on ye— As ye love the Almighty, young man, don't tell nobody, but I swar ter Gawd thet picter begun ta make me *hungry fer victuals I couldn't raise nor buy*—here, set still, what's ailin' ye?—I didn't do nothin', only I wondered haow 'twud be ef I *did*— They say meat makes blood an' flesh, an' gives

ye new life, so I wondered ef 'twudn't make a man live longer an' longer ef 'twas *more the same—*" But the whisperer never continued. The interruption was not produced by my fright, nor by the rapidly increasing storm amidst whose fury I was presently to open my eyes on a smoky solitude of blackened ruins. It was produced by a very simple though somewhat unusual happening.

The open book lay flat between us, with the picture staring repulsively upward. As the old man whispered the words *"more the same"* a tiny spattering impact was heard, and something shewed on the yellowed paper of the upturned volume. I thought of the rain and of a leaky roof, but rain is not red. On the butcher's shop of the Anzique cannibals a small red spattering glistened picturesquely, lending vividness to the horror of the engraving. The old man saw it, and stopped whispering even before my expression of horror made it necessary; saw it and glanced quickly toward the floor of the room he had left an hour before. I followed his glance, and beheld just above us on the loose plaster of the ancient ceiling a large irregular spot of wet crimson which seemed to spread even as I viewed it. I did not shriek or move, but merely shut my eyes. A moment later came the titanic thunderbolt of thunderbolts; blasting that accursed house of unutterable secrets and bringing the oblivion which alone saved my mind.

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